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Vol. 14 No. 1 March 1986

NAVJIVAN RASTOGI / Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta	1
RUPERT GETHIN / The Five Khandhas: Their Treatment in the Nikāyas and Early Abhidhamma	35
RODNEY J. PARROT / The Problem of The Sāṃkhya Tattvas as both Cosmic and Psychological Phenomena	55
ELI FRANCO / Once Again on Dharmakīrti's Deviation from Dignāga on Pratyakṣābhāsa	79
Book Review Steven Collins, <i>Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism</i> (PRABAL SEN)	99
Announcement	107

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JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 14 No. 2 June 1986

GADĀDHARA BHATṬĀCĀRYA / Viśayatāvāda	109
N. E. SJOMAN / The Memory Eye: An Examination of Memory in Traditional Knowledge Systems	195
Announcement	215

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Vol. 14 No. 3 September 1986

GADĀDHARA BHATṬĀCĀRYA / Viṣayatāvāda (Continued
from Vol. 14, No. 2)

217

Book Reviews

The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki, *An Epic of Ancient India*,
Volume I, Bālakāṇḍa (J. L. BROCKINGTON)

303

John Vattanky, *Gaṅgeśa's Philosophy of God* (KARL
H. POTTER)

309

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JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 14 No. 4 December 1986

WILLIAM L. AMES / Buddhapālita's Exposition of the Madhyamaka	313
ROBERT P. GOLDMAN / The Serpent and the Rope on Stage: Popular, Literary, and Philosophical Representations of Reality in Traditional India	349
YOSHITSUGU SAWAI / Śaṅkara's Theory of Samnyāsa	371
PHYLLIS GRANOFF / The Miracle of a Hagiography Without Miracles: Some Comments on the Jain Lives of the Pratyekabuddha Karakaṇḍa	389
Book Review: Gopikamohan Bhattacharya (ed.), <i>Yajñapati Upādhyāya's Tattvacintāmaṇiprabhā (Anumānakhaṇḍah)</i> (KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA)	405

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THEORY ¹ OF ERROR ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA ²

The discussion of the problem of error represents an important facet of Indian Philosophy. It has been inspired by a basic concern for complete freedom, a concern to elucidate the nature of false knowledge and how it could be removed. The present paper confines itself to the Abhinavan answer to the problem. We propose to state the major premises of his thesis before we come to take a close and detailed look into it.

Abhinavagupta's main interest seems to be evolving a model in whose terms all possible analyses of error may be classified.

Abhinava shares the general consensus among the Indian philosophers that the test of validity of knowledge is its uncontradictedness. The Śaiva view is known as Akhyāti, an abbreviation of Apūrṇakhyāti, which means imperfect knowledge. Thus the Abhinavan theory of error is a corollary of the Śaiva metaphysics of ignorance — e.g., ignorance is imperfection brought about by the obscuration of one's real nature, which is a synthesis of knowledge and freedom, through its own integral dynamism. Abhinava talks of three kinds of ignorance — (i) cosmic or metaphysical, (ii) empirical and (iii) epistemic or subjective. It is the third type which we are concerned with. The important thing to be noted in this connection is that the metaphysical error was deliberately modelled after the epistemic error i.e., common illusion.

In answer to the question, "what is an error", Abhinava appears to hold that an error is incomplete knowledge which is incidental to the fact that the object does not continue to figure in as perfect form as it should upto the time of a final judgement. Incompleteness is a qualitative concept which consists in the lack of correspondence between objective content and its cognitive ascertainment. There are two explanations in respect of this incompleteness — e.g.,

(i) Incomplete cognition of a locus is responsible for erroneous cognition of its content.

(ii) Want of exposure to other percipients renders it a privative, hence incomplete, judgment.

To the second question, "how is the error caused", Abhinava's answer may be summed up as follows:

(i) The equation among the components of an erroneous situation is:

illusory content = silver = Uparañjaka

locus = nacre = Uparañjya

unification = Melana = This is silver = Uparāga.

(ii) Falsity is caused by rest on an other locus than one's own, because the Adhikaraṇa (locus) lets itself be inadequately grasped.

(iii) Error consists in the incorrect unification of objective components (brightness of silver mistaken for that of silver).

(iv) Lack of contemporaneity in the different objective constituents leads to disorder in unification.

(v) Self-consciousness which witnesses both the illusion and its corrective cancellation is the constant factor.

(vi) It is subjective (mis-)unification that leads to the private character of illusion occasionally aided by sensory and environmental defects and the like.

In this connection certain incidental issues are subjected to close examination. Accordingly, by an incisive analysis of Ābhāsavāda and its application to the phenomenon of error an attempt is made to show that —

(a) Unification is nothing but linking of constituent Ābhāsa to the principal Ābhāsa.

(b) Not all, but only those Ābhāsa that are not mutually opposed, get united due to the law (power) of determination which is a Śaivist transformation of the Buddhist Apohavāda.

(c) Erroneous judgement is a synthetic judgement and depends upon the reversal of recognitive unification. 'Ubhayamelanātmaka-prakriyā' is not exclusive to the recognitive knowledge alone, but is a necessary corollary of the concept of Ābhāsa being applied to the field of epistemology.

(d) Silver alone, to the exclusion of others, is seen in nacre because of similarity of brilliance. 'Silver' is a representative element, while 'this' (nacre) is a presentative.

(e) A judgement forfeits its right to make a truth claim if there is disagreement between the perceptive content and determinate judgement. This is again a corollary of the process of unification.

(f) Due to transposed unification a logical fallacy called Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha (lit. the fallacy of disproved substratum) takes place in the erroneous cognition.

In respect of the discovery of error four questions have been raised — (1) How is the error discovered and cancelled? (2) What is the object of cancellation? (3) What is the result of cancellation? and (4) Is cancellation a negative function?

All the questions have been taken up together.

Correction is relative to immediate past experience, it is not an absolute negation.

Cancellation is always addressed to the aspect of unification (Melanāṁśa) because it is the precise point of error. The essence of cancellation lies not only in breaking the continuity but also in ensuring that the existing judgement should not have arisen at all.

Cancellation as absolute negation does not fit in with the wholistic absolutism of the Abhinavan metaphysics. Negation, therefore, must be construed in terms of the affirmation of something. The relation of existence of one thing with the absence of another is the same as that of two things standing in relation of a locus and its content. It is, therefore, not the nacre-as-such, but the nacre-as-qualified-by-the-absence-of-silver that requires corrective perception.

Cancellation is called a real subjective construction in the sense that the knowledge of nacre or non-silver by itself is ineffective unless the two are mutually coordinated by a dependence relation of negation, providing them a subjective berth in the form of a single knower.

From the foregoing discussion the following equation may be formulated: —

Contrary	=	Subsequent cognition	=	This is nacre/ This is not silver.
Object of negation	=	Element of Unification	=	Silver(-in nacre)
Negation	=	Break in the continuity of of current judgement.	=	There has been no silver.
Correction	=	(a) Restoration of identity of Vimarśa with Prakāśa	=	(a) This is nacre which was seen as silver.
		(b) Restoration of the capability of being perceived by others	=	(b) This is nacre.

The next question that interests us is to find out the nature and ontological status of the illusory object.

The Abhinavan position approximates the third of the three "standard" positions.

Although Abhinava is a staunch absolutist he advocates adherence to a Bhedābheda (unity in multiplicity) position at the empirical level which is the main concern of epistemology.

It appears that Abhinava makes a distinction between real and empirical (or actual) on the one hand, and between object and content on the other. The content may be 'real' but not 'empirical'; while 'serving the purposes' may be the criterion of empiricity, and 'figuring in cognition' that of reality. On this criterion the content is real.

In answer to the question whether an erroneous perception is a simple judgement of a complex one, Abhinava says that one cannot lay down the absolute rule that illusion will always stem from determinate perception alone. As such it would be a complex judgement. But he later on modifies his stand to the effect that error is a determinate judgement as it involves the functions of synthesis and analysis.

To sum up. There is ample evidence to show that Abhinava wanted to develop Apūrṇakhyāti as a comprehensive model for all the theories of error. However, in respect of the theories mentioned by him, he has used a nomenclature different from the usual one to reflect his understanding of these theories. It is no doubt surprising that he nowhere refers to Prabhākara's theory of error called Akhyātivāda. Due to apparent similarity of names some scholars have tended to confuse Abhinava's Akhyāti with Prabhākara's. However, with the scanty nature of our information and paucity of material the problem is left for future study.

As Potter rightly points out,³ the basic concern of a seeker after truth is to convince himself that erroneous cognition can be dispelled for good so that complete freedom may be permanently realized. It is in this context that the Indian philosopher raises the question of the nature of false knowledge and the question of whether and how it can be removed. The various theories of error and negation provide answers, offered by different thinkers, to these questions.

Although all these answers are at times very illuminating and fascinating, we propose to confine this paper to the analysis of the answer offered by

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ignorance.¹⁴ The same term Akhyāti has been used to designate cosmic ignorance.¹⁵ Knowledge or integral consciousness is the nature of the self which is a harmony of being and becoming, knowledge and freedom. Ignorance is imperfection¹⁶ brought about by the obscuration of either aspect of the self through its own integral dynamism. This is known as *Āṇavamala* (atomic impurity),¹⁷ loss (i.e., concealment) of intrinsic absolutism.¹⁸ This is known as imperfect consciousness, *Apūrṇamanyatā*.¹⁹ This is cosmic ignorance and is responsible for the emergence of the creative order. Self-alienation (*Aphana* or *Vikalpa*) and finitude (*Saṃkoca*) characterize it. The Kashmir Śaivism advises recourse to spiritual initiation (*Śiva-dikṣā*) to get rid of this ignorance. Next follows another kind of ignorance – intellectual ignorance (*Bauddha Ajñāna*).²⁰ While the first sort of ignorance affects the cosmic being, the second conditions the intrinsic thought-mechanism which invariably leads either to non-ascertainment or to contrary ascertainment. It consists in not recognizing the self at all, or treating the not-self as self and self as not self. This is empirical ignorance. The system propounds four *Upāyas* marked by the gradual refinement of thought-constructs (*Vikalpas*) to steer clear through this phase. We are now in a position to describe the first stage as cosmic or metaphysical error, the second as empirical error and the third as epistemic or subjective error which consists in incomplete or inadequate apprehension of the object.

Abhinavagupta while projecting the logical continuity and, in a sense, the progression of the different sorts of error has also underlined their mutual distinction by dividing them into two groups. The first two are portrayed as great illusions (*Mahābhrānti*) and the third as simple illusion²¹ (*Bhrānti*). The first is universal error, error common to or involving all subjects; the second is individual error, error confined to individual subjects in their determinate reactions to empirical objectivity; the third is epistemic error, error which forms an extraordinary subjective experience.²² It is this third form of error that is our main subject of discussion. The task is especially worthwhile because metaphysical ignorance is deliberately modelled after common illusions.²³ This attitude finds a close parallel in the Advaita Vedānta, and in the *Yogācāra* and *Mādhyamika* Buddhism which approach the problem in the same spirit.

To tackle the first question first, "What is an error?" The same question can be differently posed – "What is the essence of an illusion?"

The phenomenon of illusion is a datum of our experience and has been

variously styled as Bhrānti, Bhrama, Viparyaya, Viparīta Jñāna, Akhyāti and, of course, Adhyāsa or Mithyā Jñāna by the celebrated Śaṅkara. Essentially they all designate the same thing, that phase of experience which turns out to be invalid on cancellation or correction by a later experience. The *Saptapadārthī* explains Bhrama as the reverse (Viparyaya) of valid knowledge (Pramā).²⁴ It is Atattvānubhava as against Tattvānubhava. The *Nyāya-vārtika* describes it as wrong apprehension (Mithyopalabdhi) in which an object is taken for what it is not.²⁵ Viparyaya consists in cognizing an object as other than what it really is. If valid knowledge lies in knowing the object as it is, Viparyaya lies in doing just the opposite i.e., in knowing the object as what it is not.²⁶ The *Vedāntasāra*²⁷ and Kumārila²⁸ echo the same view. Error takes place when a thing is comprehended as something which it is not. In other words, error consists in attributing such characteristics to an object of perception as are not actually found in it.²⁹ It is called Viparītanirṇaya as it contradicts the real nature of its object and, as such, turns out to be a false judgement about the object through attribution of such qualities as are precluded by it (Viparītadharmādhyaṛopaṇa). It amounts to saying that illusion or error represents an object in a form which does not belong to it. Śaṅkara by using the term Adhyāsa enlarges the scope of attribution. Two other words Adhyāropa³⁰ (superimposition) and Avabhāsa³¹ (appearance) have also been used to convey the same meaning. Adhyāsa is nothing but the apprehension of something as something else.³² This something is both objective and cognitive. Thus the illusion consists in apprehending an object as being other than it, either by ascribing one thing to another (such as taking a rope for a snake) or ascribing the attribute of one thing to another (such as perceiving a white conch as yellow). In both these ascriptions³³ the superimposition of the cognition of one object inheres in the other object. Unless one is swayed by scholastic biases the element of superimposition (Adhyāropa) or attribution (Āropa) necessarily implies a reference to a substratum or locus (Adhiṣṭhāna, Adhikaraṇa, Ādhāra) of the object of erroneous cognition. In it one object (or universal, if we borrow the term from the Nyāya, silverness — Rajatattva for example) is referred not to its own locus (silver) but to that of different object (or universal, so to say nacre — Śukti³⁴).

In all the three accounts there is agreement that an error is a 'false apprehension of the object' by negation of its real identity or by predication of attributes it does not possess to it. It arises in the wake of our relating,

confusing, or failing to differentiate two or more cognitive objects which happen to be unrelated in actual life. We realize our error when a gap is discovered between our cognition and activity inspired by it. This is what is known as contradiction, negation, sublation or correction. It exposes the absence of a correspondence between the content of a judgement and the objective world and thereby proves the invalidity of such experiences.

Coming to the Kashmir Śaivism, if we go by the definition of valid cognition mentioned earlier, the essence of an error lies in its being subsequently contradicted. If asked what type of knowledge is open to being contradicted, or better, corrected, the pet reply of the Śaivite is: one which is incomplete. No precise explanation of the notion of 'incomplete knowledge' seems to be available. Only once,³⁵ in a parenthesis, does Abhinavagupta afford us a clue to his understanding of incompleteness. He presents the phenomenon of error as proceeding from lack of such complete comprehension as is adequate and efficient in the circumstances. Probably he means to say that the twin characteristics of adequacy and efficiency are the *sine qua non* of any definition of completeness.

Abhinavagupta probably proceeds with the assumption that we all are well briefed on his position. A cryptic remark made by him, however, appears to hold the key to his understanding of error as incomplete knowledge which is incidental to the fact that the object does not continue to figure in as perfect form as it should upto the time of judgement.³⁶ According to Bhāskara, Abhinava's commentator, such incomplete knowledge is found in instances like the perception of silver in a piece of nacre.³⁷ But how the cognition of nacre as silver constitutes incomplete knowledge has not been explained. Abhinava is also silent about the complete form (Pūrṇarūpatā) of an object. Nevertheless, in fairness to Abhinavagupta, it must be said that incompleteness (Apūrṇatā) is not a mere quantitative concept, it seems to have acquired a qualitative connotation as well, as if Abhinava subscribed to the dictum of Marx and Engels that at a given stage quantity is transformed into quality and vice-versa.³⁸ Hence, if we reconsider Abhinava's remark, cited above, we shall learn that he holds that completeness consists in the final evaluation of an object. In other words, the object must continue to figure uninterruptedly in our determinate judgement. But the negative discovery that it is not silver but nacre interrupts the continuous flow of our previous cognition with regard to the object i.e., silver. Therefore, completeness consists in correspondence or dialogue between an objective content and its cognitive ascertainment. The

absence of such correspondence would disrupt the continuity of cognition and render the object incomplete.³⁹

There have been two types of explanation in respect of this lack of correspondence. According to the first explanation when one notices silver at the sight of nacre, the silver in fact does not exist there because the substrata of the two cognitions (e.g., silver- and nacre-cognitions) are found to be different (silver and nacre respectively).⁴⁰ On a closer logical analysis we find that the incomplete cognition of one locus is responsible for the erroneous cognition of its borrowed content.⁴¹ This position is surprisingly close to the Naiyāyika's. It predicates silverness which is a quality of a thing (silver) to something else (nacre) where it does not exist.⁴²

According to the second explanation Abhinavagupta refers to the common perceptibility of the objective content of cognition, the absence of which is liable to keep our knowledge incomplete. The cognition of an empirical whole must be open to all eligible perceivers in order to justify its identity as an object.⁴³ The moment its doors are closed, it suffers from privation and degenerates into an error and thereby any judgement about it becomes a partial judgement. It is the reference to this lack of common perceptibility which lies at the root of the non-existence of an illusory object in its locus and the falsity of the relevant judgement.⁴⁴ But as we shall see later, the word *Apūrṇa* does not connote the Śaiva attitude fully, because the phenomenon of illusion is not a simple act of omission. It is not that we visualize a particular aspect of the object and overlook or miss another. Instead, we add something to the object. It is not that we simply miss something of nacre itself but that we also bring something of silver to it. It is in this sense that one finds the word 'incomplete' deficient in connotation. We propose to look into this further as we move on to the next issue.

The next question that crops up is — "How is an error possible?" To put it differently, one may ask — "How is error caused?"

Broadly speaking⁴⁵ Indian thought seems to offer two alternatives. According to one alternative a cognitive experience is erroneous by its very nature. The *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra* Buddhists must be mentioned here. For them epistemic error is imply a logical extension of metaphysical error. Others believe that knowledge is valid or capable of being valid if certain conditions are fulfilled. They thereby simply that it is likely to be erroneous under characteristic conditions. Most of the Indian schools, especially realists, subscribe to this view holding that these characteristic circumstances normally

occupy the domain outside our knowledge. There is, however, a third position, if one can call it that, which accepts the intrinsic validity of knowledge and yet holds that causes of error are its own creations by granting empirical reality to them. This last option represents a sort of synthesis between idealism and realism and may be said to be captained by the Śaivism of Kashmir.

The basic question is whether one can identify any cause of illusion. To quote Murti, 'To assign any cause for the appearance is not to take it as a mere appearance, as we should, but as the appearance of something.'⁴⁶

Abhinava has named his theory as *Apūrṇakhyātivāda* implying that there is no error as such. It is in contrast to complete knowledge that incomplete, partial or limited cognition comes to be considered as erroneous or illusory. So far as our initial perceptual reaction is concerned, there is no error. Error is discovered only when the continuity of a judgement e.g., 'this is silver', is interrupted. It is the analysis of this discovery and the corresponding corrective knowledge that leads one to decide upon the cause (or causes) of this error.

Abhinavagupta following his master Utpala picks up two stock examples for analysis — one is "this is silver" and the other is "there are two moons in the sky", the former typifying mental errors and the latter sensory errors.⁴⁷ In both instances Abhinava finds that error is due to subjective unification of objective components (*Ābhāsas*) while in the latter case an optical defect also makes a partial contribution. When we perceive silver at the sight of nacre and exclaim "oh, this is silver", we judge it to be a piece of silver, which is solid, capable of being cognized as such by other percipients and of serving its purpose (i.e., efficient). Thus silver as an object represents unification of thisness, silverness, solidity, common perceptibility and efficiency in one locus. All these taken separately are objects themselves and are real because they are individually judged to be so, but their unification in the form 'this is silver' proves illusive because it is not supported by a succeeding judgement, arising from the perception of nacre, which takes the form "This is not that silver which is solid, open to common percipients and capable of discharging desired activity." In fact the silver which has been negated by the subsequent cognition was the proper (should-have-been) object of the previous judgement. But as this absence of silver in nacre escapes our attention, error results.⁴⁸ In other words, our judgement suffers from the failure to grasp the frontal object i.e., nacre, in its complete form due to a defective subjective unification in respect of the objective components. Thus error in judgement consists

in incomplete predication of the object (this = nacre). The contrary cognition disrupts the continuity of the determinate judgement in respect of the unification from the rise of the perceptive judgement itself.⁴⁹ Thus the error lies in unification or subjective synthesis. According to Abhinava what happens is that the piece of nacre which is represented by 'this' acts as a limiting adjunct in the form of the locus of 'silver' (because of its silvery brightness and the rise of an image in memory) and is responsible for the resulting confusion in the judgement 'this is silver'. Since the two stages of former and later experiences are found to be mutually opposed owing to their lack of correspondence, the previous judgement is found to be illusory.⁵⁰ The same is the case when, due to an optical defect or external pressure on the eye-ball, one perceives two moons. Here again the duality of number, moon, sky and their connection taken independently do not betray any confusion. Error arises the moment they are mixed up. Here the portion of sky which as the locus of the moon acts as the moon's limited adjunct is confused with the sky as locus of two moons due to a sensory defect which results in such unification which is falsified by later cognition, for the judgement "there are two moons" does not continue after one moon has been sighted by normal vision. Thus it is the cognitive (mal-)unification of objective constituents that causes error. Error always consists in the element of unification in our cognition lacking correspondence of judgement with its relative limiting locus.

Thus we are led to certain conclusions with regard to the cause of illusions:

(i) There is the following equation of relationships between the components of an erroneous situation —

(a) illusory content = silver = Uparañjaka.

(b) locus = nacre = Uparañjya

(c) unification = Melana = This is silver = Uparāga.

(ii) Falsity (Vaiparītya) is caused by resting on a different locus other than one's own, because the Adhikaraṇa lets itself be inadequately grasped.

(iii) Error consists in the incorrect unification (Melana or Yojanā) of objective components (brightness of nacre mistaken for that of silver). This leads to the appearance of something new i.e., silver.

(iv) The lack of contemporaneity in the different objective constituents leads to disorder in unification. In other words, error is also due to the association of subject and predicate with two different orders of time i.e.,

presentative (nacre) and representative (silver). The operation of memory-traces left by a valid experience of real silver lends content to our illusory experience.

(v) Self-consciousness which witnesses both the illusion and its corrective cancellation⁵¹ is the constant factor.

(vi) It is subjective (mis-)unification that is responsible for the privative character of illusory perception, as aided by sensory and environmental defects, appearance of similarity, etc.

A few observations may help give a better appreciation of the Śaiva position. The wholistic approach of the Śaiva absolutism treats reality as a synthesis of being and consciousness (Prakāśa and Vimarśa). Thus the objective manifold, like its subjective counterpart, depends upon the Prakāśa aspect for its being and upon the Vimarśa aspect for its mutual distinction and unification. Thus the 'this' aspect stands for universality and being, and 'being of such and such nature' represents its peculiar character.⁵² The former is known as the universal object (Sāmānyābhāsa) and is totally free from reference to time and space etc. This constitutes the basic unit of objective knowledge and is designated by a specific word. The latter is known as a particular object (Svalakṣaṇābhāsa) which is a sort of common locus of different characteristics which combine to give us an objective entity.⁵³ The operation of the means of knowledge extends to all objects. The individual character of an object is not fixed, it is dynamic and is a by-product of unification and as such admits of a variety of cognitions according to the taste or purpose or the intellectual equipment that one, that is the subject, brings to the object.⁵⁴ Thus, while the object represents the Prakāśa aspect, the particularity wrought by determinate activity of the subject consisting in determinative synthesis (and, by implication, analysis) represents the Vimarśa aspect. Thus the Śaivist appears to take a gestalt view of objectivity. Accordingly, in the configuration of Ābhāsas there is always a principal Ābhāsa, which is taken to be the locus of all others. Thus unification or co-localization (Sāmānādhikaraṇya) is nothing but the linking of these Ābhāsas to this common locus.⁵⁵ Once a configuration is formed, its erstwhile different components now constituting a single whole discharge a collective function, even though continuing to retain their individual distinction. Thus the synthetic unity of Ābhāsas or their individuality is a result of corresponding determinate subjective activity called Vimarśa. It is geared to a particular formation governed by a particular purpose.⁵⁶ But a question may well be

asked — why is it that only certain Ābhāsas are mixed together and not others? To this Abhinava answers that only those Ābhāsas, which are not mutually opposed, are united. For example the Ābhāsa of colour does not unite with that of wind, because they are contrary to each other. This opposition is a direct result of the power of determination (Niyati).⁵⁷ Shorn of mythical jargon, Niyati is determination. Every determination is a negation. Thus while a definition predicates a certain character to an Ābhāsa it also distinguishes it from others by the implied negation of that character elsewhere. This is reminiscent of the Buddhist concept of Apoha with one difference. In Buddhism negation is conceptual, here it is the logical manifestation of absolutic essence. It is why it is supposed to be ingrained in the very nature of things that an epistemic object must be an Ābhāsa or a unity of Ābhāsas guided by the law of absolutic determinism.⁵⁸ Thus, as a logical extension of the same argument, it is the continuity of the determinate cognition that is responsible for the unity of the principal Ābhāsa which constitutes the locus of component Ābhāsas.⁵⁹ This again, incidentally, brings us face to face with the metaphysical foundation of the Śaiva absolutism known as 'Pratyabhijñā', that is, the unity of various Ābhāsas, either at different points of time or space or through different channels of knowledge, is a synthetic process. This process brings out the underlying unity of the entire manifold through the cognitive unification of being and consciousness reflected in the synthetic judgemental (and also, at the metaphysical level, in the experiential) activity. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things to deduce that since recognition forms the core of all cognitive activity, erroneous knowledge too must depend upon the reversal of cognitive unification. There must be a lack of recurrence, continuity or synthesis of judgement in respect of the object of illusory experience. It will be quite logical to conclude that the "commingling process" (Ubhayamelanātmaka Prakriyā)⁶⁰ in the system is not exclusive to the cognitive knowledge alone, but is a necessary corollary of the concept of Ābhāsa being applied to the field of epistemology covering all the Pramāṇas. This is why, as we have seen, Ābhāsa (ontological entity) and Prameya (epistemic entity) are not distinguished.

If we closely follow the present line of thinking it becomes fairly easy to answer the doubtful opponent: there will be no talk of error if it is accepted that the determinate cognitive activity is the sole determinant of intra-objective difference and non-difference. Because, such a view will necessarily lead us to the conclusion that even nacre will turn out to be silver in reality,

since it is so comprehended by the determinate judgement "this is silver". There being, therefore, no illusory experience, the possibility of its contradiction will not arise at all and this will obviously do away with the utility of positing 'uncontradictedness' as a necessary ingredient of the definition of valid knowledge.⁶¹ Abhinava's answer to this is very clear: the judgement elicited by the perception of nacre as silver is shattered the moment nacre is apprehended. Since the two judgements (i.e., 'this is silver' and 'this is not silver') do not agree and the original judgement does not continue after the nacre has been seen, it is proved to be illusory.⁶²

This further explains how error enters the process of unification. According to the theory of Ābhāsavāda, it is the principal Ābhāsa that constitutes the substratum while all other relative Ābhāsas constitute its collective content. While we see nacre our natural judgement would be 'this is a piece of nacre', where 'thisness' represents universality and 'nacre-hood' constitutes particularity. Since a particular Ābhāsa is always a configuration, a gestalt, the nacre must constitute the locus for other related Ābhāsas to be united and to discharge a collective function. The other Ābhāsas comprise present time, solidity, general perceptibility (capability of nacre to be perceived as such by other perceivers) and capacity to lead to the desired activity. It is a moot point that this judgement continues to last and is verified by the achievement of the desired result.

But the whole process comes to a halt when we mistake nacre for silver, giving rise to the judgement "this is silver". Here all other Ābhāsas cooperate, but the principal Ābhāsa i.e., nacre, is replaced by silver which now takes up the job of constituting the locus. At the same time the urge for collective functioning undergoes a change due to the change in the principal Ābhāsa⁶³ which is deprived of its claim to objectivity (the capability of being perceived by other cognizers). Again it is a moot point that failure to obtain a desired result breaks the continuity of initial judgement and hence is discovered to be an illusory experience. Though the discovery is a subsequent event exposing it to truth, the confusion in the process of unification is the initial basic factor that causes illusion.

However, one very relevant question remains. Why is it silver which is erroneously cognized in nacre to the exclusion of all other bright objects? Only a few scattered references give us a clue. Glittering brilliance is something that is common to both nacre and silver. When one perceives silver at the sight of nacre, the latter appears to have acquired the brightness of silver. This

brightness recalls the memory of silver from a past valid cognition. This identification of the remembered object with the object of immediate perception, which is reflected by 'silver' and 'this' respectively, gives rise to the judgement 'this is silver'⁶⁴. The representative character of silver is possibly arrived at by a process of elimination — were the silver an object of direct perception in nacre, it would have caused the illusion of silver to everybody. In a slightly differently worded statement, Maheśvarānanda, a devout successor of Abhinava from the south, remarks that while the apparent nature of nacre is cognized through perception, the same is logically constructed (determinately grasped) as silver.⁶⁵ Perhaps Maheśvarānanda is following the line of his predecessor Abhinava who also considers nacre to be an object of perception and silver an object of determinate judgement. A judgement may make a truth claim if its perceptive content is endorsed by a determinate apprehension. It forfeits its right to do so if there is disagreement between the perceptive and determinate judgements. Here error lies in the fact that the object of perception — i.e. nacre, is falsely identified with the object of determinative judgement — i.e. silver, which is the opposite of the former.⁶⁶ This type of confusion is again a step towards error in the process of unification itself.

Abhinava has gone far enough to examine the proposition 'this is silver' and has come to the conclusion that such a unification, though entirely subjective,⁶⁷ is logically fallacious. According to Abhinava the unifying arrangement in instances like this tends to adopt the following course.

Even though silverness is grasped as a property inhering in an other substantive — i.e. nacre (than one's own, i.e. silver), and nacre is grasped as a locus/substantive of other property — i.e. silverness (than one's own, i.e. nacre), the substantive-locus (nacre) has been responsible for the adjectival character of the property (silverness) and the dependant property (silverness) has been responsible for the substratum-like character (nacre). This transposed unification is a logical fallacy and has been designated as Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha or Āsrayāsiddha (i.e., one whose substratum is disproved). Such a fallacy arises when, as seen above, something is portrayed as an attribute of some such locus where it does not belong.⁶⁸ Such a treatment, however, brings Abhinava very close to the Naiyāyika view of Anyathā Khyāti.

By the way, by borrowing two terms from Sivaraman⁶⁹ which he has used in the context of Rāmānuja's Satkhyāti, here also the condition of

error may be classed in two categories. While the mental transposition of an object from actual locus to the other is the 'epistemic' condition, the constitution of an Ābhāsa as a unification of several objective components furnishes the 'constitutive' condition.

The next phase of our enquiry pertains to the discovery of error. Four questions naturally occur e.g., (i) How is the error discovered and cancelled? (ii) What is the object of cancellation? (iii) What is the result of the cancellation? and (iv) Is cancellation negative function? We shall try to fathom Abhinava's mind on these problems.

As we have seen, the judgement 'this is silver' is found to be erroneous on the strength of a subsequent cognition taking the form 'this was not silver'. Implicit in the judgement is the viewer's belief "there was no silver, only I have been misled"⁷⁰. Thus the predicate 'not silver' refers to the same subject, which was predicated by 'silver'. In fact 'this is not silver' should have been the appropriate judgement at the time of the initial experience, which is now restored by the later experience.⁷¹ Thus the subsequent cognition supplements the incomplete perception of the previous movement. As the cancellation temporally comes later, our corrective judgement involves a subtle reference to time, although it rejects the truth claim of a previous judgement as such.⁷² In other words, the "this-was-not-silver" cognition seeks to cancel the "this-is-silver" cognition which has for its object silver that came to appear at a given point of time in the immediate past. It does not cancel silver absolutely at all points of time and space. Thus the correction is relative to the immediate past experience; it is not absolute negation, it does not even negate silver-cognition, if any, in the present time.⁷³ The nature of the remover or negator (Bādhaka) is essentially cognitive i.e., it is a different cognition⁷⁴ which takes the form — 'this form is not silver' or 'there is no second moon in the sky'.

It may be recalled that according to Abhinavagupta an object is a synthetic unity of universality and particularity, where the universality refers to its general being as Prakāśa and particularity to its peculiar attributes as Vimarśa comprehended by a name e.g., silver. This particularity again is an outcome of the union of various objective components, which is *ipso facto* a cognitive phenomenon. Cancellation is always addressed to the element of unification (Melanānṛśa), because it is the precise point of error.⁷⁵ This is achieved by removing the continuity of erroneous judgement e.g., "this is silver" or "there are two moons". The continuity of judgement has been described as.

correspondence,⁷⁶ continuity⁷⁷ and recurrence⁷⁸ on different occasions. The main thrust of the cancellation is to uproot its presence. The cancelling judgement points out the gap between the cognitive judgement and its objective reference⁷⁹ "here there has been no silver" and "there are no two moons". However, discontinuity of judgement as constituting cancellation should not be understood in absolute terms. In a sense, each subsequent cognition always replaces the current cognition and thereby removes the continuity of an existing cognition by implication. After reading a book if one diverts his attention to writing, the previous judgement 'I am reading a book' will naturally be discontinued by the following judgement "I am going to write". But, shall this constitute negation? Abhinava's answer is a clear "no". He says that the essence of cancellation lies not only in breaking the continuity but also in ensuring that the existing judgement should not have arisen at all.⁸⁰ That is why, according to him, the spontaneous corrective judgement is not that "this is not silver", but that "there was no silver here". That is why *Asaṁvāda* is supposed to be more expressive and, in fact, is sometimes posited as a cause of the discontinuity of cognition. Without fear of being contradicted it may now be concluded that the break in the continuity of cognition arising from the lack of correspondence between the cognitive judgement and its objective counterpart leads to the discovery of error which involves the correction or cancellation of error.⁸¹

The phenomenon of cancellation is not as simple as it appears. Our encounter with nacre may give rise to two types of judgement e.g., (1) 'there has been no silver', and (2) 'this is a piece of nacre'. In the *Nyāya* terminology the two instances represent the two cases of *Viśayāpahāra* and *Phalāpahāra* respectively.⁸² According to Abhinava negation is a positive function because it does not cancel, but corrects. "This is nacre" is the corrective phase of our perceptive judgement "there has been no silver". It is this type of approach that explains the concept of *Apūrṇatā* in respect of knowledge. Cancellation as absolute negation does not fit in with the wholistic absolutism of the Abhinavan metaphysics. Negation, therefore, must be construed in terms of the affirmation of something. The relation of the existence of one thing with the absence of another is the same as that of two things⁸³ standing in the relation of a locus and its content. Thus 'this is a piece of nacre' is a positive mode of expressing the negation of silver i.e., 'there has been no silver'. Lest capriciousness take over, the dependence relation must function between the two. Nacre-cognition is the locus of non-silver-cognition or,

better, nacre is the substratum of non-silver.⁸⁴ It is not the bare silver as such that is being negated by the perception of nacre, it is that silver which was identified with the nacre-locus. Thus the object of corrective judgement is to place the nacre in correct perspective. It is not the nacre-as-such, but the nacre-as-qualified-by-the-absence-of-silver that one perceives.⁸⁵ Thus Abhinava discovers a sort of reasoning between the two experiences. The silver-(in nacre)-experience is a datum which is not in dispute. The point of dispute is the invalidity of silver in the silver-(in nacre)-experience resulting from the discontinuity of the previous perceptive judgement on and after the perception of nacre. Thus the perception of nacre acts as the reason (minor term – Hetu) and the invalidity of silver-(in nacre)-judgement as the Sādhya (major term).⁸⁶

Two incidental observations:

- (i) The discontinuity of judgement by the cancelling judgement involves a reference to the consciousness of relevant objective efficiency, and
- (ii) Like error, its correction also is a subjective function. To elaborate: according to Abhāsavāda, an Ābhāsa by definition is constituted, *inter alia*, by a reference to the expected fruitful activity. The contrary judgement arising from the sight of nacre, being itself an Ābhāsa, weakens the grip of earlier reference to the desired objective efficiency (of silver) and, as such, provides an additional fillip towards cancellation of the previous judgement.⁸⁷ This is in tune with the Abhinavan stand on empirical reality as constituted by the twin criteria of continuity and usefulness⁸⁸ and also in tune with the concept of Ābhāsa as a 'whole' made so by the taste, intellectual equipment and volitional activity of the subject.⁸⁹ In fairness to the Śaiva absolutist, however, a word of caution is necessary. The capacity to bring about a desired result is, in itself, determined by the relative cognizing subject and, as such, plays only an ancillary role so far as it supports the principal factor in the context i.e., Vimarśa. By itself it is not a sole decisive factor in any corrective judgement.⁹⁰

Correction or cancellation is a constructive activity on the part of the subject. It is not simply a synthesis or repetition, it is a real construction in the sense that the previous cognition is distinguished from the subsequent one which, because of former's failure to maintain consistent predication, cancels the former. While the constructive activity in error is purely mental hence confined to the cognizing subject alone, it is bidimensional in correction – (i) it rejects the previous⁹¹ judgement and therefore breaks the continuity

and (ii) it demolishes the barriers of exclusive subjectivism by opening the gate to other perceivers.⁹² It is called a real subjective construction in the sense that the knowledge of nacre or non-silver by itself is ineffective unless the two cognitions (this-is-silver and this-is-not-silver/this-is-nacre) are coordinated mutually by a dependence relation of negation by providing them a subjective berth in the form of a single knower.

From the foregoing discussion we may now devise the following equation as deemed to have been envisaged by Abhinava —

Bādhaka (Contrary)	= subsequent cognition (Uttara Parāmarśa OR Vimarśāntara)	= This is nacre/ This is not silver.
Bādhya (Object of negation)	= Element of unification (Melanāmrśa)	= Silver(-in nacre)
Bādhā (negation)	= Break in the continuity of current judgement (Vimarśānuvṛttinirmūlana)	= There has been no silver.
Bādhā-parihāra (correction/ cancellation of error)	(a) Restoration of identity of Vimarśa with Prakāśa (Pūrṇatā). (b) Restoration of capability of being perceived by others (Pramatrantaraviṣaya- tvābhāvanivṛtti).	= This is nacre which was seen as silver. = This is nacre.

To close the point under discussion we would like to quote Sharma "This view that error is actually a part of truth, in the sense that its correction is not a matter of cancellation but of supplementation, is essential to the absolutist's position",⁹³ and with Potter we would like to assert "Correction does not involve rejecting either object or even a relation but rather in appreciating the inadequacy of this 'interpretation' as a piece of silver."⁹⁴ Nacre-cognition is thus not a negation of silver-cognition, it is an improvement upon and fulfilment of silver-cognition.

'What is the nature of an illusory object', or to be more exact, 'What is the ontological status of the object' is a question that has generated the greatest

heat among the Indian philosophers. In fact, the various theories of error, as we have already noted, are the accounts of the nature and status of objects in erroneous knowledge. We propose to make a reference to these theories in passing without critically evaluating them just to situate the Abhinavan position with greater clarity. In a sense all the Indian systems may be divided into two broad groups — one affirming the reality of the object of erroneous cognition while the other denying it. Between these two extremes various systems seek their place with varying shades of doctrinal difference. A third pattern may also be conceived which partly subscribes to reality of the content and partly denies it.

The Akhyāti of Prabhākara, Satkhyāti of the Sāṃkhya, Viparīta-khyāti of Kumārila, Anyathākhyāti of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Śaiva Siddhānta, Akhyāti-samvalitayathārtha-khyāti of Rāmānuja form the first group so far as the reality of the object is concerned. For them both the terms of the erroneous judgement (silver and nacre) are real. The confusion between the two seen in an illusory perception results either from non-grasping of their difference or grasping of their similarity or from misplacement or misconstruing of them. The other group consists of Asatkhyāti of the Mādhymikas, Ātamakhyāti of the Yogācāras, Anirvacanīyakhyāti of the Advaita Vedāntin which either totally deny the reality of the two terms or ascribe to them dependent reality which in ultimate analysis turns out to be false.


The third group may include the Apohavādins like Dharmakīrti, Bhedābheda-vādins, some Jinas, and philosophers like Mādhava and Śrīkumāra propounding Asatkhyāti or Abhinava-anyathākhyāti and Sadasadvilakṣaṇakhyāti respectively. According to them, either one of the two terms is real the other being unreal, or both of them are real in one situation but unreal in different situation, or both of them are partially real and partially unreal.

With such a sketchy description it is difficult to assign a definite place to the Apūrṇakhyātivādins like Abhinava in the above scheme. Although Abhinava is a staunch absolutist he advocates adherence to the Bhedābheda position at the empirical level which is the immediate concern of epistemology.⁹⁵ Hence he may be associated with the third category. But only so far and no further.

According to Abhinava in the nacre-silver event the object of cognition is complete nacre (Pūrṇa Śukti) which because of its incomplete grasp constitutes error. Now going by the Abhinavan metaphysics this silver (-in nacre) cannot

be rejected as false, though it is different from actual silver and nacre both.⁹⁶ But none-the-less it is real because it is revealed to be so by the cognition. Even when the erroneous knowledge is cancelled, occurrence of silver-(in nacre)-experience is never denied. During the continuity of silver-cognition silver did form the content of our knowledge. The fact of manifestation is the guarantee of its reality.⁹⁷ Since knowledge never foresakes its natural disposition towards truth, reality must be granted to its content.⁹⁸ Now if it is real, the Buddhist phenomenalist may ask, it must serve the purposive activity ascribed to real silver.⁹⁹ Then it will obliterate difference between actual silver and silver(-in nacre). It cannot be said that unreal in the form it is being projected by the silver-(in nacre)-knowledge, because that will condemn the very thesis of manifestation of silver in nacre-silver. Abhinava has now been trapped in a vicious circle. Either he must admit that what he means by 'real' is 'empirical' which test silver(-in nacre) cannot pass or he should accept the Vedāntin's position that this silver is a sort of Anirvacanīya silver which is real because it is experienced, unreal because it is contradicted, hence it must have a different order of existence altogether. It appears that Abhinava distinguishes between real and empirical or actual on the one hand and between object and content on the other. According to him silver(-in nacre) is real as a content of knowledge, but it is not actual or empirical as the Buddhist seeks to establish. Similarly as a content it is real and is not Anirvacanīya as there is no confusion of two orders of existence. Thus the Vedāntin's description of Prātibhāsika Sat, so long as it is not interpreted as Anirvacanīya but only as a fact of experience, may be acceptable to Abhinava. Because as a datum in experience, as a content, it is not denied, it is denied as an actual object and it is where the error lies. The content may be 'real', but not 'empirical'. While 'serving the purpose' may be the criterion of empiricity, 'figuring in cognition' that of reality. However, if content fails to measure up to 'object', it is not because the object (nacre) has changed, but because silver-in-nacre has received fuller appreciation. This fuller appreciation does not negate silver-in-nacre altogether but adds to our information that it-is-nacre-that-was-viewed-as-silver. The function of Vimarśa is to restore the unity of the real with the actual. It is precisely the import of propounding that error lies in unification of the objective components, and it is this aspect of the whole episode that is sought to be corrected, neither the content nor the object.

Thus to quote Sharma¹⁰⁰ again "The Śaiva and Sūnya Absolutism



represent two extreme standpoints regarding the erroneous, while the Vedāntins and Yogācāras assert (i.e., Adhiṣṭhāna) or deny (i.e., externality) only one of the two terms of an illusory judgement, the Śaivites affirm and the Sūnyavādins negate both the terms (this = nacre, and silver). In the Śaiva view both 'this' and 'silver' are real as Ābhāsas." ¹⁰¹

We have so far not touched upon a vital problem that has been engaging the mind of almost all the realists and also the Buddhist phenomenologists. The problem has been raised with regard to the nature of judgement in an erroneous perception — whether it is simple judgement or a complex one. The question has been put differently also; is an erroneous judgement a single psychosis or a complex one? In other words, is it indeterminate experience or a determinate judgement? Let us see how Abhinava handles this problem.

According to the Naiyāyika there is a difference between simple and complex judgements. The erroneous judgement is a determinate cognition of 'this' (Idam) as characterised by silverness (Viśiṣṭajñānam) ¹⁰² that leads to purposive activity. As is natural in any determinate perception erroneous cognition is also a single perception where a 'datum' i.e., sensum, mixes up with related ideas to yield one perception. However, simple judgements relating to immediate perception are immune from error. Only the determinate perception is liable to error. Kumārila finds himself in agreement with the Nyāya.

Similarly, while Prabhākara shares Dharmakīrti's professed thesis that error is nothing but non-grasping of difference (Bhedāgraha = Apoha) he differs from him in holding that all judgements are simple, i.e. indeterminate and also that they are true. Needless to say Dharmakīrti finds the position untenable and maintains that all judgements are determinate, hence complex. For Prabhākara 'silver' and 'this' (or nacre) are two separate simple judgements which have been condensed into one — 'this is silver', hence it is erroneous cognition. They are two true judgements, but because there has been failure to distinguish the two error follows. It, however, does not follow from this that all complex judgements are erroneous. They are labeled erroneous if they fail to answer practical demands.

Abhinava's stand crystalizes from his attack on Dharmakīrti's position. Dharmakīrti tries to account for the empirical world by placing extra weight on coordination (Sārūpya) as an adhesive gluing the bare point instant (Svalakṣaṇa) with the so-called universal. This relation between two extremes,

one real and the other unreal, leads to determinate judgement (*Adhyavasāya*) which being conceptual is erroneous. As against this Abhinava takes the position: since knowledge as such is valid, it is difficult to isolate determinate cognition as being capable of being illusory from indeterminate which is not so.¹⁰³ Abhinava seems to hold that though there is no error in indeterminate judgement, all determinate judgements are not necessarily erroneous. It is only on the inverse concomitance that if error is to be found it will be in respect of determinate judgement which is a complex psychosis. We can develop this position further, as he proceeds to assail the Buddhist logician.

If determinate judgement, asks Abhinava, is responsible for the proper determination of the empirical world and if that determinate judgement is erroneous, the objective determination will become an impossibility. In fact, Abhinava refers to his own thesis that determinate judgement does not suffer from 'temperamental' illusoriness because it reveals or manifests *Ābhāsa*. It is the manifestation or illumination that is responsible for the determination of objects (*Arthavyavasthā*). In fact it is presumptuous to brand illusion as indeterminate or determinate. For deciding that it is a case of illusion, its perversity (i.e. opposition to truth) must be detected by a contrary cognition. If this criterion is not adhered to, all mutually exclusive cognitions will be deemed to be illusory.¹⁰⁴ This opposition or perversity directly results not from conceptualization, but from imposing one thing on the different locus.¹⁰⁵ Similarly even on the Buddhist view indeterminacy is not the essential condition that eschews illusion. Had it been so, Dharmakīrti would not have specially added the word 'non-illusory' (*Abhrānta*) in his definition of perception.¹⁰⁶ So far as the apprehension of silver-in-nacre is concerned, it is no doubt a determinate knowledge, but this does not lay down the absolute rule that illusion will always stem from determinate perception alone.¹⁰⁷ Abhinava, however, seems to modify his stand subsequently and says that error no doubt refers to determinate judgement, because indeterminate judgement refers to the bare being that figures in our immediate awareness while determinate judgement involves the function of synthesis and analysis which is no doubt a determinate activity. But only those determinate judgements are liable to err which do not endorse the data of immediate perception and are found, as such, to be at variance with the indeterminate knowledge.¹⁰⁸

Now we come to the last but very fascinating leg of our enquiry. Abhinava's greatest contribution seems to consist in his attempt to fashion a model for all

the theories of error. At this stage we know very little about how Abhinava proposed to give a concrete shape to it, but there is no doubt that he did have a pattern in his mind. It is really a matter of great pity that even his great follower Maheśvarānanda and celebrated commentator Bhāskara missed the opportunity to develop it. Abhinava's effort is reminiscent of the one made by an equally great scholar Vācaspati in the *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparya-Tīkā* where he tried to develop his theory of Anyathākhyāti as providing a basic model for the various theories of error.¹⁰⁹ Similarly Apūrṇākhyāti was sought to be developed by Abhinava as an all-comprehensive pattern in which all the major theories could be accommodated. In all three passages¹¹⁰ are available to us from which are culled the following observations:

(i) Among all the theories of error Apūrṇākhyāti represents the ultimate explanation.

(ii) Error as incomplete knowledge constitutes essence of all accounts of error.

(iii) All the five theories form a logical whole beginning with Asatkhyāti and ending with Viparītakhyāti and then this whole seeks culmination in Apūrṇākhyāti after being reprocessed through Asatkhyāti.

(iv) The manifold naming of different theories only brought out their different perceptions of the problem, though this variety of approach was to be shunned in view of the ultimate account offered by the absolute-realism (Paramārthavastuvāda).

(v) Out of the five theories alluded to, Abhinava has used a different nomenclature in respect of the three theories, which in all probability reflects his understanding of these theories. They are (i) Asat-khyāti, (ii) Asthira-khyāti, (iii) Asādhāraṇākhyāti and (iv) Anarthakriyākāri-khyāti and (v) Viparīta-khyāti. Elsewhere he refers to Anirvācya-khyāti in addition to Asat- and Viparīta-khyātis. Thus Asthira-khyāti 'probably' refers to Ātmakhyāti, Asādhāraṇa- to Anirvacanīya- and Anarthakriyākāri- to Anyathā-. 'Probably', because we have no conclusive collateral evidence to prove identification just at the moment.

It is really surprising that in all three accounts he nowhere refers to Prabhākara's Akhyāti. Though on the contrary, the cluster of five theories of error (Khyātipañcaka), referred to elsewhere,¹¹¹ does not include Viparīta-khyāti. Possibly it was a fashion to enumerate one of the Mīmāṃsaka views. Abhinava and his followers,¹¹² however, normally use the word Akhyāti but as a shortened form of Apūrṇākhyāti. In fact, in all the three passages

cited, some modern scholars appear to have confused this Akhyāti with that of Prabhākara¹¹³ due to the apparent similarity of names. A critical evaluation will reveal that Abhinava's theory of incomplete comprehension is in a sense more an extension of Viparītakhyāti than that of Akhyāti.

We leave, however, the development of this aspect for a future occasion handicapped as we are today with little information available on the subject.¹¹⁴

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.B.O.R.I	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
Bhās.	Bhāskarī
B.S.	Brahmasūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya
Epistemology	Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā
I.P.K.	Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā
I.P.V. (Bh.)	Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī (published along with Bhāskarī)
I.P.V.V.	Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī
K.S.	Kashmir Śaivism
K.S.T.S.	Kashmir Series of Texts & Studies
Methods	Methods of Knowledge
M.M.	Mahārtha-mañjarī
M.M.P.	Mahārtha-mañjarī-parimala
N.S.	Nāṭyaśāstra
Nyāya Theory	The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge
Presuppositions	Presuppositions of India's Philosophies
Śaivism	Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective
T.A.	Tantrāloka
T.A.V.	Tantrāloka-viveka
T.S.	Tantrasāra
V.S.	Vedānta-sāra

NOTES

¹ This paper is a modified and improved version of my paper read in the International Seminar on Abhinavagupta held in October 1981 at B.H.U., Varanasi (India).

² Abhinavagupta was a tenth century stalwart and doyen of Kashmir Śaivism, aesthetics and dramaturgy. Here we are concerned with him as a philosopher of the School of

Recognition. His major works include the *Tantrāloka Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivismarśinī*, *Dhvanyālokalocana* and *Abhinavabhāratī* on the *Nāṭya-śāstra* of Bharata.

³ *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Presuppositions), Karl H. Potter, U.S.A., 1963, p. 186.

⁴ No apology is needed for choosing this topic even though some good studies of the problem have already appeared. See *Kashmir Śaivism* by L. N. Sharma, Varanasi, 1972, pp. 79–89; *Pratyabhijñā Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*, Ph.D. thesis by Geeta Rastogi, University of Lucknow, 1977 (unpublished), pp. 317–339.

⁵ *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī* [I.P.V. (Bh.)], Abhinavagupta, published with *Bhāskari* (Bhās.) of Bhāskarakanṭha, edited by K. A. S. Iyer and K. C. Pandey, Varanasi, 1983–1954, II, p. 123; *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī* (I.P.V.V.), Abhinavagupta, Kashmir Series of Texts & Studies (K.S.T.S.), Volume III, 1938–1943, pp. 152, 154.

⁶ So'ntastathāvimarśātmā deśakālādyabhedini I Ekābhidhānaviśaye mitirvastunyabādhita II Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā (I.P.K.), Utpala Deva, published with Bhāskari, 2.3.2. Translation Pandey's, p. 5. (Bhās., III, p. 140).

⁷ apramāṇam hi pramāṇalakṣaṇaviparyayeṇa bhavati.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 152.

⁸ Mark the emphasis on Abādhitattva (uncontradictedness) in respect of knowledge. It means that the phenomenon of error is wide enough to cover the entire gamut of knowledge, though the instances we are confronted with in an analysis of error mostly relate to perceptual error to the exclusion of non-perceptual ones namely, inferential or verbal-testimonial. Various theories thus address themselves less to the consideration of the epistemic error than to that of its subsidiary, namely, perceptual error. (See, *Methods of Knowledge According to Advaita Vedānta* [Methods], Swami Satprakashananda, Calcutta, 1974, p. 121)

⁹ From the root √Khyā – to narrate + suffix Ktin. Apte describes it as knowledge, a faculty of discriminating objects by appropriate designation. Vide, *The Student's Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Delhi, 1959, p. 177.

¹⁰ apūrṇakhyātirūpā akhyātireva bhrāntitattvam.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 123.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² It appears that, throughout the series of error—analyses, these words have been treated as instances of Tatpuruṣa compounds bringing the nature of their objective content into bold relief. For example, Asatkhyāti is Asataḥ Khyātiḥ, Anirvacanīyakhyāti is Anirvacanīyasya Khyātiḥ and so on.

However, in a recent effort (vide, *The Theories of Error in Indian Philosophy: An analytical Study*, Bijayananda Kar, Delhi, 1978, p. 11) the process has been reversed by treating them as instances of Karmadhāraya compound where the first element acts as an adjective modifying knowledge rather than as an object. Thus, it is now Asatī Khyātiḥ or Anirvacanīyā Khyātiḥ as against Asataḥ Khyātiḥ etc. But on a closer scrutiny this grammatical analysis fails in respect of Ātmakhyāti which cannot be explained away except by imparting an additional word (Ātmaviśayā Khyātiḥ).

¹³ Khyātyabhāvarupatve tu rajatabhāvena jñānam api ayuktam eva syāt iti bhāvah. Īśadarthe naṇ na tu abhāve.

— Bhās., II, p. 123.

¹⁴ Pūrṇaprathābhāvād apūrṇakhyātirūpa iyaṁ akhyātir eva bhrāntiḥ.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 153.

15 The Pratyabhijñā theory of ignorance is a very complex affair and indiscriminate use of interchangeable key words has confounded the matter. Thus we have Ajñāna, Añavamala, Apohana, Māyā, Avidyā, Akhyāti, Bhrānti, Mahābhrānti, Dvaitapratihā and Vikalpa — all these terms have definite connotations, but quite often they are used as synonyms. Hence the difficulty. In fact ignorance is a multi-tier, multi-dimensional concept. Mala or ignorance as defiling or delimiting agent obscures the real and this is the essence of this concept of ignorance.

16 Ato jñeyasya tattvasya sāmastyena aprathātmakam I Jñānameva tadajñānam śivasūtreṣu bhāṣitam.

— *Tantrāloka* (T.A.), Abhinavagupta, K.S.T.S., 1918–1938, 1.26.

17 svātmapracchādanecchaiva vastubhūtastathāmalaḥ I

— T.A. 9.66.

18 svātmantrayahānirbodhasya svātantryasyāpyabodhatā I dvidhāṇavam malamidam, svasvarūpāpahānitāḥ II

— I.P.K. 3.2.4.

19 pūrṇasvarūpasya akhyātimātram.

— *Tantrāloka-viveka* (T.A.V.), Jayaratha, K.S.T.S., 1918–1938, Vol. VI, p. 58.

20 dvidvidham ca ajñānam. buddhigataṃ pauraṣaṃ ca, tatra buddhigataṃ anīśayasvabhāvaṃ, viparītanīśayaātmakaṃ ca.

— *Tantrasāra* (T.S.), Abhinavagupta, K.S.T.S., 1918, p. 2–3; vide, also T.A. 1.36.

21 na kevalamatra samastasārisāripramātrāsādhāraṇyām mahābhrāntau akhyātiḥ paramārthaḥ, yāvātpatipramātrīṇyatāyāmapi pramātrvikalparūpāyām mahābhrāntau saiva tattvam iti darśayati . . . māyāpramāturvyāpāro yo vikalpamā idam sukha-sāadhanamityādiḥ, sa rūpaṃ yasyāḥ bhrāntēḥ saṃsārasaṃmatāyāḥ, sāpi sarvaiva samasteṣu pramātreṣu pratyekaṃ bhedenā vartamānā advayākhyātirūpeti pūrveṇa sambandhaḥ; na tu apūrvasya arthasya yā khyātirvividharūpaḥ prakāśastadrūpaprakāśanaṃ bhrāntiḥ.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 155.

22 Pramāntararaviṣayatvābhāvasya akhyātireva yato bhrāntitā, tato bhrāntinivṛttasya khyātiriti bhāvaḥ.

— *Ibid.*, III, p. 156.

23 The use of two more terms Svarūpakhyāti and Advayakhyāti in the Kashmir Śaivism clearly betrays the imprints of such thinking.

24 Vide, *The Nyāya Theory of knowledge* (Nyāya Theory), S. C. Chatterjee, Calcutta, 1950, p. 32.

25 atasminstaditi pratyayaḥ atasminstadbuddhiḥ.

— *Nyaya-vārtika* 1.1.2, quoted, (Nyāya Theory), p. 33.

26 atadrūpapratiṣṭhā.

— *Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective* (Śaivism), K. Sivaraman, Delhi, 1973, p. 322.

27 atasminstadbuddhiḥ.

— *Vedāntasāra* (V.S.), p. 2, quoted, Brahmasūtra-śāṅkarabhāṣya (B.S.), ed. K. N. Misra, Varanasi, 1976, p. 11.

28 atasminstaditi pratyayo viparyayaḥ.

— *Prāśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 177, quoted,
Critique of Indian Realism, D. N. Shastri,
 Agra, 1964, p. 482.

29 anyathāśantamākāramanyathā grhṇāti.

— *Nyāya-ratnākara* on *Śloka-vārtika*, Nir. 118,
 Quoted, *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of*
Pūrvamīmāṃsā (Epistemology), G. P. Bhatt, Varanasi,
 1962, p. 96.

30 Vastunyavastvāropaḥ.

— V.S., p. 2, quoted, B.S., p. 11.

Yādṛśaṃ hi jñānasya svarūpaṃ tadṛśyevārthe'dhyāropayāmīti yāvat.

— *Kāśikā* of Sucaritamīśra on *Śloka-vārtika*,
 Nir. 110, quoted, *Epistemology*, p. 96.

31 avasanno'vamato vā bhāso'vabhāsaḥ.

— B.S., Int.

32 adhyāso nāma atasmin tadbuddhiḥ.

— *Ibid.*

33 Arthādhyāsa and Jñānādhyāsa are the technical words for it. See, *Methods*, p. 124–25.

34 Here we may refer the reader to the *Epistemology*, pp. 95–97 where the author offers an excellent account of all the error-illustrations employed by Indian theoreticians.

35 Bhrāntivivahāro'yam tāvatyapi samucitopayogipūrṇaprakhyāvīrahāt.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 153.

36 tato yāvatā purṇena rūpeṇa prakhyātavyam vimarśaparyantaṃ tāvat na prakhyāti,
 ityapūrṇakhyātirūpā akhyātireva bhrāntitattvam.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 123.

37 apūrṇaṃ jñānam tvatra tāvadasti śukteḥ rajatatayā grahaṇāt.

— Bhās., II, p. 123.

38 Vide *Discovery of Marx*, Harsha Narain, Lucknow, 1981, p. 45.

39 samyagvimarśānuvṛttyābhāsanam saṃvādanam.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 126.

40 Rajataikavimarśepi śuktau na rajatasthitiḥ I upādhideśāsāṃvādād dvicandre'pi
 nabho'nyathā II

— I.P.K. 2.3.13.

41 sa vyadhikaraṇāsiddhasya api adhikaraṇāntarasāmbāndho'na doṣāya, apitu taddvāreṇa
 āśrayeṇa yaḥ sambāndhaḥ, sa eva.

— I.P.V.V., II, p. 398.

42 atādrūpye tādrūpyapratipattiḥ.

— *Paramārthasāra-vivṛti*, Yogarāja, K.S.T.S.,
 1916, p. 67.

43 'Etat' iti prāthamānasya pramātrantaraviśayatvasya 'viruddho na prathate' iti
 pūrṇaprathābhāvadapūrṇakhyātirūpā iyamakhyātireva bhrāntiḥ.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 153.

Cp. "anyathābhūtameva" iti abhimatakrīyāsūnyaṃ pramātrantarāsādhāraṇaṃ ca."

— *Ibid.*

Also cp. "pramātrantaraviśayatvābhāvasya akhyātireva yato bhrāntitā."

— *Ibid.*, p. 156.

44 Pramātrantarāsādhāraṇatvābhāvasya yadākhyānaṁ tanmahimnaiva asattavai-
parītyavyapadeśau yuktānvayavyatirekābhyām.

— *Ibid.*, III, pp. 155–56.

45 Vide, Śaivism, p. 323.

46 *Ajñāna*, Malkani, Das & Murti, London, 1933, p. 142.

47 Ucyate aindriyakamānasavibhramabhedena.

— *Ibid.*, III, p. 79.

48 'idaṁ rajataṁ sthiraṁ sarvapramātsādhāraṇaṁ arthakriyāyogyam' iti idamāṁse,
rajatādyaṇiṣeṣu tatsammelanāṁse ca ābhāsavimarśanabalāt na tāvat kiñcit mithyātvaṁ
kintu uttarakālāṁ yo bhaviṣyati vimarśaḥ 'nedaṁ rajataṁ vastu sthiraṁ pramātran-
taragamyam abhimatakāryakāri iti tadvimarśavimarśaṇīyaṁ yat tatpūrvavimarśa-
kālasamucitameva rūpaṁ tat tasmin pūrvavimarśakāle naivāmīṣyate, bhāvyam ca
tenāmarśaṇīyena.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, pp. 121–22.

49 ataśca prthak idamītādyābhāseṣu na kācana bhrāntiḥ, melanāṁse tu vimarśānuvrtti-
nirmūlanaṁ vimarśodayakālādeva ārabhya bādhakena kriyate, iti tatraiva bhrāntibhāvaḥ,
— iti siddham.

— *Ibid.*, p. 125.

50 rajatasya śūktikayā saha yadyapi eko vimarśaḥ tathāpi śūktau rajatasya tena jñānena
yā dattā sthitiḥ 'idaṁ rajataṁ' iti, sā na, yata upādhirūpo yo deśaḥ' atra iti rajataccchāyam
ātmanoparañjayan śūktideśaḥ tasyāsamvādāt.

— *Ibid.*, pp. 125–26.

51 svasamvit atra ca sāksiṇī tadaiva 'na idaṁ rajataṁ' iti vṛttapūrvasyaiva vimarśasya
avimarśīkaraṇaṁ samvedyate.

— *Ibid.*, p. 78.

52 yasya vaśāt sāmartyāt, vastu nīlasukhādikaṁ vyavatiṣṭhate, niyatāṁ prakāśamaryādāṁ
nātivartate, idamiti svarūpeṇa etādgiti ca viśeṣaṇabhūtanityatvānityatvādiyogena, talloke
pramāṇam iti sthitam.

— *Ibid.*, p. 68.

53 tata ābhāsamātrameva vastu, svalakṣaṇaṁ tu tadābhāsaśāmanādhikaraṇyābhāsarūpaṁ
ābhāsāntaram ekam anyadeva, tatra ca prthageva ca pramāṇam.

— *Ibid.*, pp. 76–77.

54 yathāruci yathārthitvaṁ yathāvyutpatti bhidyate I ābhāso'pyartha ekasminnanus-
āndhānasādhite II

— I.P.K., 2.3.3.

55 ābhāsabhedādvastūnāṁ niyatārthakriyā punaḥ I sāmānādhikaraṇyena pratibhā-
sādbhedinām II

— *Ibid.*, 2.3.6.

56 ābhāsavimarśārthakriyābalena tathā vyavasthānāt iti.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 105.

57 yatpunarābhāsānāṁ miśraṇe kā sīmā iti? tatra ucyate yeṣāṁ avirodhah ta eva
ābhāsa miśribhavanti, nahi rūpābhāso mārutābhāsena miśribhavati — virodhāt, so'pi ca
niyatīśaktyutthapitah.

— *Ibid.*, p. 106.

58 evamābhāsaśtanmelanam ca niyamānuprāṇitam — ityetāvadeva prameyam, etānyeva
āgame tattvāni vakṣyante.

— *Ibid.*, p. 128.

59 nanu vimarṣepi pratyābhāsaṁ tathaiva bhinnatā? satyam, tathāpi tu paro yo vimarṣaḥ sa evāyaṁ padārthaḥ iti ekapratyavamarśrupaḥ tena prāṇitakalpena ā samantāt khyānaṁ prathanam yasya mukhyāvabhāsaḥ ekarūpabhāvābhāsaḥ, ekapratyavamarṣe taducito 'pi hi astyekāvabhāsaḥ, ābhāsavimarṣayoranyonyamaviyogāt, tasmāt mukhyāvabhāśadekatvamapratihatamāste.

— *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118.

60 See *Recognition in Pratyabhijñā School: A Study in Epistemology*, Navjivan Rastogi, Annals of Bhendarkar Oriental Research Institute (A.B.O.R.I.), Diamond Jubilee Volume, pp. 848–849.

61 nanu vimarśabalādeva yadi vastūnām bhedābhedavyavasthā tarhi idānīm trijagati nivṛttā bhrāntisaṁkathāḥ, śūktikāyāmapi satyarajatatāiva āpatati 'idam rajatam' iti vimṛṣyamānatvāt, tataśca bhrāntyaabhāve bādhānupapatteḥ kimarthamuktaṁ 'mitir-vastunyabādhitā' (I.P.K. 2.3.2) iti. Vyabhicārābhāve hi 'abādhitā' ityasya viśeṣaṇasya vyavacchedyaṁ na labhyate.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 121.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 123.

63 Bhāskara's following observation may be found relevant — "Melaṇāmīse yadevedaṁ tadaiva sthīratvādiguṇayuktaṁ rajatamiti samānādhikaraṇatayā sthāpanārūpe bhāge tu"

— Bhās., II, p. 125.

64 idamiti hi satyatayā agrasthavastuviṣayam, rajatamiti tu smaryamāṇarajataviṣayam, anyathā dṛṣṭarajatasya'pi śuktau rajatabhramāpattē.

— *Ibid.*, p. 125.

65 tatra hi śūktyāḥ svarūpam vyaktamevādhyakṣikriyate, rajatatayā adhyavasīyate ca.

— *Mahārthamañjarī* (M.M.) with *Parimala* (M.M.P.),

Maheśvarānanda, ed. B.V. Dwivedi, Varanasi, 1972, p. 40.

66 śuktau dṛṣyāyām taddṛṣyaviparītena rajatena adhyavasāya aikyam yadā karoti, tadā bhrāntatvam.

— I.P.V.V., I, p. 247.

67 kṣetrajñānirmitatayā ākhyānameva ca brāntirīti vitanīṣyate.

— *Ibid.*, III, p. 152.

68 dharmasya anyadharmyāśrayatvena dharmatayā, dharmiṇaśca anyadharmādhāratvena dharmitayā siddhāvapi satyām tena dharmiṇā āśrayeṇa dharmatā, tena ca dharmeṇa āśritena tasya dharmitā — ityevaṁ yā saṁyojanā, tasyā asiddhiryā sā āśryāsiddhirvā vyadhikaraṇāsiddhirvā vyapadīṣyate.

— *Ibid.*, II, 398.

69 Vide, Śaivism, p. 329.

70 tatraiva kāle 'nedaṁ rajatam abhūt' iti hi uttaraḥ parāmarśo . . .

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 123.

Bhāskara comments — apūrṇakhyātīrūpatvamasya śūktikārajatajñānasya sādhayati, tatraiva iti. hi yasmāt, tatra tasmin rajataparāmarṣe, kāle agre 'nedaṁ rajatamabhūt' iti 'idam rajatam nāsīt kintu mayā bhrāmeṇaiva jñātam' ityevamuttaraḥ parāmarśo bhavati.

— Bhās., II, p. 123.

71 kintu uttarakālām yo bhaviṣyati vimarśo 'nedaṁ rajatam' . . . tat tasmin pūrvavimarśa-kāle naivāmṛṣyate bhavyam ca tenāmarśanīyena.

— *Ibid.*, pp. 121–22.

72 vimarśodayakālāt pūrvavimarśodayasamayāt bādhakena uttaraparāmarśena kriyate iti nedaṁ rajatamabhūtiye vamuṭpādāditi bhāvaḥ.

— *Ibid.*, p. 125.

73 tatraiva kāle 'nedaṁ rajataṁ abhūt' iti hi uttarah parāmarśo, na tu uditapratyasta-
mitāyāṁ śatahradāyāmiva idānīmeva 'idaṁ na' vimarśah.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 123.

74 tatra anyathābhūtaṁ vimarśāntaram unmūlakamudeti.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 152.

75 melanānśe tu vimarśānuvṛttinirmūlanāṁ bādhakena kriyate.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 125.

76 saṁvādaḥ

77 sthairyāṁ or sthiritā

78 anuvṛttiḥ

79 (a) atra rajataṁ . . . tasyāsaṁvādāt, samyagvimarśānuvṛttyābhāsanāṁ saṁvādanam.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 126.

(b) dvitvābhāsacandrābhāsayorapi melanābhāse vimarśānuvṛttivyāvartanaṁ vācyam
tadetadāha dvirūpe candre'pi, na kevalaṁ rajata eva

— *Ibid.*, pp. 127–28.

(c) dvicandrādi tu tathābhāsamānamapi uttarakālāṁ pramāvyāpārānuvṛttirūpasya
sthairyasya unmūlanena 'dvicandro nāsti' ityevamrūpeṇa asatyam.

— *Ibid.*, p. 34.

80 evakārārthaṁ svayameva sphuṭīkaroti anuvṛttibhaṅgakaraṇena hi unmūlanāṁ
prāyaśo vimarśasya, bādhakena tu utpattivirodha eveti spaṣṭayitum 'nanu' ityādinā.

— I.P.V.V., II, p. 79.

81 Upādhideśe'tra rajatamitideśarūpatayā uparañjakasvabhāvāyām śuktau asamvādādun-
mūlanāt satpratipakṣābhūtavimarśasthairyāt na idaṁ rūpaṁ rajatamiti. samyagvadanāṁ
bhāsanaparāmarśānātmakam saṁvedanam, tadvipakṣo'saṁvādaḥ.

— *Ibid.*, p. 151–52.

82 Vide, Nyāya Theory, p. 36.

83 iha bhāve eva bhāvāntarasya abhāva iti vyavahartavyaḥ iti ayaṁ tāvat aparityāyaḥ prātītiḥ
panthāḥ, tatra bhāvasya bhāvāntareṇa ya ādhāryādhārābhāvaḥ sa eva bhāvatadabhāvayoḥ.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), I, p. 377.

84 rajatasya yaḥ śūnyatākhyo dharmastadviśiṣṭāyāḥ śūktikāyāḥ yat prathanametadeva
pūrvameva pramātrantarāṇāṁ aviśayo'yamiti asya rūpasya prathanam.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 156.

85 tata eva hi śuktyādestacchūnyatvena prathanāt, na tu rajatasya abhāvarūpatayā
prathanāt tadeva hi svātantryeṇa upapādyate rajatābhāsamātrasya anyadeśādiviśiṣṭarajata-
bhāsamātratādātmyapratipannasya abhāvayogāt.

— *Ibid.*

86 nanu asti eṣā pratipattiḥ- tat rajatajñānaṁ tadeva pramāṇaṁ na abhūditi adhunaiva mayā
jñāyate śuktijñānānubhavāt hetoriti. . . . śuktijñānasvasaṁvedanāvadhaḥ rajatajñānasvasaṁ-
vedanātā api māyoparāgayogāpagamāt sthitaiva. . . . tatastasya rajatajñānasya dharmināḥ
sādhyam apramāṇātmakam ananuvṛttidharmavimarśakatvaṁ nāma yat, tat śūktikājñānasa-
tyatayā sādhyate.

— *Ibid.*, II, pp. 400–401.

87 Śūktikājñānaṁ svasaṁvedanapatitaṁ, śūktikayā arthakriyā kṛtā iti jñānaṁ yataḥ
upacīyate, tataḥ śūktikājñānaṁ balavat bhūtaṁ, arthakriyānupraveśaśūnyābhāvaparidur-
balaṁ tat svasaṁvedanapatitameva rajatabodhaṁ bādhate tadvimarśamunmūlayat.

— *Ibid.*, III, pp. 403–404.

88 kriyāsaṁbandhasamānyadravyadikkālabuddhayaḥ I satyāḥ sthairyopayogābhyāme-
kānekāśrīyā matāḥ II

— I.P.K., 2.2.1.

89 yathāruci yathārthitvaṁ yathāvyutpatti bhidyate I ābhāso'pyartha ekasminnanus-
aṁdhānasādhite II

— *Ibid.*, 2.3.3.

90 svarūpabhedāt hi sambhāvyetānyatvaṁ, na ca svarūpam arthakriyākāritvaṁ,
ityuktaṁ vakṣyate ca bahuśaḥ. svarūpaṁ ca pratyavamarśabalādekeveva bāhyāntarādāvapi
iti.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 120.

91 iha śuktyā tāvat rajatasya na kācit bādhā nāma kriyamāṇā dṛṣyate, śuktijñānena
rajatajñānam bādhyate ityapi na yuktam, svasmin viṣaye ātmani ca svarūpe dvayoh
jñānayoh pariniṣṭhitayoh viśrāntayoh anyonyaṁ virodhasya abhāvāt. . . . 'śuktikā
iti' 'na rajatamiti' jñānasya unmūlanam tadīyavirmarśātmakapramārūpavyāpārānuvar-
tanavidhvaṁsaṁ kurvat pramātari pratiṣṭhāṁ bhajate.

— *Ibid.*, I, pp. 365–368.

92 pramātrantaraviṣayatvābhāvasya akhyātireva yato bhrāntitā, tato bhrāntinivṛttasya
khyātiriti bhāvaḥ.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 156.

93 Kāśmir Śaivism, pp. 86–87.

94 Presuppositions, p. 219.

95 ghaṭagatābhāsabhedābhedadrṣṭireva ca paramārthādvayadrṣṭipraveśe upāyaḥ
samavalambanīyaḥ.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), II, p. 129.

96 nahi rajatajñānena satyarajatasya śuktervā vyavasthā kāciditi

— I.P.V.V., I, p. 243.

97 bhāsamāntaiva sattā tadasacca khyāti ceti vyāhatam.

— *Ibid.*, p. 245.

98 bhrāntabodhe'pi svasamvedanamabhrāntaṁ sarvatreti ghaṭayati.

— *Ibid.*, III, p. 73.

99 tena pratibhāsaṁ cedasti, tat tadanusāriṇyā arthakriyayā api bhāvyam prati-
bhāsamāne rūpe yadi asad syāt, pratibhāsamānataiva katham syāt.

— *Ibid.*, I, p. 245.

100 Kāśmir Śaivism, page 89.

101 Explanations with in brackets are ours.

102 Knowledge of the qualified and not the qualified knowledge (Viśiṣṭasya jñānam).

103 sarvatra ca adhyavasāyādeva arthavyavasthā sa ca bhrānta eveti. . . . pṛcchāmaḥ —
kimanena vastu prakāśyate na vā. yadi tāvat prakāśate bhrāntatvamanupapannam.

— I.P.V.V., I, p. 242.

104 saugatamate'pi śikākāro bhrāntitattvaṁ darśayan nirvikalpake tāvat na bhrāntitā,
nāpi sarvatra vikalpe iti ghaṭayati. . . . yasyā eva hi samīdho bādhakapramāṇena
viparītanīṣṭhatvamavedyate saiva anavasthīrūpatvāt bhrāntirbhavitumarhati. . .
anyathā. . . . paṭaviparītaghaṭasamvedanādi avadhīrya suhasamvedanamapi bhrāntam
syāditi.

— *Ibid.*, pp. 243–44.

105 nanu vaiparītyaṁ tattaddēśāvaṣṭambhakṛtaṁ vāstavaṁ gṛhyate.

— *Ibid.*, p. 244.

106 ekacandradeśāvaṣṭambhastu dvicandrasyeti vastutas tadviparīto'sau nirvikalpakenāpi
gṛhīta iti dvicandre nirvikalpakaṁ kasmāt na bhrāntam. tathāpi hi tannivṛttaye eva
pratyakṣalakṣaṇa'dhikaṁ bhrāntapadaṁ prākṣepi.

— *Ibid.*, p. 244.

107 kāmāṃ rajatabhrame pūrvaṃ śuktiḥ anyadeśāvaṣṭambhena na prakāśate iti aviparītaiva nirvikalpake bhātīti tatsamvedanamavikalpakam abhṛāntam. rajatādhyavasāyastu rajate śuktideśāvaṣṭambhena bhavan vastu to viparīto bhavatīti bhrāmatvaṃ tatra adhyavasāyasyaiva, na tu niyamo'yamupapadyate adhyavasāyasyaiva bhrāmarūpateti.

— *Ibid.*

108 ataḥ prathamāne nirvikalkapaviṣaye rūpe tat vaiparītyaṃ yena adhyavasāyate tadeva adhyavasāyarūpaṃ sarvatra bhrāmajñāne bhrāntamiti yuktam. nanu nirvikalpāntarameva tathā astu. netyāha 'tacca iti'. avikalpakametadeva yat prathāmātrarūpatvaṃ saṃyojanaviyojanādivyāpārastu vikalpanam, tadāha vikalpātmanastu iti bhrāntitvaṃ yuktamiti sambandhaḥ. tasya hi prathamānarūpapātītvamasti śuktau dṛṣyāyāṃ taddṛṣyaviparītena rajatena adhyavasāya aikyaṃ yadā karoti, tadā bhrāntatvaṃ. nīle tu dṛṣye nīlenaiva vikalpyena aikye kā bhrāntatā.

— *Ibid.*, pp. 246–47.

109 Vide, Nyāya Theory, pp. 37–40.

110 (a) ityapūrṇakhyātīrūpā akhyātīreva bhrāntitattvaṃ tadvaśena hyasadviparītaṃ nirvācyādikhyātayo'pi ucyantām.

— I.P.V. (Bh.), p. 123.

Bhaskara comments on the word Ādi — "ādīśabdena ātmakhyātigrahaṇam"

— Bhās., II, p. 123.

Here Bhāskara discusses the five theories of error in brief, but fails to see in them evolution of a logical pattern.

(b) 'athāpi'-ityādinā 'astyevaṃ'-ityantena granthena asatkhyātim asthirakhyātim asādhāranakhyātim anarthakriyākārikhyātim viparītakhyātim ca krameṇa paryavasāyā 'kevalamasau' ityādinā tāmapi asatkhyātau viśramayya akhyātiparamārthatāṃ nirvāhayiṣyati.

— I.P.V.V., III, p. 152.

(c) evam akhyātīrūpatve bhrānteḥ sthite'satkhyātiviparītakhyātināmadheyādhānamapi pratibhāsapratyavamarśabalāyātam, tathā paramārthavastuvādena na sahyamityāha 'tadevam' ityādi.

— *Ibid.*, p. 154.

111 ātmakhyātirasatkhyātīrākyātiḥ khyātīranyathā I tathā'nirvacanīyakhyātīrītye-tatkhyātipañcakam II

112 akhyātivādapadavīprasthāne'pi.

— M.M.P., p. 46.

113 abhinavaguptapādā api tāmenāmakhyātimevāṅgīkurvanti evaṃ ca prāyo gurumatasammato'khyātivāda evābhinavaguptamaheśvarānandādīnam saṃmataḥ.

— M.M., introduction, p. 'Tha'.

114 I am thankful to Prof. H. P. Alper of the Southern Methodist University, Dallas for going through the paper and suggesting various improvements.

THE FIVE KHANDHAS: THEIR TREATMENT IN THE NIKĀYAS AND EARLY ABHIDHAMMA

The five *khandhas* — *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras*, *viññāṇa* — clearly constitute one of those primary lists of terms that form the basis of much of Buddhist teaching as presented in the Pali Canon. A major *vagga* of the *Samyutta-nikāya* is devoted almost entirely to their treatment,¹ while they also feature repeatedly as categories of analysis in the early *abhidhamma* texts. Yet such accounts of the five *khandhas* as are found in contemporary studies of Indian Buddhism are for the most part of a summary nature, confining themselves to a brief discussion of each of the *khandhas* and the part they play in the breaking down of man into various constituent elements.² It does not seem inappropriate in such circumstances to attempt a clearer assessment of the place and understanding of the five *khandhas* in early Buddhist literature.³

Although the *khandhas* feature widely in the Pali Canon, they are found most characteristically treated in the *Majjhima-* and *Samyutta-nikāyas*, and certain sections of the *abhidhamma* texts. In the *Vinaya-piṭaka* and *Dīghanikāya* they are mentioned really only in passing, while in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* they feature only sporadically, conspicuous by their absence from the section on “fives”.⁴ When we begin to consider as a whole the body of *nikāya* material concerned with the *khandhas*, what we find is the sequence of terms *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* being treated according to a number of recurring formulae which are interwoven and applied in various contexts. Out of this there gradually emerges a more or less comprehensive account of the five *khandhas*. It is to a consideration of the principal *khandha* formulae that the greater part of this paper is devoted, while reference is also made to the early *abhidhamma* material where this is found to be of help in elucidating the general understanding of the *khandhas* in early Buddhist thought.

The sequence *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras*, *viññāṇa* is largely taken as given in the *nikāyas*. We find very little in terms of formal explanation of either the sequence as a whole or of the individual terms. What there is, is confined to a few stock and somewhat terse definitions.⁵ But before turning

to the *nikāya khandha* formulae, it is perhaps as well to comment briefly on these five basic terms and also, at slightly greater length, on the subject of *khandha* and *upādānakhandha*.

Rūpa is typically defined as the four elements earth, water, fire and wind, and *rūpa* dependent upon (*upādāya*) them. What is clear, both from the *nikāyas*' elaboration of this by reference to parts of the human body, and from the list of twenty-seven items of *rūpa* distinguished in the *Dhammasaṅgani*, is the extent to which the early Buddhist account of *rūpa* focuses on the physical world as experienced by a sentient being — the terms of reference are decidedly body-endowed-with-consciousness (*saviññāṇaka kāya*).⁶ In view of this, the tendency to understand and translate *rūpa* as "matter" is rather misleading.⁷ The connotations of the word "matter" in the Western philosophical tradition, its association with concepts such as inert "stuff" or "substance", are hardly appropriate either to the treatment of *rūpa* in the *nikāyas* and early *abhidhamma*, or to *rūpa*'s literal meanings of "form", "shape" or "appearance".

The translation of *vedanā* as "feeling" seems more straightforward, although the *nikāyas*' understanding of *vedanā* is not without its difficulties. It is usually defined as being pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant (*dukkha*), or not-unpleasant-not-pleasant (*adukkhamasukha*), and is said to be either bodily (*kāyika*) or mental (*cetasika*).⁸ The significance of the three kinds of *vedanā* seems to lie in their being seen as three basic reactions to experience which possess a certain potential to influence and govern an individual's subsequent responses in either skilful or unskilful ways.⁹

The stock definition of *saññā* in the *nikāyas* illustrates its function by reference to various colours. It is this, it seems, that has led translators to render *saññā* in the context of the *khandhas* as "perception". Yet, as Alex Wayman has pointed out, there are a number of passages in which the translation "perception" fails to make sense of the *nikāyas*' usage of *saññā* as a technical term. Wayman suggests that it is the word "idea" that should regularly be employed as a translation of *saññā*.¹⁰ This certainly seems to make better sense of the technical usage in connection with the *khandhas*. A *saññā* of, say, "blue" then becomes, not so much a passive awareness of the visual sensation we subsequently agree to call "blue", but rather the active noting of that sensation, and the recognising of it as "blue" — that is, more or less, the idea of "blueness". This appears to be in general how *saññā* is understood in the commentarial literature.¹¹

The *nikāyas* define *saṃkhāras* primarily in terms of will or volition (*cetanā*); they also describe them as putting together (*abhisamkharonti*) each of the *khandhas* in turn into something that is put-together (*saṃkhata*).⁵ In this way *saṃkhāras* are presented as conditioning factors conceived of as active volitional forces. *Cetanā* is, of course, understood as *kamma* on the mental level,¹² and in the early *abhidhamma* texts all those mental factors that are considered to be specifically skilful (*kusala*) or unskilful (*akusala*) fall within the domain of *saṃkhārakkhandha*.¹³ Thus it is that the composition of *saṃkhārakkhandha* leads¹⁴ the way in determining whether a particular arising of consciousness constitutes a skilful or an unskilful *kamma*. All this accords well with the *nikāyas*' singling out of *cetanā* as characteristic of the nature of *saṃkhāras*.

In many *nikāya* passages *viññāṇa* is apparently used generally to characterise the fact of self-awareness or self-consciousness.¹⁵ An interesting section of the *Mahāvedalla-sutta* is devoted to a discussion of the nature of the relationship between *viññāṇa*, *vedanā* and *saññā*.¹⁶ *Viññāṇa* is here characterised as discriminating (*viñānāti*) the three feelings, *vedanā* as feeling (*vedeti*) the three feelings, and *saññā* as noting (*sañjānāti*) yellow, blue, etc. The passage then goes on to say that these three states (*dharmas*) should be considered closely connected (*samsatṭha*) since "what one feels, that one notes; what one notes, that one discriminates". Thus *vedanā*, *saññā* and *viññāṇa* are here apparently viewed as operating together as different aspects of the process of being aware of a particular object of consciousness. *Viññāṇa* can perhaps best be characterised as awareness or consciousness of things in relation to each other; this seems to relate both the notion of self awareness and that of discriminating various objects.

Finally we may note how the *khandha-saṃyutta* explains *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* each in terms of six classes corresponding to consciousness that is related to the five senses of eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, and sixthly mind⁵ — that is, the six internal spheres of sense (*saḷāyatana*).

KHANDHA AND UPĀDĀNAKKHANDHA

Within the *nikāyas* the five terms *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* are variously designated both *khandhas*¹⁷ and *upādānakkhandhas*, and in addition are sometimes treated in sequence without either designation.¹⁸

A *khandha-saṃyutta* passage states that the *khandhas* are to be considered

upādānakkhandhas only when they are with *āsavas* (*sāsava*) and subject to grasping (*upādāniya*).¹⁹ In another passage that recurs several times in the *nikāyas*, the question is asked whether *upādāna* should be considered the same as the *upādānakkhandhas* or whether there is *upādāna* apart from them.²⁰ In reply it is stated that although *upādāna* is not the same as the five *upādānakkhandhas* there is no *upādāna* apart from them; *upādāna* is then defined as "whatever is will and passion (*chandarāga*) in respect of the five *upādānakkhandhas*". Clearly the *nikāyas* understand *upādāna* as some form of attachment that falls within the general compass of the *khandhas*. The early *abhidhamma* texts clarify *upādāna*'s relationship to the *khandhas* under three principal headings: active grasping (*upādāna*), subject to grasping (*upādāniya*), and the product of grasping (*upādiṇṇa*). *Upādāna* as an active force is confined to *saṃkhārakkhandha*, although all five *khandhas* are potentially the objects of *upādāna* — that is, are *upādāniya*; similarly all five *khandhas* are said to be in some measure the products of *upādāna* — that is, *upādiṇṇa*.²¹ By following procedures which are adumbrated in the early *abhidhamma* texts, it is possible to detail further *upādāna*'s relationship to the *khandhas*. The text of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* begins by setting out the triplets and couplets of the *abhidhamma mātikā*, and then by way of explaining the categories of the first triplet goes on to detail the constitution of various arisings of consciousness (*citta*); the categories of the remaining triplets and couplets are explained only in brief. By treating the *cittas* in terms of the categories of the relevant triplets and couplets exactly when and in what measure the three terms *upādāna*, *upādāniya* and *upādiṇṇa* apply to the *khandhas* might be specified in detail. The early *abhidhamma* texts also state that *rūpakkhanda* is always considered to be with *āsavas* and subject to grasping, and that the only time when the four mental *khandhas* are not such — that is, in *nikāya* terminology, are not *upādānakkhandhas* — is on the occasions of the four *ariya* paths and fruits.²²

Returning to the immediate problem of how exactly early Buddhist thought conceives of *upādāna*, we find that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* by way of explanation of greed (*lobha*) lists a whole series of terms including passion (*rāga*), craving (*taṇhā*) and *upādāna*.²³ It does not appear that these terms are intended to be understood as mere equivalents either in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* or in the *nikāyas*. Within the *nikāyas* each of these terms is characteristically employed in particular contexts with more or less fixed terms of reference. Thus the *khandhas* are not designated the *lobhakkhandhas* or the *taṇhakkhandhas*.

for example. It seems to follow from this that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* intends *rāga*, *taṇhā* and *upādāna* to be understood as particular manifestations of greed in general.

The usage of the term *upādāna* in Pali seems to involve the association of the following range of ideas: "taking up", "grasping", and hence "feeding", and lastly "food", "fuel" and "basis".²⁴ Since the term *upādāna* is used in such close association with the *khandha* analysis, and since that analysis is used in the *nikāyas* especially as a way of looking at existence and experience at the level of the apparently stable individual being,²⁵ the notion of *upādāna* and the significance of its relationship to the *khandhas* can, I think, be summed up as follows. As grasping, *upādāna* is that greed which is the fuel and basis for the manifestation and coming together of the *khandhas* in order that they might constitute a given individual or being. This is, of course, exactly the truth of the arising of *dukkha* (see below). But in particular *upādāna* seems to be seen as greed of a degree and intensity that is able to support the reappearance and coming together of the *khandhas* from one existence to the next. To put it another way, if craving has attained to the degree of *upādāna*, then the reappearance of the *khandhas* in the form of an individual being inevitably follows. This tallies quite precisely with *upādāna*'s position in the sequence of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, falling as it does after *vedanā* and *taṇhā*, and before becoming (*bhava*) and birth (*jāti*). Indeed a number of *nikāya khandha* formulae link directly into the *paṭiccasamuppāda* chain at the point of *upādāna*:

For one who finds pleasure in *rūpa* . . . *vedanā* . . . *saññā* . . . *saṃkhāras* . . . *viññāṇa*, who welcomes them and becomes attached to them, there arises delight (*nandi*); that which is delight in respect of *rūpa* (etc.) is *upādāna*; for him dependent on *upādāna* there is becoming, dependent on becoming there is birth, dependent on birth there is old age and death — grief, sorrow, lamentation and despair come into being. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.²⁶

To sum up, the term *upādānakkhandha* signifies the general way in which the *khandhas* are bound up with *upādāna*; the simple *khandha*, universally applicable, is used in the *nikāyas* and especially the *abhidhamma* texts as a neutral term, allowing the specific aspects of, for example, *upādāna*'s relationship to the *khandhas* to be elaborated.

THE PRINCIPAL KHANDHA FORMULAE

(i) The "Totality" Formula

The totality of each *khandha* is referred to in the *nikāyas* according to the following formula: Whatever *rūpa* . . . *vedanā* . . . *saññā* . . . *saṃkhāras* . . . *viññāna* are past, future or present, within or without, gross or subtle, inferior or refined, are far or near.²⁷ The various terms of this formula are not explained further in the *nikāyas*, but the *Vibhaṅga*, which takes this formula as characteristic of the *suttanta* account of the *khandhas*, furnishes us with an illustration of their application to each of the *khandhas* in turn.²⁸

Leaving aside the question of the exact understanding of the nature of time in early Buddhist texts, the collective term past (*atīta*), not-come (*anāgata*), just arisen (*paccuppanna*) is straightforward.

The pair within/without (*ajjhattam/bahiddhā*) is explained as relative, having as its point of reference any given individual: one's own *khandhas* are within, while the *khandhas* of other beings are without. Interestingly, when this pair of terms is thus applied to *rūpakkhanda*, inanimate *rūpa* is left unaccounted for,²⁹ as is recognised by the commentarial appendix to the *Dhammasaṅgani*, which adds that it should be understood as without.³⁰ This lack of attention to inanimate *rūpa* further illustrates the way in which the analysis of *rūpa* centres around the sentient being. This orientation is, of course, relevant to the *khandha* analysis as a whole.

As far as their application to the four mental *khandhas* is concerned, the remaining pairs of terms are also explained as relative. That is to say, a particular manifestation of *vedanā*, for example, is distinguished as gross or subtle (*oḷārika/sukhuma*), inferior or refined (*hīna/pañīta*), far or near (*dure/santike*) in relation to another particular manifestation of *vedanā*. The principles according to which the distinctions between gross and subtle etc. are made involve the discernment of increasing degrees of excellence within the compass of the four mental *khandhas*. For example, although in general not-unpleasant-not-pleasant feeling is said to be subtle when compared to pleasant and unpleasant feeling, pleasant feeling occurring in conjunction with one of the four *ariya* paths or fruits would be subtle in relation to not-unpleasant-not-pleasant feeling occurring in conjunction with the fourth *jhāna* of the form sphere, since the former is without *āsavas* while the latter is with *āsavas*.

As for the application of these pairs of terms to *rūpakkhanda*, although the

inferior/refined pair is again treated as merely relative, the *Dhammasaṅgani* and *Vibhaṅga* can be interpreted as taking each part of the two pairs gross/subtle and far/near as referring to fixed items in the *abhidhamma* list of twenty-seven kinds of *rūpa*. Yet, as Karunadasa has pointed out, the *Vibhaṅga* should possibly be read as indicating that the far/near pair could be applied in a number of different ways, and moreover the various ancient schools of *abhidharma* are not consistent in the way they interpret the application of these terms to *rūpa*.³¹ One is left with the suspicion that in the case of *rūpakkhanda* too these terms were employed in a number of different ways to indicate the variety to be discerned in *rūpa*. Whether or not the details of the *Vibhaṅga* exposition are accepted as valid for the *nikāyas*, it seems clear that this formula is intended to indicate how each *khandha* is to be seen as a class of states, manifold in nature and displaying a considerable variety and also a certain hierarchy.

(ii) *The khandhas and the Four Noble Truths*

It has been usual for scholars to explain the *khandhas* as the analysis of the human individual into psycho-physical phenomena. Yet an expression of the matter in just such terms is not exactly characteristic of the texts. The preferred *nikāya* explanation of the *khandhas* would seem to be in terms of the first of the four noble truths — the *khandhas* are presented as one way of defining what is *dukkha*. The stock *nikāya* statement of the truths explains *dukkha* as “in short the five *upādānakkhandhas*”.³² What is interesting is the way in which various terms are substituted for *dukkha*. For example, we find in the *khandha-saṃyutta*:

I will teach you, *bhikkhus*, *sakkāya* (the existing body), its arising, its ceasing, and the way leading to its ceasing. And what, *bhikkhus*, is *sakkāya*? The five *upādānakkhandhas* should be said.³³

The well known “burden” *sutta* is also in principle a variation on the four-truth theme. The burden (*bhāra*) is explained as the five *upādānakkhandhas* in accordance with its standing for *dukkha*, while clinging to the burden (*bhārādāna*) and laying down the burden (*bhāranikkhepana*) are explained according to the standard definitions of the second and third truths respectively. The troublesome taking up of the burden (*bhārahāra*), defined as the person (*puggala*), is inserted between the first and the second truths, while the fourth truth is omitted altogether; thus the usual pattern is departed from.³⁴

Another frequently quoted *nikāya* statement that follows the structure of the four truths substitutes world (*loka*) for *dukkha*:

In this fathom-long body endowed with sentience and mind, I declare the world, its arising, its ceasing and the way leading to its ceasing.³⁵

In addition, we find *dukkha* as the first truth defined, not in terms of the five *upādānakkhandhas*, but in terms of the six internal spheres of sense (*ajjhattika āyatana*).

Within this general context can be placed the verse attributed to the nun Vajira and referred to in the *Milindapañha*.³⁷ This states that just as the word "chariot" is applied to what is really a sum of parts, a being (*satta*) is the conventional designation (*sammuti*) for the *khandhas*; there is, in fact, just *dukkha*. A *khandha-saṃyutta* play on the word *satta* finds a hidden significance in this explanation:

"A being" (*satta*) is said; in what measure is "a being" said? Whatever is will, passion, delight and craving in respect of *rūpa . . . vedanā . . . saññā . . . saṃkhāras . . . viññāṇa* is being attached (*satta*) thereto, is being strongly attached (*visatta*) thereto; for this reason "a being" is said.³⁸

What begins to emerge, then, is a series of correspondences: *dukkha*, the five *upādānakkhandhas*, *sakkāya*, *bhāra*, *loka*, the six internal *āyatanas*, *satta*. All these expressions apparently represent different ways of characterising the given data of experience or conditioned existence, and are also seen as drawing attention to the structure and the sustaining forces behind it all. In this way the *khandhas* begin to take on something of a wider significance than is perhaps appreciated when they are seen merely as a breaking down of the human individual into constituent parts.

By way of expanding on the theme of the *khandhas* as *dukkha*, a whole series of designations is applied to them both collectively and individually. Most frequent in this respect is the standard sequence of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā* (see below). To this a fourth term, *saṃkhata* (conditioned), and also a fifth, *vadhaka* (murderous), are occasionally added.³⁹ One treatment describes each *khandha* in turn as, in addition to *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā*, *roga* (sickness), *gaṇḍa* (a boil), *salla* (a barb), *agha* (misery), *ābādha* (an affliction), *para* (other), *paloka* (unstable), *suñña* (empty).⁴⁰ The *khandhas* are also called embers (*kukkuḷa*); they are on fire (*āditta*); they are Māra, and by grasping them one is bound to Māra.⁴¹ All this acts as vivid illustration of the danger inherent in attachment to the *khandhas*. Images of disease,

bodily affliction and burning abound in the *nikāyas*; the effect in the present context is one of alluding to and drawing together various *nikāya* passages.

Formulae which may be considered as adaptations of the four-noble-truth structure are used to take up the theme of the *khandhas* as *dharmas* that are to be fully understood (*pariññeyya*).⁴² Thus ignorance (*avijjā*) is defined as not knowing in turn *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras*, *viññāṇa*, their arising, their ceasing and the way leading to their ceasing; conversely knowledge is knowing all of these.⁴³ In similar vein is the formula that runs: Thus is *rūpa* (etc.), thus is its arising (*samudaya*), thus is its passing away (*atthagama*). This is one of the most frequently occurring *nikāya khandha* formulae, and is usually found as an explanation of the expression, "he dwells contemplating the rise and fall of the five *upādānakkhandhas*" — an expression used especially in contexts where the process of the gaining of that insight that constitutes the destruction of the *āsavas* is being described.⁴⁴

The theme of the arising and passing away of the *khandhas* is interwoven in a cycle of *khandha-samyutta suttas* with that of their pleasure (*assāda*), their danger (*ādīnava*) and the escape from them (*nissaraṇa*); this apparently brings together all the various aspects which make for the full understanding of the nature of the *khandhas*.⁴⁵

(iii) *The anicca-dukkha-anattā Formula*

Perhaps the most well known of the *khandha* formulae is that which demonstrates *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* in turn as *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā*. In its fullest form this treatment of the *khandhas* is found in the *Vinaya-piṭaka* placed as a second utterance after the Benares discourse on the four noble truths.⁴⁶ At its core is a series of questions and answers in the following pattern:

What do you think, is *rūpa* (etc.) permanent or impermanent? Impermanent. That which is impermanent, is that suffering or happiness? Suffering. Is it right to regard that which is suffering, of a changeable nature, as "This is mine, I am this, this is my self (*attā*)"? No.

This series of questions and answers, applied to *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa*, occurs regularly throughout the *khandha-samyutta* and also elsewhere in the *nikāyas*.⁴⁷ Significantly, as a method of demonstrating *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā* the formula's use is not confined to the five *khandhas*, but is also applied by the *nikāyas* to a whole series of categories.

In the *Cūḷa-Rāhulovāda-sutta* we find it applied to eye, visible forms, eye-contact and to “what is connected with *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* and arises dependent upon eye-contact”; ear, nose, tongue, body and mind are all treated in a parallel fashion.⁴⁸ The *sutta* thus understands thirty consecutive rehearsals of the formula. The *saḷāyatana-saṃyutta* also employs this formula in respect of a similar list of categories.⁴⁹ The *Rāhula-saṃyutta* treats a total of fifty-nine categories in this manner: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind; the six corresponding kinds of object; six corresponding classes each of *viññāṇa*, *saṃphassa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *sañcetanā* and *taṇhā*; six elements (*dhātu*), namely earth, fire, wind, water, consciousness, and space; finally the five *khandhas*.⁵⁰ Bearing in mind that the six classes of *vedanā*, *saññā*, *sañcetanā* and *viññāṇa* are also used to explain the appropriate *khandhas*, it is apparent that the *khandhas* feature widely in this exhaustive treatment apart from their appearance at its close. One is tempted to suggest that this seemingly repetitive list conveys a certain movement from the particular to the more general along the following lines. According to its *nikāya* definition, eye, visible forms and eye-consciousness together constitute eye-contact – similarly for the other senses. Dependent upon sense contact there arises subsequent *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa*. The significance of the appearance of the *khandha* sequence at the close of the *Rāhula-saṃyutta* list seems to lie in the fact that it is seen as integrating and synthesising what comes before into a whole – a whole that is still, however, *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā*.

(iv) *Attā, anattā and sakkāyadiṭṭhi*

The conclusion that the *anicca-dukkha-anattā* formula focuses upon is that each of the *khandhas* is to be seen by right wisdom as it really is: “This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my *attā*.” It is the attainment of this vision that distinguishes the *ariya sāvaka* (noble hearer) from the *assutavanta puthujjana* (ignorant ordinary man).⁵¹ A fourfold formula applied to each of the *khandhas* in turn indicates twenty ways in which the *puthujjana* falls short of this vision: he views *rūpa* (etc.) as the *attā*, the *attā* as possessing *rūpa* (etc.), *rūpa* (etc.) as in the *attā*, the *attā* as in *rūpa* (etc.).⁵² In both the *nikāyas* and the *abhidhamma* texts these twenty ways of viewing the *attā* in relation to the *khandhas* are used to explain in detail *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* (the view that the body is real).⁵³ No doubt they are seen as operating at various levels in the psyche of the *puthujjana*, yet that they are seen as having a particular

relevance to notions of the *attā* associated with various meditation attainments seems likely, given the importance of such concerns in the *nikāya* context. Thus a passage that occurs several times in the *nikāyas* treats the four *jhānas* and the first three formless attainments successively, stating that whatever there is connected with *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* at those levels is to be seen as (amongst other things) *anattā*.⁵⁴ This is said to result either in the destruction of the *āsavas*, i.e. arahatship, or in the abandoning of the five lower fetters (*orambhāgiya saṃyojana*), i.e. the attainment of nonreturnership. *Sakkāyadiṭṭhi* is, of course, counted among these five lower fetters.

That the abandoning of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* does not of itself involve the complete destruction of the *āsavas* is a point taken up in a *khandha-samyutta* discourse⁵⁵ in which the venerable Khemaka is asked by a number of *theras* whether or not he views anything as *attā* or as belonging to the *attā* in respect of the five *upādānakkhandhas*. Khemaka replies that he does not; he is, however, not an arahat since the general notion "I am" still persists within the compass of the *khandhas*, although it does not take the form of a specific view, "I am this". He concludes, "when the five lower fetters have been abandoned . . . there yet remains a residuum of the conceit 'I am', of the desire 'I am', of the tendency 'I am'."

The abandoning of the twenty modes of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* is, then, a central element in the transition from *puthujjana* to *ariya sāvakas*. Any sense of individual existence that subsequently persists, is of too subtle a nature to act as the basis for a definite view which might identify the *attā* with all five *khandhas* or any one of them.

The formula of the twenty modes of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* is also employed in the *nikāyas* to explain in detail the statement that, "whatever *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* view the *attā* in diverse ways, they all view the five *upādānakkhandhas* or one of them".⁵⁶ In other words, there can be no specific views concerning the *attā* apart from the twenty ways of viewing the *attā* in relation to the five *khandhas*. Now, a number of scholars have drawn attention to the fact that the *nikāyas* fail to categorically deny the *attā* and declare only that the *khandhas* are *anattā*.⁵⁷ Yet, when this is taken in the context of the former statement, it must be added that the *nikāyas* refuse to allow the *attā* as a meaningful concept apart from the five *khandhas*, that is apart from views or notions of the *attā* that are ultimately to be abandoned. The *attā* is in this way squeezed out to the *nikāyas*' ultimate frame of reference,

and deliberately confined to the level of speculations and views. This can be seen, up to a point, as a challenge to those *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* who maintained views concerning the *attā* to explain the exact nature of that *attā*. Their response seems to have been to accuse the Buddha of declaring the destruction of the existing being, or to demand an answer to the question of whether or not the Tathāgata exists after death. The Tathāgata is untraceable (*anānuvejja*), the question of his existence or not after death is unexplained (*avyākata*), was the reply.⁵⁸

(v) *The Arising of dukkha: The khandhas as paṭiccasamuppanna*

Precisely because the *puthujjana* views the *khandhas* as his *attā*, and is attached to them through the workings of “will, passion, delight, craving, and that clinging and grasping which are determinations, biases and tendencies of mind”,⁵⁹ there arises for him “grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair”. The *nikāyas* thus convey a picture of a complete spectrum and network of attachment, and, as indicated above in the course of the discussion of *upādāna*, a number of *khandha* treatments link directly into the *paṭiccasamuppāda* chain. The continued manifestation of the *khandhas* is thus presented as the direct consequence of attachment in respect of the *khandhas*.

In addition to this kind of treatment, which has as its scale a lifetime or a series of lifetimes, a number of *nikāya* passages focus attention on the process of the arising of the *khandhas* in the context of a given sequence of consciousness. A section of the *Mahāhatthipadopamā-sutta* describes the case of one who knows that there is nothing in respect of *rūpa* of which he can say “I” or “mine” or “I am”.⁶⁰ If he is insulted by others, he knows, “There has arisen for me this unpleasant *vedanā* born of ear-contact; it is caused (*paṭicca*), not uncaused (*appaṭicca*).” He is thus said to see that contact (*phassa*) is *anicca*, that *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* are *anicca*. The *sutta* goes on to state that a manifestation (*pātubhāva*) in any section of consciousness (*viññāṇabhāga*) is to be considered as the result of three conditions, namely that the appropriate bodily organ — eye, ear, nose, tongue, body or mind — is intact (*aparibhiñṇa*), that corresponding external objects — visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles or mental states — come within its range (*āpātha*), and finally that there is an appropriate bringing together (*saṃannāhāra*).⁶¹ When these conditions are fulfilled “whatever *rūpa* that thus comes into being is included (*saṃgahaṃ gacchati*) in *rūpupādānakkhandha*”; likewise for *vedanā* and *vedanupādānakkhandha*,

and so on. The *sutta* understands all this as illustrating *paṭiccasamuppāda*, and comments that what is causally arisen (*paṭiccasamuppanna*) is the five *upādānakkhandhas*.

This kind of treatment, then, considers the arising of the *khandhas* dependent on any one of the six internal sense spheres. The sequence of terms that thus emerges — (*rūpa*), *phassa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras*, *viññāṇa* — parallels the initial pentad of *dhammas* that the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* lists for the arising of each consciousness, namely *phassa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *cetanā*, *citta*,⁶² and invites a certain comparison. The precise nature of the time scale of the consciousness process envisaged by the *nikāya* treatment is ambiguous — perhaps intentionally so, while the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* apparently reduces the scale to its base unit: the individual arising of *citta* at any given time (*samaya*).⁶³ Yet what is common to both the *suttanta* and *abhidhamma* material here is the concern to consider how the *khandhas* or how *dhammas* stand in relationship to each other, how they are conditioned and sustained within a particular consciousness sequence, however that might be conceived.

THE KHANDHA-VIBHAṄGA

The *khandha-vibhaṅga* is the first of the eighteen chapters that make up the *Vibhaṅga*. It is divided into three sections, the first of which, dealing with the *suttanta* treatment of the *khandhas*, has already been referred to above. The second section, the *abhidhamma-bhājanīya*,⁶⁴ involves the analysis of the totality of each of the five *khandhas* in turn according to how each is, in the first place, a whole, and then how each is divisible into two kinds, three kinds, four kinds and so on. This procedure is taken as far as an elevenfold division in the case of *rūpakkhanda*, and as far as a tenfold division in the case of the other *khandhas*, although for the latter the text subsequently goes on to indicate additional ways of sevenfold, twenty-fourfold, thirtyfold and manifold division. The bulk of the section is taken up with the application of the relevant triplets and couplets from the *abhidhamma mātikā* to each of the four mental *khandhas*; this provides a whole series of ways of threefold and twofold division. By taking each applicable triplet with each applicable couplet in turn, according to all possible permutations, the *Vibhaṅga* indicates in the region of one thousand different sets of divisions for each of these four *khandhas* — the precise number varying according to the number of triplets and couplets relevant in each case.

The final section of the *khandha-vibhaṅga*, the *pañhāpucchaka*, takes the form of a series of questions and answers, again concerned with how the *khandhas* relate to the *abhidhamma* triplets and couplets, and as such forms an extension to the *abhidhamma-bhājanīya* treatment.

The emphasis in the *khandha-vibhaṅga* is once again on the complexity and manifold nature of the *khandhas*. In addition, taken in conjunction with the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* analysis of the various individual arisings of *citta* in terms of the triplets and couplets, the *khandha-vibhaṅga* provides a comprehensive method of classification by which any given conditioned *dhamma* can be classed as *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* or *viññāṇa*, and can be precisely analysed and assessed within the whole scheme of *abhidhamma* and the Buddhist path.

KHANDHA-ĀYATANA-DHĀTU

For the *abhidhamma* texts such as the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga* and *Dhātukathā* the *khandhas* form one of the primary category headings by means of which *dhammas* may be classified. Along with the twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus*, the five *khandhas* constitute a triad among these *abhidhamma* headings in that they represent three different methods of classifying the totality of *dhammas* that make up conditioned existence. However, unlike the *khandhas*, the *āyatanas* and *dhātus* also take into account the unconditioned, *nibbāna*.⁶⁵ The other headings employed in the *abhidhamma* texts relate, for the most part, to the more specific aspects of Buddhist spiritual practice, for example the *indriyas*, the limbs of *jhāna* and the eightfold path, and so on.

As an indication of the importance of the *khandha-āyatana-dhātu* triad in early Buddhism, it is worth noting a phrase repeated several times in the verses of the *Khuddaka-nikāya*: He/she taught me *dhamma* — the *khandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*.⁶⁶ Yet when we turn to the four primary *nikāyas*, although the twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus* are specifically mentioned in one or two places,⁶⁷ it is significant that the *Samyutta-nikāya* fails to provide three corresponding treatments of the *khandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus* as might have been expected. What we do find in the *Samyutta-nikāya* are the *khandha-samyutta* and the *salāyatana-samyutta* — two exhaustive treatments, each running to some two hundred pages in the PTS editions and each dominating its respective *vagga*. A much slighter *dhātu-samyutta*,

found in the second *vagga* (which is dominated by the treatment of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula), in fact concerns itself with the eighteen *dhātus* only briefly at its opening, being for the most part devoted to the treatment of the various other items also sometimes termed *dhātus* in the *nikāyas*.⁶⁸ On closer examination the *saḷāyatana-saṃyutta*, for its part, does not strictly constitute a treatment of the twelve *āyatanas*, but seems rather to represent an approach which is relevant to analysis, from the point of view of *abhidhamma*, by both *āyatana* and *dhātu*.

All this suggests that the *khandha-āyatana-dhātu* triad is not standard in quite the same way for the *Samyutta-nikāya* as it is for the early *abhidhamma* texts. Whether this is best understood as reflecting a difference in the respective concerns of the *nikāya* and *abhidhamma* texts, or whether it indicates that this triad evolved as standard only after the composition of the bulk of the *nikāya* material, is a question that goes beyond and scope of the present paper. Whatever the case, as A. K. Warder has pointed out,⁶⁹ the *khandha-āyatana-dhātu* triad is common to all schools of Buddhism, and is not something confined to the Theravādin *abhidhamma*.

CONCLUSION

To explain the *khandhas* as the Buddhist analysis of man, as has been the tendency of contemporary scholars, may not be incorrect as far as it goes, yet it is to fix upon one facet of the treatment of the *khandhas* at the expense of others. Thus A. B. Keith could write, "By a division which . . . has certainly no merit, logical or psychological, the individual is divided into five aggregates or groups."⁷⁰ However, the five *khandhas*, as treated in the *nikāyas* and early *abhidhamma*, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* are presented as five aspects of an individual being's experience of the world; each *khandha* is seen as representing a complex class of phenomena that is continuously arising and falling away in response to processes of consciousness based on the six spheres of sense. They thus become the five *upādānakkhandhas*, encompassing both grasping and all that is grasped. As the *upādānakkhandhas* these five classes of states acquire a

momentum, and continue to manifest and come together at the level of individual being from one existence to the next. For any given individual there are, then, only these five *upādānakkhandhas* — they define the limits of his world, they are his world. This subjective orientation of the *khandhas* seems to arise out of the simple fact that, for the *nikāyas*, this is how the world is experienced; that is to say, it is not seen primarily as having metaphysical significance.

Accounts of experience and the phenomena of existence are complex in the early Buddhist texts; the subject is one that is tackled from different angles and perspectives. The treatment of *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa* represents one perspective, the treatment of the six spheres of sense is another.⁷¹ As we have seen, in the *nikāya* formulae the two merge, complementing each other in the task of exposing the complex network of conditions that is, for the *nikāyas*, existence. In the early *abhidhamma* texts *khandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu* equally become complementary methods of analysing, in detail, the nature of conditioned existence.

The approach adopted above has been to consider the treatment of the five *khandhas* in the *nikāyas* and early *abhidhamma* texts as a more or less coherent whole. This has incidentally revealed something of the underlying structure and dynamic of early Buddhist teaching — an aspect of the texts that has not, it seems, either been clearly appreciated or properly understood, and one that warrants further consideration.

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NOTES

Acknowledgement is due to L. S. Cousins for advice and criticism. Abbreviations of Pali texts are those of *A Critical Pali Dictionary, Epilegomena to Vol. I*, Copenhagen, 1948.

¹ The *Khandha-vagga* (S III): *khandha-samyutta*, S III 1–188, followed by the *Rādha-samyutta*, S III 188–200, which also treats the *khandhas* in all its *suttas*.

² E.g. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1914, pp. 39–56; A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1923, p. 85; E. Conze, *Buddhism — Its Essence and Development*, 2nd pbk ed., Oxford, 1974, p. 14; N. Smart, *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*, London, 1964, pp. 42–5; T. O. Ling, *A History of Religion East and West*, London, 1968, pp. 86–7, 131. Fuller discussions seem to be lacking, although some further details may be gleaned from the following: K. Bhattacharya, *L'Ārman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien*, Paris, 1973, pp. 109–10, and 'Upadhi, upādi et upādāna', *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*, Paris, 1968, pp. 81–95; Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'Khandha and Upādānakkhandha', *Pali Buddhist*

Review, Vol. I, No. 1, 1976, pp. 91–102; E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, London, 1962, passim; E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, Louvain, 1958, passim, and *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, Vol. IV, pp. 1995–2042; A. O. Lovejoy, 'The Buddhist technical terms *upādāna* and *upādisesa*', JAOS, XIX, 1897, pp. 126–36; A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, 2nd ed., Delhi, 1982, passim.

³ The principal sources are the four primary *nikāyas* (D, M, S, A) with the first three works of the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* (Dhs, Vibh, Dhātuk) taken as representative of the early *abhidhamma*.

⁴ Twenty-four M suttas contain some reference to the *khandhas*. They are also mentioned at Vin I 10 (=S V 420) and Vin I 12 (=S III 66), and at D II 35, 301, 305, 307; A. K. Warder, *op. cit.* p. 86, notes that Chinese versions of the (*Mahā*-) *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* omit the references to the *khandhas*; the *khandhas* are also found in various contexts in the summaries of *nikāya* teaching that constitute the *Saṅgīti*- and *Dasuttara-suttas*: D III 223, 233, 278, 286.

⁵ E.g. *khandha-samyutta* definitions, S III 59–60, 86–7.

⁶ Cf. the following passages: M I 185–90, S III 86, Dhs 134–46.

⁷ Taken for granted and left largely unquestioned in Y. Karunadasa's study, *The Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, Colombo, 1967.

⁸ M I 303.

⁹ See in general the *vedanā-samyutta*, especially S IV 209, 231; cf. also C. Gudmunsen, *Wittgenstein and Buddhism*, London, 1977, pp. 12–4.

¹⁰ A. Wayman, 'Regarding the Translation of the Buddhist Technical Terms *saññā*/*saṃjñā*, *viññāna*/*viñjāna*', *Malalasekera Commemoration Volume*, ed. O. H. de A. Wijesekera, Colombo, 1976, pp. 324–36.

¹¹ *Vism* XIV 130; cf. Nyanapoika, *Abhidhamma Studies*, Kandy, 3rd ed. 1971, pp. 68–72.

¹² A III 415.

¹³ This is most simply expressed at Dhātuk 9 where the truth of arising and the truth of the path are said to be *saṃkhārakkhandha*; it is elaborated at Dhs 185–225, and at Vibh 63–9 where the various categories of unskillful *dhammas* are treated in terms of the *khandhas*.

¹⁴ Cf. *Vism* XIV 135.

¹⁵ Cf. S II 94–5, III 9–10, IV 195.

¹⁶ M I 292–3.

¹⁷ The primary meaning of Pali *khandha* (=Skt. *skandha*) would seem to be the trunk of a tree, and then the shoulder or back of a man or an animal. In the Pali Canon the word is also regularly used in a number of expressions in the sense of an accumulation or collection of something, e.g. *bhogakkhandha*, *puññakkhandha*, *dukkhakkhandha*, and often apparently indicating a division or grouping of some kind, cf. *silakkhandha*, *samādhikkhandha*, *paññakkhandha* (e.g. D I 206).

¹⁸ For the three types of reference: (i) e.g. M I 138, S III 66, Dhs, Vibh, Dhātuk passim; (ii) e.g. D III 233, 278, M III 16, S III 26, 83; (iii) e.g. D II 35. Also to be noted are the occurrences of the forms *rūpadhātu*, *vedanādhātu* etc. (e.g. S III 9), and on one occasion in verse of the sequence *rūpa*, *vedayita*, *saññā*, *viññāna*, *saṃkhata* (S I 112), cf. note 34 below.

¹⁹ S III 47.

²⁰ M I 299 – S III 100–1; cf. S III 166–7.

²¹ Four *khandhas* are not *upādāna*, *saṃkhārakkhandha* may or may not be; *rūpakkhandha*

is *upādāniya*, four *khandhas* may or may not be; all five *khandhas* may or may not be *upādāṇa*, Vibh 67.

²² Dhs 196, 246. The *abhidhamma* view that *rūpakkhanda* is always *sāsava*, while the other four may or may not be, seems to be paralleled in a *nikāya* passage which first considers how body (*kāya*) and mind (*citta*) are diseased (*atura*), and then how body is diseased but mind is not, S III 3–5.

²³ Dhs 189.

²⁴ See *upādāna*, PTS *Pali-English Dictionary* and *A Critical Pali Dictionary*.

²⁵ This is perhaps most simply summed up in the *nikāya* usage of such expressions as “the manifestation of the *khandhas*” and “the breaking up of the *khandhas*” in part definition of birth and death respectively, usually in the context of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula, e.g. M I 49, 50.

²⁶ S III 14; cf. M I 511, S III 94.

²⁷ E. g. M I 138–9, III 16–7, S III 47, 68.

²⁸ The *khandha-vibhaṅga*, *suttanta-bhājanīya*, Vibh 1–12.

²⁹ Presumably because the terms *ajjhataṃ* and *bahiddhā* are used in the *nikāyas* in the context of “all *rūpa*” (e.g. M I 138), Karunadasa suggests that the two terms are not being used relatively, as in the *abhidhamma* texts, but rather to establish the dichotomy between “matter that constitutes the body of a living being and the matter that obtains outside of it” (*op. cit.* p. 116), but clearly this dichotomy cannot apply in the cases of *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhāras* and *viññāṇa*.

³⁰ Dhs 241.

³¹ Karunadasa, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–9.

³² Vin I 10 = S V 420, D II 305, M I 48, S III 158.

³³ S III 159, M I 299.

³⁴ S III 25; this is to some extent explained if the *sutta* is viewed as an exposition of the accompanying verse – that statements in verse should not always conform to the patterns of *sutta* prose is not surprising.

³⁵ S I 62, A II 48.

³⁶ S V 426.

³⁷ S I 135, M I 28.

³⁸ S III 190.

³⁹ S III 56, 114.

⁴⁰ E. g. S III 167–8.

⁴¹ See S III 177, 71, 194, 198, 74.

⁴² D III 278, S III 26, Vibh 426.

⁴³ S III 162–3.

⁴⁴ E. g. D. II 35, M III 115, S III 152.

⁴⁵ S III 13–5, 27–31, 61–5, 81–2, 160–1, 173–6. Cf. the recurring refrain found in the *Brahmajāla-sutta*: The Tathāgata is freed without grasping “having known as they really are the arising of feelings, their passing away, their pleasure, their danger and the escape from them.” D I 17–38, *passim*.

⁴⁶ Vin I 12–3 = S III 66–8.

⁴⁷ E. g. S III 56, 88, 104–5, 187–8, M I 138, 232–4, S II 125, 249.

⁴⁸ M III 277–80.

⁴⁹ S II 244–9.

⁵⁰ S III 18–9; cf. S III 16.

⁵¹ E. g. M III 188, 227, S III 3, 16, 96.

- 53 M I 300, III 17-8, S III 102, Dhs 182.
 54 M I 436, A V 422, cf. 128.
 55 S III 125-33.
 56 S III 63.
 57 E. g. E. Conze, *op. cit.*, p. 39, and E. J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, London, 1933, p. 101, n. 2.
 58 M I 140, S III 119; cf. S III 124, where Māra searches in vain for the consciousness of a *bhikkhu* who has just attained arahatship and then died. The most extensive treatment of this aspect of the *khandhas* is found in the *avyākata-samyutta*, S IV 374-403. On this whole question cf. S. Collins, *Selfless Persons*, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 117-38.
 59 S III 13, cf. 7, 18.
 60 M I 185-6.
 61 M I 190-1.
 62 Dhs 9.
 63 See Nyanaponika, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-26.
 64 Vibh 12-69.
 65 Dhātuk 9.
 66 Ap 563, cf. 42; Thī 43, 69, 103; cf. Th 1255, Nidd I 45.
 67 E. g. D II 302 (six internal and external *āyatana*s), M III 62 (eighteen *dhātus*).
 68 *Salāyatana-samyutta*, S IV 1-204; *dhātu-samyutta*, S II 140-77.
 69 'The Mātikā', introductory essay to the *Mohavicchedanī*, London, 1961, p. xx.
 70 A. B. Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
 71 As additional ways of analysing the whole of experience, cf. *nāma-rūpa* (e.g. D I 223) and *diṭṭha, suta, muta, viññāta* (e.g. M I 3, 135).

THE PROBLEM OF THE SĀṂKHYA TATTVAS AS BOTH COSMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA

The Sāṁkhyas were the masters of observation. They perfected the impossibly simple art of sitting and looking. The Sāṁkhya preceptor initiated a student with a straightforward charge: "Sit down, watch, observe the world around you!" Indeed, the world (Prakṛti) as we know it is said to come forth so that one (Puruṣa) can see it.¹ By watching the world one fulfills the first great human purpose, as presented in the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, the authoritative text for classical Sāṁkhya.²

The *Kārikā* exhibits a deep interest in the manifest world: how does it work? what is it made up of? how is it created? Why such a zealous concern? Because, via the medium of the senses and the mental movements which directly result from them, one comes to know the world. And, in this knowing of the world, one fulfills the other great purpose of human life: spiritual freedom. For the Sāṁkhyas not only said, "Sit down, watch and see", they also had the gall to state that in this simple observation is found the essential reality of the human being: "Know the world and you will discover your self!"

Out of this intense observation of the world comes what classical Sāṁkhya is most famous for: the categorization of cosmic creation into 23 essences (*tattvas*) (Puruṣa and unmanifest Prakṛti make 25). The whole cosmology of Sāṁkhya finds its foundation on these essences. Yet a deep confusion has existed among scholars who have attempted to interpret the essences. This state of affairs has come about because the *Kārikā* presents the essences as both cosmic and psychological phenomena. However, this confusion disappears if we see that the Sāṁkhya poet-philosophers declare those verses on the essences from the viewpoint of bound Puruṣa, one falsely identified with Prakṛti in manifest form as the world. The justification for this interpretation is the task of my study.

When the Sāṁkhya seeker observes his world ("his" because there were typically no female seekers in the orthodox culture) he sees an utterly lopsided duality: Puruṣa, as the fact of consciousness, and Prakṛti, as the fact of existence. Man is consciousness, everything else is Prakṛti. When Puruṣa and Prakṛti come into relationship (*saṁyoga*) the creation of the world takes

place. Creation in the *Kārikā* is termed *sarga*, coming from the verbal root *srj*, which means "to emit" or "to pour out."³ In the cosmic manifestation, Prakṛti emits the world from herself. But Prakṛti does not emit the world as a lamp emits light. Rather, Prakṛti simply becomes the world via the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of her three basic qualities, the *guṇas*.⁴ Existence itself transforms into existent things.

The *tattvas* are the materials out of which these things of the world are made. Gauḍapāda glosses *tattva* as *astitvam*, literally "isness."⁵ Thus I have used the term "essence" (Latin *esse*) as a translation for *tattva*. Gaspar Koelman, in his poetic way, offers a good provisional definition of the essences:

Everything prakritic is made up of the three *guṇas* which never perish, never come to be. They always remain all three as the universal substrative cause in their various modifications that constitute the different evolutes [*tattvas*]. The prakritic evolutes are immanent differentiations, different states of the *guṇas*, but states sufficiently stable to be considered as distinct entities. These fixed energizations of the *guṇas*, though substantially stable, do still undergo uninterruptedly some accidental and ephemeral changes. The relatively stable states are called the entities (*tattva*) whereas the accidental and ephemeral changes do not affect the essential structure of the stable entities; they give only superficial new determinations of modality or of temporal and spatial alterations of intensity.⁶

All things, internal and external, are built up of the essences, but each thing is not a new essence unto itself. Things are simply minor alterations of the essences.

When Prakṛti goes forth into her manifest state, she is said to *cause* the world. In that creation is the self-transformation of Prakṛti, she is seen as containing all the things of the cosmos in latent form within herself. This is the metaphysical basis for the Sāṃkhya doctrine of causality called "pre-existent effect" (*satkāryavāda*).⁷ Before the actual causal process occurs, the effect already pre-exists in the cause. Unmanifest Prakṛti has no cause; she exists as the self-contained first cause.

Creation from the unmanifest proceeds in a very orderly manner, each essence being produced from that essence above it, and in turn, that essence brings forth the next from within itself. Each essence owes its form of existence to the prior essence; the effect, says *Jayamaṅgalā*, is lorded over by the cause:

Only upon heeding that [essence] from which an [essence] arises does an [essence] bear its own effect, not without that. This is the point to be seen. From another point

of view, simply by the fact that [an essence] has a cause, is it proved that it is empowered by another. The unmanifest Prakṛti is contrary in nature. She is self-empowered. She heeds nobody.⁸

Because Prakṛti stands above all effected essences, she is called the Foremost One (*pradhāna*). She does not owe her existence to a prior essence, thus she need not heed that prior essence in order to bring forth her effect.

The orderly succession of essences becoming manifest in creation is reversed at the time of cosmic dissolution. Each lower level essence returns into the immediately higher essence which had brought it about. All created essences return into the original cause, the unmanifest Prakṛti. Prakṛti has no cause and thus does not dissolve into anything at dissolution. Existence itself remains during cosmic rest.⁹

Verse 22 of the *Kārikā* tells us that the first essence to emerge in Prakṛti's self-transformation into cosmos is *mahat*, the great one. Verse 23 gives us the much more popular name of this essence: *buddhi*. The commentators give many other alternative names: *mati* (thought), *pratyaya* (idea), *upalabdhi* (ascertainment), *jñāna* (wisdom), *khyāti* (discrimination), *prajñā* (insight), *saṃvittiḥ* (understanding), *citi* (mentality), *smṛti* (recollection).¹⁰ Note that all these names refer, in some way, to the realm of knowledge. Verse 23 also says that *buddhi* is judgment (*adhyavasāya*). This means that it is *buddhi* which not only determines the specific nature of a thing, it also judges what course of action is best in regard to that thing i.e., *buddhi* is the center of the will. Thus, the *buddhi* is the volitional knowing center in the human psyche.¹¹

Verse 22 also states that, from the first cosmic essence, *buddhi*, emerges *aḥamkāra*, the "I-maker". The I-maker is most easily understood by first looking at what it produces from itself. From its *sāttvika* aspect, called *vaikṛta* (transformed), come 11 powers of sensation (*indriya*). From its *tāmasika* aspect, called *bhūtādi* (elemental), come the external objects of sensation. Thus, the I-maker is the originator of subjectivity and objectivity; in itself it is the principle of cosmic differentiation. Verse 24 says that the I-maker is "self-awareness" (*abhimāna*).¹² *Yuktidīpikā* describes the I-maker in this way:

That agent, having the nature of being absorbed in its own self, and for whom the notion arises "I am this," that is indeed the I-maker, an essence different than *mahat*. How so? Because that [*mahat* or *buddhi*] has the essential nature of making judgments in regard to all objects of sense, but this [I-maker] is absorbed in the notion of its own self.¹³

The I-maker is the reflexive movement of the human psyche. It is self-referential, not outward directed as is the function of volitional knowing. I-maker is the basic sense "I am". Further, it is the sense "I am this, not that". "I am me, the subject, different from that, the objects of the outer world".

Verse 24 describes the causation from the I-maker as a "two-fold creation". On the subjective side appear the 11 powers of sensation (*indriya*). Verse 26 states that of those 11, five are powers of apprehension: eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin. Five more are types of motor activity: voice, hand, foot, anus, and genitals. The eleventh power of sensation is mind (*manas*). Though physical body parts are used to describe these powers, they have no physicality in themselves. To illustrate this, it may be pointed out that the subtle body, which transmigrates from physical body to physical body, is made up of volitional knowing, I-maker, and the 11 powers of sensation. Thus the powers of sensation exist without any physical substratum at all.¹⁴

The 11 powers of sensation are those inner functions of the human being which make contact with the outer world of things. The building materials for the external world are the essences called *tanmātras* or subtle elements. Verse 38 states that the subtle elements are without distinguishing characteristics.¹⁵ *Jayamañgalā* explains:

Just as on the tip of a tiny blade of grass, sharpness is not perceived, and nothing is illuminated [by the light of sensation], just so are those [subtle elements] without distinction.¹⁶

The sense powers are not able to grasp the subtle elements; they exhibit no manifest physicality which would serve to reflect the light of the outreaching senses. They are potential physicality. Koelman calls them "*genera*, or objective universals".¹⁷ However, even though not sensible, they are called by names of objects of sensation: sound, touchable things, smell, form, and taste.¹⁸ The subtle elements, or physical potentials, are named in accordance with that sensory process which, when observed closely, reveals the nature of the subtle element itself. The Sāṃkhya seeker observes the physical world through the reaching out of the five powers of apprehension. By observing these sensations, he discovers the world to be built up out of five subtle elements. Each one he christens with a name corresponding to the particular sense power which allowed its discovery.¹⁹

The last five essences in this cosmic creation are the great elements: space,

wind, earth, fire, and water.²⁰ They come into being as transformations of the five subtle elements. It is these great elements which, in their combination, make up the physical things of the world.

If any reader wants to go a bit deeper into the meaning of the essences, one problem quickly rears up as the major obstacle in the way. It is *the* stickler in the secondary literature on interpretation of the essences. The problem is this: The *Kārikā* discusses the essences in both cosmic and psychological terms. Verse 22 describes the beginnings of cosmic creation: the first essence to emerge into manifestation is the great one, *mahat* or *buddhi*. In the very next verse, without any intervening explanation, this *buddhi* is said to be "judgment". *Buddhi* is, paradoxically it would seem, both the first created thing of the cosmos and the human function of volitional knowing. Verse 22 also states that out of *buddhi* comes *ahamkāra*, verse 24 that *ahamkāra* brings forth the subjective sensory world and the objective sensed world. Yet that same verse 24 also defines *ahamkāra* as "self-awareness". *Ahamkāra* is both the cosmic differentiator of subject and object as well as the human sense of "I am".

The immediate implications of these three verses, 22 through 24, are either (1) the first two essences of creation are personal volitional knowing (*buddhi*) — call it intellect — as well as self-awareness (*ahamkāra*), and out of these arises the rest of the created cosmos; or (2) two different *buddhis* and *ahamkāras* must be intended here, one pair cosmic, the other pair personal (psychological). Neither of these options sits well for long. The first implication, that the world comes from personal intellect and self-awareness, leads to an idealism which the Sāṃkhya realistic duality of consciousness/existence simply will not allow. Or, if this world creation from personal intellect has independent reality, it means that each human being has a separate objective world. This contradicts the clear Sāṃkhya notion that Prakṛti, as the manifest world, is one and common to all Puruṣas.²¹ Further, the second option would add two essences to the list which is clearly closed at 25, including only one *buddhi* and one *ahamkāra*.

A way out of this dilemma is not found in these three verses themselves. One is found, however, when the verses are read in the context of the three immediately preceding them (verses 19 through 21):

Because Puruṣa is opposite [of Prakṛti], his witnesshood, completion, indifference, viewerhood, and inactivity are proved.

By means of their relationship the inconscient one appears as if characterized by consciousness; likewise the indifferent one appears to be an actor, even though the agent of activity is the *guṇas*.

The relationship of those two, like that of the blind and the lame, is for the purpose of Puruṣa's seeing [Prakṛti], and for his spiritual completion. Creation comes forth out of that relationship.²²

Verse 19 describes Puruṣa, in his self-nature, as the indifferent witness of unmanifest Prakṛti, complete and whole unto himself, and inactive. Puruṣa is totally other than unmanifest Prakṛti. But, verse 20 and 21 tell us, when Puruṣa comes into relationship with Prakṛti, two momentous results occur. First, the inconscient Prakṛti seems to become conscious, and the inactive Puruṣa seems to become the agent of activity. That is, Puruṣa seems to become active because of his relationship with Prakṛti, who is constituted of the three *guṇas*, which are in ceaseless motion. Puruṣa as pure consciousness falsely identifies himself with Prakṛti as existence itself. The second result of this relationship between consciousness and existence is that the manifest world comes forth. Existence itself transforms into existent things. The next 40 verses (through 61) undertake an intricate description of this manifest world. It is a world which comes about under the condition of Puruṣa's being falsely identified with the (now manifest) *guṇas*. These 40 verses describe a world which is experienced *as if* pervaded by consciousness.

The false identity of Puruṣa with Prakṛti is most often talked about in the *Kārikā* in terms of the individual human being. The only reality of the human being is consciousness; all else is Prakṛti. Yet, due to false identification, the human being experiences selfhood as consisting in Prakṛti. Vācaspati has an objector argue against the Sāṃkhya duality in this way:

All this [discussion about Puruṣa being an inactive, conscious witness, totally other than the active inconscient Prakṛti] may be true in light of valid inferential reasoning. However, having decided upon some purpose to be accomplished, the notion arises in one: "I am conscious, I desire to act, I [will] act." Thus it is proved by means of experience that there is a common subject for both consciousness and activity.²³

In response to this objector it must be said that, according to classical Sāṃkhya, everyday experience cannot be trusted in determining the nature of the self and its locale. The objector speaks out of the false identification of who he really is with the activity of what he is not: "That which is me is conscious, that which is me has desire, that which is me will take action". False identity means uniting Puruṣa and Prakṛti, making them both "me".

The movement from verses 19 through 20 to 21 charts an utterly important transition in the viewpoint from which these *kārikās* are enunciated; it is the transition into a realm of real union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Verse 19 states that Puruṣa's nature is characterized by wholeness and completion (*kaivalya*). He is free and independent. Verse 20 re-asserts his freedom, his otherness from unmanifest Prakṛti, stating that their relationship is one of mere proximity, only a seeming union. However, verse 21 states that this relationship has the sole purpose of Puruṣa's gaining completion (*kailvalya*), i.e., gaining that very state which is, according to verse 19, already his by nature. Verse 21 gives up the *seeming* aspect of the union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, and speaks from the standpoint of a real union from which Puruṣa needs to be released. Therefore, verse 21 not only describes the beginnings of false identity of self with Prakṛti, but also must be interpreted as taking on the perspective of that false identity.

This mistaken state of experiencing self in Prakṛti is called *ajñāna*, "non-wisdom." Koelman describes this state:

An ordinary human experience is always some kind of knowledge, and every knowledge is some kind of experience. Knowledge and experience are a combination of awareness, of a dynamic agent, of an activity, and an object of the activity. Indiscriminating consciousness [*avidyā* or *ajñāna*], as the all-pervading factor in all kinds of afflictions, is the failure to dissociate the factor of awareness from all other components.²⁴

Lacking wisdom, a person cannot figure out where the self really is. This is a condition called bondage.²⁵ The exact type of bondage one is under is determined by where one experiences the self to lie. The commentators list three types of bondage. The first type, *prākṛtika* ("related to Prakṛti"), applies to those who are intent upon the unmanifest Prakṛti as the locus of the true self. This may be seen as the least false of the levels of false identification. Though this is still not an expression of true wisdom, Puruṣa is not experienced as located in the manifest world. The second bondage, *vaikṛtika* ("related to the transformations [of Prakṛti]"), is for those who identify some specific created essence as the self. This is the middle level of false identification. It is the bondage of the Sāṃkhya seekers, those who have begun to inquire into the whereabouts of the self, but wrongly locate it in the created world. The third bondage, *dākṣiṇaka* ("related to sacrificial ritual"), applies to those who are totally ignorant of the existence of Puruṣa. They identify themselves with the physical and subtle body, performing pious rites in order to attain early pleasure and heavenly reward. This is the depth of false identification, total immersion in the day to day workings of transmigratory life.²⁶

The second type of bondage is most important for this investigation into the problem of the cosmic and psychological descriptions of the created essences. For, under this condition of non-wisdom, one believes that a certain created essence is the self. The entire gamut of created essences is available ground for Puruṣa's mistake: "I am the elements [i.e., the bodies]", "I am the sense powers", "I am *ahamkāra*", "I am *buddhi*".²⁷ Now this is the type of bondage which is expressed in the language of verses 22 through 24, and elaborated upon through verse 61. It is the language of the bound Puruṣa, the Puruṣa falsely identified with the created essences; it is the language of the Sāṃkhya seeker observing the created world in search of the self, and still finding it residing there.

In verses 22 through 61 the Sāṃkhya poets discuss the manifest world in a way which speaks directly to the seeker who is practicing the spiritual discipline of world observation. They do so by taking on the viewpoint of the seeker, and thereby express the seeker's vision of the world. The seeker has not yet found the self. The language of *finding* the self is not used until after verse 61. The description of the world of the real bondage of Puruṣa, i.e., the world experienced under the condition of Puruṣa falsely identified with the essences, will then be dropped. The philosophical perspective of Puruṣa's natural condition will again be revealed and a more appropriate language taken up. Compare Verses 21 and 62:

The relationship of these two, like that of the blind and the lame, is for the purpose of Puruṣa's seeing [Prakṛti], and for his spiritual release.

Thus, no one is bound, neither is anyone released; also no one whatsoever transmigrates. [Only] Prakṛti, by means of her manifold forms, transmigrates, is bound and released.²⁸

These verses are absolutely at odds in describing the nature of Puruṣa, unless we see that verse 21 speaks from the realm of real bondage and verse 62 from Puruṣa's natural stance of completion.

This notion of the false identification of Puruṣa with the essences makes it easy to understand how these essences can be depicted as both cosmic and psychological, for it is this very false identification which turns the cosmic into the psychological. Verse 22 says that the first created essence is *buddhi*. From the long list of alternative names for this essence, it was seen that "knowing" was overwhelmingly the central notion conveyed by *buddhi*. Cosmic knowing is the first manifest essence. When verse 23 describes *buddhi* as "judgment", it is using the language of Puruṣa's false identity.

When Puruṣa, as consciousness, comes into relationship with the inconscient Prakṛti, in the form of her first created essence, *buddhi*, that essence becomes as if conscious. The inconscient cosmic knowing is experienced as the location of the self: "I am *buddhi*". This false identification transforms cosmic knowing into personal volitional knowing; it makes cosmic *buddhi* into "my intellect" (which is the usual definition of the world). Cosmic knowing is experienced as my intellect when I identify with it as my self.

From the *ahamkāra*, which follows from *buddhi*, is led forth the subjective and objective world. *Ahamkāra* is the cosmic principle of differentiation. It is that which differentiates unified cosmic knowing into ascertaining subject and the ascertained object. Chennakesavan observes:

The *mahat* [great one or *buddhi*] is the last limit, in an ascending order, up to which the subjective and objective are differentiated. Or, in other words, at this stage of evolution [creation] the subject and object aspects of experience had not yet emerged.²⁹

Ahamkāra commonly (and in fact literally) translates as "I-maker". The *ahamkāra* is an I-maker in the sense that, in differentiating the subjective and objective, it makes the "I" possible. "I" and the objects of "I" — the other — come into being simultaneously. Thus, *ahamkāra* could just as properly have been termed *tatkāra*, "that-maker".

When, however, verse 24 calls this *ahamkāra* "self-awareness" (*abhimāna*), this is the language of false identity. Puruṣa wrongly considers the subjective to be himself. "I am this 'myself' of which I am aware". "This myself is me". False identification of Puruṣa transforms cosmic subjectivity/objectivity into personal self-awareness. The I-maker (and that-maker) is experienced as my ego when I identify it as my self.

The confusion in scholarly literature on the essences, which I mentioned in the introduction, results from a refusal to take seriously this notion of Puruṣa's false identification. Scholars have balked at the *Kārikā*'s presentation of the essences as cosmic and psychological: "The essences can't be both cosmic and psychological phenomena. They must be one or the other". Interpreters have been bold in attacking the issue, but all have ended up skirting the jump; none have actually made a satisfactory leap.

One early scholar, A. B. Keith, concluded that *buddhi* can only make sense as a cosmic and psychological phenomenon if indeed that person for whom this essence is an aspect of the psyche is cosmic; that is, without a world-soul as cosmic person the Sāṃkhya vision of *buddhi* is unintelligible.

Keith contended that the Sāṃkhya cosmogony finds its roots in the creation models of the middle Upaniṣads. In this model a supreme spirit creates the primal stuff of the cosmos. The supreme spirit is then born, in a new form, out of this primal stuff. This first manifested thing of the cosmos is the world-soul. From this world-soul the rest of the cosmos is created.³⁰

According to Keith, classical Sāṃkhya used this model for its creation scheme, but got rid of the essential ingredients which hold the model together:

The conception of intellect [*buddhi*] as the first evolute from nature [*Prakṛti*] is doubtless to be traced to the derivation from the *Avyakta* [unmanifest] of the great soul in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (iii, ii). This fact, and its position in the series of evolutes [essences] before the principle of individuation [*ahaṃkāra*], suggests that the primary sense of the expression is cosmic, but the exact force of a cosmic intellect in a system which has not a creator or world-soul is difficult to appreciate, though in the Vedānta it is easy to understand how from the impersonal Brahman can be derived the personal Hiranyagarbha who can be regarded as the world soul.³¹

It is true that Sāṃkhya maintains a model of creation which resembles the model in the middle Upaniṣads. *Buddhi* does come forth from the unmanifest *Prakṛti* (*avyakta*), and from *buddhi* the rest of the cosmos is created. Even the term *hiranyagarbha* (golden embryo) survives in Māṭhara's commentary as an alternative name for *buddhi* (See note 10). However, the *Puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya is not a supreme creator, nor does he reappear in the cosmos as a personal world-soul. The *Puruṣa* only falsely identifies with the created world. Thus, what is seen as real cosmogony in the Upaniṣads is described in the *Kārikā* as a process taking place under the condition of non-wisdom (*ajñāna*). The real event of a supreme creator entering into the cosmos, as seen in the Upaniṣads, is only a seeming occurrence for *Puruṣa*, as declared in the *Kārikā*. I do not mean to imply here that the cosmogony of Sāṃkhya is itself an illusory process. *Prakṛti* does, in full reality, transform herself into the created essences, headed by *buddhi*. The seeming part is *Puruṣa*'s entering into this creation.

Why then — and this is Keith's first problem — does Sāṃkhya maintain the model at all? It is maintained because the cosmos is *experienced as if* pervaded by consciousness; the cosmos is experienced as if *Puruṣa* does enter into this creation which comes out of unmanifest *Prakṛti*. The cosmogony of verses 22 through 61 is expressed in terms of how it is experienced by a seeker who is in the condition of non-wisdom.

The main stumbling block for Keith and other scholars, however, is that

they can not make any sense of a "cosmic intellect" without a cosmic person. "Intellect" implies an intelligent being, and because *buddhi* (as intellect) is the first cosmic creation, it must be the intellect of a cosmic person. Keith is right in that intellect does imply an intelligent being, but he errs in inferring that *buddhi* as first cosmic essence must belong to a cosmic intelligent being. These verses describe the cosmos as if *Puruṣa* is bound up in it, as if cosmos is pervaded by consciousness. But *Puruṣa* is not cosmic or universal. As is stated in verse 18, *Puruṣa* is individual.³² *Puruṣa* is the only reality of each human being: "I am *Puruṣa*." When *Puruṣa* falsely identifies with the essences of cosmos, those essences are experienced as pervaded by individual consciousness: "I am *buddhi*", "I am *ahaṃkāra*", etc. The *buddhi*, as intellect, is the intellect of a human being, not a cosmic universal being. Keith could not find a cosmic person for his cosmic intellect, but he would not have this problem had he seen that no such thing as cosmic intellect is posited by Sāṃkhya. There is only cosmic knowing which, when falsely identified as the self of the individual *Puruṣa*, is experienced as human intellect. Only cosmic knowing is a real essence, the first essence of creation. Human intellect is a creation of false identity. It has only experiential reality. Cosmic intellect is Keith's creation, resulting from his interpretation of the cosmic and psychological nature of *buddhi*, as presented in verses 22 and 23, without the necessary context of the preceding verses. He thus ignores the all-important notion of the false identity of *Puruṣa*. The search for a cosmic person in Sāṃkhya is therefore unnecessary, in that it is based on the mistaken assumption that cosmic intellect exists as the first created essence. Keith was looking for a cart to carry a load which he did not have.³³

S. N. Dasgupta attempts to solve the problem of the presentation of the essences as both cosmic and psychological by proposing that the *Kārikā* intends two different types of *buddhis*: one in the verse about *buddhi* as cosmic first principle (verse 22), another in the verses concerned with *buddhi* in the personal psychological realm (verses 23, etc.). This conclusion adds to the number of essences, and is thus suspect from the first. It also creates a new problem of interpretation: If cosmic *buddhi* and personal individual *buddhi* are real and different, how are they related to one another? Dasgupta describes this relationship:

Thus the first stage in the onward course of the development of prakṛti is the mahat which comprises the knowable, the empirical universe, cosmic matter or stuff of consciousness, the intelligible essence of the cosmos The relation of this stage

to the individual buddhi is that they are only the part of this universal, first great stage of being.

[*Buddhi*] thus holds within it the minds (*buddhi*) of all puruṣas which were lost in the prakṛti during the pralaya [dissolution of cosmos] This state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (*buddhi*) of all the puruṣas is therefore called *buddhitattva*.

This stage of buddhi may thus be regarded as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it all the buddhis of individuals and all the matter of which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising all creation, and is thus called *mahat* (the great one).³⁴

The psychological *buddhi*, the personal intellect, is thus seen by Dasgupta as a particular part of the cosmic *buddhi*, the capability of knowing. This cosmic knowing holds within it all the individual intellects just as it does "all the matter of which the gross world is formed". This is Dasgupta's mistake. We have seen that the cosmic *buddhi* does indeed transform itself, via the causal process described as *satkāryavāda* ("pre-existent effect"), into the *ahamkāra*. *Ahamkāra* brings forth the senses and elements. The (gross) elements combine to form the physical world. Thus it can be rightly said that *buddhi*, as cosmic knowing, contains within itself the entire creation. But, where are the individual intellects in this creative process? They are not found among the essences created from within cosmic knowing; and these comprise the entirety of creation. The personal intellect simply does not come forth from the cosmic knowing. The 22 created essences coming out of cosmic knowing are the *parts* of the universal whole, not the individual intellects. The problem for Dasgupta is that he assumes that his different *buddhis*, the cosmic and the psychological, both have the same ontological status. They do not. Cosmic knowing is Prakṛti as her first created essence, real as Prakṛti herself. Cosmic knowing brings forth the rest of Prakṛti's features — the essences — not personal intellects. Personal intellects are not created from Prakṛti in the real causal process. A personal intellect is "created" when Puruṣa imagines the cosmic knowing to be the locus of his self. "I am cosmic knowing" creates personal intellect, not the causal process.

Gerald Larson has gone the deepest into this problem of the cosmic and psychological character of the essences. He penetrates into the weakness of the interpretations like those of Keith and Dasgupta, but his honesty in the attempt left him finally with no satisfying answer.

[A] problem arises when one tries to comprehend the nature of *buddhi* unto itself.

What is also true, however, is that the *Kārikā* leaves many questions and issues unanswered It is not clear whether or not Īśvarakṛṣṇa understands *buddhi* cosmologically or psychologically or both.³⁵

Larson rejects the possibility of *buddhi* being simply cosmic, since *buddhi* is described as a component in the perceptual and volitional process of an individual person.³⁶ He also rejects what he believes to be the other two remaining possibilities:

... the precise significance of the *tanmātras* [subtle elements] is difficult to determine. On the one hand, they serve as the support or basis of the individual, and yet they are also said to generate the external world. Does this mean that the external, manifest world is simply a manifestation of individual evolution or emergence? Or does it mean rather than there must be some kind of cosmic *buddhi* or *ahaṃkāra* which exists somehow apart from the individual *buddhis*, etc.? If one accepts the latter interpretation, as Garbe, Dasgupta and other interpreters have done, then it becomes difficult to appreciate the classical Sāṃkhya doctrine of the plurality of *puruṣas*. The *puruṣas* must then be seen as one totality, the presence of which brings about the emergence of cosmic *auddhi*, a cosmic *ahaṃkāra*, etc., which somehow then generate or bring forth individual *buddhis* and *ahaṃkāras* which transmigrate. Such an interpretation simply adds more categories and more difficulties to the original problem. The only reasonable solution seems to be that the classical Sāṃkhya understands the basic evolutes or emergents primarily in individual terms and considers questions regarding cosmic development and the external world as secondary. In other words, the classical Sāṃkhya is not primarily a cosmology, a theory of physics or any other kind of natural science, except perhaps on a very primitive level. The classical Sāṃkhya is, rather, a soteriological system which seeks to find an answer to the problem of suffering in human life.³⁷

Larson, in his own mind, exhausted all the available interpretations of the cosmic/psychological essences. None of them stood up to a critical view, so he settled for a rather half-hearted "reasonable solution".³⁸ This is not a solution, and it is only reasonable in the sense of: "O.K. Enough is enough. We don't know what to do. Let's be reasonable".

First, classical Sāṃkhya is both a soteriology and a cosmology. Yes, it is primarily soteriology, for it aims to provide a path for those who seek wholeness and spiritual freedom. But the classical Sāṃkhya is also cosmology. For it is by knowing thoroughly the essential aspects, i.e., *guṇas* and *tattvās*, of the cosmos that soteriology is fulfilled. By knowing the cosmos the self, whole and complete, is found.

Further, Larson could not answer the question of how to understand the cosmic/psychological nature of the essences as presented in the *Kārikā*. So he shifted the question a little: Why does Sāṃkhya *emphasize* individual

terms to describe the cosmos? This question he can answer. The *Kārikā* is for the purpose of spiritual release of the individual person, thus the personal, psychological is emphasized. Larson does not deny the cosmological parts of the *Kārikā*; he simply says they are unimportant.

Actually, it is within an earlier discussion by Larson himself concerning the individual, psychological viewpoint in the *Kārikā*, that all the ingredients for a real solution to his dilemma lie:

To achieve this ultimate goal of the isolation of *puruṣa*, the classical Sāṃkhya sets forth a rather subtle analysis of that which makes up the manifest and unmanifest world Access to the world, however, is only by means of the presence of *puruṣa*, and since the *puruṣa* is individual (yet impersonal) the world is understood primarily in terms of the individual. In other words, the world is comprehended in terms of how the *puruṣa* witnesses it. This explains why the principles (*tattvas*) in the *Kārikā* are expressed usually in terms of psychological rather than cosmological categories the world is understood primarily from the point of view of the individual, witnessing *puruṣa*. In one sense, then, the classical Sāṃkhya analysis is a description of what consciousness sees. Yet, again, however, one gets caught up in the dialectic, for the description of what consciousness sees does not occur or is not performed by consciousness. The description, rather, takes place in that which reflects consciousness or in that which consciousness is conscious of – i.e., the *buddhi*, etc., according to classical Sāṃkhya.³⁹

Prakṛti begins her dance of creation in order to be seen by conscious *Puruṣa*. The *Kārikā* is a record of that viewing. Verse 19 states that *Puruṣa* is an individual, inactive, conscious spectator of Prakṛti. Thus, according to Larson, “explains why the principles (*tattva*) in the *Kārikā* are expressed usually in terms of psychological rather than cosmological categories”. But the record of *Puruṣa*’s seeing is performed by *buddhi*, as the intellect of the individual described in verse 23. Larson calls the relationship between witnessing consciousness and personal intellect a “dialectic”. He uses this term to describe the interplay which comes about between *Puruṣa* and Prakṛti: the eternal dual pair, who never unify.⁴⁰ The relationship between the indifferent *Puruṣa*, whole unto himself, in verse 19 and Prakṛti in the form of cosmic knowing in verse 22, is indeed a dialectic. Ontologically, *Puruṣa* and cosmic knowing are eternally two. Larson’s mistake is that he equates the *buddhi* as cosmic knowing of verse 22 with the personal intellect of verse 23. He does not attentively read verses 20 and 21, and so fails to take into account the false identification of *Puruṣa* with Prakṛti, as described in those verses. It cannot be said that a dialectical relationship exists between *Puruṣa* and personal intellect, for it is in fact the false identification of *Puruṣa*

with cosmic knowing (both ontologically real) that brings the individual intellect into experience (it has no ontological reality). Had Larson taken the notion of false identity into account, he would have seen that the viewpoint of *buddhi* (i.e., personal intellect), from which the description of cosmos in verses 22 through 61 is offered, is the viewpoint of *Puruṣa*, *Puruṣa* that is falsely identified with *buddhi*. There is no dialectic here. Bound *Puruṣa* and *buddhi* are one. "I am *buddhi*" creates the personal intellect which gives us these verses. The viewpoint of the indifferent *Puruṣa*, whose unto himself, is the source of verses only after 61. But by that point in the *Sāṃkhya*'s spiritual search, the personal intellect is no longer imagined as the locus of self.

Thus the personal, psychological terminology used in reference to the essences of the cosmos results from the *experiential* unity of the individual consciousness with the cosmic knowing (and cosmic differentiation, etc.). Larson saw their ontological difference and missed their coming together in *Puruṣa*'s condition of lacking wisdom. It is wisdom which allows *Puruṣa* once again to realize their ontological difference.

In summary then, we may say that in order to explain the cosmic and psychological nature of the *Sāṃkhya tattvas*, it is not necessary to posit a world-soul, nor add essences to the list of 25, nor de-emphasize classical *Sāṃkhya* cosmology. Rather, a very satisfying reading is attained if we understand that the essences are described in the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* from two vantage points, one of *Puruṣa* in his natural state of completion and wholeness, the other of *Puruṣa* bound in false identity with *Prakṛti*. The *Sāṃkhya* poets not only speak about *Puruṣa*, they also speak from his point of view.

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NOTES

¹ Refer to *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* verse 21 quoted below. (Henceforth the text is noted: "SK").

² I have followed Gerald Larson and Michel Hulin in defining classical *Sāṃkhya* as that school of religious philosophy (*darśana*) systematized in the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, as well as the commentaries written directly on this text. Gerald

Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), p. 4. Michel Hulin, *Sāṃkhya Literature* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1978), p. 128. All modern works, after an initial citation in complete form, will be noted by the author's last name and page number. For example: Larson, p. 4. The five major commentaries of the classical period have been consulted for this study. The following editions were used: *The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the Commentary of Gauḍapāda*, T. G. Maikar (ed.), trns., (Pune: Oriental Book Agency, 1964). *Sāṃkhyakārikā* [with *Mātharavṛtti* and *Jayamaṅgalā*], V. P. Sarma and S. Vangiya (eds.), (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1970). *The Tattvakaumudī*, Ganganatha Jha trans. ed., (Pune: Oriental Book Agency, 1934). *Sāṃkhyakārikā* [with *Yuktidīpikā*], R. S. Tripathi ed., (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970). All citations refer to *Devanāgarī* numbered pages. These commentaries will be referred to as: Gauḍapāda, Māthara, *Jayamaṅgalā*, Vācaspati, and *Yuktidīpikā*.

³ SK 21, 46, 52, and 53 illustrate the use of *sarga*. For example, SK 53 reads:

The divine realm is eightfold; the sub-human realm is fivefold; and the human realm is of one kind. Briefly, this is the natural creation. aṣṭavikalpo daivas tairagyonaś ca pañcadhā bhavati. mānuṣyaś caikavidhaḥ samāsato bhautikaḥ sargaḥ.

The Sanskrit text of the *Kārikā* is taken from T. G. Maikar's edition. All translations are my own. Sanskrit citations are entered in transliteration. A period denotes a *daṇḍa* (verical bar) in the text. An apostrophe denotes the *avagraha* (symbol of vowel elision). No other punctuation, as offered by some editors, is used.

⁴ See SK 16:

Unmanifest Prakṛti is the cause. She goes forth [into manifestation] by means of the three *guṇas* in combination. The transformation, like that of water, is due to the specific nature residing in the respective *guṇas*.

kāraṇam asty avyaktaṃ pravartate triguṇataḥ samudayāc ca. pariṇāmataḥ salilavat pratipratiguṇāśrayaviśeṣāt.

⁵ Gauḍapāda, p. 70 (comment on SK 23). Larson likes "emergent" for *tattva* (p. 11). This is acceptable in that it emphasizes the creation as *sarga* or emission of Prakṛti. But "essence" is linguistically more correct. The commonly found term "evolute" should not be used, since the manifestation or Prakṛti is not a movement from simplicity to complexity as the theory of evolution requires. See B. N. Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (London: Longmans, 1915), p. 7.

⁶ Gaspar Koelman, S. J., *Patanjala Yoga: From Related Ego to Absolute Self* (Pune: Papal Athenaeum, 1970), p. 15

⁷ See SK nine:

The effect is pre-existent [in the cause] because of the non-productivity of the non-existent, because of [necessary] employment of a material cause, because of the impossibility of origination of everything [from everything], because capable causes [only produce] that which it is competent to produce, and because the effect is like the cause.

asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt. śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca satkāryam.

⁸ *Jayamaṅgalā*, p. 75 (comment on SK 10).

yad asmād utpadyate tad evānuruddhya svakāryam janayati na tad vyatirekeṇeti darśanārtham. anyathā hetumad ity anenaiva paratantratvam prasiddhem eva. viparītam avyaktam svatantram na kiṃcid apekṣate.

9 The commentators are clear on this point. See, for example, Gaudapāda, p. 30 (comment on SK 10).

As the manifest is soluble, so the unmanifest is insoluble, because it is eternal [i.e., having no causal beginning in time]. The great one, etc. [the created essences] dissolve one into the other at the time of dissolution, not so the Foremost One. Thus the Foremost One is said to be insoluble.

tathā vyaktam liṅgam aliṅgam avyaktaṃ nityatvāt. mahadādi liṅgam pralayakale parasparam praliyate naivaṃ pradhānam tasmād aliṅgam pradhānam.

To translate *liṅgam* as “soluble” is unusual, though quite necessary in this particular case. *Liṅgam* is related, by the commentators, to the verbal root *li*, which means “to dissolve”. Monier-Williams does give the following as a possible definition for *liṅgam*: “anything having an origin and therefore liable to be destroyed again”. [M. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Delhi: Mushiram Manoharlal, 1981), p. 901.]

10 SK 22 and 23 read:

From unmanifest Prakṛti comes *mahat*, from that *ahaṃkāra*, and from that the group of 16. Further, from five of the 16 come the five great elements.

prakṛter mahāṃs tato 'haṃkāraḥ tasmād gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ. tasmād api ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni.

Buddhi is judgment. Virtue, wisdom, indifference, and power [constitute] its *sāttvika* form. Opposite of that is its *tāmasika* form.

adhyavasāyo buddhir dharmo jñānam virāga aiśvaryam. sāttvikam etadrūpaṃ tāmasam asmād viparyastam.

See *Jayamaṅgalā*, p. 87 (comment on SK 22).

Great one, knowing, thought, idea, ascertainment – these are the alternative names of *buddhi*.

mahān buddhir matiḥ pratyaya upalabdhir iti buddhiparyāyāḥ.

See Māthara, p. 27 (comment on SK 22).

Great one, knowing, thought, insight, understanding, discrimination, mentality, recollection, *Āsuri*, *Hari*, *Hara*, *Hiraṇyagarbha* – these are the alternative names.

mahān buddhiḥ matiḥ prajñā saṃvittir khyāti citir smṛtir āsuri hariḥ haraḥ hiraṇyagarbha iti paryāyāḥ.

Āsuri, *Hari*, and *Hara* are odd here. *Āsuri* is the first student of Kapila, the traditional founder of Sāṃkhya. Perhaps he is known as the introducer of the concept *buddhi*. Also, it has been suggested to me that, because *Āsuri* is the first fruit of Sāṃkhya, perhaps he is being compared here to *buddhi* as the first fruit of unmanifest Prakṛti. *Hari* and *Hare* are normally epithets of *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva* respectively. It may be that these names are in laud of *Āsuri* in this case. *Hiraṇyagarbha*, or golden embryo, is parallel to

mahat in that it emphasizes *buddhi* as the first essence of the cosmos out of which all else comes. For an excellent discussion of the history of *mahat*, see J. A. B. van Buitenen, 'The Large Ātman', *Journal of the History of Religions*, 4 (1964), 103 ff.

¹¹ See Gauḍapāda, p. 71 (comment on SK 23).

The *buddhi* is defined by such statements as: "This is a pot, this is a cloth".

ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ ayaṃ paṭaḥ ityevaṃ sati ya sā buddhir iti lakṣyate.

See Vācaspati, p. 42 (comment on SK 23).

In this world the notion "that should be done" belongs to *buddhi*.

tatra yo ayaṃ kartavyam iti . . . buddheḥ.

¹² SK 24 reads:

Ahaṃkāra is self-awareness. [From it] a twofold creation comes forth: the group of 11, and also the five subtle elements.

abhimāno 'haṃkāras tasmād dvidividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ. ekādaśakaś ca gaṇas tanmātraḥ pañcakaś caiva.

¹³ *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 133 (comment on SK 24).

kartuḥ svātmapratyavamarśātmako yo ayam aham iti pratyayotpadyate sa khalv ahamkārah mahatas tattvāntaram. kasmāt tasya sarvaṣaḍādhyaṣāyārūpatvāt asya tu svātma-pratyavamarśāt.

¹⁴ See Gauḍapāda, p. 106 (comment on SK 24).

The *tanmātras* are subtle. The subtle body, which is ever existent and ever transmigrating, is composed of those subtle elements and marked by the great one, etc. (i.e., *buddhi* down through the sensory powers to the subtle elements).

sūkṣmāḥ tanmātrāṇi. yat saṃgrhiṭaṃ sūkṣmaśarīraṃ mahadādīlingaṃ sadā tiṣṭhati saṃsarati . . .

Cf. Chennakesavan:

It has been already stated that these senses are not their physical counterparts, but determinate modifications of *ahaṃkāra* or egoism. The *jñānendriyas* [powers of apprehension] may be compared to sensory impulses and the *karmendriyas* [powers of activity] to motor impulses.

Sarasvati Chennakesavan, *Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), p. 30 [first published, Bombay 1960].

¹⁵ SK 38 reads:

The subtle elements are non-specific. From these five [come] the five great elements. These are known as specific, and are tranquil, turbulent, and perplexing.

tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣāḥ tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ. ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ śāntā ghorāś ca mūḍhaś ca.

¹⁶ *Jayamaṅgalā*, p. 98 (comment on SK 38).

yathā sūkṣmatrñāgrāvasthitam tejo na kaksyate na ca kiñcit prakāśayati tadvat te apy
aviśeṣaḥ.

17 Koelman, p. 89.

18 See Gauḍapāda, p. 104 (comment on SK 38).

Those five elements which arise from I-maker are: sound subtle element, touch subtle element, form subtle element, taste subtle element, and smell subtle element.

yāni pañca tanmātrāṇi ahaṁkāṛād utpadyante tāni śabdatanmātram sparśatanmātram rūpatanmātram rasatanmātram gandhatanmātram.

19 Cf. Dasgupta:

Each of our senses can only apprehend a particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be grasped by the five senses.

Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), p. 252.

20 See Gauḍapāda, p. 104 (comment on SK 38).

The five great elements are known as earth, water, fire, wind, and space.

pañca mahābhūtāni pṛthvyāptejovāyvakāśasaṁjñāni.

21 Sk 11 describes Prakṛti thus:

Both manifest and unmanifest Prakṛti are characterized by the three *guṇas*, indistinguishable, objective, common, inconscient, and productive. Puruṣa is the opposite of them, although similar [to unmanifest Prakṛti of verse 10].

triguṇam aviveki viśayaḥ sāmānyam acetanam prasavadharmi. vyaktam tathā pradhānam tadviparītas tathā ca pumān.

I have resorted to the archaic form "inconscient" to translate *acetanam* because it seems to me that the more common "unconscious" is loaded with too many irrelevant psychoanalytic connotations to be useful. Vācaspati (p. 27) comments on Prakṛti as "objective" and "common":

Some [Buddhists] say: "It is consciousness (*vijñāna*) only whose nature is denoted by the words 'delight', 'dismay', and 'delusion' [i.e., the three *guṇas* as expressed in world experience] and by the terms 'sound' etc. [i.e., the elements]; and moreover there is nothing other than consciousness which is the substratum of these. In response, it is asserted that the manifest [Prakṛti] is objective. "Objective" here stands for "what can be apprehended." That is, it is exterior to consciousness. And, because it is objective, it is common, i.e., apprehended by many people [simultaneously] . . . As in the case of a dancing girl, when she makes a gesture with her creeper-like eyebrows, many take note of it in unison.

ye tv ahuḥ vijñānam eva harsaviśādamohaśabdādyaṁmakam na punar ito 'nyas tad dharma iti tan pratyāha viśaya iti. viśayo grāhyaḥ vijñānād bahir iti yāvat. ata eva sāmānyam sadharaṇam anekaiḥ puruṣair grhitam ity arthaḥ . . . tathā ca nartakī bhrūlātābhaṅge estasmin bahūnām pratisandhānam yuktam.

22

tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddham sāksitvam asya puruṣasya. kaivalyaṃ mādhyaस्थ्यam
draṣṭṛtvam akārtṛbhāvaś ca.

tasmāt tatsamyogād acetanaṃ cetanāvad iva līṅgam. guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteḥ
bhavaty udāsinaḥ.

puruṣasya darśanārtham kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya. paṅgvandhavad ubhayaḥ api
samyogas tatkr̥tāḥ sargāḥ.

23 Vācaspati, p. 39 (introduction to SK 20).

syād etat prameṇena kartavyam artham avagamyā cetano ahaṃ cikīrṣan karomīti
kṛticaitanyayoh sāmānādhikaranyam anubhavasiddham.

24 Koelman, p. 131.

25 See SK 44:

By means of virtue there is movement upward; by means of non-virtue there is movement
downward. And spiritual perfection comes by means of wisdom; bondage results from the
opposite [i.e., non-wisdom].

dharmaṇa gamanam ūrdhvaṃ gamanam adhaśtād bhavaty adharmeṇa. jñānena cāpavargo
viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ.

26 The commentators agree, in the main, in their description of the three bondages. I
quote Vācaspati (p. 58), as he is very clear in this case.

The [bondages] are of three types: *prākṛtika*, *vaikṛtika* and *dākṣiṇaka*. *Prākṛtika* is of
those who are devoted to the unmanifest *Prakṛti* because they understand the self to be
located in the unmanifest *Vaikṛtika* bondage is of those who are intent upon some
transformation of the *guṇas* as the locus of the self, either the elements, or the sense
powers, or the I-maker, or intellect *Dākṣiṇaka* comes about by means of pious
works. Those who are overcome by passionate [attachment], those performers of pious
works, are bound, being ignorant of that essence called *Puruṣa*.

sa ca trividhaḥ. prākṛtiko vaikṛtiko dākṣiṇakas ceti. tatra prakṛtav ātmajñānād ye
prakṛtim upāsate teṣāṃ prākṛtiko bandhaḥ vaikāriko bandhas teṣāṃ ye vikāraṇeva
bhūtendriyāhaṅkārabuddhiḥ puruṣādhivopāsate iṣṭapūrtena dākṣiṇakaḥ. puruṣa-
tattvānabhijño hiṣṭapūrtakārī kāmopahatamanā badhyate iti.

27 See Vācaspati, in the above note. See Vācaspati, p. 35 (introduction to SK 17).

In refutation of those complacent ones who are addicted to these only – the unmanifest
Prakṛti, or the great one, or the I-maker, or the sense powers, or the elements, considering
it to be the self – the following is said.

ye tu tauṣṭikā avyaktam vā mahāntam vāhaṅkāraṃ vendriyāṇi vā bhūtāni vātmānam
abhimanyamānās tāny evopāsate tān praty āha.

Cf. Māṭhara, p. 25 (comment on SK 20).

Since the self-nature of *Puruṣa* is consciousness, therefore, as a result of relating with that
consciousness, the inconscient, emergent essences, beginning with the great one, as if
they themselves were conscious, go forth into their functions: the judgment of [*buddhi*],

the self-awareness [of *ahaṁkāra*], the synthesizing [of *manas*], the seeing [of the external senses].

yasmāc cetanasvabhāvaḥ puruṣaḥ tasmāt tat samyogād acetanaṁ mahadādi liṅgam
adhyavasāyābhimānaśākalpālocanādiṣu vṛttiṣu cetanāvāt pravartate.

28 (See note 22 for Sanskrit text of SK 21.) SK 62 text:

tasmān na badhyate 'ddhā na mucyate nāpi saṁsarati kaścit. saṁsarati badhyate mucyate
ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ.

29 Chennakesavan, p. 24.

30 A. Berriedale Keith, *The Sāṁkhya System: A History of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy* (Delhi: Y.M.C.A. Publishing House, 1949), p. nine [first edition 1918].

31 Keith, p. 97.

32 Sk 18 reads:

The plurality of Puruṣas is proved because of diversity of births, deaths, and sense powers, because of non-simultaneity of activities, and particularly because of the difference in things made up of the *guṇas*.

jananamaraṇakaraṇānāṁ pratiniyamād ayugapatpravṛtteṣu ca, puruṣabahutvaṁ siddham
traiguṇyaviparyayā caiva.

33 Keith makes the same misinterpretation of *ahaṁkāra*, for the same reason (p. 98):

It is impossible to interpret the principle of individuation [*ahaṁkāra*] in any real cosmic sense, as if this is done we would find ourselves faced with the conception of a really conscious world spirit, which is not accepted in the *Kārikā*.

Ahaṁkāra, like *buddhi*, has its *tattva* reality as cosmic differentiation. It is that which differentiates the subjective and objective world. *Ahaṁkāra* becomes self-awareness ("individuation") only when falsely identified with as "me". The *ahaṁkāra* as "me" has only experiential reality. The *ahaṁkāra* is not the individual awareness of a world spirit, it is the falsely experienced individual awareness of the (individual) Puruṣa.

Later writers have continued to hold this improper position:

The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, in fact describes God as "hidden in his own *guṇas*". This integral view of ultimate reality found in the Upanishads, we must take it, has been meddled with here [in Sāṁkhya] as a result of a dualistic bias; and spirit has been separated from nature, rendering the whole doctrine unintelligible . . . Such an explanation also throws light on the names given to some of the evolutes of Prakṛti like "intellect" (*mahat*), "egoism" (*ahaṁkāra*), etc.

Mysore Hiriyana, *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949), p. 127.

Considering the individual experience, the significance of the terms *Mahat* or *Buddhi*, *Ahaṁkāra*, becomes clear. But how can they be 'cosmic' stages in development . . . This is possible only when the *Puruṣa* of the Sāṁkhyas . . . is taken as a Universal of Cosmic *Puruṣa*, and the whole manifestation of *Prakṛti* as an ideal presentation to him. In which case 'the psychological presentation coincides with that of actual evolution' — the *Mahat* becomes the Cosmic *Buddhi* illumined by the Spirit, and the *Ahaṁkāra* becomes the self-feeling arising in him.

But in its reaction against Absolutism, the doctrine has discarded the idea of a universal soul and by sundering it into two – *Prakṛti* and *Purusha* – has reduced each to a mere abstraction.

K. B. Ramakrishna Rao, *Theism of Pre-Classical Sāṃkhya* (Mysore: University of Mysore, 1966), pp. 92–3. The method of interpreting the essences used by Keith, Hiriyana and Rao is to look for historical precedent when faced by a hard passage. They find the forerunner of the Sāṃkhya cosmogony in the Upaniṣads. The unifying principle of the cosmogony in the Upaniṣads is a supreme creator or personal world-spirit. They then look to the *Kārikā* and find that the cosmogonic model survives, but without its unifier. And if this unifier were present, then the cosmic/psychological nature of the essences is easily understood. Therefore, they reason, Sāṃkhya has bastardized the old notions of cosmogony in a way which makes their doctrines unintelligible. (Thus, though attempting to interpret, they end up criticising the system as fundamentally irrational and so uninterpretable.) The mistake in all this is to assume that the unifying principle of the Upaniṣads and the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* is the same. Actually, that which holds the conceptual structure and language of the Sāṃkhya cosmogony together is the notion of false identity. This notion is found in the *Kārikā* itself; in fact, in those verses which immediately precede the description of cosmogony.

³⁴ Dasgupta, p. 249.

³⁵ Larson, pp. 183 and 47–8.

³⁶ Larson, p. 183.

³⁷ Larson, p. 195–96.

³⁸ See Larson, p. 184.

In the final analysis, however, no parallel from our own experience can do justice to the Sāṃkhya notion. We suggested earlier that the Sāṃkhya analysis arose to some degree as an attempt to describe the various levels or stages of yogic awareness. The *buddhi* is certainly one such level, and it transcends all our familiar experiences.

Larson looked to his own experience to try to find a way to get a handle on *buddhi*. He does not find any cosmic *buddhi* there. The problem, of course, is that familiar experience is the experience of non-wisdom, the condition of indentifying falsely with the essences. In familiar experience only *buddhi* as personal intellect presents itself.

³⁹ Larson, p. 177–8.

⁴⁰ Larson, p. 173.

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ONCE AGAIN ON DHARMAKĪRTI'S DEVIATION FROM DIGNĀGA ON *PRATYAKṢĀBHĀSA*

M. Hattori and A. Wayman proposed two mutually opposed interpretations of Dignāga's classification of *pratyakṣābhāsa*.¹ I shall proceed to propose yet a third interpretation which contains elements from both Wayman and Hattori, and can, therefore, be considered as a compromise between the two scholars. In the second part of this paper I shall try to deal with the philosophical considerations which led Dignāga to attribute all errors to the mind, and no errors whatsoever to the senses.

The discussion evolves around *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I,7cd-8ab:

*bhrānti-saṃvṛtti-saj-jñānam anumānānumānikam /
smārtābhilāṣikam cēti pratyakṣābhaṃ sataimiram //*

The verse is translated by Hattori as follows: "erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection and desire are not true perception and are accompanied by 'obscurity (*sataimira*).'"²

Dignāga in his *Vṛtti* on this verse explains only three types of *pratyakṣābhāsa*:

- (1) Erroneous cognition (*bhrānti-jñāna*) is not perception, because it conceptually constructs such objects as water out of vapour etc.
- (2) Cognition of empirical reality (*saṃvṛtti-saj-jñāna*) is not perception, because it superimposes (*āropa*) on empirical reality something else, that is, conceptually constructs empirical reality as absolute reality.
- (3) Inference, its result etc., are not true perception, because they are conceptual constructions of previous experience (*pūrvānubhūta-kalpanā*).

All three types of *pratyakṣābhāsa* explained by Dignāga are produced through conceptual construction. Jinendrabuddhi, however, explains a fourth type, *tāimira*, as a cognition caused by a defective sense organ (*indriyōpaghāta-jaṃ jñānam*).

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is based on Dharmakīrti's interpretation in the *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.288-300, according to which there are three sorts of *pratyakṣābhāsa* produced by conceptual construction, and a fourth type, free from conceptual construction (*avikalpa*).

Dignāga's silence on this fourth type of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, as well as his

criticism of the Nyāya definition of perception, in which he argues that the word 'nonerroneous' (*avyabhicārin*) is superfluous, combined with the fact that some commentators disagree with Dharmakīrti's interpretation led Hattori to the conclusion that Dignāga accepted only three types of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, all due to conceptual construction, and interpreted "the word '*sataimiram*' as an adjective modifying '*pratyakṣābham*', . . . [and] not as mentioning a separate kind of *pratyakṣābhāsa*."³

Against this conclusion, Professor Wayman argued that the interpretation of *taimira* as obscurity is linguistically impossible, and that Dignāga did not make any comment on a fourth type of *pratyakṣābhāsa* simply because it is too obvious, and that this becomes clear by the similarities in structure between the four kinds of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, the four kinds of errors enumerated by Dharmottara (cf. below), and the four kinds of perception.

The reader is advised to read Wayman's article himself. I do not know whether I can reproduce his arguments faithfully, as I am puzzled by most of them. I really do not understand, for instance, how the following speculation on Kamalaśīla's education could lead us anywhere:

"Hence the [Monier-Williams] dictionary recognizes only the concrete significance of the derived form *taimira*. We may presume now that Dharmakīrti knew this by his wide reading in general Indian literature, while Kamalaśīla, restricting himself to Buddhist texts and philosophical works of adversaries of Buddhist logicians, did not encounter the literary contexts of the term *taimira* and too hastily jumped to the conclusion of what it means in Dignāga's verse."⁴

First, with all the respect due to the Monier-Williams, it can by no means be considered as an extensive dictionary, and is especially insufficient for philosophical texts. If there happens to be a contradiction between Monier-Williams and Kamalaśīla, I would rather believe Kamalaśīla. Second, if Kamalaśīla's reading list was shorter than Dharmakīrti's, then one would expect him to interpret *taimira* in its usual sense of a cognition produced by the *timira* sickness, as Dharmakīrti does, and not in the highly unusual one of 'deceptive' (*viśamvādaka*). Third, the interpretation of *taimira* as *viśamvādaka*, which is based on the interpretation of *timira* as *ajñāna* (ignorance), is not even Kamalaśīla's, who simply reports here the point of view of *svayūthyas* ("some Buddhist insiders" as Wayman himself translated it, p. 391). Fourth, this interpretation of *taimira* does not indicate that whoever proposed it, did not know enough Sanskrit, but is, obviously, a simple commentators' trick.

Fifth, nor is this interpretation adopted by Hattori, since he translates *taimira* as obscurity, and not as deceptive.

To support his interpretation of the word *taimira*, Wayman establishes the following association:

<i>causes of error</i>	<i>types of perception</i>	<i>pratyakṣābhāsa</i>
(1) error due to object (<i>viṣaya-gata</i>)	mental perception (<i>mānasa-pratyakṣa</i>)	erroneous cognition (<i>bhrānti-jñāna</i>)
(2) error due to place (<i>bāhyāśraya-sthita</i>)	perception of Yogin (<i>yogi-pratyakṣa</i>)	cognition of empirical reality (<i>saṃvṛtti-saj-jñāna</i>)
(3) error found within (<i>ādhyātma-gata</i>)	self-awareness (<i>svasaṃvedana</i>)	inference etc. (<i>anumānādi</i>)
(4) error due to senses (<i>indriya-gata</i>)	sense-perception (<i>indriya-pratyakṣa</i>)	caul (<i>taimira</i>)

I think the above association is far-fetched, and that Wayman has no convincing argument on which to rest his interpretation. I really don't see, for instance, how moving trees, seen from a boat, can be associated with the perception of a Yogin just "because the prescription for the Yogin from ancient times is that he should be careful of the place — hence he retreats to the forest etc.; or in his home has a room secluded from people in general and conventional usages. If the Yogin does not see things rightly in his visions, he would be projecting unrealities."⁵

The last sentence cannot be objected to, of course, but Wayman fails to provide an answer to the most obvious objections which immediately arise against the association he tries to establish. For instance, Dharmottara himself, from which the examples of error are taken, derives all causes of error from the senses. Wayman is well aware of that as he says that Dharmottara "appears content (or safe) to derive all four causes of error either immediately or remotely from the senses (*indriya*)"⁶, but he provides no reason why we should not accept Dharmottara's interpretation.

Furthermore, the whole comparison is based on the assumption that Dignāga recognized four types of perception, an assumption which Wayman, like all modern scholars who wrote on the subject, simply takes for granted. This assumption, however, is highly doubtful. And it is not based on Dignāga's own words, but rather on Dharmakīrti's reshuffle of them.⁷ In my opinion Dignāga recognized only three types of perception: *indriya-pratyakṣa*,

mānasa-pratyakṣa and *yogi-pratyakṣa*; he did not accept *svasaṃvedana* as a fourth type of perception. The point becomes quite clear when we look at *Pramāṇasamuccaya* k.6ab and the *Vṛtti* thereupon: In a manner which leaves no place for ambiguity Dignāga *subsumes* the self-apprehension of desire etc., under mental perception! One could argue perhaps that k.7ab introduces a fourth type of perception, namely, the self-apprehension of conceptual construction. But since in the case of mental perception Dignāga did not recognize self-apprehension as a different type of perception, there is no reason to assume that he did so in the case of conceptual construction. I do not claim, of course, that Dignāga rejected self-apprehension altogether. All I mean is that self-apprehension is an aspect of the cognition (an aspect which, in as much as the cognition is *pramāṇa*, can be considered as *pramāṇa-phala*), and not a fourth type of perception.

The last argument brought up by Wayman is based on the following passage from *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I.2: *caḥsur-ādīnām apy ālambanatva-prasaṅgaḥ, te 'pi hi paramārthatō 'nyathā vidyamānā nīlādy-ābhāsasya dvicandrādy-ābhāsasya ca jñānasya kāraṇī-bhavanti*. "[If that which forms a cause of cognition, although it assumes an appearance different from its real form, is to be recognized as the object, then] there would be also the absurd conclusion that even the visual sense and the other [senses] would be [admitted as] objects [of cognition]. This is because they also exist, in the ultimate sense, in different forms [from those appearing in a cognition], and [yet they] become the cause of such cognitions as the representation of something blue, etc., or of double moon, etc."⁸

Dharmakīrti refers to this passage in *PV*, 3.294, and says that it proves that Dignāga admitted errors caused by sense organs; those who interpret erroneous cognitions like the one of double moon etc., to be mental, will find themselves in contradiction with Dignāga's own words in the above passage. Therefore, concludes Dharmakīrti, there is a fourth type of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, which is an exception (*apavāda*) in so far that it is free from conceptual construction.

I think this passage should be understood otherwise. There is nothing in it to commit Dignāga to the view that sense organs produce wrong cognitions, because the mode of argument employed is a *prasaṅga*, a *reductio ad absurdum* of one's opponent's view which does not involve one's own philosophical positions. In fact, Dignāga can argue, quite consistently with his theory that the mind is always the cause of wrong cognitions, that if one considers the

external and internal objects of a cognition to be different, for instance, the sun rays to be the external object (*ālambana*) of an erroneous cognition of water although they do not appear in it (i.e. just because they are supposed to participate in its production), then the definition of object becomes too wide and can be applied to the other causal factors, such as the eye etc., too. There is nothing in this argument to compel Dignāga to accept as his own view that erroneous cognitions are produced by sense organs. He could claim for instance that erroneous cognitions are produced by the mind or by memory, and still employ the argument successfully against the *Vādaśāstra*.

This interpretation of Dignāga's argument is corroborated by his criticism of the Nyāya definition of perception, where he argues that the word nonerroneous (*avyabhicārin*) is superfluous, because erroneous cognitions are produced by the mind. In other words, there are no errors when sense organs are in contact with their objects, and those errors which arise when sense organs are not in contact, are already excluded from the definition by the word *indriyārtha-sannikarṣōtpannam*.

It should be emphasized that all the above arguments are not directed against Wayman's interpretation of *taimira* as "caul", but only against his endorsement of Dharmakīrti's view that *taimira-jñāna* is free from conceptual construction. In that respect, his suggestion seems to be better than Hattori's, for the interpretation of *taimira* as obscurity is, indeed, highly unusual, and in the context of this verse not very probable. Note, however, that 'caul' is not a literal translation of *taimira*. It could be taken as a translation of *keṣaṇḍuka*, but the *taimira* sickness produces also the cognition of the double moon etc.⁹ In any case the view that *taimira-jñāna* is free from conceptual construction could not possibly have been Dignāga's view, because it has a clear-cut effect: it invalidates Dignāga's definition of perception. For if one defines perception as free from conceptual construction, the following two inferences should be true (otherwise the definition is either too broad or too narrow):

(1) This cognition is free from conceptual construction, because it is perception.

(2) This cognition is perception, because it is free from conceptual construction.

Obviously, if one accepts a *pratyakṣābhāsa* free from conceptual construction, the second inference becomes false. Dharmakīrti who accepted as an exception

a *pratyakṣābhāsa* free from conceptual construction, had to modify the definition of perception, and added to it the word *abhrānta*. But one could hardly expect Dignāga to accept such an "exception" to his own definition.

Cf. PVA, p. 334.25–27: *yadi [tāmiram] avikalpakam kalpanāpodhatvāt pratyakṣam prāptam. na sarvam kalpanāpodham pratyakṣam api tv abhrāntatve sati. "abhrāntam kalpanāpodham pratyakṣam" na sarvam.* "[Objection:] If [the *tāmira*-cognition] is free from conceptual construction, it would be perception, [precisely] because it is free from conceptual construction. [Answer:] Not every [cognition] which is free from conceptual construction is [also] perception, but [only] in case it is [also] nonerroneous. [For the definition of] perception is nonerroneous [and] free from conceptual construction; not every [cognition which is free from conceptual construction is also nonerroneous]."

Moreover, since inference was considered *bhrānta*, and no other means of right cognition except inference and perception was accepted, the introduction of the word *abhrānta* to the definition of perception rendered the word *kalpanāpodha* completely superfluous.

Prajñākaragupta is aware of this problem, but the explanation he gives lacks, I think, any historical plausibility; cf. PVA, p. 335.12–14: *abhrānta-grahaṇam eva kasmān na kriyata iti cet. satyam etat. sākṣāt-kāri hi pratyakṣam tac cābhrānta-grahaṇena śakyam nidarśayitum, na hy asākṣāt-karaṇākāram abhrāntam savikalpakasya bhrāntatvāt. pare tu savikalpam api sākṣāt-karaṇākāram abhrāntam icchati, tad-anurodhena dvayam etad ucyate.* "[Objection]: Why is [the word] nonerroneous (*abhrānta*) not employed alone [in the definition of perception]? [Answer:] True. Perception is immediate experience, and it can be designated by employing [the word] nonerroneous [alone], for [a cognition] which does not have the form of immediate experience is not nonerroneous, because conceptual [cognition] is [always] erroneous. But others accept conceptual [cognition] too as having the form of immediate experience [and] as nonerroneous. With reference to that [view] both these [words, i.e. *abhrānta* and *kalpanāpodha*] are taught [as the definition of perception]."

When we see what was left of Dignāga's definition at the time of Prajñākaragupta, we cannot be dupe of Dharmakīrti trying to persuade us that this was Dignāga's original intention. For first we start with perception defined as *kalpanāpodha*, then the word *abhrānta* is added, and finally the word *kalpanāpodha* is practically rejected: it is formally kept in the definition out of deference for Dignāga, but its role is not to define perception — the word *abhrānta* alone

does that! — but merely to reject the view of certain others who recognize conceptual perception.

Granted that *taimira* is to be understood as *taimira-jñāna*, and that it is not free from conceptual construction, the question arises whether it is a fourth kind of *pratyakṣābhāsa* or not. I was inclined to believe that it does not form a separate kind of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, and that Dignāga mentions it only as an illustration, for it could be included under *bhrānti*. But Professor Schmithausen who kindly read through the first draft of this paper and saved me from some embarrassing mistakes, pointed out to me that in such a case the *sa-* of the *sataimira* becomes problematic. But then, if *taimira* is a fourth type of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, why did not Dignāga comment upon it, as he does on the other three types? Professor Schmithausen proposed the following solution: In several places in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, there are important differences between the *kārikās* and the *Vṛtti*. From that we can conclude that the *Vṛtti* was not written at the same time as the *kārikās*, and that Dignāga changed his mind in the meantime. Here we have one such case. When Dignāga wrote the *kārikās*, he considered four types of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, but when he came to comment upon them, he saw that the *taimira-jñāna* involves a problem which he did not know how to solve, and therefore left it without commentary. The *Vṛtti* being his last work, perhaps he did not have the time to make up his mind. (Note also that *taimira* is absent in the *Nyāyamukha*.)

Now, if the above analysis is true, then Dignāga propounds a very strange philosophical position: our senses can produce only right cognitions. This is also the conclusion reached at by Hattori, as he says: "Dignāga attributed errors only to the mind (*manas*) and . . . he admitted cognitions produced by sense organs as absolutely free from error."¹⁰ And this position contrasts sharply not only with our common sense, but with the Indian tradition as well. Indeed, if a wrong cognition is produced when a sense organ is defective, why blame it on the mind?

The question I am asking myself is what led Dignāga to take such a radical philosophical position. But this is exactly the kind of question one is not liable to get a satisfactory answer to. "Why" questions rarely get a clear-cut answer, "because writers (at any rate good writers) always write for their contemporaries, and in particular for those who are 'likely to be interested', which means those who are already asking the question to which an answer is being offered; and consequently a writer very seldom explains what the question is that he is trying to answer. Later on, when he has become a 'classic'

and his contemporaries are all dead, the question has been forgotten; especially if the answer he gave was generally acknowledged to be the right answer; for in that case people stopped asking the question, and began asking the question that next arose.”¹¹

One could expect, of course, some insight from autobiographical literature, personal letters and so on, but this is exactly the kind of literature which is completely lacking in India. Should we, then, as serious Indologists, avoid the question “To what question did So-and-so intend this proposition for an answer?”?

The trouble is that even if we had the Sanskrit original of Dignāga, in a perfect critical edition, with all philological problems solved, we would still not be able to understand what he means by simply studying his statements. In order to understand what he means, we have to know what was at the back of his mind. If, like Collingwood, we characterise a statement in terms of questions under discussion, then the context of a statement depends on questions raised in previous discussions. Moreover, methodologically, we have to assume that these previous discussions have reached us in some form or another. I say ‘methodologically’, for it may be possible that a context is lost to us temporarily, or without recovery.

Question and answer must, of course, be strictly correlated, a particular answer presupposing a particular question. One is not likely to gain much understanding by saying that Dignāga, in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I, asks himself questions such as “what are the means of right cognition?”, or “how can we distinguish between true and false cognitions?”, or “how is knowledge possible?” etc., but rather “how is knowledge possible, taking into account this particular objection made by this particular philosopher?”.

In what follows, I shall try to interpretate Dignāga’s theory of knowledge as a reply to the sceptical problems raised by Nāgārjuna. When stating that Nāgārjuna raised sceptical problems, I do not mean to say that he was a full-fledged sceptic. However, I do claim that Nāgārjuna’s arguments function — or give rise to the same problems — as sceptical arguments. The reason I chose Nāgārjuna and not, say, the Sautrāntikas or the Yogācāras, is that Dignāga’s claim that sense organs never produce wrong cognitions looks like an exasperated attempt to secure the possibility of valid cognition, and, as we know from multiple examples in Western philosophy,¹² such attempts usually arise as a reaction to scepticism.

Now, before I am accused of begging the question or of circularity, let

me emphasize that this is nothing but a supposition. Dignāga himself does not tell us why he says what he says, and, therefore, we can only guess, that is, make suppositions. And suppositions are, of course, not definite conclusions, but possibilities and probabilities, which can be easily criticised as "sheer speculations". But a good supposition can explain a number of things, whereas prudent silence explains nothing at all. This is why we make suppositions, and this is how we choose among different suppositions. When two suppositions are checked and compared with each other, the one to be adopted is the one which has a better explanatory power.

Nāgārjuna is one of the most studied Indian philosophers, he hardly needs to be introduced here. I shall therefore simply recall a few points which I believe crucial to our subject matter. Among the characteristics of reality (*tattva-lakṣaṇa*) enumerated in *MMK*, 18.9 one finds *prapañcā* *aprapañcitam* and *nirvikalpa*; and Candrakīrti ad loc. explains *prapañca* as speech (*vāk*) and *vikalpa* as the play-ground of thought (*citta-pracāra*). Is it a mere coincidence that Dignāga defines perception with practically the same word (*nirvikalpa* = *kalpanāpoḍha*)? If reality is beyond conceptual construction, then a true cognition which has to be a faithful representation of it, has to be free from conceptual construction.

Starting from his definition of reality, Nāgārjuna demonstrates that none of the concepts cherished by the Hīnayāna Buddhists fulfills the conditions of reality, and they are therefore all void. His way of arguing seems quite tedious. He rejects one concept after the other, showing that there is nothing independent, and that violates the first condition given in the definition of reality (*apara-pratyayam*). Sense and mind data are illusive, just like the mirage of water, or the celestial city of the Gandharvas.¹³

Nāgārjuna claims that all concepts are relational concepts, such as "the father of", "the son of"; which are meaningless alone and presuppose one another (*IV*, 49).¹⁴ But he does not really bother about the nature of this dependence relationship which is mentally constructed. It does not seem important to him to determine the exact way in which they function, the kind of dependence relationship involved, whether they form closed or open systems, and so on. Thus, in one place he can analyse a two-term-dependence relationship such as between cause and effect; but, in another place, the number of terms can be increased to five, for instance, cause, effect, agent, instrument of action and action itself (*MMK*, 24.1) The basic distinction is

between *sva-* and *para-bhāva*, where *parabhāva* can be anything else in the world. *Svabhāva* is accordingly defined as non-dependence on anything else (MMK, 15.2). As long as Nāgārjuna manages to show that there is at least one thing on which the object under discussion depends, his purpose is accomplished for he can conclude that it is empty, devoid of intrinsic nature.

In the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Nāgārjuna substitutes his specific refutations with a general criticism of the means of knowledge, and here his sceptical arguments are pressed to their furthest limit. For if the means of knowledge themselves are deceptive, no matter how careful one is in establishing one's theories, one can never be sure that one is not led astray by the only means at one's disposal for gaining knowledge.

But Nāgārjuna is certainly not suggesting that we should stop talking because reality cannot be expressed by words, nor does he suggest that we abandon our everyday activities, which necessarily involve conceptual constructions, because these constructions are devoid of intrinsic nature. All he says is that one should not take empirical reality for absolute reality, or superimpose (*samāropa*, cf. MMK, 16.10) one on the other.

MMK, 24.6–8: “[By your theory of] emptiness, you reject the real existence of fruit (*phala-sadhāva*), *dharma* and *adharma*, and all everyday practice.

On this [objection] we reply: You do not understand neither the aim of emptiness, nor emptiness [itself], nor [even] the meaning of [the word] emptiness. That is why you frustrate yourself. The Buddhas teach the *dharma* on the basis of two [levels of] truth, the empirical truth (*loka-samvṛtti-satya*) and the absolute truth (*paramārthataḥ satyam*).”

All the elements of this short exposé of Nāgārjuna's thought have been integrated by Dignāga into his theory of knowledge: the two levels of empirical and absolute truth, the consideration of empirical reality as a superimposition (*āropa*, *samāropa*) on absolute reality, the definition of absolute reality as inexpressible by words and beyond conceptual construction, the interdependence of all concepts, their being viewed as mental constructions, which are incapable to refer to reality. This and the fact of “Thematisierung” of *pramāṇas* by both Nāgārjuna and Dignāga give the supposition that Dignāga took Nāgārjuna into account while formulating his theory of knowledge some probability in its favour. This does not mean, of course, that each and every element had to be taken directly from Nāgārjuna, and from Nāgārjuna alone. Dignāga could borrow for instance, his definition of perception from

Vindhyavāsin. But to affirm this is to answer the question where he took his definition from, not why he took it. As for the question "why", I suggest the following answer: The onslaught of Nāgārjuna's dialectics crumbled the old foundations that used to support the entire Buddhist religion. A new basis to justify and guarantee again the Buddha's teaching (or, at any rate, what the non-Madhyamaka Buddhists took it to be) was required, and Dignāga sought to provide this by establishing a new theory of knowledge.¹⁵

Dignāga would then proceed in the following manner. First he establishes an absolute distinction between perception and inference, according to their respective objects:

"k.2a—b1. the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely,] perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

They are only two because

k.2b2—c1. the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects.

Apart from the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and inference only the universal."¹⁶

Then, in a second step, Dignāga defines perception as free from conceptual construction, and conceptual construction is defined, in turn, as the association of a word with a thing perceived, which results in the verbal designation of the thing.

This twofold operation results in the restriction of Nāgārjuna's critique to the realm of inference. For linking to inference all conceptual constructions which, admittedly, result in words denoting nothing real (*artha-sūnya-śabda*),¹⁷ which cannot denote reality as their function consists of a superimposition of empirical reality on absolute reality and so on, Dignāga clears the ground for perception to apprehend absolute reality. In other words, Dignāga tries to win the war by losing a battle.

But, the attribution of all errors to conceptual constructions, and the close association between conceptual construction and inference, made inference a highly vulnerable means of knowledge. If inference was to be at all considered a means of knowledge, Dignāga had to take into account the fact that it dealt with empty interdependent concepts. Having made an absolute distinction between reality as a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and concept as a universal (*samānya-lakṣaṇa*), his problem was to bridge the gap between

them again. This is where the theory of *apoha* comes in. A word gets its meaning, not by referring directly to reality, but by the exclusion of everything else (*anyāpoha*). Here again, one can see that the idea that all things or concepts are interdependent is incorporated in the *apoha* theory. For to say that meaning is obtained by the exclusion of all other things means that these other things delimit the semantical field of a word; and this presupposes a dependence on these other things, for without their being there, there is neither delimiting nor meaning.

If our supposition is true (the final judgment of which, as I emphasized above, has to wait till alternative suppositions are checked and compared), then the phenomenon of "Inklusivismus", which was so capably analysed by P. Hacker, is not limited to religious texts, but plays an important role in philosophical reasoning as well. In other words, Dignāga saw that in order to overcome Nāgārjuna's arguments he had to accept them, that is, by integrating them into his system, and by delimiting their validity. By accepting and rearranging Nāgārjuna's specific positions he tried to check-mate the general conclusion and reopen the way to knowledge.

After this long digression, we can go back to our initial point, namely, why Dignāga refused to admit the existence of erroneous cognitions produced by sense organs. I think the point becomes clearer now. If one admits that some of our cognitions are false, the criterion problem, that is, how to distinguish between true and false cognitions, is immediately raised. In fact, several criteria had been suggested long before Dignāga, for instance, the efficiency of the activity (*pravṛtti-sāmarthya*), the absence of sublation (*bādhā-rahitatva*), and so on. None of these criteria could stand a serious sceptical attack, for the criterion problem is the sceptic's realm. What Dignāga did was to offer a new kind of criterion which he thought could stand the sceptical critique, because it literally complied with the sceptical requirements. One of the characteristics of reality enumerated by Nāgārjuna was that it cannot be conceptualized. Dignāga not only admits this, but he proceeds to making a criterion out of it. If reality cannot be conceptualized, then a true cognition must be free from conceptual construction, for a necessary condition of knowing is that our cognitions be the exact likeness of the object to which they correspond. This, of course, is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. In order to guarantee the truthfulness of a cognition, a further assumption has to be made, namely, senses should be denied the capability of falsifying. This assumption is compatible with most of the Indian

stock-examples of error. The mirage of water, for instance, can be easily analysed in the following manner. The sense organs apprehend correctly a bright surface, and the mind interprets it wrongly as water. The same analysis applies to mother-of-pearl mistaken for silver etc. (Note that under this analysis the notion of illusion disappears, resolved into the notion of error.)

The fact that Dignāga uses the absence of conceptual construction as a criterion of truth is corroborated by a passage in the *Prasannapadā* in which the *pūrvapakṣin*, a logician from Dignāga's school, tries to establish causality by the fact that we have an immediate experience (*anubhava*) of it.¹⁸ (For Dignāga too immediate experience is always free from conceptual construction.)¹⁹

If I am right, then "free from conceptual construction" is not only the definition of perception, but its criterion as well. A Naiyāyika asked "How do you know a cognition is true?", would answer "Because of the efficiency of the activity", or something to that effect. Dignāga, on the other hand, faced with the same question, would answer "Precisely because it is free from conceptual construction."

(A criterion does not always have to be a confirmation or coordination principle among different cognitions. Think of Descartes' criterion according to which clear and distinct ideas are necessarily true!)

Further, one can always tell whether a cognition is free from conceptual construction or not, because the absence of conceptual construction itself is always rightly apprehended. This is probably the reason why Dignāga insists that the self-apprehension (*svasamvedana*) is always, even in the case of conceptual cognitions, free from conceptual construction. By this he avoids the fallacy of infinite regress which is inherent to such criteria as the efficiency of the activity.²⁰

But Dignāga did not conceive his theory of knowledge in order to substantiate common sense fancy of reality. The fact that perceptual cognitions are absolutely true is useless for everyday practice, for they are evanescent and unique, they can neither persist nor recur, and, therefore, no relations among them can be established. The flux of sense destroys any *sensum* before it has lasted long enough to permit its relations being studied. In everyday life, one must operate with conceptual constructions; and indeed Dignāga classifies the cognition of empirical reality as *pratyakṣābhāsa*. The real aim of Dignāga's theory of knowledge was probably to provide a foundation for the Buddha's teaching, and for that a third type of perception was necessary — the *yogi-pratyakṣa*. In the case of the Yogin, we have the exact opposite of

the usual cognitive process. In everyday life, the perceptual cognitions are immediately transformed, or more precisely give rise to, conceptual cognitions; the Yogin, on the other hand, starts with a conceptual cognition, which becomes clearer and clearer as he moves forward from one stage of meditation to the next, till it becomes a *yogi-jñāna*, that is, free from conceptual construction. The most common simile to illustrate this process is the meditation of the lover on the beloved girl. The mental image of the girl gains in vividness till, as it were, she stands before her lover.²¹ The postulation of the *yogi-jñāna* was necessary in order to establish the Buddhist dogmas such as the four noble truths, the momentariness etc., which are necessarily transmitted in the form of conceptual construction, as absolutely true.

It is clear that what holds all this together is the equation between absence of conceptual construction and truthfulness. The equation had to be established in both directions: (1) by correspondence or likeness between cognition and reality, i.e. since a conceptual cognition cannot have the likeness of an unconceptualizable reality, it follows that whatever is true cognition is free from conceptual construction, (2) by the attribution of all falsification to the mind; from this it follows that whatever is false cognition is conceptual.

In order to establish the second proposition, Dignāga had to deny that there are erroneous cognitions free from conceptual construction, and, therefore, could not allow the senses to produce erroneous cognitions.

Dignāga's position is very original, but it is not without a parallel in Western philosophy. The sceptics of the 16th century undermined the assumption that sensation gives us a real acquaintance of the real world. Hobbes who granted that there is no way to distinguish between real sensation and imagination sought to avoid the distinction. *Sensa*, he says, are "fancy, the same waking as sleeping . . . so that sense in all cases is nothing else but original fancy" (Leviathan ch. 1). Spinoza (for whom *imaginatio* is the regular term for sensation) and Leibniz (for whom all *sensa* are confused ideas) agree with Hobbes on this point, but Locke propounds the opposite view. For him "our simple ideas are all real". The only ideas which he allows to be fantastical are complex ideas which are formed by combining simple ones. Dignāga's and Locke's conception of all *sensa* as real met no success at the hands of their followers. And just as Berkeley and Hume thought it a matter of urgency to disown it, Dharmakīrti had to pretend that Dignāga never meant it.

Let us attend to the *taimira-jñāna* again. How can it be interpreted without jeopardizing the equation of truthfulness with absence of conceptual

construction? Here, the interpretation proposed above for the mirage of water, i.e. as impressions rightly apprehended and wrongly interpreted, cannot be applied, because there is no external object which stands in the same relation to the hair-net as the sun-rays to the water. Nor could the error be attributed to the mind alone (as in the case of dreams), because *timira* is an eye sickness, not a mind sickness. One possible solution to this problem is to say that sense organs are passive. The eye by itself does not have the capacity of "inventing" the image of caul, what it could do at most is to disturb the mind in such a way, that a mental cognition of a caul is produced. This solution has the advantage of keeping all cognitions free from conceptual construction true, and, at the same time, accounting for such cases as *taimira* where sense organs are defective. Dharmakīrti mentions briefly (PV, 3.295) the possibility of sense organs being indirectly (*pāramparya*) responsible for the *taimirajñāna*, a possibility which he, of course, immediately rejects. But as far as I can see this is the closest interpretation of Dignāga. (It is certainly more faithful to him than Dharmakīrti's interpretation.)

The trouble with this or any similar interpretation is that it is not very convincing. No matter how well each and every one of the Indian stock examples of errors could be explained away as being due to the mind, the basic conviction that sense organs are sometimes directly responsible for errors could not be uprooted, especially not in the case of defective sense organs. Moreover, if sense organs never produce false cognitions, then a defective sense organ has to produce either a true cognition or no cognition at all; and Dignāga was probably severely criticized on this point.

Another problem which was left open by Dignāga was how to account for the validity of inference. The triple criterion of valid reason (*trirūpa-liṅga*) adopted by Dignāga in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* II. enables one to differentiate between valid and invalid reasons, but it does not answer the question how the cognition of the inferred object, which is always a fictitious universal, could be valid at all. The *apoha* theory could explain on which basis inference operates, but it could not guarantee its validity, for the basic assumption remains that by inference one does not apprehend reality, but only conceptual constructions.

Dharmakīrti had to complete and modify Dignāga's theory on these two points in order to make it more acceptable. On the one hand he admitted that there are erroneous cognitions free from conceptual construction. On the other hand he had to find a new criterion to guarantee the validity of inference. This is

probably the reason why he introduced the concept of *artha-kriyā* (efficient action), which was unknown to Dignāga. But as the universal could not possibly produce an efficient action, since it does not exist, a further modification of Dignāga was inevitable. As we have seen, the corner stone of Dignāga's system is that perception has for its object only the particular, and inference only the universal. But if the particular alone has an efficient action, then inference, in order to be valid, must apprehend the particular. Thus, according to Dharmakīrti the particular is cognized by both perception and inference: in its own form (*svarūpeṇa*) by perception, in a different form (*pararūpeṇa*) by inference.²² By introducing these modifications, Dharmakīrti had to destroy the basic principles of Dignāga, namely, the absolute distinction between perception and inference according to their respective objects, and the equation of truthfulness with absence of conceptual construction.

Paradoxically enough, Dignāga's concepts of validity and error were to be taken up and further developed in rival schools, by the Vyākhyāṭr and Prabhākara, into what later came to be called *svataḥ prāmāṇyam* and *smṛtipramoṣa*.²³

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ABBREVIATIONS

- MMK: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ* of Nāgārjuna avec la *Prasannapadā*, commentaire de Candrakīrti, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin. St. Petersburg 1913.
PV(A): *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam* or *Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ* of Prajñākaragupta, ed. R. Sāṅkṛityāyana. Patna 1953.

NOTES

- ¹ Cf. M. Hattori, *Pratyakṣābhāsa*, Dignāga's View and Dharmakīrti's interpretation. *Indogaku-shiron-shū* 6-7 1965, pp. 122-128. — *Dignāga, On Perception*. Harvard Oriental Series 47, 1968, n. 1.53 pp. 95-97. A. Wayman, "A Reconsideration of Dharmakīrti's 'Deviation' from Dignāga on *Pratyakṣābhāsa*." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Diamond Jubilee Vol. 1978, pp. 387-396.
- ² Cf. Hattori, *op. cit.* p. 28.
- ³ *Ibid.* p. 96.
- ⁴ Wayman, *ibid.* p. 392; cf. also *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamalaśīla. G.O.S. 30, Baroda 1926, p. 394.16-23 (v. 1324), quoted by Hattori p. 97.

⁵ Wayman, p. 394.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 393.

⁷ In this connection it would be interesting to take a closer look at the *Vṛtti*, the second part of which Hattori reconstructs as follows: *rāgādiṣu ca svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvād mānasam pratyakṣam*. First, it should be noted that according to the Tibetan translation (hdod chags dañ še sdañ dañ gti mug dañ bde ba dañ sdug bsal la sogs pa ni dbaṅ po la mit ltos pahi phyir rañ rig pahi mñon sum mo. I quote Karnakavarman's translation; Vasudhararakṣita's translation is practically the same. Hattori arbitrarily replaces ni with la yañ rañ rig pa, and rañ rig pahi with yid kyi) one has to read *rāgadveṣamohasukhaduḥkhādiṣu*, and the *ca* should probably be omitted (cf. *PVA* p. 305.17–18). This, however, is not of much importance; the interesting point is that *mānasam* has no equivalent in the Tibetan, even though its presence is testified by Prajñākaragupta. We have, therefore two alternatives in order to account for this difference: either *mānasam* was originally in Dignāga's text, and was later taken out; or it was not originally there, and was later added. Suppose it was not originally in the text, what could be the reason for interpolating it? One possible answer is that *indriyānapekṣatvāt* was misunderstood or not understood, that is, the ambiguous position of the ablative led to its being constructed with *pratyakṣam* instead of *svasaṃvedanam*; (the logical relation with *svasaṃvedana* is not at all obvious, even if we interpret it as apprehension through itself and not as apprehension of itself); *indriyānapekṣatvāt pratyakṣam* makes no sense, and, therefore, *mānasam* was added. But is the ablative really so ambiguous? The Tibetan translators who did not read *mānasam* rightly constructed *indriyānapekṣatvāt* with *svasaṃvedanam*, and anyone, after a moment of thought, would do the same. Now, suppose that *mānasam* was originally in the text, and later omitted, what could be the reason for that? This could have been done under Dharmakīrti's influence (Note that Dharmakīrti expounds his theory of *svasaṃvedana* while commenting on *PS(V)* 6ab, (in *PV* 3.250f.)) and that Dharmakīrti's works were translated into Tibetan before Dignāga's). For if we take out *mānasam*, we can read the *Vṛtti* on 6ab as two independent sentences (this may also account for the *ca* being added), the one explaining *mānasa-pratyakṣa* (i.e. *mānasam api rūpādīviṣayālabhanam avikalpikam anubhavākārapravṛttam*), the other as explaining *svasaṃvedana* in general, not as a type of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, but as a type of perception (i.e. *rāgadveṣamohasukhaduḥkhādiṣu svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvāt pratyakṣam*). Moreover, since *rāga*, *dveṣa* etc., were considered as *caittas*, one is immediately reminded of Dharmakīrti's definition of *svasaṃvedana* (*sarvacittacaittānām ātma saṃvedanam*). Thus, one could reach a perfect harmonisation between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. I suppose the temptation was too strong to be resisted. This note is partly based on Professor Schmithausen's lectures on Dignāga.

⁸ Translated by Hattori p. 35, Sanskrit fragment quoted from p. 120 n. 2.26.

⁹ Cf. for instance *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* on v. 2879: *taimirikādīnam dvicandrādījñāneṣu puruṣāntaraparipraśnād evānyathatvaniścayo bhavati*.

¹⁰ *Pratyakṣābhāsa*, p. 125; cf. also *Dignāga* p. 96.

¹¹ R. G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*. Oxford University Press (reprint) 1970, p. 39.

¹² Cf. R. H. Popkin, *History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes*. London, 1967.

¹³ *MMK*, 23.8. Nāgārjuna uses here the word *kevala* which I do not quite understand.

¹⁴ Candrakīrti, however, glosses it with *parikalpitamātra*.

¹⁵ *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, *The Critical Method of Nāgārjuna*, trans. K. Bhattacharya, ed. E. A. Johnston and A. Kunst. Delhi 1978.

¹⁵ This is not to say that Dignāga was the first to do so. What the Yogācāra reaction to Nāgārjuna was, and why Dignāga was dissatisfied by it are questions that lie far beyond the scope of this paper. I think Frauwallner gives us a clue to this problem in "Dignāga, Sein Werk und seine Entwicklung." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Südost Asiens* 3 1959, p. 129.

¹⁶ Hattori, *op. cit.* p. 24.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 25.

¹⁸ *Prasannapadā* p. 58. Note that the argument could be brought up by a philosopher of the Prabhākara school.

¹⁹ Cf. Hattori, *op. cit.* p. 27 (Db), also p. 42 (Ba).

²⁰ Cf. my *Studies in the Tattvapaplavasiṃha* I. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 1983.

²¹ Cf. Y. Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*. Koyto 1966, p. 54, n. 124.

²² Hattori *op. cit.* p. 80, n. 1.14; cf. *PV*, 3.53d: *meyam tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam*. Cf. also Manorathanandin on 3.54, p. 118. Jayarāśi (*Tattvapaplavasiṃha*, p. 30.15 f.) points out the ambiguity and weakness of the Buddhist position. If there are two means of valid cognition because there are two kinds of objects, then what is the object of inference? If it is the particular, the distinction between the two *pramāṇas* cannot be established according to their objects. If it is the universal, inference cannot be a *pramāṇa* because the universal does not exist.

²³ For the Vyākhyātṛ and Prabhākara cf. L. Schmithausen, *Maṇḍanamīśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ, mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der Indischen Irrtumslehre*. Wien 1965, pp. 171–176; 205–212.

A NOTE ON ABHILĀSIKA

I have concentrated in the above paper on one type only of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, namely, *taimira*, for the crucial point in my argumentation was to show that there is no *pratyakṣābhāsa* free from conceptual construction, and in this respect *taimira* alone is problematic. However, the case of *abhilāṣika* has already caused some confusion, and, therefore, a few clarifying words would not be out of place here. Hattori translates *abhilāṣika* as "desire". But if desire is *pratyakṣābhāsa*, isn't there a contradiction with Dharmakīrti's theory, according to which all *cittas* and *caittas* are immediate experiences? Were we fooled by Dharmakīrti again? Should we conclude perhaps that the self apprehension of desire etc., is perception (as Dignāga says that the self apprehension of desire etc., is mental perception), but desire itself is not perception, just as the self apprehension of conceptual construction is perception, whereas conceptual construction itself is, obviously, not perception?

Professor Wayman, who has given the problem some thought in his above mentioned paper, suggests that we can avoid the problem by taking *abhilāṣika* in a different meaning altogether: "This (i.e. *abhilāṣa*) does not mean 'desire'. My study of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary made clear that this term is employed like the verb form *īsyate*, which in these contexts does not mean 'desire', but 'it is believed, claimed', so *abhilāṣa* means here a belief, and the derivative form (i.e. *abhilāṣika*) 'derivative belief'." (*ibid.* p. 389)

I am not sure what a 'derivative belief' means, for Wayman's way of expressing himself is, if not confused, highly confusing. I think he means a belief derived from speech, for, so he argues, it is preceded by speech. This interpretation of *abhilāṣika* takes

its place in a wider 'matching up' of four *pratyakṣābhāsas* with four *pramāṇas*:

<i>anumāna</i>	—	<i>anumāna</i>
<i>anumānika</i>	—	<i>arthāpatti</i>
<i>smārta</i>	—	<i>upamāna</i>
<i>abhilāṣika</i>	—	<i>śabda</i> (sic)

Wayman considers this association 'indisputable', and probably for this reason, does not waste his time to bring forward logical reasons or historical evidence to substantiate it. While denying it, I shall do likewise, for the burden of proof lies, I think, on him.

But even if we refuse to accept the association between *abhilāṣika* and *śabda*, the question as to its meaning in Dignāga's verse remains open. Wayman mentions a variant on this verse (from the *Vibhūti*) which reads *abhilāpika* ('derived from a word') instead of *abhilāṣika*; but as he considers both words as synonyms anyhow, he does not deal with the question whether this variant should be opted for. Hattori, however, who knows of this variant, rejects it, and there are, I believe, sufficient philological grounds to reject this *lectio facilior*, which contradicts both Tibetan translations, and several Sanskrit quotations of this verse. It seems to me that this variant has arisen in order to solve the apparent contradiction mentioned above: Someone who took *abhilāṣika* to mean desire, and thought it would contradict Dharmakīrti's theory of *caittas* as immediate experiences, meddled with the verse.

Not to complicate any further a matter which is basically simple, I suggest the following interpretation: *abhilāṣika* is not desire, as Hattori translates it, for *abhilāṣa* is desire, nor is it a 'derivative belief' or a belief derived from speech, as suggested by Wayman, who saw that Hattori's translation cannot be right, but opted for quite an absurd solution; *abhilāṣika* is something derived from desire, namely, such conceptual constructions which take the form 'I want to obtain this object' etc.

BOOK REVIEW

Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism, by Steven Collins, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, etc., 1982, pp. 323 (including Bibliography, Glossary and Index of Pali and Sanskrit terms and General Index), Cloth £22.50 (SBN 0 521 24081 6).

The book under review contains a thoroughgoing discussion of the doctrine of *anatta* in Theravada Buddhism. *Anattavāda* is one of the cornerstones of Buddhism, and accordingly, it has been discussed and evaluated in a number of well-known books on Buddhism. In this book, Dr. Collins has attempted to achieve two ends, viz. to provide (i) "a new account of a familiar doctrine" (p. 9), and (ii) "a picture of an alien cultural world for philosophers and intellectual historians which will be comprehensible without any previous knowledge of Buddhism or Indian religion" (*ibid.*). The other problem discussed in detail is "Buddhism and Society".

Readers of this book may ask a pertinent question at the very beginning: why discuss a familiar doctrine afresh? In answer, one may point out the following reasons:

- (i) there is no unanimity among scholars as to the exact import of *Anattavāda*, and the interpretations suggested so far have not always been supported by adequate textual evidence,
- (ii) the roles played by this doctrine in Buddhism as an intellectual discipline and as a living religion have not been properly ascertained,
- (iii) the tenability of the doctrine as well as the mutual compatibility (if any) of the roles played by it deserve to be examined in greater details.

A little elaboration of these points may not be out of place.

Anattavāda is usually rendered in English as 'the doctrine of notself'. There is, however, a lot of dispute about the exact meaning of this expression. According to some scholars, it amounts to a denial of a permanent self; which is supposed to be (a) distinct from body, sense-organs, mental states, etc. (b) the cogniser, the doer, and the director of the physical organism, and (c)

that which enjoys the results of its deeds and undergoes transmigration. What we call self (*atta*) or person (*puggala*) is only a collection of give elements (*khandha*) like matter, feeling, etc. Some others maintain that *Anattavāda* denies only the reality of the empirical, lower or 'small' self, and that it is quite compatible with the doctrine of *Ātman* as prounded in the *Upaniṣad*-s. Others would like to maintain that since for the Buddhists the self is not identical with body, consciousness, feeling, impressions, etc., it must be something other than these — thus *Anattavāda* is not a denial of self at all. Such an interpretation is often sought to be reinforced by citing passages from Buddhist text that definitely seem to describe the self (*atta*) or individual (*puggala*), or passages (e.g. in the *Jātaka*-s) where Buddha refers to his previous births. For some, this doctrine embodies a "pragmatic agnosticism in which the self is not so much denied as declared inconceivable" (p. 10). Some others lay emphasis on the famous 'unanswered questions', and argue that Buddha did not offer any theory about self.

There is, again, a lot of controversy as to whether *Anattavāda* plays any significant role in the religious life of the lay Buddhists, who may not be acquainted with the abstruse discussion of this doctrine in *Abhidhamma* texts or works like *Visuddhimagga*. Some even maintain that the popular Buddhist religion, as practised by the lay devotees in countries like Sri Lanka, Thailand etc., is a corruption of the original teachings of Buddha. Others have gone a step forward, and maintained that such corruptions are inevitable consequences of *Anattavāda* insofar as it is not conducive to religious practices like worship or prayer.

Finally, it may be asked whether *Anattavāda* can account for personal identity/continuity, and phenomena like memory and recognition. One may also ask whether the Buddhist can believe in *Karma* and *Samśāra*, and at the same time, subscribe to *Anattavāda*. As a matter of fact, Buddhism has been assailed on these counts by rival schools like Nyaya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.

It should now be evident that a number of knotty issues must be settled before we can come to grips with *Anattavāda*. In the sequel, one must identify the assumptions underlying the arguments for and against the opinions that have been offered, check them in the light of textual evidence and independent reasoning, and then assess the compatibility or otherwise of the conclusions reached with actual religious practices. Dr. Collins is perfectly aware of the multidimensional character of the problem, as is evident from the following remark:

"The task of scholarship is endlessly to investigate, by any and every academic discipline which proves necessary, the words in which beliefs and doctrines are presented, the categories of thought which they express, and the function or functions which they might have in the life and thought of those who hold them". (p. 12)

Dr. Collins has tried to achieve this ideal of scholarship in his book, and his success in this regard has been remarkable. A distinctive feature of this book is the judicious employment of theories and concepts of Sociology and Anthropology. Tools of literary criticism have also been used with due discretion.

According to Dr. Collins, *Anattavāda* is best understood when it is recognized to be "a soteriological strategy", "... a linguistic taboo; but a taboo which is applied differently by different Buddhists, according to their position on the continuum from ordinary man to specialist", and "the *anatta* doctrine's crucial importance is to provide an intransigent symbolic opposition to the belief system of the Brahmin priesthood, and therefore to the social position of the Brahmins themselves" (p. 12). In this connection, he has justifiably pointed out that there are:

"... two main forms of the soteriological strategy of *anatta*, corresponding to the two emphases of the doctrine as the true description of reality, or as an instrument of salvation. There is the right view of not-self, which opposes other 'wrong views', and which forms part of the practice of 'mental purification'; and there is the 'no-view' approach, which imposes a certain moral and epistemological attitude towards the activity of conceptualisation *per se*, and which brings with it a particular and peculiar Buddhist, aesthetic of 'emptiness'" (p. 13).

The passage quoted above shows with remarkable brevity an effective way of avoiding one-sided views and the confusions that they bring in their wake. At the same time, it clearly indicates the role that *Anattavāda* plays in Buddhism in all its major aspects.

The book contains four parts – (I) the Cultural and social setting of Buddhist thought, (II) the doctrine of not-self, (III) Personality and rebirth and (IV) Continuity. Each part contains two chapters. The first chapter, 'The origin of rebirth', traces the historical development of the Vedic religion that centred on sacrifices, and delineates the gradual emergence of three concepts, viz. *Karma*, *saṃsāra* and *mokṣa*. In the Brahmanical tradition, these three concepts were linked with the concept of an abiding self (*ātman*). The religion of sacrifice put a lot of emphasis on the householder performing

these sacrifices, the Brahmin priests who conducted these ceremonies and a society operating under rigid rules of caste. Sacrifices were taken to be forms of participation in the cosmic process. With the emergence of the Upanisadic thought, the sacrifices began to lose their importance, and *yajamāna*, the householder performing such rites yielded his place of importance to the recluse who leaves the society bound by the rules of castes, and seeks his own salvation. Thus, the three fundamental concepts of Buddhism, viz. *karma*, *saṃsāra* and *mokṣa* are thus taken over from Vedic religion. In Buddhism, one comes across a conscious acceptance of some elements of Vedic religion, as well as a conscious rejection of some others; thus, the three fundamental concepts *karma*, *saṃsāra* and *mokṣa* as well as the value attached to the life of a recluse retain their importance in Buddhism as well (the only significant change in nomenclature is to speak of *nibbana* rather than of *mokṣa*) whereas the belief in a permanent self is explicitly rejected. The second chapter, 'Varieties of Buddhist discourse', shows how such a stance could be consistently adopted. It shows, *inter alia*, that the mere occurrence of terms like *atta* or *puggala* in scriptural passages need not imply any explicit or implicit acceptance of self. The expressions in which such terms occur have been classified into three groups, and through intensive textual analysis, it has been proved that none of these passages commit the Theravada Buddhists to the acceptance of an entity called self. It has also been shown that a lot of misconception about the doctrine of *anatta* are due to "literal translation into English, where the translation contains presuppositions and implications *not* found in the original Pāli" (p. 71). The last section of this chapter spells out the significance of supplanting the notion of *mokṣa* by that of *nibbana*:

"The concept of *nirvāṇa* (Pali *nibbana*), although . . . the criterion according to which ethical judgements are made and religious life assessed, is not the liberated state of a self. Like all other things or concepts (*dhamma*) it is notself (*anatta*). . . the denial of self in whatever can be experienced or conceptualised – that is, in the psychophysical being who is exhaustively described by the lists of impersonal elements – serves to direct the attribution of value away from that sphere. Instead of supplying a verbalised notion of what *is* the sphere of ultimate value, Buddhism simply leaves a direction arrow, while resolutely refusing to predicate anything of the destination, to discuss its relationship with the phenomenal person, or indeed to say anything more about it." (pp. 82–83).

The metaphor of "direction arrow" is quite apt, and helps us to see why and where many earlier attempts at explaining *anatta* and *nibbana* went awry. Part

II of the book, comprising Chapters 3 and 4, shows how the doctrine of *anatta* turns out to be a "soteriological strategy" in Buddhism. We have already noted that this strategy has two aspects, and the third chapter, "the denial of self as 'right view'," reveals the first one of them. The chapter indicates the nature of 'right view' (*sammaditthi*) and its place in Buddhist spiritual discipline — the 'Noble Eightfold Path' (*ariya atthangika magga*), and proceeds to show why the belief in self is a 'wrong view' (*micchaditthi*). In Indian philosophy, it is quite usual to employ a two-pronged attack on a thesis that is to be rejected — the first step is to show that what the proponents of the thesis consider to be evidence in its favour is, in fact, pseudo-evidence (*sādhaka-pramāṇābhāva*), while the second step is to show that there is adequate evidence in favour of rejecting the thesis (*bādhakapramāṇasadbhāva*). From the account given by Dr. Collins, it is clear that this procedure was adopted in Theravada Buddhism as well. Of the four arguments culled from Theravāda texts like *Anattalakkhana Sutta* and *Mahanidana Sutta* the first two show that the reasons adduced for admitting an entity called self are not tenable, while the two others point out that there are good reasons for denying that there is any self, and that the phenomena sought to be explained in terms of the self may very well be explained in terms of Dependent Origination (*paticca-samuppada*). Next, it is shown how the denial of self is also a strategy in 'mental culture'. The cultivation of 'right view' forms part of Wisdom (*panna*), the initial part of the Eightfold path, while 'mental culture' (*bhāvanā*), which yields a deeper insight into the truth of the doctrine, leads the spiritual aspirant to the final stage of this path, there

"Concentration (*samadhi*) and Wisdom progress together, and correspond to two different types of meditational practice . . . [viz.] the methods of *śamatha*, 'tranquility' or 'absorption', and *vipaśyanā*, 'insight'" (p. 111).

The 'right view' also helps the spiritual aspirant to observe 'morality' or code of conduct (*sila*). The close connection between the doctrine of *anatta* and the three categories of the Eightfold path, viz. *sila*, *samadhi* and *panna* is thus exhibited. In the fourth Chapter, "Views, attachment and 'emptiness'", the second aspect of the soteriological strategy has been explained. It contains an illuminating discussion of "attachment" (*upādāna*), and the consequences of holding on to wrong notions. The discussion of the 'unanswered questions' at this point is relevant indeed, and the treatment of this difficult topic is praiseworthy. It is often maintained that since Buddha refused to answer a

set of well-known questions about soul, world and Tathāgata, it follows that he discouraged speculation of all sorts, and that accordingly, the doctrine of not-self, being a result of metaphysical speculation, could not have been intended by Buddha. Dr. Collins has placed the refusals of Buddha in their proper perspective, and according to him, Buddha did not intend to discourage speculations of *all* sorts. He discouraged only those speculations that aimed at answering linguistically ill-formed questions, and were thus only hindrances in the path of spiritual progress. The chapter closes with a good discussion of 'careful attention' (*yoniso manasikāra*) and avoidance of hostility and confusion.

In Parts III and IV, Dr. Collins takes up the second major problem of the book — "Buddhism and Society". Unlike the doctrine of *anatta*, this problem has not generated any remarkable heat or controversy. But this does not mean that the problem is less exciting. We have already noted the view that *Anattavāda* is seriously taken only by learned and spiritually advanced monks, whereas the beliefs and actions of lay Buddhist devotees are hardly compatible with *Anattavāda*. This view, if true, would indicate a wide gap between Buddhism as presented in the scriptures and Buddhism as found in actual practice. As we have seen, this will then inevitably lead to the question as to whether *Anattavāda* can be the bedrock of a living religion. Besides, in many Buddhist societies there are also other practices like propitiating evil spirits, placating hostile planets, etc. some of which were strongly condemned by Buddha. The co-existence of such practices and faith in Buddhism is indeed problematic at first sight. Dr. Collins, however, maintains that Buddhism is "indissolubly a single cultural world" (p. 265). He explains the unity of this cultural world in a number of ways. First, he draws our attention to the Buddhist dichotomy between 'conventional' truth (*sammuti-sacca*) and 'ultimate' truth (*paramattha sacca*) through which "... Buddhist intellectualism has oriented itself to society and culture ..." (p. 147). In this connection, he has invoked Spiro's distinction between 'Kammatic' Buddhism that aims at a good rebirth, and a 'nibbanic' Buddhism that aims at cessation of rebirth. These two are not opposed to each other — they are rather the two extremes of a continuum. Once we admit these two distinctions, 'popular' or 'corrupt' Buddhism and 'pure' Buddhism can live in peaceful co-existence, because they belong to different domains, and do not contradict each other. Moreover, what is admitted as 'conventional' truth has its value only as a means of achieving the 'ultimate' truth. The two truths are not, therefore, antagonistic. But the movement need not be only from 'conventional' truth to 'ultimate truth' — there are cases where the

intellectual tradition accepts, systematises and reshapes notions that enjoy conventional truth — Dr. Collins has cited the cases of *attabhava* and *puggala* (pp. 156–165). Besides, the Theravāda texts contain some patterns of imagery, and for Dr. Collins, “... such patterns of imagery give us access to fundamental and unconscious structures of the imagination in Buddhist culture, and ... these structures unite all Buddhists ... into one cultural world” (p. 166). In Parts III and IV of this book, a number of such imageries have been noted and discussed, e.g. the house imagery that seeks to convey the sense of embodiment, and the imageries of (i) a lamp being lit from another lamp, (ii) a river, and (iii) seed and fruit, all being employed for explaining the notion of continuity co-existing with difference. The role of such imageries in the understanding, assimilation and transmission of culture is extremely significant, and Dr. Collins deserves all praise for drawing our attention to these aspects of Theravāda texts. Finally, Buddhism has inherited some themes from the Brahmanical tradition — the Karma-samsāra — nirvāṇa scheme is a good example, this may explain the presence of some Brahmanical practices in Buddhism.

In Part IV, Dr. Collins has reached, *en passant*, some negative conclusions. The Buddhist doctrine of *anatta*, *anicca* etc. have often been compared with corresponding doctrine of Hume, Heraclitus, Bergson, etc. Dr. Collins has undertaken a scholarly discussion of such doctrines, and he, for once, has emphasized their difference over fundamental issues.

There are many things in this book that deserve to be praised and emulated. But what makes it most distinctive is Dr. Collins' attitude to philosophical problems in general, and to the current state of affairs in Western philosophy, which is best expressed in his own words:

- (i) “I think that a great deal of contemporary philosophy particularly in the English-language tradition, suffers from a lack of historical and social awareness. I want to argue that philosophical reflection should not proceed in abstraction from intellectual history and anthropology, from the investigation and comparison of cultures” (p. 1).
- (ii) “There seems to me to be a strong tendency in contemporary philosophy — at least in some parts of the English-language tradition primarily influenced by Wittgenstein — to accord to different cultures, under the names perhaps of ‘forms of life’ or ‘language games’, a kind of immunity from external historical or sociological criticism. This tendency, exaggeratedly and self-protectively tolerant, is encouraged by the tacit, but frequent assumptions that *for us* what one might call (paraphrasing Chomsky) ‘the intuitions of the native English thinker’ should be the arbiter of philosophical correctness, and that it is the conceptual and linguistic habits of ‘common sense’ to which we should look

for enlightenment of philosophical issues. The approach I am suggesting, on the contrary, will see these 'intuitions', and the 'common sense' constructed out of them, as merely problematic data; data, moreover, whose implicit presuppositions and particular concerns must be investigated and made explicit by appropriate historical and socio-anthropological scholarship" (p. 3).

Decades ago, the attitude of English-speaking philosophers was similarly deplored by Edward Conze in his *Buddhis Thought in India*:

... The rapid growth of communications has brought Eastern and Western cultures face to face. So far European, and particularly British, philosophers have reacted by becoming more provincial than ever before. . . . I hope that one day the European philosophers will be made to examine, question and substantiate their own latent presuppositions. At present the omens are, I admit, most unpropitious. With the honourable exception of Prof. H. H. Price, no Oxford or Cambridge professor would demean himself by paying the slightest attention to his colleague of ancient India (p. 9).

The book of Dr. Collins, written at Oxford and published from Cambridge, would have certainly pleased Conze if it had reached his hands.

We are certain that this book will be received well in all quarters. Further contributions from the pen of this young, enterprising and imaginative scholar will, we hope, set a new trend in Indological research.

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PRABAL SEN

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
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GADĀDHARA BHATṬĀCĀRYA'S
VIŚAYATĀVĀDA

*Text edited and translated * with explanations by*

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. *Definition of Cognition*

Text: Buddhir nāma kaścīd ātma-viśeṣa-guṇaḥ.

Translation: Cognition is a special quality of the self.

Explanation:

(1) Terminology:

The Sanskrit *jñāna*, though philologically cognate with the English "knowledge" through the Greek *gnosis*, is nowadays translated as "cognition". We shall use this translation with the following remarks.

(i) *Jñāna* is used to denote not merely propositional acts like judging, believing, disbelieving, doubting, assuming, inferring, remembering, perceiving, introspecting, but also nonpropositional states like sensing, etc. *Jñāna* is, therefore, identical with awareness (of facts, objects, sensory qualities, internal states).

(ii) *Jñāna* is always used in the episodic sense to denote an occurrence of an act, but never in the dispositional sense. The term *saṃskāra* is used for "disposition" in general, physical as well as mental; in the context of cognition, *saṃskāra* is used to denote unconscious traces which, when stirred up or activated, produce conscious memory.

(2) Theory:

Cognition is a special quality of the self. According to Navya-Nyaya every finite self has the following fourteen qualities:-

- (1) Number —
- (2) Magnitude —

- (3) Separateness –
- (4) Contact –
- (5) Disjoining –

These five qualities are what the self shares with material things. The remaining nine are *special* qualities in the sense that they belong only to finite selves.

- (6) Cognition –
- (7) Pleasure –
- (8) Pain –
- (9) Will or desire –
- (10) Aversion –
- (11) Effort –
- (12) Memory impression –
- (13) Merit –
- (14) Demerit –

A special (perceptible) quality is a quality which makes the self an object of introspection. The self-substance, devoid of special qualities, cannot be cognised directly in introspection. In introspection the self is cognised invariably in the form 'I cognise something', 'I feel pain', 'I perform this action', etc. but never as mere 'I'.

The Navya-Nyaya theory of cognition as a special quality of the self has the following special feature. Cognition is the same as awareness, the other special qualities of the self are not conscious states. The next five (7–11) special qualities of the self – pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort – are necessarily cognised in introspective cognition which invariably succeeds them immediately. A cognition, however, *may* itself be cognised, if we so desire, in a higher order, secondary, cognition.

Cognition is one of the nine special qualities of the self. In defining it, it is necessary to state how it differs from the other special qualities of the self. It is usual to define cognition as that special quality of the self which is a cause of all behaviour,¹ and to interpret 'all behaviour' as verbal behaviour, i.e. use of language. The author of *Padakṛtya*, however, interprets 'all behaviour' literally to include eating, walking, etc.² Here Gadādhara states the definition of cognition simply as a special quality of the self, without further specifying the speciality.

2. Ontological Status of Cognition

Text: Tad-vyavasthitiḥ, ghaṭam ahaṃ jñānāṃ-tyākāra-kāpāmara-sādhāraṇā-nubhava-balād eva.

Translation: That cognition is a different kind of reality is established only by introspective cognition of all (including common) people of the form 'I know the jar'.

Explanation: Cognition conceived as a quality of the self-substance is, according to Navya-Nyaya, ontologically a distinct type of reality. The cognition of cognition as a distinct type of reality is by introspective cognition. It is only by this universal introspective evidence that cognition is recognised as a distinct ontological reality. To say that the *form* of this introspective cognition is 'I know the jar' is to say that the introspective cognition is *expressed by* the sentence 'I know the jar'. Cognition being an attribute or a quality (of the self) cannot have any *form* in the sense of physical shape. Hence the idiom 'the cognition of the form of . . .' means only the cognition which is expressed in the sentence ' . . . '.

3. Object and Objectivity

Text: Sā ca saviśayikā, uktadharmi-grāhaka-pratītyā ghaṭādi-viśayakatvenaiva tad avagāhanāt.

Translation: That (cognition) is, again, always of an object, as the (secondary) introspective evidence, mentioned above, is always of a (primary) cognition having the jar etc. as its object.

Explanation:

(i) Gadādhara here introduces the concept of *object of cognition* and the property *being an object of cognition*. That every cognition has an object is evidenced by the introspective awareness of the cognition. In introspection, a cognition is always cognised as having an object. The phrase 'having an object' means that it is the cognition which determines the objecthood resident in the object. In simple language, this means that the cognition and its objects are correlatives.

(ii) That every cognition has an object can be established by cognising that cognition, i.e. by introspective evidence.

(iii) By 'object of cognition' is meant whatever is cognised — a thing, a quality, an action, a universal, etc. Thus 'object' does not stand for an

isolated thing-like element. It means anything belonging to any category, provided it is cognised.

(iv) Gadādhara uses 'ādi' ('etc'.) to express a universal proposition. In Hindu algebra, first colours, then letters (both of which are meant by 'varṇa') have been used to state a universally valid law. But in philosophy or logic use of letters is totally absent. Gadādhara adds 'ādi' as in this case to 'ghaṭa', to indicate that the word 'ghaṭa' means ghaṭa just as an example, that any other example of this type would do as well. This means that 'ādi' added to any word indicates that the word is used vacuously. Henceforward I shall not translate 'ādi', for, all particular examples of cognition are mere examples which can be replaced by other examples of the appropriate type.

II. NATURE OF OBJECTIVITY: TRADITIONAL NAVYA-NYAYA THEORY: REDUCTIONISM

4. Objecthood as a Relation

Text: Ghaṭādi-niṣṭhaṃ tad viśayatvaṃ ca tat-pratīyogikaḥ sambandha-viśeṣaḥ.

Translation: The objecthood of *that* resident in the jar is a particular relation with *that* as its successor (second term) (that = cognition).

Explanation: 'Cognition of an object' simply means that the cognition is related to the object by a special type of relation, the successor (second term) of which is the cognition and the predecessor (first term), the object. The relation is objecthood. The cognition is related to the object by objecthood.

Thus a cognition of a particular jar has the jar as its object. The objecthood of that cognition resides in the jar and that (cognition) is the successor of this objecthood.

4.1. Objecthood as a Self-Linking Relation

Text: Sa ca pratīyogitvādivat svarūpad anātikṛta eva, klptena svarūpeṇaivōpapatta atirikta-kalpanāyā anavakāśāt.

Translation: That relation (which is objecthood) is indeed not an additional entity other than the very nature (of its terms), just as counterpositiveness is the very nature of the entity which is the counterpositive. As it is necessary to postulate that everything has its own nature, there would be no scope

for postulating an additional entity, if the problem (of the ontological status of objecthood) is solved by holding that objecthood is the very nature (of its terms).

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains the Navya-Nyaya theory of a self-relating relation. In ordinary relations we have two terms and a relation which is ontologically different from them. But in the case of self-relating relations, they are ontologically identical with the very nature of one or other or of both terms. Gadādhara gives the usual Navya-Nyaya argument that if in order to explain our cognition of a relation between two terms, we do not need to postulate an ontic real as the relation between the terms then it would be unjustified to postulate such an additional entity. If ontologically there is no separate entity serving as the relation between the two terms then how can we explain the cognition of a relational complex, i.e. of two terms as related by a relation? The Navya-Nyaya answer is that the very nature of one, or of the other, or of both terms, functions also as the relation in cognition. The Naiyayikas, specially of the older school, find it unreasonable to postulate a real *additional* relation between a cognition and its object to explain cognition of an object. The very nature of one of the terms here namely, the cognition, functions as the relation. It is the very nature of the cognition to be related to its object. It is necessary to postulate that everything including cognition must have its own nature. And if this nature can serve also as a (self-linking) relation, then it is wasteful to postulate an additional reality as the relation.

4.11. Criticism

Text: Na ca tādṛśa-saṃbandhasya jñāna-svarūpatā viśaya-svarūpatā vā svīkriyate ity atra vinigamanā-virahād ubhayasyaiva saṃbandhatā kalpyā, iti tad apekṣayā lāghavāt saṃbandhatvenātiriktaika-viśayatā-kalpanam evōcitam iti vācyam.

(i) *Translation:* It cannot be determined whether the very nature of the cognition or of the object is the relation between the cognition and its object, hence the nature of the cognition and the nature of the object, both, have to be admitted as the relation; but then it would be simpler to postulate an additional relation as one objecthood.

Explanation: The Nyaya philosophers have argued that it is not necessary to postulate a third ontologically real relation to explain how a cognition

can be *of* an object, by holding that this real relation can be ontologically identical with the nature of one of the terms. Now the objection is, as there is no reason to prefer the nature of the cognition to the nature of the object as the relation between cognition and object, we shall have to hold that the natures of both the terms constitute the relation between cognition and object. But then it will be simpler to postulate one relation ontologically different from cognition and object.

4.111. Reply

Text: Viṣayatāyā viṣayasvarūpatve viṣayeṇa samaṃ tasyā ādhārādheya-bhāvānupapatteḥ, jñāna-svarūpāyā eva tasyā upagamāt. Abhede'pi ādhārādheya-bhāvōpagame ghaṭo jñāna-viṣayatāvān iti vat ghaṭo ghaṭavān ity ādi-pratīty āpatteḥ.

(2) **Translation:** If objecthood were of the nature of the object, then objecthood could not be said to be *in* the object; hence objecthood must be identified with the nature of the cognition of the object. If (the relation of) identity also could explain the cognition of one *being in* the other, then as we have the cognition that (the) jar (is) objecthood-possessing, we would also have the cognition that (the) jar (is) jar-possessing.

Explanation: The objection is that there is no reason to choose either the nature of the object or the nature of the cognition as the real relation which is objecthood; hence both have to be accepted as the relation. Against this objection it is now argued that the objecthood as the relation between the object and its cognition has to be identified with the very nature of the cognition itself, not with the nature of the object. For we have the cognition that the jar possesses the objecthood of the cognition (of the jar) which shows that the objecthood *is in* the jar. Now if the objecthood of the jar were identified with the very nature of the jar, i.e. with the *jar itself* then we would have such a cognition as the jar *is in* the jar as an explanation of the cognition that the objecthood *is in* the jar. Navya-Nyaya distinguishes between two fundamentally different types of relations – (i) Relations which produce the cognition that one term *is in* the other, and (ii) relations which do not produce such cognition. If objecthood were identified with the nature of the object, i.e. with the object itself, then objecthood and the object would have been identical. But this relation of identity between the object and objecthood cannot give rise to the cognition that the object

has objecthood. Identity is *not* an occurrence-exacting relation; so we could not cognise that the jar possesses objecthood of the cognition of the jar.

4.112. *Objection to Reply and Its Reply*

Text: Na ca viśayatātvā-' vacchinna-nirūpitā-' dhikarāṇataiva ghaṭādāv upeyate na ghaṭatvā-' vacchinā-' dhikarāṇatā iti nā'tiprasaṅga iti vācyam. Tadvacchinna-nirūpitatvasya tadāśrayanirūpitatva-vilakṣaṇasya durvacatvāt.

(3) *Translation:* It cannot be said that the jar possesses substratumness determined by what is limited by objecthood-ness and not substratumness limited by jar-ness and hence there is no over extension (this definition of objecthood is not too wide). For it is difficult to distinguish between being determined by what is *limited by* some property and being determined by the *locus* of that property.

Explanation: This is an attempted solution of the problem of objecthood being identified with both the cognition and the object. The official Navya-Nyaya position is that objecthood is identical with the cognition but cannot be identified with the object. Now a reply is here attempted to show that even if objecthood be identified with the object there would be no difficulty. The difficulty here is that like the cognition:

- (I) The jar is objecthood-possessing,
which we have, we ought to get the impossible consequence,
- (II) The jar is jar-possessing
because of the following identity
- (III) The objecthood (resident in the jar) = the jar.

The problem is how to distinguish between (I) and (II), admitting (III).

The solution lies in distinguishing between two substratum-nesses both of which reside in the jar. This may be explained by analysing (I) and (II) to reveal more structure. Analysis of (I) proceeds as follows:

- (1) The jar is objecthood-possessing.
- (2) Objecthood is the superstratum and the jar is the substratum.
- (3) Objecthood possesses superstratum-ness which determines the substratum-ness resident in the jar.
- (4) Now if objecthood is again cognised under the mode of the higher

order abstract, objecthoodness, then the superstratum-ness resident in objecthood is limited by objecthoodness.

So (3) becomes

- (5) The substratumness, determined by the superstratumness (resident in the object) limited by objecthoodness, resides in the jar.
- (II) The jar is jar-possessing becomes merely
- (6) The substratumness determined by the superstratumness limited by jar-ness resides in the jar, which is, of course, false.

Thus by distinguishing between the two substratum-ness-es resident in the jar one can successfully explain why (I) is true, but (II) is false.

Reply: The whole explanation of the difference between (I) and (II) rests on the crucial distinction between 'being determined by what is limited by' and 'being determined by what is a locus of'. But this all-important distinction cannot be explained any further. 'Something as limited by objecthoodness' and 'something as a locus of objecthoodness' seem to differ only verbally in the absence of any further explanation.

Thus in the present example, (I) becomes

- (7) that (superstratumness) which is limited by (i.e. cognised only under the mode of) objecthoodness, determines the substratum-ness resident in the jar,

whereas (II) becomes

- (8) That which is the locus of objecthoodness determines the substratumness resident in the jar.

The difference between (7) and (8) cannot be further explained, and hence is not justified. So objecthood cannot be identified with the object also, but has to be identified only with the cognition.

4.12. *An Alternative Solution*

Text: Astuvā vinigamanā-virahād ubhayam eva viśayatvaṃ, tathāpi tādīśōbhayasya klptatvāt, atirikta-viśayatāyās tatra jñānādi-saṃbandhatāyāśca kalpanā'pekṣayā tadubhayasya jñānādi-saṃbandhatva-kalpane gauravā'navakāśa iti siddhantā 'nuyāyinaḥ.

Translation: Or, let both be objecthood in the absence of reason for preference, both being necessary. Still there is no scope for heaviness in holding that both constitute the relation of cognition, rather than postulating a different ontological entity of objecthood and, then its additional relation to cognition, and so on.

Explanation: It was suggested by the opponent that it will be simpler to postulate one single ontological entity of objecthood instead of postulating that both the object and the cognition constitute objecthood. But Gadādhara points out that the position traditionally held by Navya-Nyaya philosophers is that even if both the object and the cognition be regarded as constituting objecthood still it would not be heavy. On the contrary, to postulate an independent ontologically real entity as objecthood will be a heavier theory. For, in any case, the object and its cognition have to be admitted as reals, whereas postulation of any other ontologically real entity is not necessary. Moreover, the postulation of such an entity will also raise the problem of relating it to the cognition and also to the object. Thus the postulation of an independent, ontologically real entity to explain objecthood will be a heavier theory.

III. THE THEORY OF THE LATER NAVYA-NYAYA PHILOSOPHERS

5. *Objecthood as an Independent Reality*

Text: Navyāstu: viśayatvaṃ padārthāntaram eva, na tu svarūpa-saṃbandha-viśeṣaḥ.

Translation: The later philosophers hold that objecthood is, indeed, a separate ontological reality, and not a special type of self-relating relation.

Explanation: After explaining the theory accepted by the traditional followers of Navya-Nyaya school, Gadādhara now explains the position of later thinkers who deviated from the traditional theory. This deviant theory

is that objecthood as the relation between the object and its cognition cannot be ontologically identified with any or both the terms of the relation. The arguments for this deviant theory now follow.


IV. ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEW THEORY: OBJECTHOOD CANNOT BE COGNITION ITSELF

5.1. *First Argument*

Text: Tathā hi — jñāna-viṣayatāyā jñānātmakatve jñānādhikaraṇa-
kālasyāpi jñāna-viṣayatvāpattiḥ; kālaniṣṭha-tat-saṃbandhasyāpi
tat-svarūpā 'natiriktatvāt.

Translation: Thus if objecthood of a cognition be identified with the cognition itself then even the time of the occurrence of the cognition, too, would (necessarily) become an object of cognition as the relation of cognition to the time of its occurrence is again identical with the nature of the cognition.

Explanation: The commonly accepted theory that the objecthood is the very nature of cognition is first examined. The argument of the later, deviant Navya-Nyaya philosophers is based on the accepted Navya-Nyaya theory of self-relating relations. These philosophers point out that there are all sorts of situations where a cognition is related to ontologically different types of entities by self-linking relations. Now if objecthood be identified with the cognition itself, then all these different entities to which cognition is related by a self-linking relation would necessarily become objects of the cognition — an absurd consequence. The first case that is cited is the time in which a cognition occurs. Now the cognition is related to the time of its occurrence by a self-linking relation which is, again, the cognition itself. Now as the cognition of a jar is related to the jar, by itself, and also to the time of its occurrence by itself, and if objecthood be identified with the cognition, then the cognition of the jar would have also the time of its occurrence as its object.




where both R_1 and R_2 are the cognition itself. So $R_1 = R_2$, and if R_1 is objecthood, R_2 , too, is objecthood, i.e. both the jar and the time of occurrence of the cognition become objects of the cognition of the jar.

5.2. Second Argument

Text: Evaṃ svābhāvena samam pratiyogyanuyogi-bhāva-rūpa-jñāna-sambandhasyā'pi sva-sva-rūpā'natiriktatayā ghaṭādi-jñānasya ghaṭādi-viśayakatvavat svābhāva-viśayakatvasyāpathih.

Translation: Thus also the relation of cognition with its own negation being counterpositive-locus-ness, is not ontologically different from the cognition itself; hence the cognition of the jar would have its own absence as its object just like the jar.

Explanation: If the relation between a cognition and its object be ontologically identical with the cognition itself then the absence of the cognition would become the object of the cognition. For the cognition is related to its own absence by being its counterpositive, and this relation is again ontologically identical with itself.



Where $R_1 = R_2$ = the cognition (of the jar) itself. Hence the absence of the cognition of the jar would become the object of the cognition as much as the jar itself.

5.3. Third Argument: An Attempted Solution and its Untenability

Text: Kālādau jñānādi-sambandhasyā'tirikte ca vinigamaṇā-virahāt viśaya-niṣṭha-tat-sambandhasyā pyatiriktiva-siddhir niṣpratyūhaiva.

Translation: If the relation of the cognition to time etc. be ontologically different from the cognition itself then the relation of cognition to its object would be similarly ontologically different from the cognition itself.

Explanation: The later deviant Navya-Nyaya philosophers have shown

that if the relation of cognition to its object be ontologically identical with the cognition itself then the time of the cognition as well as the absence of the cognition would necessarily become its object for the same reason. Now if to avoid this consequence the traditional Navya-Nyaya philosophers assert that the relation of cognition to time or to its absence is not ontologically identical with the cognition itself, then they would not have any reason to hold that the relation between the cognition and its object be ontologically identical with the cognition itself. The point here is that if it is denied that the cognition is related to the time of the cognition or to its own absence by a self-linking relation, then there will be no reason to hold that the cognition is related to its object by a self-linking relation.

5.4. Fourth Argument

Text: Evaṃ viṣayatāyā jñāna-svarūpatve ghaṭapaṭā vityādi-samūhālam-banātmak-aika-jñānīya-ghaṭapaṭādi-rūpa-nānā-viṣaya-niṣṭha-viṣayatānām ekatayā tādrśa-jñānānām ghaṭatva-paṭatvādyavacchinna-paṭa-ghaṭādi-niṣṭha-viṣayatākatayā bhramatvāpattiḥ, tad-avṛtti-dharmā'vacchinna-tan-niṣṭha-viṣayatāśali-buddher eva bhramatvāt.

Translation: So also if objecthood be ontologically identical with the cognition itself, then in the conjunctive cognition 'both the jar and the piece of cloth' where one cognition has many objects there will be correspondingly many objecthoods all of which will however be the same, being ontologically identical with the cognition; hence the true cognition 'both the jar and the piece of cloth' would have to be regarded as false as the objecthood resident in the jar will be limited by the property clothness and the objecthood resident in the cloth will be limited by jariness. For a false cognition is one the objecthood of which resides in something and is limited by a property not resident in that something.

Explanation: A fourth objection against identifying objecthood (i.e. the relation of the cognition to its object) ontologically with the cognition itself, is that a cognition which is simultaneously of many objects, *has* to be regarded as false. This type of cognition is called cognition of a collection. In such a type of cognition there will be as many objecthoods as there are objects, for the cognition has to relate itself to all those objects individually. Thus in the conjunctive conjunction of both a jar and a piece of cloth the

cognition will have to be related to both the objects separately by two relations, thus:




Fig. A.

Now as both R_1 and R_2 are ontologically identical with the cognition itself they are identical with one another. This means that the objecthood resident in the jar (R_1) and the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth (R_2) being identical, the cognition can be interpreted as the cognition of the jar with the objecthood of a piece of cloth and of the piece of cloth with the objecthood of a jar. As R_1 and R_2 are identical ontologically it would make no difference if the cognition is interpreted thus:




Fig. B.

But thus interpreted the cognition becomes false. In Figure A, the objecthood resident in a jar is limited by jarness, a property which is resident in the jar. In other words, the object which is a jar is known as a jar i.e. under the mode jarness, so also with the piece of cloth. But in Figure B. as the objecthoods have been switched, the cognition has become false; for now the objecthood resident in the jar is limited by clothness, a property which is not resident in the jar. This means that in Figure B the cognition of the thing which is the jar is as a piece of cloth and of the thing which is the piece of cloth as a jar. This cognition is false, for in it a jar has been cognised as a piece of cloth and a piece of cloth as a jar, although this false cognition is, like the true cognition, a cognition of both a jar and a piece of cloth.

5.5. *Fifth Argument*

Text: Tādṛśa-jñānānantaram ghaṭatvena paṭam jānāmī-tyākārakā-nuvyavasāyā pattiśca ghaṭatvā'vacchinna-paṭa-niṣṭha-viṣayatāka jñānasyaiva tādṛśā'nuvyavasāya-viṣayatvāt.

Translation: Immediately after such a cognition one ought to have a secondary (introspective) cognition of the form 'I am knowing a piece of cloth as a jar'; for only the cognition having the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth and limited by jariness is the object of such a secondary (introspective) cognition.

Explanation: A fifth objection against ontologically identifying objecthood with the cognition itself is based on an absurd consequence which this theory has for introspective cognition. The introspective cognition is a secondary cognition having a primary cognition of the object as its object. Now the introspective awareness of a conjunctive cognition like the cognition 'both a jar and a piece of cloth' will be not merely of the form 'I know both a jar and a piece of cloth' but of the form 'I know a piece of cloth as a jar and a jar as a piece of cloth'. According to Navya-Nyaya introspection is possible only of a qualified primary cognition which is of the form of *a* (is) *b*-possessing, where *a* is the qualificandum of the cognition and *b* is the qualifier. No indeterminate primary cognition can be an object of a secondary (introspective) awareness. Now a conjunctive cognition is different from a qualified cognition of one object in this that in a cognition of one object, there is one qualificandum as well as one qualifier. But in a conjunctive cognition of two objects like the cognition 'both a jar and a piece of cloth' there are two qualificanda and two qualifiers thus:

- (i) a jar (the thing) is the first qualificandum and jariness is its qualifier.
- (ii) the piece of cloth (the thing) is the second qualificandum and clothiness (the property – being a piece of cloth) is its qualifier.

Now in introspective awareness of such a cognition one has the cognition of the form, 'I cognise a jar under the mode of jariness and also a piece of cloth under the mode of clothiness'. But if the two objecthoods are switched then one should have the introspective awareness of the form 'I cognise what is actually a piece of cloth as a jar' etc., which is absurd. This shows

that the objecthood (of the primary cognition) resident in the jar cannot be identified with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth. But this means that objecthood, i.e. the relation of the cognition to its object cannot be identified with the cognition itself.

5.51. Reply to the Fifth Objection

Text: Na ca tādṛśa-samūhāmbanīya-ghaṭa-paṭādi-niṣṭha-viśayatāyā aikye'pi sā viśayatā ghaṭatvādyavacchinna-viśayatātvena ghaṭa eva vartate, paṭatvādyavacchinna-viśayatātvena paṭa eva vartate, ato na tādṛśa-dhiyo bhramatvāpattiḥ, tad-avṛttir yo dharmas tad-avacchinna-viśayatātvena tad-vṛttir yā viśayatā tat-pratīyogina eva jñānasya bhramatvāt, na vā tādṛśa-samūhā lambanānantaram uktānuvyavasāya-prasaṅgaḥ, ghaṭatvādy-avacchinna-viśayatātvena paṭādi-vṛtti-viśayatā-pratīyogina eva jñānasya tad-viśayatvād iti vācyam.

Translation (Reply): Even though the objecthood resident in a jar and a piece of cloth of that conjunctive cognition be ontologically identified still the objecthood cognised under the mode of (the property of) being objecthood limited by jariness resides only in the jar, and the objecthood cognised under the mode of (the property of) being objecthood limited by clothness resides only in the piece of cloth, hence a cognition of that type is not erroneous; for that cognition is erroneous which is the second term of objecthood (which is the relation of the cognition to its object) which resides in something and is cognised under the mode of (the property of) being objecthood limited by a property not resident in that thing. Nor is there any possibility of a secondary (introspective) cognition of that (erroneous) type immediately succeeding the conjunctive cognition. For that type of erroneous secondary cognition has, as its object, that primary conjunctive cognition which is the second term of the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, and cognised under the mode of being objecthood limited by jariness (not resident in the piece of cloth)

Explanation: This is an attempted reply to the above objection concerning conjunctive conjunction. The point made here is this. Even though objecthood resident in a jar is *ontologically* identical with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, still considered *as* objecthood i.e. cognised under the mode of the second-order abstract property of objecthoodness the two objecthoods are

different. The principle here is that even an object which is one ontologically may be known in different ways, i.e. may be different from the epistemological point of view. In the Navya-Nyaya technical language this epistemological point of view is expressed by the concept of the limiting property. The limiting property of objecthood is the way the object is cognised, is the mode of cognition of the object. In the present instance although there is ontologically one objecthood resident in both the jar and the piece of cloth, still the objecthood resident in the jar, under the mode objecthoodness i.e. being objecthood, limited by jariness, is different from the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, under the mode objecthoodness, limited by clothness. Thus we cannot switch these objecthoods as they are *cognised* in different ways even though they are ontologically identical.

The point is that we are talking here of cognitions, and cognitions are determined by what features of their objects get manifested in them by the mode under which the object is cognised. Thus if we consider the cognition of the objecthoods by using a higher order abstract property, objecthoodness, which is the mode under which objecthood is cognised then we shall find that the objecthood resident in the jar being limited by jariness is epistemically different from the objecthood which is limited by clothness and is resident in the piece of cloth.

Thus there will be no absurdity in the secondary (introspective) awareness, too, of the primary conjunctive cognition. The objecthood resident in the jar cannot be introspectively cognised as belonging to the piece of cloth if we take into consideration the mode under which the objecthood resident in the jar is cognised.

5.511. *Refutation of the Reply*

Text: Yataḥ ghaṭatvādyavacchinna-viṣayatātvena paṭādi-vṛttitvaṃ hi tad-rūpā'vacchinna-nirūpita-paṭādi-niṣṭhā'dhikaraṇatākatvaṃ, tādrśī cādhikaraṇatā yadi śuddha-viṣayatātvā'vacchinna-nirūpitā'dhikaraṇatāto' nātiriktā tadā tādrśa-jñāniya-paṭādi-niṣṭha-viṣayatāyam api tādrśā'dhikaraṇatākatvaṃ akṣatam eva, atiriktā cet, tarhi kim aparāddham atirikta-viṣayatayā iti.

Translation: For, residence in the piece of cloth, cognised under the mode of being objecthood limited by jariness is merely the property of having substratumness which is resident in the piece of cloth, and is determined

by what is so limited. Now if such a substratumness be ontologically the same as the substratumness determined by what is limited by unqualified, pure objecthoodness, then, in the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth as cognised in the conjunctive cognition, the property of having the qualified substratumness remains as before. If they are different ontologically, then what harm is there if objecthood be regarded as an ontologically different entity?

Explanation: Here Gadādhara is refuting the above argument to distinguish between two objecthoods of a conjunctive cognition by having recourse to the second order limiting property, objecthoodnesses, which are the modes under which the objecthoods are cognised.

Gadādhara refutes this argument by analysing residence (in the piece of cloth) cognised under the mode of being the objecthood limited by jar-ness and the objecthood being cognised simply under the mode of *objecthoodness*. The analysis can be represented as follows:

C1 = Conjunctive cognition 'the jar and the piece of cloth'

- (i) the objecthood of C1 resident in the jar = the objecthood of C1 resident in the piece of cloth.
- (ii) the objecthood resident in the jar = the objecthood limited by jar-ness.
- (iii) the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth = the objecthood limited by cloth-ness.
- (iv) the objecthood limited by jar-ness = the objecthood limited by clothness (from (i), (ii) and (iii)).

Now (iv) simply states that *ontologically* the two objecthoods are the same.

The attempted reply is based on forming an abstract of the RHS of (ii) and (iii). These abstracts will then be *epistemic* modes thus:

- (v) (λx) (x is the objecthood limited by jar-ness) or, in the language of N.N. objecthoodness limited by jar-ness.

So also from (iii).

- (vi) (λx) (x is the objecthood limited by clothness) or objecthoodness limited by clothness.

Because (v) and (vi) are epistemic modes, these properties will be different even though (ii) and (iii) are not different ontologically as in (iv). So (v) will reside only in the jar, and (vi) will reside only in the piece of cloth and hence the cognition will be true. These properties, therefore, cannot be switched to turn C1 false.

Criticism: This attempt to save the theory that objecthood is identical with cognition does not succeed. For by switching (v) and (vi) we get (v) resident in the piece of cloth and (vi) resident in the jar. Now what is this residence in the piece of cloth? It is just

(vii) $(\lambda x) (x \text{ resides in the piece of cloth}),$

where x is the superstratum and the piece of cloth is the substratum.

So (vii) really stands for the superstratumness which is the determiner of the substratumness resident in the piece of cloth.

Thus:

(viii) residence in the piece of cloth = being the determiner of the substratumness resident in the piece of cloth.

Hence:

- (ix) The property *being a resident* (in the piece of cloth) cognised under the mode of objecthoodness limited by jariness is identical with
- (x) the property of being the determiner of the substratumness which is resident in the piece of cloth and is determined by what is limited by objecthoodness limited by jariness.

But then the question is, whether (x) is the same as

- (xi) the property of being the determiner of the substratumness which is resident in the piece of cloth and is determined by what is limited by objecthoodness pure and simple?

There are two possible answers.

(a) As a qualified entity is identical with that entity without the qualifier, so the substratumness determined by qualified objecthoodness (in (x)), and that determined by simple objecthoodness (in (xi)), are the same. But then the objecthoods can be switched and the true conjunctive cognition is rendered false. For even if the epistemic modes are different, their residence or rather the substratumness relative to this residence, may be

the same; hence, this residence (or the substratumness relative to it), of the modes may be, although the modes cannot be, switched.

(b) The second answer is that the substratumnesses relative to the two residences are different ontologically, i.e. a qualified substratumness is ontologically different from unqualified substratumness. But then what harm is there if objecthood is postulated as an ontologically different real entity?

V. OBJECTHOOD CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE OBJECT

6.1. *First Argument*

Text: Viśayatāyā viśaya-svarūpatve ca ghaṭatva-prakāraka-pramā-nirūpitāyāḥ paṭatva-prakāraka-bhrama-nirūpitāyāś ca ghaṭa-niṣṭha-viśayatāyā aikya-prasaṅgena ghaṭatva-prakāraka-pramāyām api bhramatvāpattiḥ.

Translation: If objecthood be ontologically identified with the object, then the two objecthoods resident in the jar which is the object of true cognition as jar-ness-possessing and is also the object of false cognition as cloth-ness-possessing, being identical, the true cognition of the jar would also become a false cognition of the jar.

Explanation: Gadādhara, explaining the position of deviant modern Navya-Nyaya philosophers, examines the position that objecthood is to be identified ontologically with the object. The first objection to this identification is based on the fact that one and the same object, say the jar, can be the object of a true cognition as well as of a false cognition. But if the objecthood of a cognition is identified with the object then the objecthood of the false cognition and the objecthood of the true cognition would become identical, thus making the true cognition false. A true cognition differs from a false cognition of the same object by virtue of different objecthoods determined by these cognitions. Thus the objecthood determined by a true cognition is different from objecthood determined by the false cognition, even though the true cognition and the false cognition have the same object. The possibility of thus distinguishing between true and false cognitions would be ruled out if objecthood determined by a cognition be identified with the object of cognition.

6.2. *Second Argument*

Text: Evaṃ ghaṭavad-bhūtaṃ ghaṭa-bhūta-saṃyogā iti jñānāyor
aviśeṣa-prasaṅgaśca, viśayānāṃ tad-ātmaka-viśayatānāṃ
cā'vilakṣaṇatvāt.

Translation: So also the cognition 'jar-possessing is the ground' and the cognition of 'jar, ground and contact (relation)' cannot be distinguished, the objects hence the objecthoods, being indistinguishable.

Explanation: This is a second argument against identification of objecthood with object. According to Navya-Nyaya there is a fundamental difference between a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition, by virtue of their objecthoods. Now if objecthood be identified with the object then no difference can be made between these two types of cognition. For the qualified cognition, 'jar-possessing is the ground', has three objects — the jar, the ground, and the relation of contact between them expressed by the suffix 'possessing'. The conjunctive cognition, 'jar, ground and contact' also has the same objects. If objecthood and object of cognitions be identified then these two types of cognition which have the same objects cannot be differentiated.

6.21. *Reply and its Refutation*

Text: Na ca prathama-jñāne sambandha-vidhayā bhāsamānasya
saṃyogasya sambandho'pi adhikô bhāṣate, na tu samūhāmbana-
rūpe carama-jñāne, ityata eva ubhayor vilakṣaṇyam ity
Upādhyāya-mataṃ samyak. Saṃyogādi-pratīyogika-sambandham
ādāyā'pi samūhāmbana-sambhavāt.

Translation (Reply): In the first cognition the contact is cognised as a relation; and hence its relation, too, becomes cognised; but in the second cognition, the relation of the contact is not cognised. Thus this theory of Upādhyāya is adequate to distinguish between the two types of cognitions.

Refutation: It is possible to have conjunctive cognition with the relation of the relation as one of its objects.

Explanation: An attempt may be made to distinguish between a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition on this theory by accepting the interpretation of Jajñāpati Upādhyāya. In a qualified cognition 'Jar-possessing

is the ground' the ground is the qualificandum, the jar is the qualifier and the relation, contact, is the qualification. Now Upādhyaṃya holds that to know a relation as a relation between two objects it is necessary to know which object is the *first term of the relation* and which the *second term of the relation*. But to know this is to know the relation of the relation with its two terms. According to Upādhyaṃya, in a qualified cognition we not merely know the qualificandum, the qualifier and the relation between them, but also the relation of the relation to the qualificandum and the qualifier. Thus there are five objective factors in the relational complex which is cognised as the object of the qualified cognition. In the case of conjunctive knowledge, however, of the form, 'the ground, the jar, and contact' there are only three items of the objective complex cognised in such a cognition. Thus a qualified cognition and the conjunctive cognition will be distinguished by the number of items cognised in the objective complex.

But Gadādhara says that this line of argument does not really help; for it is possible to have a conjunctive cognition not merely of the form, 'the jar, the ground and contact' but also of the form 'the jar, the ground, contact, being the first term (of the contact), and, being the second term (of the contact)'.


6.22. Another Reply

Text: Na ca saṃyoga-saṃsargaka-viśiṣṭa-buddhau saṃyogah svarūpata eva bhāsate na tu saṃyogatvena, sakhaṇḍa-padārthasyā'pi sambandha-vidhayā svarūpatōbhanā'bhyapagamāt ukta-samūhālambane ca saṃyogatvena saṃyogō bhāsate iti saṃyogatva-rūpādhika-viśaya-bhānā'bhanābhyām eva tayoṛ viśeṣa iti vācyam.

Translation (Reply): In a qualified cognition where contact is the qualifying relation, contact is cognised in and through itself, not under the mode of contactness. For even an analysable entity may be admitted to be cognised as a relation in and through itself. But in the conjunctive knowledge mentioned above, contact is cognised under the mode of contactness (as contact is not cognised as a relation). Thus a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition are distinguished from each other by considering whether contactness has been manifest in the cognition or not.

Explanation: Another attempt is made to distinguish a qualified cognition from a conjunctive cognition on this theory. According Navya-Nyaya only

one relation, inherence, has been admitted as an independent ontological entity, but all other relations have been assimilated into other non-relational categories. Yet in a cognitive situation an entity which is ontologically not a relation may yet serve as a relation in that cognition. This is because what entity is functioning as a relation in a certain cognition is determined by the relation of the cognition to that entity. This may be explained by the following diagram:



One cognition, C_1 , is related by three different relations, R_1 , R_2 , R_3 to three elements in the objective complex. That element in the objective complex functions as a relation to which the cognition is related by R_3 , whether the element is ontologically a relation or not does not matter. Thus the Navya-Nyaya theory is that an entity which is ontologically not a relation (i.e. not inherence), may yet be the first term of R_3 in the cognition. Now what is the peculiarity of R_3 , such that to be the first term of it is to be cognized as a relation in the cognition? According to Navya-Nyaya philosophers, the peculiarity of R_3 is this that *its first term* is never cognized under a *mode*, although anything other a universal or an unanalysable property cannot be so cognized as a qualifier or a qualificandum. In all other cases, the qualificandum and the qualifier are, as a rule, cognized under a mode; whereas anything cognized as a relation is never cognized under a mode whatever may be its ontological status. This feature of the different elements of the objective complex may be taken to be the defining mark of a relation. A relation is not an ontologically different type of entity; it is that which is cognized under no mode in a determinate, i.e. qualified cognition. Thus one entity may function as a relation in a certain cognition, but may not function as a relation in another cognition, by simply being cognized under a mode.

Now, in the qualified cognition 'jar-possessing (is) (the) ground', contact

between the ground and the jar functions as a relation, because it is not cognized under the mode of contact-ness. But in the conjunctive cognition '(the) jar, (the) ground, and contact', contact, being a qualificandum, just like the jar and the ground, is cognized under the mode, contact-ness. Thus whether contact-ness has been manifested in the cognition or not, will determine whether the cognition is conjunctive or qualified.

6.221. *Refutation*

Text: Evam api ghaṭavad-bhūtaḥ saṃyogaśca ghaṭa-bhūta-saṃyogaḥ
iti jñānāyora viśeṣa'nirvāhāt.

Translation: Even then the two cognitions, 'jar-possessing is the ground and contact' and 'the jar, the ground and contact' cannot be distinguished.

Explanation: But this way of distinguishing between a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition does not succeed for the following reason. Let us take two types of conjunctive cognition — one in which a conjunct is itself an object of a qualified cognition, and the other where the conjuncts are separate items.

Example of the first type of conjunctive cognition:

(C3) Jar-possessing is the ground and contact.

Now in this cognition, the first conjunct being an object of qualified cognition contact is not manifested under a mode; but then as the contact is again the second conjunct, it has to be cognised under a mode. Thus in this cognition we have the jar, the ground and contact all three cognised under their respective modes.

Example of the second type of conjunctive cognition:

(C4) The jar, the ground and contact.

In this conjunctive cognition, again, all the three items, the jar, the ground and contact are cognised under their respective modes. Thus we cannot say that a conjunctive cognition and a qualified cognition differ by the fact that in qualified cognition the relation is not cognised under a mode. For undoubtedly C3 and C4 are different cognitions, yet not merely the object cognised but also the modes of their cognition are the same in two cases.

6.23. *Another Reply*

Text: Ghaṭavad-bhūtaḥ ity jñānasya ghaṭa-prakāra-ka-tvam eva ghaṭa-viśeṣyakōkta-samūhālambanāt viśeṣa iti cet.

Translation: If it is said that in the cognition 'jar-possessing is the ground' the jar is the qualifier and in the conjunctive cognition the jar is the qualificandum and hence they are different, then the reply is this:

6.231. *Refutation of the Reply*

Text: Ghaṭa-prakāratvaṃ hi ghaṭa-niṣṭha-prakāratā-pratīyogitvaṃ, ghaṭa-viśeṣyakatvaṃ ca ghaṭa-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-pratīyogitvaṃ, tatra ca jñāniya-prakāratā-viśeṣyate yadi prakāra-viśeṣābhyām anātirikṭe tadā ukta-viśiṣṭa-buddher api ghaṭa-viśeṣyakatvaṃ ukta-samūhālambanasyā'pi ghaṭaparakāratvaṃ durvāram eva, ghaṭātmakayos tan-niṣṭha-prakāratā-viśeṣyatayor bhavan-mate' bhinnatvāt. Yadi ca te ātirikṭe tadā siddham naḥ samīhitam prakāratā-viśeṣyatayor viśayatātmakatvāt.


Translation: Having the jar as the qualifier is simply being the successor (the second term) of (the relation of) qualifier-ness resident in the jar; similarly having the jar as a qualificandum is simply being the successor (the second term) of the (the relation of) qualificandumness resident in the jar. Now if qualificerness and qualificandumness relative to the cognition be ontologically non-different from the qualifier and the qualificandum then even the qualified cognition will have the property of having the jar as the qualificandum and the above mentioned conjunctive cognition, too, will have the property of having the jar as the qualifier. For in your view, qualificerness and qualificandumness resident in the jar are identical with each other, both being identical with the jar itself. If, however, they are ontologically different then our position is conceded to, qualificerness and qualificandumness being identical with objecthood.

Explanation: 6.23–6.231 – Qualified cognition refers to an objective structure of the form $a R b$ where a is the qualificandum, b the qualifier and R the qualification of the cognition. In the qualified cognition of the form 'jar-possessing is the ground', the ground is the qualificandum, jar the qualifier and contact is the qualifying relation. In the conjunctive cognition

of 'the jar, the ground and contact' the jar is the qualificandum, like the ground and contact. Thus this conjunctive cognition has three qualificanda and three corresponding qualifiers, namely, jar-ness, ground-ness and contact-ness. Thus the qualified cognition of the form 'jar-possessing is the ground' and conjunctive cognition of the form 'the jar, the ground and the contact' can be distinguished from each other by the fact that while in the qualified cognition jar is the qualifier, in the second cognition the jar is a qualificandum.


But this way of distinguishing between a qualified cognition and a conjunctive cognition is not justified because of the following reason. What is it for a cognition to have the jar as a qualifier? It is merely to be the second term of the relation — qualificierness resident in the jar. To have the jar as the qualificandum a cognition has to be the second term of the relation, qualificandum-ness resident in the jar. This may be explained by the following two diagrams:

Cognition having jar as the qualifier



where R_2 is the qualificierness resident in the jar (the first term), of which relation the cognition is the second term.

Cognition having the jar as qualificandum



where R_1 is the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar (the first term) of which relation the cognition is the second term.

Now the question is: What is qualificierness, or qualificandumness

ontologically? If they are self-linking relations, then in the first case, qualificierness is ontologically identical with the jar; so also is qualificandumness in the second case. Thus even in the first case, the cognition will have the jar as its qualificandum and in the second case it will have the jar as the qualifier. Hence the two cognitions cannot be distinguished by holding that the jar is the qualifier in the first case, and the qualificandum in the second case. If, however, qualificierness and qualificandumness be regarded as ontological entities, different from the jar and different from each other, then, as qualificierness and qualificandumness are two forms of objecthood, objecthood becomes ontologically a different type of reality.

6.24. *Another Reply*

Text: Yattu bhāsamāna-vaiśiṣṭya-pratīyogitvaṃ prakāratvaṃ tādṛśa-vaiśiṣṭyā'nyuyogitvaṃ ca viśeṣyatvaṃ na viśayatā-rūpam iti. Tad asat.

Translation: The theory that the qualificierness is being the second term of the relation manifested in the cognition and qualificandumness of a cognition is being the first term of such a relation and hence not identical with objecthood is untenable.


6.241. *Refutation of the Reply*

Text: Ukta-samūhāmbanasyā'pi ghaṭa-pratīyogika-vaiśiṣṭya-viśayakatayā ghaṭa-prakāratvāpatteḥ, saṃyogādi-rūpa-vyadhikaraṇa-sambandhena dravyatvādi-bhramasya dravyatvādi-prakāratvā'nupapatteḥ, bhūtale ghaṭa ityādi-jñānasya bhūtalādy-anuyogika-saṃyogādi-viśayakatayā bhūtalādi-viśeṣyaktvāpatteḥ, guṇādaḥ saṃyogādi-sambandhena ghaṭādi-bhramasya guṇādi-viśeṣyaktvā'nupapatteṣca.

Translation: For even the abovementioned conjunctive cognition has the jar as the qualifier, for as the jar is the second term of a relation which is the object of cognition. Secondly, in the erroneous cognition of substance-ness residing in something by the relation of contact which is an incompatible relation, substance-ness cannot be explained as the qualifier of the erroneous cognition. Thirdly, in the cognition 'the jar is on the ground' the relation manifested in the cognition is contact, with the ground as the first term, and

hence the cognition would have the ground as the qualificandum. Fourthly, the erroneous cognition of a jar in a quality by the relation of contact cannot have the quality as its qualificandum.

Explanation: 6.24—6.241 — So far various attempts have been made to define the qualificandum and the qualifier of a cognition by relating them to the cognition by different relations. But now an attempt is made to define them without a direct relation to the cognition. This new theory may be explained by the following diagram:




Here the cognition is directly related to a relation which must be evident in a qualified cognition. That which is in fact, but not cognised as, the first term of this relation which has become evident in the cognition by being directly related to it, is the qualificandum; and that which is in fact, but not cognised as, the second term of this relation is the qualifier.

The difficulties of this theory stem from the fact that neither the qualificandum nor the qualifier of a cognition is directly related to the cognition and is not therefore manifested as such in the cognition. They are not objects of the cognition but are factually related to the relation which is manifest in the cognition.

The *first* objection is to show that the jar could become the qualifier of the conjunctive cognition 'the jar, the ground and contact' as the jar is the second term of the relation contact of which the first term is the ground. The point here is that the contact which is cognised is a relation the first term of which is the ground and the second term is the jar, although it is a fact that they are not cognised as such. Factually, contact is a relation between the ground and the jar but when contact is cognised in the conjunctive cognition, it is not cognised as holding between the ground and the jar. The theory under consideration holds that if factually certain things are the first and second terms of a relation which alone is cognised, then the terms of this relation become the qualificandum and the qualifier of the cognition.

The *second* objection to this theory is that in an erroneous cognition where the relation cognised does not as a matter of fact hold between the terms which however have been cognised wrongly as the terms of the relation, they cannot be regarded as the qualificandum and the qualifier of the cognition. The following diagram will make the point clear.



Now there cannot be ontologically a relation of contact between a substance and substance-ness; hence when such a relation is erroneously cognised as holding between a substance and substance-ness, they cannot be regarded as the qualificandum and the qualifier of the cognition as they are not factually the first and the second term of the relation cognised, even though erroneously.

Thirdly we can cognise a relational complex in two ways: (i) we may cognise the first term of the relation as the qualificandum and the second term as the qualifier of the cognition. (ii) Or we may cognise the first term of the relation as the qualifier and the second term of the relation as the qualificandum. Thus we may cognise the relational complex of a jar on the ground either as (i) the ground is jar-possessing or as, (ii) the jar is on the ground. In (i) the jar is the qualifier, in (ii) it is the qualificandum. Yet in both the cases, factually the jar remains the second term of the relation of contact. Thus this theory which defines the qualifier of a cognition not by its relation to the cognition, but by a factual property of being the second term of the relation which alone becomes manifest in the cognition, fails to explain cases like (ii) where the jar has become the qualificandum.

Fourthly, the theory cannot explain the case of an erroneous cognition of a jar being in contact with a quality when actually a jar cannot be so related to a quality. The quality cannot be qualificandum of the erroneous cognition as actually it cannot be the first term of the relation of contact.

6.25. Another Reply

Text: Atha vāstava-tādṛṣa-vaiśiṣṭya-pratiyogitvā'nyuyogitve na prakārātā-
viśeṣyatve yena ukta-doṣāṇām avasaraḥ syāt, api tu vaiśiṣṭya-
pratiyogitayā tad-anuyogitayā ca bhāsamānatvam eva prakāratvam
viśeṣyatvañ ca iti cen na.

Translation: Now, then, the factual second term and first term of a relation manifested are not the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition but only when they are manifested as the second or as the first term of the cognised relation, they become the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition. But this view is untenable.

6.251. Refutation of the Reply

Text: Pratiyogitayetyādaū tṛtiyārthasya durvacatvāt, bhāsamānatvasya
jñāna-viśayatā-tmakatayā prakārātā-viśeṣyatayor viśayatātva-
siddheś ca.

Translation: For it is very difficult to explain the meaning of 'as' in 'manifested as'. Moreover to be manifest in a cognition is to be an object of that cognition; hence qualificierness and qualificandumness become forms of objecthood.

Explanation: 6.25—6.251 — The above difficulties of this theory may be avoided if instead of defining the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition as what are actually the second and first term of the relation which is manifested in the cognition, they are defined as those objects which become manifested, in the cognition, as the second and the first terms of the manifested relation.

But this attempt to save this theory is not successful. For it is not clear what is to be meant by 'as' in 'manifested as'. Secondly, to be *manifested* as the first and second term of the manifested relation is simply to be the objects of the cognition. Thus being the qualifier or the qualificandum of a cognition is simply being an object of the cognition. Thus qualificierness and qualificandumness become forms of objecthood.

VI. OBJECTHOOD IDENTIFIED WITH BOTH COGNITION AND OBJECT

7. *Argument for the Theory*

Text: Yattu viṣayatvaṃ na kevala-jñāna-svarūpaṃ nāpi kevala-viṣaya-svarūpaṃ api tu jñāna-viṣayōbhaya-svarūpaṃ ato na prāg-ukta-doṣānām avasaraḥ, tathāhi ghaṭa-ṭaṭavityādi-samūha-lambanīya-ghaṭādi-niṣṭha-taj-jñāna-ghaṭādy-ubhayātmaka-ghaṭatvādy-avacchinna-viṣayatāyāḥ, ṭaṭādi-niṣṭha-taj-jñāna-ṭaṭādy-ubhayātmaka-ṭaṭatvādy-avacchinna-viṣayatā'nātmakatayā na tādrśa-jñānasya bhramatvā pattiḥ, na vā upadarśita-viśiṣṭa-dhī-samūhālambanayor aviśeṣa-prasangāḥ, tādrśa-samūhālambanasya tathāvidha-viśiṣṭa-buddhi-nirūpita-taj-jñāna-ghaṭōbhayātmaka-prakāratā-'nirūpakatvena viṣayatā-vailakṣanyasya sattvāt iti.

Translation: The theory that objecthood is not merely ontologically identical with the cognition, not also with the object itself, but is of the nature of both the cognition and the object, avoids the above mentioned objections. For the objecthood (of the conjunctive cognition 'the jar and the piece of cloth') resident in the jar, and ontologically identical with both the jar and its cognition, and limited by jar-ness is not identical with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, and identical with both the piece of cloth and its cognition, and limited by cloth-ness; hence this conjunctive cognition cannot be possibly interpreted as false. Nor is there any possibility of non-distinction between the above mentioned qualified cognition and the conjunctive cognition; for, there is a difference in the objecthood of the two cognitions, as the conjunctive cognition of that type does not have the qualificierness, which is determined by the qualifier cognition of the above mentioned type, and which is ontologically identical with both the jar and its cognition.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains another attempt to avoid postulating objecthood as a separate ontological entity. The theory is to identify objecthood ontologically not merely with either the object or the cognition but with both. This theory of objecthood may be symbolically represented as:

- (T) objecthood is ontologically identical with both the cognition itself and the object itself
- (TS) $(\lambda x)(\lambda y)(x \text{ is the cognition of the object } y)$.

The two other theories previously discussed identified objecthood of a cognition either with the cognition itself or with the object itself. These theories may be represented symbolically thus:

- (A) objecthood is ontologically identical with the cognition itself:
- (AS) $(\lambda x) (x \text{ is the cognition of (object) } y)$
- (B) objecthood is ontologically identical with the object itself:
- (BS) $(\lambda y) (x \text{ is the cognition of (object) } y)$.

Although (AS) and (BS) denote relational property resident in only one of the two, cognition and its object, still these properties are regarded as relations, although *ontologically* they are identical with one or the other of the two terms. As we have already discussed in detail both these theories, we now turn to an examination of (T).

It is claimed on behalf of (T) that it avoids the defects of the earlier two theories (A) and (B). First of all a true conjunctive cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth cannot be rendered false by switching the objecthood resident in the jar with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth. Thus it is impossible to cognise erroneously a jar as a piece of cloth and a piece of cloth as a jar. The reason for the impossibility of thus interpreting a true conjunctive cognition as false is that the objecthood of the conjunctive cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth, which is resident in the jar is ontologically identical with the jar and its cognition and limited by jar-ness, such an objecthood being not the same as the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth, and ontologically identical with both the piece of cloth and its cognition. Hence the one objecthood cannot be replaced by the other. As objecthood resident in the jar cannot be interpreted to be resident in the piece of cloth, the possibility of interpreting a true conjunctive cognition as false is excluded.

The other objection that a qualified cognition cannot be distinguished from the corresponding conjunctive cognition is also answered. For the two objecthoods are different: the objecthood of a conjunctive cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth does not have the qualifier-ness which is determined by the qualified cognition and is ontologically identical with the jar and its cognition. To cognise 'jar-possessing (is the) ground' is to have the qualifierness resident in the jar (the jar is the qualifier in this cognition). determined by this qualified cognition, and ontologically identified with both the jar itself and its cognition itself. The objecthood resident in the

jar, in the conjunctive cognition 'a jar and a piece of cloth', is determined by the conjunctive conjunction, not by the qualified cognition (the jar here is the object of this conjunctive cognition, and not of the qualified cognition) and cannot be ontologically identified with the jar and *its qualified* cognition. Thus the two objecthoods resident in the jar cognised in two different ways, and different; *hence* the two cognitions are also different.

7.1. Criticism of the Argument

Text: Tad apy asat. Ghaṭa-paṭāvity-etādṛṣa-samūhāmbanātmake-jñānasya taj-jñāna-paṭobhayātmake-paṭatvā-'vacchinna-paṭa-niṣṭha-ṣayatākatvena ghaṭatvā-'vacchinna-ghaṭa-niṣṭha-taj-jñāna-ghaṭobhayātmake-ṣayatākatvena ca ghaṭa-niṣṭhā yā paṭatvā'vacchinna-taj-jñāna-rūpā ṣayatā tan-nirūpakatvena bhramatvāpatter durvāratvāt.

Translation: That theory, too, is untenable. The objecthood of the conjunctive cognition 'both a jar and a piece of cloth', (i) is resident in the jar and (ii) is limited by clothness and (iii) is ontologically identified with the cognition of the jar as cognised under the two modes (a) the property of having the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth and is limited by clothness and ontologically identical with the piece of cloth and its cognition; (b) the property of having objecthood resident in the jar and which is limited by jar-ness and its cognition. This objecthood being determined by the conjunctive cognition, the charge that a true conjunctive cognition is rendered false cannot be avoided.

Explanation: The theory of objecthood that it is ontologically identical with both the object and its cognition is not an improvement upon inadequate theories examined earlier (theories A and B). It has been argued that the objecthood resident in the jar if ontologically identified with the jar and its cognition cannot be switched with the objectivity resident in the piece of cloth. But this contention is untenable for the following reason.

Let us examine the objecthood resident in the jar. It is identical with the jar and its cognition. Now the question is what is the nature of this cognition of the jar? The jar is the object of this cognition and therefore the objecthood resident in the jar is ontologically identical with the cognition of the jar. But it is possible to have, on the theory under consideration, an objecthood resident in the jar but is limited by clothness. If the objecthood

resident in the jar is limited by clothness then the jar becomes the object of cognition as a piece of cloth thus the conjunctive cognition becomes erroneous. Now we have to explain how the objecthood resident in the jar can yet be limited by clothness — the objecthood which is identical also with the cognition of the jar. The explanation is as follows:

The conjunctive cognition of a jar and a piece of cloth determines two objecthoods — (i) one objecthood which (a) is resident in the jar, (b) is limited by jariness and (c) is ontologically identical with the jar and *the conjunctive cognition*; (ii) another objecthood (d) which is resident in the piece of cloth, (e) is limited by clothness and (f) is ontologically identical with the piece of cloth and *the conjunctive cognition*. The conjunctive cognition cognised as thus determining both these objecthoods can be said to determine also the objecthood which is resident in the jar (a), but which is limited by clothness (e), and is ontologically identical with the conjunctive conjunction. Here the switching occurs between the limiting *properties* of objecthoods and *hence*, of objecthoods, but there is no direct switching of objecthoods which are ontologically different.

This is because one and the same conjunctive cognition determines objectivities having features:

(F) ((a) . (b) . (c)) . ((d) . (e) . (f).)

which can be regrouped as

(F*) ((a) . (e) . (c)) . ((d) . (b) . (f).)

because conjunction is both associative and commutative. But (F*) renders the conjunctive cognition false, as determining the objecthoods resident in one thing and being limited by properties resident not in *that* thing but in the other thing.

7.11. *Objection to the Criticism*

Text: Atha tad-dharmā'vacchinna-ṣayātātvaṃ taj-jñāna-tat-tad-
ṣayayor vyāsajya-vṛtti upeyate, evaṃ ca tad-dharmā'vacchinna-
ṣayātātvena tad-dharmā'nadhikaraṇa-vṛttir yā ṣayātā tat-
pratiyogitvam eva bhramatvam, upadarśita-samūhālabane ca

paṭatvādyavacchinna-viṣayatātvasya taj-jñāna-paṭādyubhaya-
paryāpta-tayā tena rūpeṇa tad-ubhayātmaka-viṣayatā na ghaṭādi-
vṛttiḥ, ghaṭādes tadrūpāśraya-paṭādyātmaka-viṣayatvā-’sam-
bandhitvāt, svāśraya-yāvat-vyakti-sambandhina eva vyāsajya-
vṛtti-dharma-puraskāreṇa tad-āśraya-vat-tvāt, iti na tasya
bhramatvā-pattiḥ iti cet.

Translation: Objection: Now the property of being objecthood, (objecthoodness) limited by the property of that, acquires *vyāsajya-vṛtti* of both that object and a cognition of that object. Hence an erroneous cognition is a cognition of that objecthood which resides in a substratum which is not of that property and which is cognised under the mode of being objecthood limited by that property. In the example, of the conjunctive cognition, cited above, the property of being the objecthood limited by cloth-ness etc., being located in both the piece of cloth and its cognition, cannot, cognised as such, reside in the jar, the jar being un-related to the objecthood which is the locus of objecthoodness having the *vāsajya-vṛtti* property. Such an objecthood-ness cognised as possessing the *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property will have as its loci all and only its substrata. Hence the true conjunctive cognition cannot possibly be interpreted on this definition of objecthood as a false cognition.

Explanation: Now another method is used to support the definition of objecthood as being ontologically identical with both the cognition and its object. If objecthood is defined in this way then objecthood-ness will reside in both the cognition and the object but not in each separately. Objecthood-ness thus conceived becomes a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property which, like bothness, can reside only in both but not in each object separately. Navya-Nyaya philosophers postulate a new type of relation by which a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property resides only in both; this new relation is the *paryāpti* relation. Thus *paryāpti* relation is the relation by which a property resides in two or many objects without residing in each. This type of property which becomes the second term of a *paryāpti* relation is a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property; and conversely a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property can reside in both or many without residing in each only by *paryāpti* relation.

Objecthood being identified with both the cognition and the object objecthoodness becomes a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property which resides by *paryāpti* relation in both the cognition and the object but not in them separately.

Thus a true conjunctive cognition cannot be given an interpretation which renders the cognition false by switching the objecthood resident in the jar with the objecthood resident in the piece of cloth. Objecthood now identified with the nature of both the cognition and the object, objecthood-ness thus becoming a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property, can reside only in both a cognition and its object. As the jar is not an object in which objecthood which resides in the piece of cloth can reside, — such an objecthoodness resides in all and only these objects which are ontologically identical with objecthood — there is no possibility of interpreting the true conjunctive cognition as false.

7.111. Reply to Objection

Text: Paṭatvādyavacchinna-viśayatātvaṃ svarūpad atiriktaṃ na vā?
 Ādye kiṃ aparāddhaṃ tad-rūpā'-vacchinā-'tirikta-viśayatayā,
 antye ca tasya vyāsajya-vṛttitvā'nupapattiḥ tat-tat-svarūpasya
 pratyeka-viśrāntatvāt.

Translation: (To the above we say:) Is the property of *being the objecthood* (objecthoodness) limited by cloth-ness etc. an ontologically separate entity or not? If the first alternative is accepted, then what harm is there in regarding objecthood as a separate ontological entity? If the second alternative is accepted, then objecthood-ness cannot be a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property, as the very nature of the cognition or of its object is located completely and wholly in each of them.

Explanation: Gadādhara here shows that this attempt, too, cannot succeed. He asks: What is the ontological status of the property of *being objecthood* thus defined? Is it ontologically identical with the nature of both the cognition and its object or not? If the objecthood-ness be regarded as an ontologically separate type of entity, then what harm is there in postulating objecthood as an ontologically separate type of entity? If, on the other hand, objecthoodness be regarded as being ontologically identical with the cognition and the object, then it ceases to remain a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property. For the nature of cognition in itself is completely located in the cognition; so also is the case with the nature of the object. So if objecthood-ness be identified with the nature of the cognition and also the nature of the object then objecthood-ness would reside in each of them. This is because according to Navya-Nyaya there is nothing in the ontology which can have both the nature of the cognition and the nature of, say, a piece of cloth. According to Navya-Nyaya,

in ontology there are only individual objects, but no collection or totality. Thus objecthood being identical with the cognition and its object, objecthood-ness as the nature of cognition and the nature of the piece of cloth will come to reside in each of them and hence will not be a *vyāsajya-vṛtti* property.

7.112. *Reply Continued*

Text: Evaṃ tad-rūpeṇa ghaṭādi-vṛttitvaṃ viśayatātvēna ghaṭādi-vṛttitvād atiriktaṃ na vā? Ādye kim aparāddham atirikta-viśayatayā. Antye ca tad-rūpeṇa ghaṭādi-vṛttitvaṃ tādrīṣa-jñāniya-svātmaka-viśayatāyā akṣatam eva.

Translation: Thus, is residence in jar, cognised under that mode, ontologically different from residence in the jar cognised under the mode of being objecthood, or not? In the first alternative, what harm is there if objecthood is conceived as an independent reality? In the second alternative, residence in the jar, conceived under that mode (under the mode of being objecthood limited by cloth-ness) continues to belong to the objecthood which is identical with such a cognition.

Explanation: Moreover, there is a further objection to this theory. The question here is whether objecthood-ness is ontologically different from residence in the jar. In the conjunctive cognition a jar and a piece of cloth are both objects. Hence objecthood of this cognition resides in the jar and also in the piece of cloth. This residence in the jar of the objecthood of the conjunctive cognition can be cognised under two modes — one mode making the conjunctive cognition false. If we cognise residence (of objecthood) in the jar under the mode of being objecthood limited by cloth-ness the conjunctive cognition itself becomes false, being the cognition of a jar as a piece of cloth and the piece of cloth as a jar. There is, however, a second mode under which residence (of objecthood) in the jar etc., can be cognised, i.e. under the mode of being objecthood (not limited by cloth-ness). Now the question is whether residence in the jar, cognised under the two modes, is ontologically different or not. If they are regarded as different, then what harm is there in regarding objecthood as ontologically different from of the nature of the object and its cognition? If they are regarded as ontologically identical — residence (of objecthood) in the jar cognised under the mode being objecthood limited by cloth-ness and under the mode of

being objecthood not so limited — then the conjunctive cognition becomes false as the objecthood which resides in the jar can be cognised as being limited by cloth-ness.

VII. REJECTION OF THE THEORY

8. *Argument for the Rejection*

Text: Evaṃ jātīmān ghaṭa ityādaḥ ghaṭatvādyeka-viśaya-vṛttereka-jñānīya-
viśayatāyā jātītvādy-avacchinnatva-tad-anavacchinnatvābhyāṃ
dvai-vidhyam anupapannaṃ, jñānasya viśayasya ca dvai-vidhya-
virahāt, tathā ca jātīmān ityādy-ākāra-kā-vidha-ghaṭatvādi-
viśayatāśāli-jñānāt tādrśa-jñānasya vilakṣaṇa-viśayatā-śālitvā'nup-
apattya vilakṣaṇākāratā-'nupapattiḥ tasmāt viśayatvam
atiriktam eva.

Translation: Thus in (the cognition) 'universal possessing is the jar' the objecthood of one cognition resident in the one object, jar-ness, cannot be said to be twofold — being limited by universalness and not limited by it — the cognition as well as the object lacking twofoldness. So also the cognition 'universal possessing' which has one objecthood resident in jar-ness cannot be distinguished from the former cognition, as the two cognitions cannot be said to have distinct objecthoods. Hence it cannot be established that they have different forms. Hence objecthood is a separate ontological reality.

Explanation: Gadādhara gives here another argument to establish the theory that objecthood must be accorded a separate ontological status. He is criticising here the traditional Navya-Nyaya reductionist theory that objecthood is ontologically identical with both the cognition and the object.

Gadādhara now points out this difficulty of the position. He takes two examples of cognition which are of different forms and have different objects and hence different objecthoods.

(i) The first example is of a cognition of the form 'universal-possessing is the jar' where jar-ness becomes the object in a twofold way. (a) Jar-ness as the limiter of the qualificandumness resident in the jar is cognised in and through itself without a further mode. (b) But jar-ness as the qualifier — the universal in 'universal-possessing' is simply jar-ness — being referred to as a universal is cognised under the mode of universalness. Thus jar-ness is cognised in a twofold way, once under the mode of universal-ness, in (b), and without

such mode in (a). This means that, in (b), the objecthood resident in jarness is limited by universalness, in (a) it is not so limited. Thus there are two different objecthoods resident in jarness in this cognition.

If, however, objecthood be identified with cognition and object then there cannot be two objecthoods in jarness. For, the cognition is one cognition and so also is the object, jarness, although the limitors of the objecthood being different, the objecthoods themselves must be different. As the traditional Navya-Nyaya theory identifies objecthoods with cognition and object and as different limitors of objecthood cannot make any ontological difference to the object, there can, therefore, be only one objecthood on this theory. But then this cognition cannot be distinguished from the following cognition.

(ii) This cognition is of the form 'universal-possessing' in which one cognises a particular jar only through the mode of jarness. This jarness again being referred to as a universal is cognised under the mode of universalness. But here there is no cognition of jarness without a mode because the word 'jar' is not used. This cognition is different from cognition (i) because in the latter jarness is first cognised in and through itself without a further mode and also cognised under the mode of universalness as the word 'universal' is used. But in this cognition as the word 'jar' is not used, but the word 'universal' is used, jarness is cognised in only one way, under the mode of universalness. Here the objecthood resident in jarness is limited by universalness. So in this case also there is one cognition and one object, jarness. If objecthood be identified with cognition and object then the two cognitions (i) and (ii) cannot be distinguished from one another although their objecthoods are different, their forms being different.

Thus in order to distinguish between these cognitions of different forms objecthood has to be accorded a separate ontological status.

VIII. INFINITE REGRESS OF RELATIONS AND ITS SOLUTION

Text: Atha viṣayatā-vat viṣaye 'nuyogitā khyas-tat-sambandho jñāne
 pratyogitā-khyas-tat-sambandhaś ca tulya-yuktyā'tirikta eva
 upagantavyaḥ. Svarupā'nati-riktatve jñāna-viṣaya-niṣṭhayos
 tat-tat-sambandhayor avilakṣaṇatāpattyā jñānasyeva viṣayasyā'pi
 saviṣayakatvaṃ, viṣaya-vat jñānasyā'pi tad-viṣayatvaṃ āpadyeta.
 Evaṃ viṣayatāyā jñāna-ghaṭādi-niṣṭhena sambandhena samam

kālā'bhāvadī-niṣṭha-sambandhasyā'pi anātikṛtatvena vailakṣaṇyā
 'nupapattiyā kālā'bhāvadīnām api ghaṭādi-visayakatvāpattiḥ,
 ghaṭa-jñānādi-viśayakatvāpattiśca. Evaṃ tulya-yuktyā tādṛśa-
 sambandhasyā'pi sambandhaḥ tat-sambandhādir api ātikṛtaḥ
 svīkaraṇīya ity anavasthita-sambandha-dhārā-kalpanā-prasaṅgaḥ.
 Evaṃ viśayatā-sambandhe'pi jñānasya tadīyatā-niyāmakō
 nirūpyatvākhyā-sambandha-viśeṣaḥ tulya-yuktyā 'tiriktaḥ
 svīkaraṇīyaḥ evaṃ tat-sambandhādir api iti tatrā'pi tat-sambandha-
 dhārā 'navasthā pattiḥ iti cet.


Kā kṣatiḥ, na hi prāmāṇikā'navasthāyā dūṣaṇāvahatvam.

Translation: Then, like objecthood, its relation to the object, i.e., being the first member, and its relation to the cognition, i.e. being the second member, should be regarded as ontologically separate for similar reasons. If these relations be regarded as ontologically non-different from objecthood then the two relations of cognition and an object to the objecthood being indistinguishable, the object, too, like the cognition, will have an object; and, like the object, the cognition, too, will have objecthood. So also objecthood being ontologically identical with its relations to cognition and jar etc., the relation of objecthood to the negation and time etc., also being identical with objecthood, these relations of objecthood to cognition and object, on the one hand, and of objecthood to the negation and time etc., become indistinguishable. Thus it would follow that negation and time etc. too, will have the jar etc., as its object, and also the cognition of the object as its object. Hence for the same reason the relation of this relation of objecthood has to be admitted as being ontologically different from other entities; and so on ad infinitum. Thus the cognition will have to be related to the relation of objecthood which is of the nature of determiner — determined relation, must also be ontologically a separate reality and so on ad infinitum.

The reply to the objection is that there is no harm in this infinite regress of ontologically real relations, all different from each other, as this infinite regress is supported by cogent reasons and is therefore not a defect.

Explanation: If objecthood has to be regarded as an ontologically separate reality then the relations of objecthood to cognition on the one hand, and to the object on the other, have also to be regarded as independent realities. These relations of objecthood to cognition and to object cannot be identified with objecthood itself without reducing them to objecthood. But this nature

of objecthood will also be the relation of objecthood to the negation and time etc., and hence the negation and time etc., being related by the same relation to objecthood as those of the cognition and also its object to objecthood, the negation and time etc., will be the same as the cognition and also the same as the object. But this is absurd. Thus their supposition that objecthood is an ontologically independent reality not reducible to the object itself and/or the cognition itself carries with it the further demand that the relation of objecthood, the relation of the relation of objecthood and so on, to the object and also to the cognition, must also be independent reals. Thus there will be an infinite regress of real relations of objecthood to object, and also to cognition. This may be represented by the following diagram:



The point here is that objecthood which is the relation between cognition and object has become a real entity thus needing further and further relations on both sides — thus generating infinite regress on both the sides — on the side of the first term, and also of the second term of objecthood. At no stage, can these infinite relations be identified ontologically with the terms themselves without thereby making objecthood itself an unregulated relation between cognition and object; many things other than the cognition and the object are related by the self-linking objecthood directly, or indirectly perhaps by a very long of chain of relations. Hence, not merely objecthood, the direct relation between cognition and object, but also all subsequent relations have to be awarded ontological independence, leading to two infinite regresses of relations.

The reply to this is simply to say that infinite regresses of this nature are not logically harmful; for they have been established by valid arguments.

They cannot, therefore, be adduced to prove the invalidity of the arguments themselves.

IX. COGNITIONHOOD AS AN INDEPENDENT REALITY

Text: Viśayatā-vat viśayitva-rūpa-jñānā-'nuyogika-viśaya-sambandhō'pi atirikta eva, na tu viśayatā-pratīyogitvam eva viśayitvam, viśayitvam evā-'tiriktaṃ tat-pratīyogitvam eva viśayatvam ity asyā'pi vaktum śakyatayā dvayorevā 'tiriktatā-siddher iti.

Translation: Like objecthood its converse, cognitionhood, — the relation with cognition as the first term and the object as the second term — has to be regarded as an independent real. Cognitionhood cannot be reduced to being the second term of the relation of objecthood, for it can be argued other way around that objecthood itself, is the converse of this relation which is, therefore, fundamental. Hence both objectivity and its converse are to be regarded as independent reals.

Explanation: The relation of cognition to its object is objecthood. The converse of this relation is the relation of the object to its cognition. This converse relation may, therefore, be called 'cognitionhood' in the manner of 'objecthood'. Now the question is: What is the ontological status of this relation of cognitionhood? It cannot be reduced to objecthood ontologically by holding that cognitionhood is the abstract of the second term of objecthood. The point may be explained thus:

- (a) Objecthood = (λx) (x is the object of cognition y)
- (b) Cognitionhood = (λy) (x is the object of cognition y).

Now, *ontologically*, cognitionhood, as *being* the second term of objecthood, may be identified with objecthood itself. For being the second term of a relation, is not an ontologically independent property, but is identical with the relation. But against this argument, it is pointed out here, that there is no way of determining which of the two relations — objecthood or cognition-hood — is ontologically fundamental and which one is to be reduced to being the first or the second term. Hence both objecthood and cognitionhood have to be accorded independent ontological reality.

X. DIFFERENCE OF OBJECTHOOD

Text: Viṣayatā ca viṣaya-bhedāt bhidyate anyathā ghaṭa-paṭāvityādi-samūhāmbanīya-ghaṭa-paṭādi-niṣṭha-viṣayatāyā aikye purvokta-yuktyā tādrśa-jñānasya bhramatvāpatteḥ, ghaṭādy-eka-viṣayaka-jñānīy-aikaika-vṛtti-viṣayatātaḥ samūhāmbane nānā-viṣaya-vṛtty-atiriktaika-viṣayatā-kalapana-prasaṅgena gauravāc ca, asman-naye samūhāmbane kṛpta-pratyeka-jñānīya-viṣayatānām evō pagamāt jñāna-bhedena viṣayata-bhede māmā-'bhāvāt.

Translation: Objecthood must be conceived to become different by difference of objects, otherwise in the conjunctive cognition 'the jar and the piece of cloth' if the objecthood resident in the jar and the piece of cloth were identical, then by the arguments given above such a cognition would be erroneous.

Moreover if an objecthood common to all the objects of a conjunctive cognition be postulated over and above separate objecthoods for the different objects, the theory will be heavy; on our theory (on the other hand) objecthood of *each* cognition which is to be assumed necessarily (in any case) can explain the possibility of objecthood of a conjunctive cognition; for, there is no justification for the theory that objecthood varies with the cognition.

Explanation: Now that objecthood has been postulated to be an independent reality, the question arises whether objecthood would vary with the objects or with cognitions. Gadādhara holds that objecthoods would differ with the difference in objects, but not with the difference in cognitions. The reason is this.

A conjunctive cognition has more than one object; if objecthood depends on the cognition, then a conjunctive cognition will determine one objecthood common to all its objects. There are two alternatives here: (i) An objecthood common to all the objects of a conjunctive cognition is postulated to replace the separate objecthoods of the objects taken separately; (ii) this common objecthood is to be postulated over and above the separate objecthoods. On the alternative (i), true conjunctive cognitions cannot be distinguished from false ones. For example, the true conjunctive cognition of a pot and a piece of cloth is the cognition of a *pot as a pot* and a piece of cloth *as a piece of cloth*. But this cognition is false if it is a cognition of a *pot as a*

piece of cloth and a piece of cloth *as* a pot. In order to distinguish between these two cases of true and false conjunctive cognitions of a pot and a piece of cloth, it is necessary to analyse the objecthood into two parts — objecthood of the pot and objecthood of the piece of cloth. Unanalysed or unanalysable objectivity common to both will not be able to show the structure of this complex objecthood. So separate objecthoods have to be admitted. But, then, this leads to the alternative (ii) which makes the theory heavy, for, now, there is no justification for postulating the one common objecthood. Gadādhara argues that on his theory in a conjunctive cognition resulting from two or more separate cognitions of individual objects, there will be single objecthoods resident in single objects and there will not be an additional objecthood resident in the totality of two or more objects. Even those who postulate an additional objecthood resident in the totality have also to postulate single objecthoods determined by the single cognitions. Thus the postulation of objecthoods determined by the separate single cognitions is necessary. The main point of the opponents, here, is: as the two cognitions of the jar and of the piece of cloth produce a separate conjunctive cognition, the objecthoods determined by the single cognitions will be different from the objecthood determined by the conjunctive cognition which is a different cognition. Gadādhara refutes this contention and argues that even though the cognitions — non-conjunctive and conjunctive — are different still the objects of the non-conjunctive cognitions remain the same as the objects of the resulting conjunctive cognition. The principle therefore is: objecthoods will vary if objects vary, not if the cognitions vary.

XI. QUALIFICANDUM-NESS AND QUALIFIER-NESS AS DISTINCT OBJECTHOODS

Text: Etena — ghaṭa ityādi-viśiṣṭa-buddher viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāvāpanneṣu ghaṭa-ghaṭatvādiṣu ekaiva viśayatā, na tu viśeṣya-niṣṭhā viśeṣaṇa-niṣṭha ca viśayatā bhinnā — iti matam heyam eva, viśeṣya-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatātmaka-viśayatayā samam viśeṣaṇa-niṣṭha-prakāratātmaka-viśayatāyā abhedasyā 'sambhavad-uktikatvāt tathā sati tādṛśa-buddhau ghaṭa-prakāratva-ghaṭatva-viśeṣyaktvayor āpatteḥ. Na ca prakāratā-viśeṣyatayor viśayatā-rūpatāyām eveyam anupapattiḥ, saiva na, api tu padārthā'ntare eva te, tayor viśayatātve mānā 'bhāvād iti vācyam. Viśaye 'tirikta-viśayatānām tatra ca

viṣayatātvasya kalpanām apekṣya viṣaya-vṛttitvena klptānam
prakāratā-viśeṣyatānām viṣayatātva-kalpanasyaiva nyāyatvāt.

Translation: It will follow from this that the theory — that in the qualified cognition of the jar, the objecthoods resident in the jar and jar-ness which function as the qualificandum and the qualifier respectively of the qualified cognition are identical, the objecthood resident in the qualificandum and the objecthood resident in the qualifier are not different — is to be rejected. The objecthood which is the qualificandumness itself, and is resident in the qualificandum, cannot possibly be identified with the objecthood which is identical with the qualifier-ness resident in the qualifier; for in that case the qualified cognition could be interpreted as the cognition with the jar as the qualifier and the jar-ness as the qualificandum. It cannot also be contended — that the very objecthood of qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness cannot be justified and that these two are different ontological realities, there being no justification for regarding them as kinds of objecthood — for it is more proper to postulate the objecthood-ness of quali-ness and qualificandum-ness which have to be, in any case, postulated as residing in the object, rather than to postulate ontologically additional types of objecthoods resident in the object, and separate objecthood-ness residing in this new type of objecthood.

Explanation: As a consequence of the theory that objecthood as a separate reality differs with the difference in objects, the theory that the qualificandum and the qualifier of a qualified cognition have one objecthood has to be rejected. In the qualified cognition 'the jar', the jar is the qualificandum and jar-ness is the qualifier. The one cognition of the jar relates itself in two different ways by two different relations to the qualificandum and to the qualifier which are elements in the complex object cognised. As objecthood is the relation of cognition to object, and as the cognition has two different relations to the qualificandum and to the qualifier, the cognition therefore determines two objecthoods resident in the qualificandum and the qualifier. Hence the theory that there is one objecthood, determined by the cognition which is one, resident in both the qualificandum and the qualifier has to be rejected. If the objecthood resident in the qualificandum, i.e. qualificandum-ness, and the objecthood resident in the qualifier i.e., quali-ness, be identified, then there will be no way of determining which element in the object is the qualifier or the qualificandum. In the cognition of the jar

one would be able to say that the jar is the qualifier and jar-ness is the qualificandum of the cognition as there is total identity of the objecthoods resident in them. Thus there will be no way of distinguishing between the qualificandum and the qualifier *as objects*. i.e., by means of different objecthoods resident in them. It may be objected here that qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness are not different objecthoods because they are not objecthoods at all. Like objecthood, qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness are two additional realities resident in the qualificandum and the qualifier.

Against this objection Gadādhara points out that it involves multiplication of entites — qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness as *additional* objecthood, and also an additional objecthood-ness in them etc. It is much simpler to hold that qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness are objecthoods.

9.1. Criticism of the Theory

Text: Yattu — nirvikalpakīyā prakāratā-viśeṣyatā-bhinnatvenōbhaya-mata-siddhā yā viśayatā viśiṣṭa-jñāna-syâ'pi saiva viśaye sambandhaḥ, tata eva ca viśiṣṭa-buddher api saviśayakatva-nirvāhō 'stu kiṃ prakāratādīnām viśayatātvopagamena, prakāratādīnām viśayatā-'nātmakatve'pi tad-vailakṣṇyasya jñāna-vailakṣṇya-sampādakette na kaścīd virodha — ity api heyam eva.

Translation: This theory also has to be rejected: the objecthood of indeterminate cognition, which is admitted by both sides (of the debate) to be different from qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness, is the relation of the qualified cognition to its object. Hence how a qualified cognition can have an object can be explained thus. So why should qualifier-ness be regarded as objecthood? Even if qualifier-ness be not identified with objecthood, still there is no contradiction in holding that a difference of qualifier-ness would make the cognition different.

Explanation: Gadādhara examines here an objection that even if qualifier-ness and qualificandumness be not identified with objecthood, still all facts about cognition can be explained. The suggestion is that the objecthood determined by an indeterminate cognition is neither the qualifier-ness or the qualificandum-ness of a qualified cognition. This is because in indeterminate cognition the object is directly presented, but is not cognised through any mode, and hence the object directly cognised does not have a relational structure of something *cognised as* something.

Hence there is neither any qualificandum nor any qualifier in indeterminate cognition. Yet this type of cognition always has an object. The objecthood resident in the object of an indeterminate cognition is, therefore, different from both qualificandumness and qualifierness. This is a new type of objecthood. This is admitted by both Gadādhara and his apponents.

Now the suggestion is that even the object of a qualified cognition in which a qualificandum and a qualifier must be distinguished, may be related to the determinate cognition by the objecthood which is admitted by all in indeterminate cognition. There is no need at all to postulate that qualificandumness and qualifierness are forms of objecthood. A qualified cognition has an object because the object has this objecthood of indeterminate cognition.

Now even if qualifierness and qualificandumness are not forms of objecthood, i.e. even if the qualifier and the qualificandum are not regarded as objects of the qualified cognition, still there is no difficulty in the view that different qualifiers or different qualificanda make the qualified cognitions different. Cognitions may be made different not merely by difference in what is regarded as their objects. Gadādhara now gives arguments why this suggestion, too, has to be rejected.

9.11. *Gadadhara's Reply*

Text: Prakāratā-viśeṣyatayor viśayatātvā 'nupagame vyāpya-pakṣa-viśeṣyaka- parāmarśayor vyāpya-viśayatā-nirūpita-pakṣa-viśayatā-śālitvenā 'nugamayyā 'numiti-hetutvā'sambhavāt kāraṇatā-bāhulyāpatteḥ nirvikalpakīya- viśayatāyāḥ parasparam nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva-virahāt.

Translation: If qualifier-ness and qualificandum-ness be not regarded as objecthoods, then the causes of the two forms of consideration — the pervader being the qualificandum and the locus of the inference being the qualificandum — cannot be given a general enunciation by stating the common feature of both; the alternative of stating the general causation by stating the common feature of having the objecthood resident in the pervader determined by the objecthood resident in the locus of the inference is not possible. Hence different causes have to be postulated to explain the two forms of considerations. The objecthood of the indeterminate cognition lacks mutual determination.

Explanation: Gadādhara points out various difficulties in the theory that qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness are not objecthoods. Here he states the first objection by pointing out that a causal law for inferential cognition cannot be stated in general terms to cover two different types of cases. According to Navya-Nyaya the cognition of the conclusion of an inference is produced directly by another cognition which is called *consideration*. Thus the cognition of the conclusion 'the hill is fire-possessing' may be produced by two different types of consideration: (i) the cognition that the hill possess smoke pervaded by fire will cause the inferential cognition that the hill possesses fire. (ii) A different consideration 'smoke pervaded by fire is on the hill' would also produce the same inferential cognition. The problem here is to state a general causal law that would cover both these types of causes. The difference between these two types of consideration is simply this that the qualificandum and the qualifier of the one are interchanged in the other. If qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness be not regarded as objecthoods there is no way of stating this general causal law. But if they are regarded as objecthoods then one objecthood resident in the qualificandum determines, or is determined by, the objecthood resident in the qualifier. Hence by simply saying that the *objecthood* resident in the pervaded (smoke) determines the objecthood resident in the locus of inference, a general statement of what is common to the two forms of consideration is obtained. The difference between the qualificandum and the qualifier is ignored by treating them as objecthoods. It is only in this way that the general causal law of inferential cognition can be stated.

If qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness be not regarded as objecthoods, nothing common to both can be found and hence the general law of causation cannot be stated. The only alternative that remains open is to state special causal laws. But this implies heaviness as many causal laws involve many limiting properties of cause-ness and effect-ness. Hence regarding qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness as objecthoods makes for simplicity.

9.11. Reply Continued

Text: Evaṃ saṃsarga-jñānasyā 'nupanāyakatā-mate upanīta-bhānaṃ prāti upanāyaka-jñānasya tat-prakāraikatvena tad-viśeṣyakaivena ca hetutā-dvaya-prasaṅgaḥ, man-mate tu prakāratā-viśeṣyatve saṃsargatā-bhinna-viśayatātvenā 'nugamayya eka-hetutā-kalpana-sambhavāt.

Translation: So also on the theory that cognition of a relation cannot be a cause of associational cognition, such a cause would be a cognition of something as a qualifier or of something as a qualificandum; and hence there would be two causes in such a case. On my theory, however, qualificierness and qualificandumness both have the common feature of being objecthood different from relation-ness, and hence one causal law can be formulated.

Explanation: Another objection to the theory that qualificierness and qualificandumness are not objecthoods is, again, based on the impossibility of formulating a general law of causation, this time, of associational cognition. Associational cognition is, as a rule, a kind of perception. The usual example of such a cognition is the visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as fragrant. Now fragrance is not an object of visual perception. Yet a person who had previously smelled a piece of sandalwood and cognised it to be fragrant, would perceive visually that a piece of sandalwood is fragrant, if he remembers his past experience. In the present visual perception only the qualificandum is visually perceived, the qualifier, however, is not visually perceived, but is still the object of present cognition. As all perceptual cognitions require some sort of direct relation with the object, and as in this case, fragrance is not an object of visual perception, the present memory of the past olfactory experience is necessary to explain how a piece of sandalwood which is visually perceived is visually perceived as fragrant. The Navya-Nyaya theory is that the present memory cognition is the relation which explains this sort of hybrid perception. Now in this example it is the qualifier which becomes the object of present perception by being presented, or fetched out, by memory which functions as the perceptual relation between eyes and fragrance. According to one section of Navya-Nyaya philosophers in this type of associational direct cognition (i.e. perception) the object related to the relevant sense organs by memory cognitions or any other preceding cognition can only be either a qualificandum or a qualifier of the hybrid perception. The present memory cognition or the preceding cognition which functions as the direct relation between the inappropriate sense organs and the object, must therefore, be a cause of the hybrid perception. As cause of the hybrid perception the present memory cognition must precede the hybrid cognition which it produces. The important point to be noted here is that even though the piece of sandalwood is visually perceived and its fragrance remembered from past experience still the resulting cognition is not of the form 'a visual perception of a piece of

sandalwood and a memory of its fragrance', but of the form 'a visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as fragrant'. The memory cognition or any other type of cognition which produces a hybrid perceptual cognition cannot be of a relation as a relation. Whatever is remembered or otherwise presented to consciousness, so that it becomes an object of the hybrid perception, cannot be a relation, but only the qualificandum or the qualifier. Thus a memory cognition of a qualificandum or of a qualifier is the cause of the hybrid associational perception. Now as sometimes the memory of the qualifier, and sometimes the memory of the qualificandum, is the cause of this type of cognition, the problem is how to state a general causal law which will cover both the cases. If both qualificierness and qualificandumness be regarded as objecthoods, then qualificandumness and qualificierness can be said to have the common property, objecthood other than relationness. In this way a general causal law for hybrid perceptions can be stated. If there is nothing common between qualificandumness and qualificierness, then a general statement of the causal law becomes impossible. There will be then only two special causal laws involving two different limitors of causeness etc. and it would thus become a heavier theory.

9.11. *Reply Continued*

Text: Evaṃ nirvikalpākīya-viśayatāyā, viśiṣṭa-buddhāvupagame ghaṭatvādi-nirvikalpakād iva jātītvādinā ghaṭatvādi-jñānād api svarūpato ghaṭatvādi-prakārikāyā ghaṭa ityādyākāraka-viśiṣṭa-buddher āpattiḥ. Na ca svarūpatas tadviśiṣṭa-buddhau tad-viśeṣyaka-taj-jñānatvena hetutvāt nāyam doṣa iti vācyam. Tathā sati jātirghaṭas cetyādi-jñānāt ghaṭa ityādi-viśiṣṭa-buddhy-anupapattir iti.

Translation: So also if the objecthood of indeterminate cognition be identified with the objecthood of qualified cognition, then like the indeterminate cognition of jarness, the cognition of jarness under the mode of universalness would produce the qualified cognition of the form '(a) jar' which has jarness pure and simple as the qualifier without being cognised through any mode.

It cannot be said that — the cause of a qualified cognition with that

(jarness) pure and simple as the qualifier is a cognition of that (jarness pure and simple) with that (the jar) as the qualificandum and hence this defect is avoided.

For, in that case, a qualified cognition of the form '(the) jar' cannot be produced by the conjunctive cognition of the form '(the) universal and (the) jar'.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara shows the inadequacy of the theory which does away with qualificandumness and qualiifierness as objecthoods by holding that the objecthood of qualified cognition is the objecthood of indeterminate cognition. In indeterminate cognition, which must be perceptual in nature, an object is cognised directly, without any mode; this indeterminate cognition very roughly corresponds, in this respect, to knowledge by acquaintance of Russell. Now the theory which Gadādhara criticises is that cognition through modes is possible only as a consequence of a cognition without any mode. The first stage of all cognitions through modes is, therefore, a cognition without a mode. But, then, a cognition without a mode has an object, has a relation to this object, which is objecthood of the cognition without any mode. Now this objecthood is different from qualiifierness and qualificandumness of a cognition with modes. A cognition with modes need not be assumed to have any different sort of objecthood as the objecthood of the indeterminate cognition may be supposed to function as the objecthood also in the qualified cognition which is produced by the indeterminate cognition.

Gadādhara points out the inadequacy of such identification of the objecthoods of the two types of cognitions. His argument is this: A qualified cognition of a jar under the mode, jarness, is produced by a cognition without mode of jarness pure and simple. Jarness can be so cognised because a universal, when not 'mentioned' (i.e. referred to) by a word, is cognised directly without any mode. So one has to cognise jarness first without any mode, in order to cognise a particular jar through the mode of jarness. This is granted by all Nyaya philosophers.

But then, suppose, jarness has been 'mentioned' by using the word 'universal'. Then jarness has to be cognised under the mode of being a universal (universalness) as jarness is a universal. Now after cognising jarness through this mode, one ought to have the qualified cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness pure and simple, not again under the mode of universalness in its turn. For to cognise jarness under the mode of universalness in a qualified cognition and to cognise jarness pure and simple in an indeterminate

perception, would make no difference to the objecthood of jariness; and it is as having objecthood of the indeterminate cognition, that jariness has become the object of the qualified cognition of jariness under the mode of universalness. So just as the indeterminate perception of jariness pure and simple, so also the qualified cognition of jariness under the mode of universalness, would produce the qualified cognition of the jar under the mode of jariness pure and simple.

Now to avoid this difficulty, the supporters of the theory which Gadādhara criticises here, may argue that the cognition which would produce the cognition of the jar under the mode of jariness pure and simple, must be a cognition which has the jar as the qualificandum and the cognition of jariness pure and simple as the qualifier. This theory is different from the usual Navya-Nyaya theory according to which a cognition of only the qualifier is the cause of a qualified cognition. But here the additional factor, that there be a cognition having the jar as its qualificandum, is stipulated as necessary. Mere cognition of the qualifier would not be sufficient, for, jariness cognised under the mode of universalness and jariness cognised under no mode in indeterminate cognition have the same objectivity, and cognition of jariness pure and simple as the *object of the indeterminate cognition* would be the cause of the qualified cognition. But this causation is not possible. Hence an *additional* factor that a cognition having the jar as its qualificandum, is stipulated as a cause. Thus a cognition of jariness under the mode of universalness is not a cognition having the jar as the qualificandum and hence is not the cause of the qualified cognition.

But this attempt to save this theory does not succeed. For, even a conjunctive cognition of the form '(the) universal (jariness) and (the) jar' produces the qualified cognition of the jar under the mode of jariness pure and simple. Such a case cannot be explained on the suggested theory. For although the conjunctive cognition has the jar as its qualificandum, it does not have jariness pure and simple as its qualifier, for jariness as the mode of the jar has been cognised under the further mode of universalness.

So the theory that objecthood of qualified cognition is really the objecthood of indeterminate cognition has to be rejected.

XII. ONLY QUALIFICANDUMNESS IS OBJECTHOOD OF QUALIFIED COGNITION

Text: Yattu — viśiṣṭa-buddhi-viśayatā viśeṣya-mātre na tu viśeṣaṇe'pi mānā- 'bhāvāt. Na ca vinigamanā-viraḥ, ghaṭa-ityādi-jñānā-ntaraṃ ghaṭaṃ jñānāṃ-tyādy-anuvyavasāyena ghaṭa-rūpa-viśeṣyena samaṃ jñānasya sambandhā-'vagāhanāt ghaṭādi-rūpa-viśeṣye jñānasya viśayatātmake-sambandhasyā-'vaśyopeyatvāt. Ghaṭatvaṃ jñānāṃ tyādy-anuvyavasāyas tu tatrā'siddha eva, tasya ghaṭatva-viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhitvena ghaṭatvatva-prakāraka-vyavasāyā-'nantaram eva tat-sambhavāt, ghaṭa ityādi-vyavasāyasya ca svarūpata eva ghaṭatvādi-prakāratayā ghaṭatvatvādy-aprakāratvāt.

Translation: The theory is that — the objecthood of a qualified cognition is only in the qualificandum not in the qualifier for absence of valid reasons. It cannot be said that there is no ground for preference; for the secondary (introspective) cognition following upon the primary cognition of the form '(a) jar' is of the form 'I am cognising a jar', shows that the relation of the cognition to the qualificandum such as the jar, which relation is identical with objecthood, is to be necessarily postulated. In this case the secondary cognition 'I am cognising jarness' is not justified, for, this secondary cognition cognises jarness as qualified by jarnessness and is possible only if the primary cognition has jarnessness as its qualifier. And the primary cognition '(a) jar' has jarness in itself (without the mode of jarnessness) as its qualifier and hence does not have jarnessness as its qualifier.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains another theory of objecthood according to which it is only the qualificandum of a qualified cognition that has objecthood. The point to be noted here is that the object is not to be identified with *what* is cognised. In a qualified cognition the three elements in the objective complex, the qualificandum, the qualifier and the qualification, are all cognised and there is no dispute over this. The dispute here centres round the point whether all the three factors cognised in a qualified cognition have to be regarded as objects of the cognition. The theory here is that only the qualificandum of a qualified cognition has objecthood, but not the qualifier. One may ask here: What harm is there if one makes the supposition other way around that it is the qualifier alone which has objecthood and not the qualificandum? The answer is that the

secondary introspective cognition following upon the primary cognition '(a) jar' has the form 'I am cognising the jar', not the form 'I am cognising jarness'. Now according to Nyaya whenever one is cognising a jar, for example when one sees a jar, one does not know, in determinate perception, only the thing, but knows the thing under the mode of jarness. Thus when one sees a jar one has the qualified cognition of the object, jar (the qualificandum), under the mode of jarness (the qualifier). In Western philosophy it is usual to distinguish between two senses of 'know', 'see', etc. — in one sense these verbs take an accusative and in the other sense these verbs take a that-clause as their objects. In Nyaya these two senses are not distinguished, for even when these verbs take an accusative, the corresponding cognition is always of something *as* something. Thus a cognition of a jar is interpreted as the cognition of the thing jar under the mode of jarness. Now this jarness, being itself a universal, is cognised in and through itself and does not require to be cognised under any further mode. Thus even though in the primary cognition jarness is cognised, still in the secondary cognition of this primary cognition one does not have jarness as the object of the primary cognition. This absence of jarness as an *object* of the primary cognition as revealed in its introspective awareness is the reason, according to the upholders of this theory, for denying objecthood to the qualifier of a cognition (in this case, to jarness). In order to have jarness as the object of a primary cognition as revealed in introspection, one has to have a primary cognition of jarness under the mode of jarnessness. It is only when one has cognised jarness under a mode that one can have an introspective awareness of a primary cognition of jarness. But as in this case jarness is not cognised under any mode in the primary cognition, the secondary cognition cannot be of the form 'I am cognising jarness'.

10.1. *Argument Continued*

Text: Jñānāmśe svarūpato ghaṭatvādi-viśeṣaṇakō 'nuvyavasāyō 'pi na tatra sambhavati; sa-sambandhika-padārtha-pratyakṣasya kiñcid-viśiṣṭa-sambandhi-vaiśiṣṭyā-'vagāhitva-niyamāt.

Translation: In that case the secondary cognition of a primary cognition in which jarness by itself is manifested, too, is not possible, for the rule is: In the case of perceptual cognition of a real which is related to a term which in its turn is related to something else, this term of the relation has to be cognised as qualified by something.

Explanation: It cannot also be argued that as in the primary cognition jariness has been cognised in itself, so also in the secondary cognition one would have jariness in itself as the object of the primary cognition. The reason why this line of argument does not succeed is this: The secondary cognition of a primary cognition is direct awareness; it is perception, although inner, of the primary cognition. Now there is a law of perceiving something which is related to something which, in its turn, is related to a third thing. The secondary perception is of the primary cognition which is related, say, to jariness which again is related to the perceived jar. The law of perception in such a case is that to perceive a thing as related to a term already related, the term has to be cognised as qualified by something. In symbols, if *a* is related to *b* which is related to *c*, then, in order to perceive *such an a*, it is necessary to cognise *b* as qualified by something, i.e. under some mode. The primary cognition is to be perceived by the secondary perception; but the primary cognition (*a*), is related to jariness (*b*) which, again, is related to, (inheres in), the cognised jar (*c*). So jariness (*b*), has to be cognised as qualified by something, i.e. has to be cognised under some mode; hence the secondary cognition cannot cognise (perceptually) jariness in itself as related to (as an object of) the primary cognition.

10.11. Criticism

Text: Na cāyaṃ ghaṭa ityādi-vyavasāyānantaram ghaṭatvenēmaṃ
jānāmī-tyādy-ākārakā-'nuvyavasāyena ghaṭatvādi-rūpa-viśeṣaṇā
pi samaṃ jñānasya sambandhā-'vagāhanāt tatrāpi viśiṣṭa-dhī-
viśayatābhyupagama āvaśyaka iti vācyam.

Translation: One cannot also argue as follows: Immediately after the primary cognition '(a) jar', one has the secondary perception of the form 'I am cognising this (as qualified) by jariness'; and hence, the relation of the primary cognition to the qualifier (jariness), too, is revealed in the secondary cognition, hence, objecthood of a qualified cognition has to be admitted in the qualifier, too.

10.11.1. Reply

Text: Yatas tatra jñānānvayi-vaiśiṣṭyam na tṛtīyārthaḥ, api tu
dvitīyārtha-viśayatā'nvayi-ghaṭatvādi-prakāraikatvam.

Translation: For, the meaning of the *trītiyā* (the third case in 'by jarness') is not being related to cognition, but only having jarness being related to objecthood which is meant by *dvītiyā* (the second case), as its qualifier.

Explanation (10.11–10.111): When one has a cognition '(a) jar' one has the cognition of a jar as a jar, i.e. a jar under the mode of jarness. In Sanskrit, this is often stated as the cognition of a jar by jarness using the instrumental case with 'jarness'. The question here is: what is the meaning of this instrumental case? Does it not mean that there is a relation of jarness to the cognition? If such a relation is meant by the instrumental case of 'jarness', then jarness becomes a locus of objectivity of this cognition. So this interpretation of the instrumental case of jarness has to be rejected. The correct meaning is that the instrumental case denotes a relation to the objectivity denoted by the accusative case of '*ghaṭa*' (the jar), — I cognise the jar by jarness, where the 'jar' is in the accusative case which means objectivity of the cognition. The instrumental case of 'jarness' means simply that jarness is related to the objectivity, denoted by the accusative case, resident in the jar. This relation which jarness has to the jar which is the object of the cognition is *to be the mode of the cognition*. Now the question is whether to be the mode under which an object of a cognition is cognised is itself an object of cognition or not.

10.12. Another Criticism

Text: Na ca viśayatā-niṣṭhaṃ ghaṭatvādi-prakāratvaṃ ghaṭatvādi-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpakatvaṃ tad-abhyupagame ca viśeṣaṇībhūta-ghaṭatvāder viśiṣṭa-dhī-viśayatā-siddhir niṣpratyūhaiva, prakāratāyā viśayatā-viśeṣātmakatvād iti vācyam.

Translation: It cannot be said that the property of having a mode of jarness resident in the objecthood is really the property of being the determiner of modeness resident in jarness. If this is admitted then the objectivity of jarness which has become a qualifier will certainly have the objecthood of the qualified cognition, for modeness is a special form of objecthood.

Explanation: It has been asserted above that jarness is related to the objecthood resident in the jar as its mode. This means that the objectivity of the jar has the modeness of jarness. Now what is to have the modeness of jarness? It is nothing but being the determiner of the modeness resident in jarness. If jarness is the mode, then the modeness is resident in jarness;

and the objectivity resident in the jar determines (i.e. has the property of being the determiner of) the modeness resident in jarness. The point here is this: the jar is the object of the cognition, and jarness is the mode of the object. Now if being the mode, i.e. modeness, be a property which is determined by the objectivity of the jar, then jarness itself becomes an object of the cognition. In a qualified cognition, there are a qualificandum and a qualifier which is usually the same as the mode of the qualificandum. Now the theory holds that it is only the qualificandum of the cognition which has objectivity and the qualifier is only related to the objectivity of the qualificandum as its mode. A question is now asked about the nature of this relation. The relation is the property, having jarness as the mode, resident in the objectivity of the jar. But if having (jarness as) the mode is being the determiner of modeness resident in jarness, then jarness itself possess objectivity, for whatever is determined by objectivity resident in the qualificandum, i.e. by qualificandumness, is qualifierness. And as qualificandumness is objectivity of the qualificandum, so also, qualifierness is objectivity resident in the qualifier. Only objectivity of the qualificandum or the qualifier determines or is determined by the objectivity resident in the qualifier or the qualificandum.

10.121. Reply

Test: Yato viṣayatā-niṣṭhaṃ ghaṭatvādi-prakāraakatvaṃ na ghaṭatvādi-niṣṭha-prakāratā-khya-viṣayatā-nirūpakatvaṃ api tu ghaṭatvādy-avacchinnatvaṃ, avacchinnatvañ ca pratiyogitva-kāraṇatvādhikar-āṇatvādāviva viṣayatādāvapi ghaṭatvādeḥ sambandha-viśeṣa eva, sa ca atiriktā-'natirikto ve-tyanyad etat.

Translation: For, the property of having jarness as the mode, resident in the objectivity, is not the property of being the determiner of the objectivity called modeness resident in jarness, but is the property of being limited by jarness, the property of being limited is a special relation of jarness to objecthood etc., as also to the properties of (i) counterpositiveness, (ii) causeness, (iii) locusness etc., whether this special relation is ontologically identical with its terms or not is a separate question.

Explanation: The answer to the above objection is that the objectivity resident in the qualificandum *does not determine*, but is limited by, the modeness of jarness; hence jarness does not have objectivity determined

by the objectivity of the jar. The point of the reply is this — when a jar is cognised under the mode of jariness, it is often said that the jar is the qualificandum of the qualifier, jariness, in the cognition. Thus qualificandum and qualifier become correlatives, for there is nothing like a qualificandum *tout court* which is not of some qualifier. But then the qualificandum-ness and the qualierness become the determiner of each other. The reply is that, although a qualificandum must be relative to a qualifier of a cognition, still it is not necessary to hold that the qualificandum-ness *determines* the qualierness; it is enough if the qualificandum-ness is *limited by* jariness resident in the qualifier. Now the property of being limited by is a relation, and whether this relation is ontologically identical with its terms or not is a separate question.

10.121. *Reply continued: Different Solutions*

Text: Iyāṁstu viśeṣaḥ — pratiyogitvādāv-anyūnā-'natiprasaktatvam avacchedyā-vacchedaka-bhāve tantraṁ, na tu viśayatā-sthale, vyadhikaraṇa-dharmasyā'pi viśayatāvachchedakatvāt. Viśeṣaṇa-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpitatvam eva vā viśayatā-niṣṭhaṁ tat-prakāratatvam. Astu vā viśeṣaṇe viśayatā-nirūpitaḥ prakāratākhyadharma-viśeṣaḥ, tathā'pi tasya viśayatātve jñāna-pratiyogikatve ca mānābhāva — ity-atirikta-viśayatā-vādināṁ prācinaika-deśināṁ mataṁ, tad api anupādeyam eva.

Translation: There is, however, a difference — The limitor-limited relation to the counterpositiveness etc. is governed by coextensionality, but not so in the case of objecthood, as even a property which is contra-located can be a limitor of objecthood. Or, being determined by modeness resident in the qualifier is the objecthood's having it as the mode. Or, let a property determined by objecthood, and called modeness, be admitted in the qualifier, yet there is no proof that this property is objecthood and has cognition as the second term of the relation.

This is the theory of one section of philosophers of the old Nyaya School who have argued for special ontological status of objecthood. But this theory, too, has to be rejected.

Explanation: It has been argued that the relation of objecthood to modeness of jariness is the limitor-limited relation, like the limitor-limited relation of counterpositiveness etc. Now it is pointed out that there is a difference

between these cases. In the case of counterpositiveness etc. the rule is that the limitor and the limited must have the same extension — must be present in exactly the same loci. But in the case of objectivity its limitor need not be coextensive with it. One may know an object through a property which cannot be located in it. Thus when one cognises a jar under the mode of potness, i.e. cognises a jar as a pot, his cognition is necessarily false. Yet the objecthood resident in the jar — the jar *is* the object of this cognition — is limited by potness which cannot be located in a jar. Such a property is called a contra-located property.

Although this is a solution of the problem raised by the opponent still other solutions are suggested. (i) One alternative is to hold that the property, resident in the jar, of having jariness as a mode is the property of being determined by modenness resident in the qualifier; when the jar is cognised under the mode of jariness, jariness *is* the *mode of* the cognition of the jar; i.e. the objecthood resident in the jar has jariness as its mode.

It has been already stated that the objecthood (resident in the jar) has jariness as its mode; i.e. the mode is related to the objecthood; the objecthood *has the mode* jariness. The qualifier is the mode, i.e. *has the modenness* resident in it. Thus we have two relations: (i) having the mode (ii) being determined by the modenness resident in the qualifier. The relation between that which has the mode (objectivity) and that which has the modenness (jariness, the qualifier) may be stated thus:

The property of having the mode (which objectivity has) *is determined by* the modenness which the qualifier (jariness) has. The jariness has the modenness of the mode which objectivity has. What is the relation which 'of' stands for here? It is the relation of determining. So we have: jariness has the modenness determining the property (which objectivity has) of having the mode. But in this case it is not objectivity which is determining the modenness which jariness has; it is the other way round — it is the modenness which determines the property of having the mode. Hence the qualificierness resident in jariness, not being determined by objectivity resident in the qualificandum (the jar), is not a kind of objectivity.

(ii) Or, let the modenness resident in the qualifier, be determined by objectivity; still it does not follow that, therefore, modenness is a kind of objectivity, that modenness is related in the characteristic manner to the cognition of which jariness is the mode. Here the law underlying the objection is challenged; whatever is determined by objectivity is itself objectivity.

Now this is the position of a section of philosophers who belonged to the older Nyaya. Their arguments seem to support Gadādhara's position that objectivity must be given an independent ontological status. Yet Gadādhara maintains that their arguments are invalid and that their position cannot be supported. This is because Gadādhara holds that modeness or qualifierness is objectivity just as much as qualificandum-ness; that the qualifier of a cognition is as much its object as its qualificandum — a position refuted by these philosophers. So now we come to Gadādhara's theory.

XIII. GADĀDHARA'S THEORY

11.1 *Arguments Against the Earlier Theory*

Text: Viśeṣaṇasya viśiṣṭa-jñānāviśayatve tad-dharma-viśiṣṭa-jñānā-nantaram tad-dharma-viśiṣṭa-jñānānupapatteḥ, viśiṣṭa-buddhau viśeṣaṇa-viśayaka-jñānasya hetutvāt, bhavan-mate tad-viśiṣṭa-jñānasya tad-viśayakatvābhāvena tad-ahetutvāt. Evaṃ viśiṣṭa-jñānāt viśeṣaṇa-viśayakōpanīta-bhānasyā-'nupapattiḥ, tad-upanīta-bhāne tad-viśayaka-jñānasyaiva hetutvāt. Etādṛśa-yuktyā viśeṣaṇasya viśiṣṭa-dhī-viśayatayā āvaśyakatve ca ukta-lāghavāt tanniṣṭha-prakāratayā eva viśayatātva-siddhir ityavadheyam.

Translation: If the qualifier does not have objectivity of a qualified cognition, then immediately after cognising something qualified by that, a qualified cognition of that thing under the *mode* of that would not arise; for a cognition of a qualifier *as an object* is necessary to produce a qualified cognition; for, on your theory, the qualifier of a cognition is not an object of this cognition and hence, can not be a cause of the qualified cognition. So also an associational cognition having the qualifier as its object cannot arise from a qualified cognition, for an associational cognition of something can arise only from a cognition of that thing as an object. Because of these reasons it follows necessarily that the qualifier has objecthood of qualified cognition; and also because of the abovementioned lightness, it is established that the modeness resident in the qualifier has objecthoodness.

Explanation: Gadādhara gives here his own theory about the objectivity the qualifier of a qualified cognition. He refutes the theory that objecthood is a separate ontological reality but belongs only to the the qualificandum of

a qualified cognition. Gadādhara gives here two points of criticism against this theory.

(i) According to Nyaya a qualified cognition requires a prior cognition of the qualifier. In Nyaya terminology cognition of the qualifier is a cause of the qualified cognition. Now Gadādhara points out that this cognition of a qualifier is a cause of the qualified cognition only if the qualifier is cognised as an object. According to the theory of the older logicians, the qualifier in a qualified cognition is only related to the objecthood of the qualificandum but itself does not have any objecthood. So they cannot explain how a cognition of the qualifier in a qualified cognition can be a cause of another qualified cognition, as the qualifier does not have any objecthood. According to Navya-Nyaya, so long as one continues to look at an object, say, a jar, one continues to have a series of perceptions of the jar. The first of perception of the jar is a qualified cognition of the jar as jar-ness-possessing. Now the cognition of the qualifier jar-ness in this qualified cognition produces the next perception, which is again a qualified cognition. On the theory criticised here, this would be impossible, for in the first perception jar-ness does not have objectivity, is not cognised as an object, and hence could not be the cause of the next qualified cognition.

(ii) Similarly in the case of associational visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as fragrant, a prior cognition of fragrance as an object is necessary. That is, for associational cognition, too, prior cognition of the qualifier as an object is necessary. But as the opponents do not admit that the qualifier of a qualified cognition can have any objecthood, and fragrance of a piece of sandalwood can be smelt only in the form of a qualified cognition where the fragrance is the qualifier, it will not be a cause of the associational cognition unless it is cognised as an object of the qualified cognition. Hence the theory of the opponenets has to be rejected. It is necessary, on this ground, to postulate the objecthood of the qualifier of a qualified cognition, the modeness resident in the qualifier will have objecthood-ness.

11.11. Reply

Text: • Atha tad-viśiṣṭa-buddhau tad-upanīta-bhāne ca sva-vṛttitva-sva-prakāra-katvā-nyatara-sambandhena tad-viśiṣṭa yā viśayatā tacchālī-jñānatvenaiva hetutā vācyā, itthañ ca viśeṣaṇasya viśiṣṭa-jñānāviśayatve 'pi tad-viśiṣṭa-jñānāt tad-viśiṣṭa-jñānāntarasya

tad-upanīta-bhānasya ca nānupapattiḥ. Na cō-padarśita-kāraṇatāvacchedaka-kotāv-anyatara-sambandhena tad-vaiśiṣṭasya viśayatāyām niveśe anyataratva-ghaṭaka-bhedayor mitho viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāve vinigamanā-viraheṇa kāraṇata-bāhulyam iti vacyam. Yatas tādṛśā-nyatarasya anyataratvena na sambandhatā, api tu svarūpata eva.

Translation: Now of a qualified cognition of *that*³ and the associational cognition of *that* the cognition which is the cause has objecthood related to *that* by either of these two relations — (i) residence in itself, (ii) being the determiner of its modeness. Therefore there is no problem in explaining another qualified cognition of *that* or an associational cognition of *that*, even if the qualifier does not have objecthood of the qualified cognition. It cannot be also said that in inserting *either or* in the relation of *that* with objecthood, this theory becomes heavy by postulating many different causal relations in the absence of any principle of determination of the qualifier-qualificandum-ness of the two differences constituting the alternation. For the alternation of the two relations is not under the mode of alternationness but is in itself (under no mode at all).

Explanation: This is another attempt to support the theory that the qualifier of a qualified cognition does not have objecthood of the qualified cognition and to show that still there is no difficulty in explaining how a qualified cognition can be a cause of another qualified cognition or of associational cognition. Gadādhara's criticism was that unless the qualifier have objecthood, a qualified cognition with that qualifier would not be able to be a cause of a subsequent qualified cognition. Now the opponents of Gadādhara answer that it is not always necessary to relate objecthood directly to the qualifier. When a qualified cognition with something as the qualifier is caused by an indeterminate perception of that thing, then this indeterminate perception of that thing as an object becomes the cause. Here the objecthood resident in the reality cognised in the indeterminate cognition directly belongs to that reality. Thus the objecthood in this case becomes the cause of the qualified cognition as residing in the reality. Yet this sort of direct relation to objectivity is not possible in all cases. For example, when something is cognised as a qualifier in a qualified cognition, and that qualified cognition produces another qualified cognition with the same thing as a qualifier then a cognition of a qualifier is not a cognition of the qualifier as an object.

There is, however, an objecthood resident in the qualificandum of the qualified cognition and this objecthood determines the qualifier of the qualified cognition. Thus the objecthood resident in the qualificandum of the qualified cognition is related to that reality by the relation of being the determiner of the modeness resident in that reality. Hence the objecthood belongs to the reality which is cognised as the qualifier in a qualified cognition by an indirect and composite relation – being the determiner of the mode-ness resident in itself (i.e. the reality). In order to cover both these two types of cases the relation of objecthood to that which becomes a qualifier in the resulting qualified cognition, must be a sum of those two relations.

Against this solution of the opponents of Gadādhara it may be argued that really there are two different relations limiting the cause-ness resident in a cognition of something; if the cognition of that which becomes a qualifier in the resulting qualified cognition be indeterminate perception then the objecthood resident in that becomes a cause by one relation. If, however, the qualified cognition of that becomes a cause of another qualified cognition with that as the qualifier then the objectivity becomes a cause by the second relation. Thus there are two different causal relations, and this postulation is heavy.

The opponents' reply to this objection is to treat the sum of the two relations not *as* a sum where there can be no preference for regarding one relation as the first term of the sum or as the second term, thus where there seem to be two different sums:

AUB or BUA.

Now, according to Western logicians, these two sums are identical for U is commutative. But according to Nyaya AUB is different from BUA because the first term of the sum is regarded as the qualificandum and the second term as the qualifier. This shows that according to Nyaya the sum by itself is not the relation but the sum has to be *cognised as the relation*. As the sum can be cognised in two, equally valid ways, there is no reason to prefer the one to the other. The opponents reply to this objection by pointing out that the sum of the two relations is cognised not *as* a sum with a qualificandum and a-qualifier, not *as* anything, but in and through itself. Thus there cannot be two ways of cognising the sum of the two relations.

11.12. *Objection to Reply and its Refutation*

Text: Na caivam apy ananugamāt kārāṇātā'dhikyam vyabhicāraś ceti vācyam. Sambandhā-nanugame 'pi tan-niṣṭha-sambandhatāyā aikyōpagamena tad-doṣānavakāśāt. Ataeva sambandhānanugamo na doṣayeti prācāṃ pravādo 'pi. Na caivam api sva-vṛttitva-sva-prakāraakatvānyatara-sambandhena tad-viśiṣṭa-viśayatām apekṣya sva-vṛttitva-sambandhena tad-viśiṣṭa-viśayatāyā lāghavena tad-viśiṣṭa-buddhyādi-janakatāvachedakatva-siddher niṣpratyūhatayā viśeṣaṇasyā'pi viśiṣṭa-dhī-viśayatvaṃ durvāram iti vācyam. Prakāratāyām viśayatāvōpagame ghaṭatvādi-rūpeṇa ghaṭādi-viśayaka-smaraṇādaū tathā-vidha-jñānasya ghaṭatvādi-prakāratā-nirūpita-ghaṭādi-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-śāli-jñānatvena ghaṭādi-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-ghaṭatvādi-prakāratā-śāli-jñānatvena vā hetutve gauravāt, asman-mate ca naitādṛśa-vinigamanā-virahā-'vakāśaḥ, viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakāratāyā, jñāna-pratīyogikatvābhāvena paramparā-sambandhenaiva tasya janakatāvachedakatvasyō-pagantavyatayā tad-apekṣayā prakāratā-nirūpita-viśeṣyatāyāḥ pratīyogitā-sambandhena janakatā-'vacchedakatve lāghavasyaiva vinigamakatvāt.

Translation: It cannot also be said that as there is no common property there will be multiplicity of causal relations and also deviation. Even though there is no common relation still if a unity of the relation-ness resident in the relations can be shown, then there will not be any possibility of those defects. Hence the old saying: absence of common feature of relations is not a defect. It cannot also be said that compared to objecthood qualified by that by either the relation of residence in itself or the relation of being the determiner of its modeness, it is lighter to postulate that the objecthood is qualified by that by the relation of residence in itself, and hence that it is limitor of the causeness of the qualified cognition of that; hence the qualifier, too, has objecthood. For, if objecthood be ascribed to the qualifier, then in memory cognition of a jar under the mode of jariness, the cognition of that form becomes its cause either as a cognition having qualificandum-ness which is resident in the jar and which is determined by qualificierness resident in jariness, or as a cognition having the qualificierness which is resident in jariness and which is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the jar, and

this supposition will be heavy. On our theory, on the other hand, there is no room for lack of such preference, the qualificierness determined by qualificandumness, being not related to cognition, can be regarded as the limiter of causeness only by a chain of relations; it is much simpler to hold that the qualificandumness determined by the qualificierness is the limiter of causeness by the relation of being the second term (of the cognition).

Explanation: The opponents of Gadādhara now reply to further objections. The first objection is that even if the two relations whose sum is the relation of objecthood to the qualifier of a qualified cognition, is cognised in and through itself, still the two relations do not have any common feature. So there are really two causal relations; and also there will be deviation. For when one causal relation is absent, then the other relation will hold; hence none of them will be necessary, either being sufficient. The reply to this objection is that it is not necessary to state a feature common to *relations* in order to obtain one general causal law. What is necessary, and also sufficient, is to find a feature common to all the causes; i.e. to find out a general property as the limiter of causeness. In support of this theory, the opponents also quote a maxim formulated by older Nyāyikas that it is not necessary to find out a common feature of relations in order to state a general law of causation. Moreover, even though the relations have not been brought under a common feature, still if the relation-ness of the relations is one, then there will be neither a plurality of causal laws, nor deviation.

The second objection is that it is much simpler to postulate objecthood of the qualifier of a qualified cognition, which can be the limiter of causeness of the qualified cognition by being directly related to the qualifier. Otherwise, one has to postulate the sum of two relations by which objecthood can be related, in the two cases of cognition, to the qualifier of the qualified cognition. The reply to this objection is that this theory, too, in spite of its apparent simplicity, involves heaviness. If modeness is objecthood, then in the memory cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness, there will be no knowing what form of cognition would be its cause. The Nyaya theory is that a memory is causally connected with a previous cognition, and that the memory cognition has the same form as the previous cognition which is its cause. 'Having the same form', in the case of cognitions, means that the cognitions have the same qualifiers, and the same qualificanda. But, now if the qualifier be accorded objectivity, then there will be two alternative causes of the cognition. For a cognition having the same qualifier and

qualificandum as another cognition, may still be analysed differently. A qualifier of a cognition is qualifier only in relation to the qualificandum of the cognition, and the qualificandum of a cognition is qualificandum only in relation to the qualifier of the cognition. Now there is no way of choosing between these two different situations. In the technical language of Navya-Nyaya the two situations are distinguished in this way: in one case, the cognition has the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar determined by the qualierness resident in jarness; in the other case, the cognition has the qualierness which is resident in jarness and which is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the jar. Thus although both the cognitions are of a jar under the mode of jarness, still they are different cognitions. There is no way of choosing one rather than the other as the cause of the memory cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness. Either cognition would be able to produce the same memory cognition. Hence according objectivity to the qualifier of a qualified cognition creates more difficulties than it solves.

If objecthood be denied to the qualifier, then there will be only one analysis of a cognition of a jar under the mode of jarness. It will be a cognition having its qualificandumness determined by qualierness which will be the cause of the memory cognition.

11.121. *Refutation of the Theory by Some Navya-Nyaya Philosophers*

Text: Maivam, ukta-viśeṣaṇa-jñānādi-kāraṇatā'vacchedaka-lāghavena prakāratayāṃ viśayatātvasya jñāna-pratiyogikatvasya ca siddhāveva darśita-smaraṇādi-hetutāyāṃ vinigamanā-virahā'vatāreṇa gauravāt, tādṛśa-gauravasya phalamukhatvenā doṣatvāt, yat-siddhim upajivya gauravā-vatāras tat-siddhau tasya virodhitvā-'sambhavāt.

Translation: No, even though objecthoodness and being the second term of a cognition are proved in the moderness on the ground of simplicity of the limiter of causeness of the said cognition of the qualifier, still to impute heaviness because of lack of choice regarding the cause of the abovementioned memory cognition is unjustified. For such heaviness being necessary is harmless; if heaviness is imputed only on the basis of what is already established, then that heaviness cannot nullify the established fact.

Explanation: Gadādhara here explains the reasons offered by some Navya-Nyaya philosophers to show the inadequacy of the opponents' arguments

to deny objectivity to the qualifier. The opponents have found the defect of heaviness in the theory which ascribes objectivity to the qualifier, although they have conceded apparent simplicity to this theory. Now Gadādhara shows that their arguments to prove heaviness of the theory are untenable. They have argued that there will be no reason to choose one of the two alternative causal laws for memory cognition. Now this heaviness is not a defect of this theory because it is established on the basis of facts. It is only because the opponents have admitted that the facts of the case prove this theory that they can bring the charge of heaviness against it. The point here is that if one brings the charge of heaviness against a theory only by presupposing it, then this heaviness cannot go against the theory. Thus heaviness of a theory is not always a defect.

11.121. *Refutation Continued*

Text: Evaṃ ghaṭa-vad-bhūtaḥ ityādi-viśiṣṭa-buddhy-anantaram bhūtaḥ jñānamīty-anu-vyavasāya-vad ghaṭam jñānamītyady-ākārakasya jñāne ghaṭādi-sambandhā'vagāhino 'nuvyavasāyasā'pi sarvā'nubhava-siddha-tayā viśeṣaṇe 'pi viśayatātmaka-jñāna-sambandha āvaśyakaḥ. Na ca tatra sva-prakāraka-viśayatā-pratiyogitva-rūpa-paramparā-sambandha eva jñāne ghaṭasyā-nuvyavasāyena grhyate iti vācyaṃ. Viśeṣaṇī-bhūta-ghaṭādir eva tādrśa-viśiṣṭa-buddhi-viśayaḥ, na tu bhūtalādi-rūpa-viśeṣyam, bhūtaḥ jñānamītyady-anuvyavasāyena tu sva-viśeṣyaka-viśayatā-pratiyogitva-rūpa-bhūtalādi-nirūpita-paramparā-sambandha eva jñānādaḥ grhyate ityasyā'pi suvacatayā vinigamanā-virahēṇa viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyayor-ubhayor eva viśiṣṭa-dhī-viśayatā-siddher nirābādhatvāt ityāhuḥ.

Translation: Thus immediately after the qualified cognition 'jar-possessing (is the) ground' like the secondary cognition 'I am cognising the ground' another secondary cognition 'I am cognising the jar' in which the relation between the jar and the cognition is revealed, is also confirmed by everyone. Hence it is necessary to postulate, in the qualifier, objecthood which is really a relation to cognition. It cannot be said here that in the above secondary cognition a chain relation of the jar to the cognition is cognised, this chain relation being *being the second term* (successor) of (of the relation to) *the*

objecthood having itself as mode. For only the jar itself, which has become the qualifier, is the object of the qualified cognition of that form, but not the ground which is the qualificandum. Moreover in the secondary cognition 'I am cognising the ground' it can also be easily said that a chain relation between the ground and the cognition is cognised, the chain relation being that which is determined by the ground and which is the successorness of the objecthood having itself as the qualificandum. Thus as there is no reason for choosing one of the alternatives rather than the other it is established that the objecthood of a qualified cognition belongs to both the qualifier and the qualificandum. This is what they say.

Explanation: Now Gadādhara gives an example of a qualified cognition, both the qualifier and the qualificandum of which are cognised in the secondary cognition. The primary cognition 'jar-possessing (is the) ground' is cognised in the secondary introspective cognition not merely as 'I am cognising the ground' but also as 'I am cognising the jar' where the relation between the jar and the primary cognition is cognised. Gadādhara claims that this sort of introspective awareness is universal. Therefore it is necessary to postulate that the qualifier, too, has objectivity which is merely a relation of the qualifier to the primary cognition.

Now it may be objected that it is not necessary. The facts may be explained as well on the theory that only the qualificandum of a qualified cognition has objectivity. When one cognises 'jar-possessing (is the) ground' the objectivity resident in the ground (the qualificandum of the cognition) is related to the jar (the qualifier) by a relation and the jar is related *through* it to the cognition. The chain relation is like this: the objectivity which is resident in the qualificandum which has the jar as its mode. So the objectivity of the qualificandum is related to the jar by the relation *having it (the jar) as the mode*. The cognition, again, is related to the objectivity by being its second term. Thus the cognition is related to the qualifier by the chain relation — being the second term of objectivity which has the jar as its mode. It is this relation of the jar to the cognition which is cognised in the secondary cognition. But this does not require the postulation of any objectivity of the qualifier.

Gadādhara's reply to this argument is that in such a case one could not introspectively cognise the jar except through the cognition of the ground which alone is the object of the primary cognition. But this is not so. One cognises introspectively that one is cognising only the jar but not the ground.

This introspective evidence clearly supports the theory that the qualifier alone can also have objectivity, i.e. a relation to the primary cognition.

Gadādhara also points out that the argument of the opponent can also show that the qualificandum, too, can be related to the primary cognition by a chain relation in the following way. Let us assume that objecthood belongs only to the qualifier, i.e. the cognition is related directly only to the qualifier by being the successor to objecthood. The ground is the qualificandum of the qualifier which has objectivity, i.e. the objectivity resident in the qualifier which has the ground as *its* qualificandum and is determined by it. Therefore the cognition has the relation to the ground as being the second term of the objectivity which has it (the ground) as its qualificandum and which is determined by it.

The cognition being determined by its second term, namely the objectivity which has the ground as its qualificandum, is thus related to the ground. Thus there are two ways of explaining the relations of the ground and the jar to the primary cognition – (i) One may say that it is the jar which is indirectly related by the chain relation to the primary cognition; or (ii) one may as well say that it is the ground which is indirectly related by the chain relation to the primary cognition. Now Gadādhara points out that both these alternatives are equally correct and there is no reason to choose one rather than the other. So it is established that the qualifier of a qualified cognition has objectivity as much as the qualificandum.

Now these replies to the position of the opponent that it is the qualificandum alone which has objectivity are not Gadādhara's own replies. They are the replies given by others who also accept Gadādhara's theory that both the qualifier and the qualificandum have the objectivity. Gadādhara has given his own arguments before (XI – 9.11).

XIV. GADĀDHARA'S THEORY: RELATIONS HAVE OBJECTHOOD OF QUALIFIED COGNITIONS

Text: Viśeṣyatā-prakāratā-vat saṃsargatvasyā'pi viṣayatā-viśeṣātmakatvāt saṃsargasyā 'pi viśiṣṭa-dhī-viṣayatvam.

Translation: Like qualificandumness and qualifierness the qualificationness, too, is a special kind of objecthood, hence, the qualification, too, has objecthood of qualified cognition.

Explanation: The object of qualified cognition is a relational complex

having three elements — a qualificandum, a qualifier and a relation between them. Now as the whole relational complex is what is cognised, and, as according to Nyaya, the relational complex is not an ontological entity over and above the three elements, all the three elements have to be accorded different types of objectivity.

XV. RELATIONS ARE NOT OBJECTS OF QUALIFIED COGNITIONS

12.1. *Arguments for the Theory*

Text: Atrôcchṛṅkhalāḥ — samsargasya viśiṣṭa-dhī-viśayatve manābhāvaḥ, ghaṭa ityādi-jñānānantaraṃ samavāyaṃ jñānītyādyākārakā-nuvyavasāyasyā'siddhatvāt, tādṛśānuvyavasāyasya samavāyatva-visiṣṭ-vaiśiṣṭyā'vagāhitayā samavāyatva-prakāraka-jñānā'nantaram eva sambhavāt.

Translation: Here the propounders of relationlessness [argue]: There is no justification for objecthood of relations in a qualified cognition; for, there is no secondary introspective evidence 'I cognise inherence' immediately following on the (primary) cognition 'a jar'. Such a secondary cognition would have to cognise the relation of what is related to (qualified by) inherenceness and hence can follow only a primary cognition having inherenceness as its qualifier.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains the position of these who deny that when a relational complex is cognised, the relation between the qualificandum and the qualifier, is also cognised as an object. Their argument is that in order to cognise a relation like inherence in a secondary cognition it is necessary to cognise inherence under the mode of inherenceness in the primary cognition. But when we cognise a jar our cognition has the jar as its qualificandum and jariness as the qualifier and inherence as the relation between them. Thus in such a cognition only the jar, the qualificandum, is cognised under the mode of jariness which is the qualifier and is not cognised, in its turn, under another mode as jariness is a universal not referred to by any word and hence is cognised in and through itself. So also the relation between the jar and its mode the jariness is cognised under no mode. Yet to be able to have a secondary cognition of the form 'I cognise inherence' it is necessary to cognise inherence under a mode, inherenceness, in the

primary cognition. But as this is not the case inference cannot have objectivity of the primary cognition of the jar.

The point here is that in order to determine whether an element in the relational complex functions as an object in the cognition the only direct method is introspective evidence of the primary cognition. If in introspection we find that we have cognised the relation as an object, only then can we say that the relation has objectivity of the primary cognition. Besides this direct evidence, there are other arguments based on sure facts about cognition which may be given to prove a theory about objectivity.

12.11. *Objections*

Text: Atha viśiṣṭa-buddheḥ saṃsargā-navagāhitve bādha-buddhi-pratibandhakatāyāḥ saṃsarga-viśeṣa-niyantritatvā-sambhavāt kapāla-dharmika-saṃyogādi-sambandhā-’vacchinna-pratīyogitāka-ghaṭādy-abhāva-vattā-niścayasya samāna-dharmitā-’vacchedakakaṃ kiñcid eva ghaṭādi-prakāraṃ jñānaṃ pratibadhyāṃ na tu sarvaṃ ity anubhava-vyākopaḥ.

Translation: Then in case a relation is not cognised in a qualified cognition, it becomes impossible to regulate, by means of a relation, the preventer-ness of cognition of a contradiction. The certain cognition of the negation of a jar, the counterpositiveness of which is limited by the relation of contact with regard to the pot-halves as its locus, can block a cognition with the jar as its qualifier and having the limiter of the some property-possesser-ness, but not all cognitions. This theory thus contradicts this experience.

Explanation: Here the opponents of the theory that relations do not have objectivity of qualified cognitions give the following argument based upon the preventer-prevented relations among cognitions. In logic and epistemology Navya-Nyaya uses extensively various facts, generalised into laws, about certain cognitions blocking certain other cognitions. This blocking of cognitions by cognitions may be based upon the nature of the object cognised or may be independent of the objects. Navya-Nyaya builds its epistemological and logical theories mainly on the first type of blocking. Now it is a rule of Navya-Nyaya that a cognition of the form ‘*a* as *b*-possessing’ is blocked by a cognition of the form ‘*a* as negation-of-*b*-possessing’. Yet the ‘— possessing’ in ‘*b*-possessing’ involves necessarily a relation, and this

relation has to be built into the blocking cognition as the limiting relation of the counter-positiveness resident in *b* in 'negation-of-*b*-possessing'. To talk of 'absence of *b*', it is necessary to specify what it is for *b* to be present, i.e. to specify the relation in which *b* will occur in a locus. By varying these relations which limit the counterpositiveness resident in the counterpositive of a negation, different negations are obtained. Thus if a jar is present on the ground, it is present there, say, by the relation of contact. Now to say that the jar is absent, one has to refer to this relation of contact. Otherwise, even though a jar be present on the ground, one may still say truly that the jar is not present in the sense in which a jar is present in its halves. The relation of the jar to its halves is inherence, and the jar does not inhere in the ground, so even when one cognises that the jar is on the ground, one may also cognise truly that the jar is not on the ground if relations are omitted from the consideration.

The cognition 'the jar is present on the ground' will prevent or block the cognition 'the jar is not on the ground' if and only if being present on the ground in 'being not present on the ground' is by the same relation in which the jar was cognised to be present on the ground in the first cognition. Thus if relations are not cognised in qualified cognition, then a cognition of a relational complex cannot block the cognition of the contradictory relational complex.

12.111. *Refutation and Criticism of Refutation*

Text: Na ca bādha-buddhi-pratibandhakatāyāḥ sambandha-viśeṣa-nīyantritvatvānuordhena tat-pratibadhya-sa-dharmitāvacchedaka-buddheḥ sambandhāvagāhitva-siddhāvapi nirdharmitāvacchedaka-buddhes tathātvam niryuktikam iti vācyam. Nirdharmitā-
'vacchedaka-viśiṣṭa-buddher api grāhya-dharmikāvr̥ttitva-jñāna-pratibadhyatayā avr̥ttitva-jñāna-pratibandhakatāyāḥ sambandha-viśeṣa-nīyantritvatvānuordhena tatrā 'pi sambandhāvagāhitvasyā
'vaśyakatvāt. Evaṃ pramātva-bhramatvayoḥ sambandha-viśeṣa-nīyantritvatvānuordhenā 'pi sakala-viśiṣṭa-buddhīnāṃ sambandhāvagāhitvam āvaśyakam. tayos tathātvānupagame kapāla-
viśeṣyakam ghaṭādi-prakāraḥ kiñcid eva jñānam pramā, tathā-vidhañ ca kiñcid eva jñānam bhrama iti pratītir na syāt, api tu kapālādeḥ samavāyena ghaṭādi-mattayā tathā-vidham sakalam

eva jñānaṃ pramā syāt, saṃyogādi-sambandhāvachchinna-ghaṭādy-
abhāva-vattayā ca tathā-vidhaṃ sakalam eva jñānaṃ bhramaḥ
syāt iti cen na.

Translation: It cannot be said that — even if being a preventer of contradictory cognition is regulated by relations relevant to particular cases, hence in the case of prevented cognitions with limitors of substratumness relations are cognised (in the primary cognitions), still in the case of cognitions without such limitors, this does not hold. For, even cognitions without limitors of substratumness are prevented by cognitions of non-residence in the cognised substratum, hence the preventer-ness of the cognition of non-residence has to be regulated by relevant relations; so even in such cases the cognition of relations has to be postulated. So also being true or false cognition is regulated by relevant relations; and hence all qualified cognitions must cognise relations. If being a true cognition or being a false cognition be not regulated by relevant relations, then one would not cognise some cognition with the pot-helves as the qualificandum and the pot as the qualifier to be a true cognition, and some cognition as false; all cognitions of pot-possessingness of the pot-helves by inference would be true, and all cognitions under the mode of absence of pots by the relation of contact will be automatically false.

Explanation: Now the opponents of the theory that relevant relations have to be cognised in qualified cognitions, argue in the following way. It is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of qualified cognitions.

(A) In one type of cognition like the cognition 'the jar is blue' we have the following elements:

- (i) the qualificandum of the cognition is the jar
- (ii) the limitor of the qualificandumness is jar-ness
- (iii) the qualifier is the blue colour
- (iv) the limitor of the qualifier-ness is blue-ness
- (v) the cognised relation, i.e. the qualification, is inference
- (vi) the limiting relation of the qualifier-ness is inference, which is the same as (v) above.

The relation cognised is always the limiting relation of the qualifici-ness resident in the qualifier of the qualified cognition. In simple language the

relation cognised, even though it is *between* the qualifier and the qualificandum, is still to be taken as falling on the side of the qualifier and not on the side of qualificandum.

- (B) In the other type of cognition like
(a) 'the jar' or (b) 'jar-ness-possessing',

we have the following elements:

- (a)
(i) the qualificandum of the cognition — the jar
(ii) the limiter of the qualificandum-ness — nil
(iii) the qualifier — jar-ness
(iv) the limiter of qualificierness — nil
(v) the qualification — inherence.
(b)
(i) the qualificandum — any jar
(ii) the limiter of qualificandumness — nil
(iii) the qualifier — jar-ness
(iv) the limiter of qualificierness — nil
(v) the qualification — inherence.

These two instances of qualified cognitions are, in a sense, degenerate, for there is no limiter of qualificandum-ness over and above the qualifier. In a qualified cognition there must be a qualificandum, a qualifier, and a relation between the two. So in (a) jar-ness has to be regarded as the qualifier. In this case the qualificandum is not a substratum of any further property for jar-ness is simply the mode under which the qualificandum is cognised. So this type of degenerate cognition is called cognition without limiter of substratumness, to mean that in such cognition nothing has been predicated of the qualificandum, only the qualificandum has been cognised under a mode which has become its qualifier.

In contemporary symbolic logic a similar case will be of existential proposition like 'horses exist'. Here there is no predicate for existence is not a predicate and goes into the qualifier thus:

- (c) $(\exists x) (Hx)$

This is different from ordinary particular propositions like 'Horses are gentle' which is symbolised as

$$(d) \quad (\exists x) (Hx \cdot Gx)$$

where there are subject and predicate.

(b) For a degenerate qualified cognition which has a qualifier which functions as the mode of cognition under which alone the qualificandumness is cognised, a corresponding example in symbolic logic will be propositions having 'everything' or 'all' like 'everything is finite' which is symbolised thus:

$$(e) \quad (x) (Fx)$$

where there is no subject and contrasts with the usual A propositions which are symbolised thus:

$$(f) \quad (x) (Gx \supset Fx)$$

where the subject term of the English sentence has become the antecedent and the predicate the consequent in the symbolisation, (b) therefore does not have any limiter of qualificandumness, for the qualificandum is cognised only under qualifier which is its only mode.

In (A), the qualificandum cognised under a mode is related to a qualifier which again is cognised under its own mode. This is the usual type of qualified cognition.

Now the argument of the opponents is that in cases like (B, (a), (b)) where there is no limiter of substratumness — because nothing has been predicated of the qualificandum, except the mode under which it is cognised, — no relation need be cognised as an object. For only when a qualificandum cognised under a mode has some other property as its qualifier, it is a substratum. If it is not a substratum, nothing has been predicated of it, and hence no relation between it and the qualifier (the predicate) can be cognised. Thus in such cases of qualified cognitions, no relation can be cognised, even if it be granted that in cases like (A), relations are cognised.

But this argument of the opponent is invalid for even qualified cognitions of the degenerate type are still prevented by cognition of a certain sort, thus: in the case (a) the cognition 'the jar' will be prevented by the cognition that jar-ness does not reside in it. Thus this cognition of non-residence will prevent both the cognitions (B, (a), (b)). Now it is a rule that the preventer-prevented relation cannot obtain between two cognitions without relations

being cognised in them, so even in these degenerated cases of qualified cognition relations are cognised.

Moreover a true cognition as well as the false cognition is necessarily regulated by relevant relations. For a cognition of a single isolated object without any relation to any qualifier must be a cognition which cannot be stated in a language. The approximate expressions would be 'this' or 'something'. Now such an indeterminate cognition cannot be regarded as either true or false. A true cognition is true because, and only because, it cognises a qualificandum as related to a qualifier by a relevant relation which corresponds to the factual situation. So also with a false cognition.

Thus all qualified cognitions, in order to be true or false, must cognise relations between the qualificandum and the qualifier. If this be not admitted then it cannot be explained why only some cognitions with the pot-halves as their qualificandum, the pot as their qualifier and inherence as qualification, are true, while others are false. If a qualified cognition did not cognise the relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum, then if it is true once, it will be always true; for a qualified cognition which is true in one case, can be false only in the case where the relevant relation does not hold. But if the cognition cannot take note of the difference between these two types of cases — by failing to cognise the relation — then it will be true always. So also is the case with false cognitions.

12.112. *Refutation of the Reply, Criticism of the Refutation and its Reply*

Text: Viśiṣṭa-buddheḥ sambandha-viśayakatvānabhyupagame 'pi
tatasthena samsargeṇa samaṃ prakāratāyā avacchedyāvacchedaka-
bhavōpagamāt, bādha-buddhi-pratibadhyatāvacchedakasya
pramāṭva-bhramatvayoś ca sambandha-viśeṣāvacchinna-prakārata-
ghatitatvād uktānupapatti-vāraṇa-sambhavāt. Na ca prakāratā-
nirūpita-sāmsargika-viśayataśrayatvam eva samsargasya prakāratā-
vacchedaka-tvam anyasya durvacatvād iti samsargasya viśiṣṭa-dhī-
viśayatva-siddhir-niṣpratyūhai veti vācyam. Pratiyogitvādi-nirūpitāyā
iva prakāratā-nirūpitāyā api samsarga-niṣṭhāvacchedakatāyāḥ
svarūpa-sambandha-rūpatvāt padārthā-ntara-rūpatvād vā viśayatā-
viśeṣātmakatve 'pi tad-rūpatāyās tulyatvāt tasyā viśayatātvasya
niryuktikatvāt. Tādṛśāvacchedakatā-viśeṣa eva ca samsargatā-
padārthaḥ, na tu viśayatā-viśeṣaḥ.

Translation: Even if qualified cognitions do not have relations as objects, still relations, though not objects of qualified cognitions, and qualierness may be related by the limitor-limited relation. It is then possible to avoid the difficulty of explaining truth and falsity, and the limitor of preventedness by contradictory cognition, in terms of the qualierness limited by appropriate relations.

It cannot also be said that – ‘relations being the limitor of the qualierness’ simply means their being the locus of relational objectivity determined by qualierness, any other definition being difficult to state. Hence objecthood of relations in qualified cognitions is conclusively established.

For, the limitorness resident in relations and determined by qualierness has either the property of being a self-linking relation or of being an independent reality, like the limitorness determined by counterpositiveness. By admitting objecthood of a special kind of this limitorness does not make any difference; moreover the postulation of the objecthood is wholly unjustified. Functioning as a relation in a qualified cognition is just being such a limitor, and not a special kind of objecthood.

Explanation: The usual Navya-Nyaya theory which Gadādhara accepts is that the three elements of a relational structure, a, R, b , are all objects of the qualified cognition of $a-R-b$. The position of the opponents is that there is no reason to ascribe objectivity to the relation, R . The difficulties which are alleged to be involved in this position are not insoluble. It is enough to admit that a relation standing between the qualifier and the qualificandum which are objects of the qualified cognition, can yet be the limitor of qualierness of the cognition. If this is admitted there is no difficulty in explaining how the cognition of a contradictory proposition is prevented by the cognition of the proposition itself. For the rule of prevention or blocking of one cognition by another is this:

Rule of prevention: A cognition having qualifier-ness limited by a relation, is prevented by a cognition of the negation the counterpositiveness of which is limited by that relation.

This may be explained as follows:

. If we have the cognition ‘jar-possessing is the ground’ where the jar is the qualifier and contact is the limiting-relation of a qualifier-ness, the cognition which will be prevented by this cognition is that the jar is not in contact with the ground. If we change the relation which is the limiting-relation of the counterpositive-ness then the relation of preventor-prevented

will not operate. What is necessary here is to identify the relation limiting the qualifier-ness of the affirmative cognition with the limiting-relation of the counter-positiveness in the negative cognition. Thus even to state the laws of prevention of one cognition by another it is necessary to hold that relations of qualified cognitions are limitors of qualifier-ness (in affirmative cognition) and of counterpositive-ness (in negative cognition). Now the question is whether we can say that a relation cognised in a qualified cognition can be a limitor of the qualifier-ness which is one form of objectivity, without itself possessing objectivity. The relation will be cognised and yet be not an object of the cognition. The answer to this question will depend upon the way in which the concept of a limiting relation is understood. Usually the cognised relation is conceived as limiting the qualifier-ness of a qualified cognition. This property of the cognised relation may be identified with relational objectivity determined by quali-fier-ness. Thus there are two properties of the cognised relation —

- (i) being the limitor of quali-fier-ness —
- (ii) having relational objectivity determined by quali-fier-ness.

Thus when one cognises 'a-possessing is b by R ' ($b-R-a$), then it is R which determines the qualifier of the cognition. In Navya-Nyaya technical language R is the limiting relation of the quali-fier-ness. Now what is this property of being the limitor of quali-fier-ness? It may be said that R is the limitor of quali-fier-ness, because and only because, R has objectivity determined by quali-fier-ness. The R is uniquely described by stating that it is that relation which has b as its second term *in this cognition*. That is, R limits the quali-fier-ness of b , because and only because its objectivity is determined by quali-fier-ness resident in b . And hence it is simpler to identify (i) and (ii).

Now the opponents argue that it is not necessary to define limitorness of quali-fier-ness in this way. It may be that the limitorness which is resident in the cognised relation and which is determined by quali-fier-ness is not objectivity of the qualified cognition, but is a self-linking relation, or an independent ontological reality. Even if objecthood of cognised relations is admitted then the same question about objecthood may be asked — Is it a self-linking relation or an independent reality?

Thus to be cognised as a relation in a qualified cognition is not to be

its object, but is to have limitorness determined by qualiifierness which is a kind of objectivity of the qualified cognition.

12.12. *Further Objections to the Theory: Objections to Objections, and Their Reply*

Text: Atha saṃsargasya viśiṣṭa-buddhy-aviśayatve tat-saṃsargaka-jñānāt tad-viśiṣṭa-buddhi-tad-upanīta-bhānā'nudaya-prasaṅgaḥ. Na ca tatas taylor utpādayā'nubhakitvābhāvād iṣṭāpattiḥ tathāsaṭi svarūpato manastvādi-viśiṣṭa-vācaka-maṇaḥ-padādyadhīna-śābda-bodhānupapatteḥ, tathāhi maṇaḥ-padāt svarūpato manastva-prakārika-śābda-dhir bhaviṣyati, tatra ca svarūpatas tat-prakāraka-śakti-jñāna-padārthōpasthity-ādiḥ kāraṇaṃ, jātivādinā tat-prakāraka-śakti-jñānādito jātivādināivā tat-prakāraka-śābda-bodhōdayāt, anyathā kadācit jātivādinā tat-prakārakaḥ kadācit svarūpatas tat-prakārakaḥ śābda-bodha utpadyate ityatra niyāmakā-'bhāva-prasaṅgāt. Svarūpatas tat-prakāraka-śakti-jñāna-padārthōpasthity-ādikā ca svarūpatas tad-viśayaka-jñānaṃ vinā na sambhavati, svarūpatas tad-viśiṣṭa-buddhau svarūpatas tad-viśayaka-jñānasya hetutvāt. Svarūpato manastvādi-viśayakaṇca nirvikalpaka-jñānaṃ na sambhavati, atīndriyasya nirvikalpaka 'vedyatvāt, nirvikalpakasya laukikatva-niyamāt.⁴ Svarūpatas tat-prakāraka-jñānasyāpekṣaṇe ca tatrāpi tādrś-jñānasyā-'pekṣaṇīyatayā anavasthā-prasaṅgaḥ, asman-mate ca svarūpataḥ saṃsarga-vidhayā kiñccij-jñāne manastvādi-bhānaṃ svīkr̥tya tanmūlakāt svarūpatas tat-prakāraka-śaktyādi-jñānāt tathā-vidha-śābda-dhiya upapattiḥ. Na caivaṃ svarūpato nikhila-jāti-saṃsargaka-jñānāt svarūpato nikhila-jāti-prakāraka-jñāna-sambhavena sarva-jñāpattir iti vācyam. Phala-balād kasyacid eva padārthasya kadācit saṃsarga-vidhayā bhānopagamena svarūpataḥ saṃsarga-vidhayā nikhila-jāti-bhānasya kadāpyanabhyupagamāt iti cen na.

Translation: Now, then if relations be not regarded as objects of qualified cognitions, then it would follow that from a cognition of that relation of that a qualified cognition of that and also associational cognition of that could not arise.

It cannot be said that this is no objection really because it can be admitted

that neither such a qualified cognition nor such an associational cognition is introspectively felt as arising from such a cognition.

For, if this were the case then there will be the following difficulty.

The word 'manas' which means that which is qualified by *manastva* would not produce the corresponding verbal cognition. For, then, the word 'manas' would produce the verbal cognition with *manastva* in itself as the qualifier as the cause of such a cognition is cognition which is of power (of the word to mean) and which has that in itself as its qualifier, and memory of the meant, etc. If the cognition of the power (of the word) had as its qualifier, *manastva* under the mode of being a universal, then the resulting verbal cognition would have *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier. If this causal relation (between the form of the cognition of the power and the resulting verbal cognition) be not admitted then sometimes a verbal cognition having *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier, and sometimes a verbal cognition with *manastva* in itself as the qualifier will result from the word, and hence there will be no regularity. Cognition of the power with that in itself as its qualifier, as also the memory cognition with that in itself as the qualifier of the meaning of the word, is not possible without a prior cognition with that in itself as its object. For the cause of a qualified cognition with that in itself as its qualifier is a cognition having that in itself as its object. Indeterminate cognition, too, having *manastva* in itself as its object, is not possible, for a supersensible real cannot be cognised in indeterminate cognition, the rule being an indeterminate cognition can have only ordinariness. If a cognition having that in itself as its qualifier be needed then, that, too, will need such a cognition, and hence an infinite regress will follow. On our theory, however, it may very well be admitted that *manastva* in itself can be cognised as a relation in some cognition, and on this basis from the cognition of power with that in itself as its qualifier, will result a verbal cognition of that form.

It cannot also be said that from a cognition in this way of all universals as a relation there may be a cognition having all universals as its qualifier, resulting in omniscience.

For by admitting on the strength of facts, the possibility of a cognition in which a real entity is cognised as a relation, one is not forced to admit a cognition in which all universals in themselves are cognised as its qualifier — which is contrary to all experience.

Explanation: Now Gadādhara explains the position of some Navya-Nyaya

philosophers who argue that relations are objects of qualified cognitions. Their argument is in two parts which we shall now explain.

Part I

In this part they try to show that a cognition of a relation to some object would not be able to produce a qualified cognition of that object or an associational cognition of that object.

Now it may be argued that this difficulty is no difficulty for no introspective evidence corroborating this causal connection between cognitions of these forms is available and hence this is a desirable consequence rather than a difficulty.

But this cannot be regarded as a desirable consequence for the following reasons:

(i) The word 'manas' means something having *manastva* which is not under any further mode. Anyone who knows this meaning of the word would have the corresponding verbal cognition. In order to explain how one gets the cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier from hearing the word 'manas' one has to rely on a causal law.

(a) One must know the meaning of the word 'manas', this 'knowing the meaning' means here that by hearing the word, one would get the cognition of *manastva* in itself as the qualifier. (b) One must also remember the meant object.

Now where (a) one knows that the word 'manas' means something possessing *manastva*, but under the mode of being a universal and (b) remembers this meaning, one will have, by hearing the word 'manas', a cognition with *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier.

If this causal relation between the cognition of the meaning of the word, and the cognition which results from hearing this word, be not admitted, then one would have to admit that by hearing the same word 'manas', sometimes a cognition with *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier, and sometimes a cognition with *manastva* without any mode as its qualifier would result. If, however, this causal relation is admitted, then the form of the resulting verbal cognition will depend upon how one has known the meaning of the word.

Now, one can cognise the meaning of 'manas' as something possessing *manastva* in itself as the qualifier of the cognition if one has the *prior*

nonverbal cognition of *manastva* in itself as its object. For if one does not already have a cognition of something as its object one cannot have a cognition with that thing as its qualifier. A qualified cognition in which something is cognised under no mode requires as its cause a prior cognition of that something also not under nay mode (not necessarily as the qualifier). When one cognises something as a jar, one has a cognition with jarness in itself as the qualifier. In order to have this cognition one must have a prior indeterminate cognition of jarness; although it will not be a qualifier in this cognition – an indeterminate cognition has no qualifier, no qualificandum either.

Now although jarness in itself, under no mode, can be cognised in indeterminate cognition, *manastva* cannot be cognised in such a way. For, according to Nyaya, *manas* is of atomic size, and therefore cannot be an object of ordinary perception; and hence the universal of *manas*, *manastva*, too, cannot be an object of ordinary perception. Now Nyaya holds that only an object of ordinary perception can be an object of indeterminate perception. No supersensible object can be ever perceived in indeterminate perception. So one cannot perceive *manasiva* in itself as one perceives jarness in itself.

If, for a cognition of something in itself as its qualifier, another such cognition is necessary then there will be an infinite regress. This means that a qualified cognition with something-in-itself as its qualifier cannot require another such qualified cognition as its ultimate cause. This regress of causal cognitions, the succeeding ones being caused by preceding ones, stops when one reaches an indeterminate perception of something in itself which will then function as the qualifier in succeeding qualified cognitions. But as we have already seen that, according to Nyaya, such indeterminate perception of *manastva* is impossible so the problem remains how to explain the possibility of a qualified verbal cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier.

Part II

On the basis of these arguments these Navya-Nyaya philosophers postulate that relations are objects of qualified cognitions. For, then, *manastva* can, in itself be cognised as a relation in some qualified cognition. This cognition of *manastva* as an object will explain the possibility of a later qualified cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. Thus relations have to be regarded as objects of qualified cognitions.

It may be objected here that if *manastva* in itself can be cognised as a relation in some cognition, and then this cognition of *manastva* in itself can produce a qualified cognition, here in the present example, a verbal cognition, with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, then one may as well argue that all universals, and not merely *manastva*, can be cognised in themselves as relation in some cognition which will then produce a qualified cognition with all universals in themselves as its qualifier. This will mean omniscience. For to have a qualified cognition with all universals in themselves as its qualifier will necessarily have all reals as instances of these universals for the qualificandum of this cognition. Thus this cognition will be the cognition of all reals which are instances of universals and will amount to omniscience.

The reply to this objection is that the cognition of a universal in itself as a relation is to be postulated only when it becomes necessary to explain facts. As omniscience is not a fact, i.e. as a cognition with all universals in themselves as its qualifier is never experienced, there is no reason to postulate a cognition of all universals in themselves as a relation in some cognition.

12.121. *Reply to Objections, Objections to Reply, and Their Reply*

Text: Tat-saṃsargaka-jñānasya tad-viśiṣṭa-buddhyādy-ajanakatve 'pi svarūpato manastva-prakāra-smaraṇa- mūlaka-tathā-vidha-śaktyādi-jñānāt tathā-vidha-śābda-bodha-nirvāhāt. Na ca svarūpatas tat-prakāra-smaraṇe svarūpatas tat-prakāra-kānubhavyā-pekṣitatayā tad-asambhavana tad-asambhava iti vācyaṃ. Bhavāntara-prabhavānubhavāhita-saṃskārā eva tathāvidha-smaraṇōpapatteḥ. Na ca janmāntariya-tathānubhave 'pi paryanuyoga-tādavasthyam, tatra tat-prāktana-janma-jāta-tathā-vidhānubhavāhita-saṃskāra-mūlaka-smaraṇasya gatitvāt, janma-pravāhasyānāditayā tādṛśānavasthāyā akiñcit-karatvāt.

Translation: Even if a cognition with that as a relation does not produce a cognition with that as its qualifier, still a memory cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier can produce a cognition of power of that form. Hence the possibility of a verbal cognition of that form can be explained.

It cannot be said that, for a memory cognition with that in itself as its qualifier, an experience with that in itself as its qualifier is necessary; and as this is impossible, that, too, is impossible.

For, the possibility of that kind of memory cognition is due to memory impression of experience transmitted from a previous birth.

It cannot be also said that even in the case of experience of that form in a previous birth, the situation in that birth would be the same.

For, it is possible to hold that even in that birth memory impressions are transmitted from a still previous birth; the series of births having no beginning, the infinite regress in this case has little value.

Explanation: The theory that cognition of something as a relation produces cognition of that something as a qualifier is not necessary. For even without such a theory one can explain the possibility of a verbal cognition having *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. For one can hold that there can be a memory-cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. And this memory-cognition lies at the root of the cognition of the meaning of the word 'manas'. From this cognition of the meaning one can come to have a verbal cognition of that form.

Now it may be argued against this theory that in order to have a memory-cognition with *manastva* in itself one must have a prior experience with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. But as we have already seen that it is not possible to have an informative cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, a recollective cognition of this form is impossible.

The answer to this objection is that even though there may not be any impression of an informative cognition of this form in this life, still such a memory cognition in this life is possible by impressions left in the self in a previous birth.

It may be objected here that this postulation of impressions which one may acquire in a previous life as the causes of memory-cognition in this life does not really solve the difficulty. For the question now is how one could have received such impressions in a previous life. For in that life, too, an informative cognition of this form is impossible and hence in that life, too, no one could have such memory impressions.

The reply to this objection is to be found in the Navya-Nyaya theory that the series of previous lives does not have a beginning. Hence it is possible to argue always that such memory-impressions in a previous life would produce an informative cognition in the next life.

This infinite regress of previous lives does not create any serious logical difficulty as it is supposed to be a fact.

12.122. *An Alternative Answer*

Text: Athavā jāitvādinā manastva-prakārakaitad-bhavīyānubhava-prabhava-saṃskārād eva svarūpatas tat-prakāraka-smaraṇam utpadyate, sāmānyatas tat-prakāraka-smaraṇe tat-prakāratvenaiva jñāna-saṃskārayoh kāraṇatvāt svarūpatas tat-prakāraka smṛtau svarūpatas tatprakāratvena taylor hetutāyā aprāmāṇikatvāt.

Translation: Or, a memory cognition having that in itself as its qualifier can arise from impressions caused by an informative cognition (experience) in this very life which has *manastva* under the mode of universalness as its qualifier. The rule here is that a memory cognition *having that as its qualifier* in general terms is caused by an impression only if both (the memory cognition and experience) have *that as their qualifier*. There is no justification for the theory that a memory cognition with *that in itself as its qualifier* is caused by an impression of a past cognition having *that in itself* as its qualifier.

Explanation: There is also the possibility of an alternative solution. Instead of assuming a beginning-less series of lives of an individual, it is possible to explain the facts. The causal law of impressions and memory cognition which they produce is this:

LAW 1: A memory cognition with something as its qualifier is caused by an impression of that form (i.e. of the same thing as its qualifier).

Now this law simply states that a memory cognition of something as a qualifier requires the prior existence of impressions of the same form. But the theory criticised here requires much more. The law which it invokes is this:

LAW 2: A memory cognition of something as its qualifier *without any mode* is caused by an impression having that something as its qualifier *without any mode*.

But Law 2 is much stronger than Law 1. Law 1 states, in general terms, the causal relation between impressions and memory cognitions produced by them, while Law 2 introduces special features into the causal law. But this law is not corroborated by introspective evidence, or on other grounds. There is no reason to postulate such special causal laws between impressions and memory cognitions.

NOTES

* In editing the text, I have consulted the book,

(A) *Viśayatāvādah*, ed. Pt. Dhundhiraja Sastri, Jaya krishna Das Haṛidas Gupta, Chowkhamba, 1940,

and two incomplete manuscripts in Bengali script, of the Government Sanskrit College Library, Calcutta,

Subject Nyāya

(B) Cat No 388 (10 pages)

(C) Cat No 2625 (5 pages).

I thank Dr Heramba Nath Chatterjee, formerly Principal of the College, for making the manuscripts available to me.

For translation and explanation, my greatest debt is to the late Pandit Madhusūdana Nyāyācārya to whom I owe my understanding of Navya-Nyāya. Pt. Viśvabandhu Tarkatīrtha explained to me many passages which I had found obscure; without his generous assistance this work would have been much worse than it is.

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¹ Annambhatta, *Tarkasamgraha* with the commentaries of *Nyāyabodhinī*, *Nirukti*, *Padadkrtya*, *Dipikārahasya*, *Vākyārthabodhinī* and *Bhāṣāpariccheda* – p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³ *that* = the qualifier of the qualified cognition.

⁴ Reading 'nirvikalpakasya laukikatva-niyamāt' as in B, instead of 'nirvikalpakasyā laukikatva-niyamāt' as in A.

THE MEMORY EYE: AN EXAMINATION OF MEMORY IN TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS

Abbreviations

ChU	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
ĪPVV	Īśvarapratyabhijñānavṛttivimārṣinī, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
N	Nīrūkta
TU	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
YS	Yogasūtram

1. INTRODUCTION

Traditional knowledge systems in India were all metaphysical knowledge systems. The world, consisting of both what is (*sat*), or real, and what is not, (*asat*), or unreal, could only be known by a knowledge system that has as its subject both the real and the unreal. This 'unreal', or part of the world that is 'not (here or available to ordinary perception)' become the special subject of metaphysical knowledge systems. The only access to the 'unreal' is through the 'real'.

The *pāṭhaśālā* system of learning in India, the system of learning employed even today in traditional Sanskrit schools, is a method of learning whose techniques are derived from metaphysical knowledge systems. In this paper, the methods of learning are outlined first as a description of the learning process with elaborations to point out the particular techniques involved, their significance, their origins and their diverse application. These techniques are correlated with literary evidence from original texts. Then, through quotations from exponents of western tradition, an attempt is made to show the familiarity of these.

The traditional study of grammar is presented as a model since the different stages and techniques are clear and the area accessible. The stages can be applied to other disciplines as well and were, indeed, separated out and pursued with isolation in the yogic texts. Detailed reference is consistently made to the *Yogasūtram* where these techniques are applied in different environments.

Aside from this general direction of the paper, a rather different light is

shed on the term samadhi, which according to the author of the commentary on the *Yogasūtram* is, indeed, the very essence of yoga. A meaningful explanation of some sutras follows from that. The most important implication of this paper is in the elimination of the division of the sacred and profane, so much a part of western religious studies concepts. Thus there is the possibility of a new perception into the 'sacred' realm of mystical states and so on from a 'functional' rather than an 'eliminative' or negative apparatus of definition; specifically, the memory function.

2. THE WAY OF KNOWLEDGE

Traditionally, in the *darśana* (literally 'seeing') metaphysical knowledge systems, the *karma mārga* (the way of action) and the *jñāna mārga* (the way of knowledge) have formed two basic contrasting poles. As *jñāna* (knowledge) and *karma* (action here meaning ritual) the absolute distinction is not clear, but when they are contrasted by Śankara's terms, *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* which give the idea of action or movement and the opposite or absence of that, then the absolute distinction becomes clear. There are offshoots and transformations in these ideas, especially in the *bhakti* development, but these two ideas have been made into a polarity from Śankara onward, at least. Śankara required that they be almost mutually exclusive.

The traditional practise of the *karma mārga* still exists. A brahmin boy, having the appropriate ceremonies performed, learns the vedas by rote, maintains his own daily rituals and performs the office of *purohit* (ritual official) and so on at various ritual occasions. Essentially, he lives out a life of ritual.

But what exactly is the path of the *jñāni*, the one who follows the path of knowledge? There is a body of *śāstras* that deal with various subjects ranging from the outside world to ultimate entities and our means of knowing them. There is the striking image that the *jñāni* is one whose mind has become hard and clear like a magnifying glass through which the sun shines through and burns away grass and such; his sun being the light of the self which shines through the mind which has become hard and clear like a jewel through knowledge burning away ignorance. The *jñāni* is traditionally the ascetic, one who has renounced action and follows the path of non-action, the *nivṛtti mārga*.

But the ascetical discipline is perhaps, more than an end, only part of a

long path. Further, there are some contradictions there. *Saṅḥyāsa* or the acceptance of ascetical vows, the renunciation of the world, is a ritual act, part of *karma*. The ascetic community in India also presents a striking contrast. At the top are orthodox ascetics of groups like the advaita Śankarācāryas, seemingly far away from the path of non-action. On the other hand, the beggar ascetics seem far away from any connection with knowledge.

This paper is an attempt to examine the path of knowledge, or perhaps only one aspect of it, from the actual practise of it – that is, from the process of learning. The particular emphasis of the traditional Indian techniques of learning will become clear. The learning process is presented here as a memory discipline. After examining the process of learning it will be related to concepts in the *Yogasūtram* and other traditional material to show the correspondence between theory and practise.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL LEARNING SYSTEM IN RESPECT OF GRAMMAR

A brahmin boy ideally begins to study parts of the vedas needed for ritual ceremonies at the age of six or eight. This means that he begins to memorize them. At the same time, he studies the *aṅgas* (subsidiary texts) of the vedas amongst which are included the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the treatise on grammar. He does not learn the meaning. The meaning would in fact hinder his capacity to memorize.¹ Raw memorization is the basic component whether it is the vedas or philosophical literature.

After that, in the field of grammar, the student would enter the *Pāṭhaśālā* (traditional Sanskrit school) and read through the *Siddhānta kaumudī*, the treatise where the application of the grammatical rules is taught. Here the attempt to *apply* the sutras begins, the attempt to *operate* in a cause-effect order what he has learned by rote in a sequential order. This stage also involves a considerable amount of rote memorization. Often the students simply memorize the *ṽrtti* or commentary on the text where application is explained and the derivations carried out. However, operational application procedure and logical determination of the *ṽrtti* is taught at this stage. As he reads further commentaries, the application procedure is polished and different sorts of questions are considered. Since he has already memorized the rules and the basic accompanying material, he is developing

a skill for analytic application through working out the *vytti*. Through the actual logical application of these rules, he is mechanically *revealing* the knowledge that he already has inside him through previous rote memorization. Proper *śāstric* teaching is a process of bringing out this knowledge through skilled and consistent application of questioning around the process of derivation. It is not direct teaching or flat statement of fact. Factual empirically verifiable knowledge is taught through a technique of revelation. The knowledge content is objective and logical. Practically speaking, when the sought knowledge item does not come to mind, the student does not grope around for it but makes his mind still and the desired item come of itself. This technique has already been used when he was practising rote memorization. In order to remember, absence of thought, that is, 'emptiness' of mind is the most reliable stimulant. Learning a *śāstra* completely, like the memorization of a veda, traditionally takes twelve years and involves working thorough detail after detail of the texts and commentaries.

4. THE THIRD STAGE OF LEARNING

Now, beyond this analytical application and development of memory — note that memory is becoming a means of investigation already, a principle of learning — there is a further development, an integration of the previous control over details into a view of the whole in which all the details lie in place. It is a stage where the student acquires the capacity to reflect, to philosophize on the system of grammar itself. In *śāstric* teaching, there is an absolute concentration on detail so that the student often knows all the sequences and details of an argument without knowing their real significance. The tendency towards any form of speculation that would lead to that is highly discouraged so that its advent is a threshold. This clearly distinguishes the Indian aural mnemonics from the ancient Grecian systems which were visual and used extraordinary inputs of imagination. Now the memory turns towards synthesis, developing a capacity to let things reveal themselves in their whole integrated structure which may even transcend the original rote memory content and the analytical content limitation and become a comment on or criticism of that. That is, a perception of the whole, of unity in the midst of detail. Already the student has become familiar with the process involved from stilling his mind until a desired item comes into his mind from memory. Now the synthetic function allows his knowledge to

become generative, like a second language when learned past the constituents and the structures becomes a way of viewing the world, a way of composing thought, so too the memory function becomes a means of direct perception. Thought, produced through this synthetic function, which is memory and something beyond that as well, assumes the reliability that perception does. Ordinarily, thought produced from memory would not be valid since memory only reveals our perception and not the actual objects of perception. Perception, of course, simply reveals things as they are. The validity of perceptual knowledge is accepted without question in the *śāstras*; failure to accept it would lead to endless regression.

In the analytical phase of learning, the student was led through a revelatory process developing the capacity to see the significance of what he had learned and directed towards critical application of what he had accumulated by rote. This was done by drawing the knowledge out of him; forcing him to reveal it through questions which he would be able to answer by using what he had already memorized, what was already inside him. Now the process has its own momentum. The capacity or revelatory power of the mind is applicable to other objects and to subjective areas as well since the basic training has been in the deriving of objective detail through subjective powers of the mind until these subjective powers are highly developed. The process of learning is complete having taught how to know. Knowledge it produced spontaneously. Memory is transformed into mind. Memory is perception.

5. THE CONNECTION OF THE ACTUAL LEARNING PROCESS WITH THE PATH OF KNOWLEDGE

Before closer examination of the details of this learning process, two things should be noted here. First of all, by the sustained culture of these learning techniques, habits of mind are learned, perhaps imprinted, which are going to be more significant ultimately than the actual content learned. Secondly, the capacity developed with respect to its object, here grammar, has been linked to perception. Perception is passive. Thinking is active.² Perception is the experience of an external entity as it is, whereas thinking is a product, a creation of the mind whose content is influenced by will and such. Perhaps 'thinking' could be considered the base activity of the mind which, directed and channeled, takes form. Thinking is obviously a surfacing, in some form,

of memory and perception is the only activity of the mind capable of overriding thinking. Most people have had the experience of stillness of the mind in moments of perception that are perhaps moments of heightened awareness. Heightened awareness because the 'thinking process' of the mind does not intervene immediately. In this learning technique, it has been a stillness of the mind which has been the primary stimulus to its activity. This has been so in rote memory learning and in analytical learning and is certainly so in the synthetic aspect. The learning process itself is an illustration of the *nivṛtti mārga*, the path of cessation of action.

6. THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEARNING PROCESS

The metaphysical background for this, the theoretical presupposition that made the systematic exploitation of this technique possible is the vedantic conception — there is only one ultimate entity in all things and that is all that has been and will be and is right within ourselves veiled by *ajñāna*, ignorance. By knowing that, we come to know all things since it is the very being of all things. Knowing that is becoming that alone and the process of knowing consists in removing the covering of ignorance (*ajñāna*) so that brahman shines through of its own accord. It is simply *reminding* (and perceiving) us of what we already know and have forgotten. 'Forgotten' means something like congenitally forgotten since it is not within the range of ordinary perception. This reminiscence is called direct perception, *sākṣātkāra*, and the quality of this perception is such that this single act of perception is sufficient to eliminate all other conceptions about reality that were previously there. This act of seeing is not merely an act of power but a possession of power.³ The aim of Indian philosophical systems is this direct perception.

7. THE TECHNIQUE OF STILLING THE MIND ON VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTS

Let us consider this 'stilling of the mind' even closer. Yoga is defined as *cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*, obstructing the moving of the mind (YS 1.2). The means to achieve this are *abhyāsa* and *vairāgya* (YS 1.12). Essentially that means practise and dispassion. Is not dispassion something similar to this 'stilling'

process that we have been talking about? Dispassion is lack of desire. It differs from stilling by an ethical overlay. Even in the rote memory system, when the desired item does not come, the process is to make the mind as blank as possible, to practise 'dispassion' and the item that is wanted then appears of itself. In the sutra on asanas, the means to that are given as *prayatnaśaithilyānantasamāpattibhyām*. *Prayatnaśaithilya* means 'by the relaxation of the effort'. That implies two things, that effort is made and that the effort is released or slackened. This indicates that an asana is not something that is simply 'done' but something that is accomplished by a particular technique. It is not something achieved by effort alone but comes after effect has ceased and by means of that. This suggests balance. The second part of the sutra, 'by *samāpatti* (samadhi or direct perception) of the infinite' also suggests some kind of balance. A particular position where effort has ceased can only maintain itself by balance. The word 'endless' has 'cosmic' overtones suggesting a harmony or balance with the universe. Already the mechanical slackening of effort is implicate with ethical considerations. Here, the principle of stillness is right in the midst of dynamic physical action.

Northrop Frye takes 'detachment' (dispassion above) to be a basic tenet of modern scientific civilization and brings up ethics again:

'... To achieve anything in the sciences, one needs the virtue of detachment or objectivity. One starts out with a tentative goal in mind, but on the way it must consider evidence impartially and draw only the strict rational conclusions from that evidence. Cooking or manipulating the evidence to make it fit a preconceived idea works against detachment. And though we may say that detachment is an intellectual rather than a moral virtue, it becomes increasingly clear as we go on that such a distinction is without meaning. The persistence in keeping the mind in a state of disciplined sanity, the courage in facing results that may deny or contradict everything that one had hoped to achieve — these are moral qualities, if the phrase means anything at all.

The triumphs of these virtues in modern civilization have naturally, and rightly, given them a high place in our scale of values. They are most clearly displayed in the physical sciences, which are so largely informed by mathematics, but as the social sciences developed, they too felt the powerful pull of detachment, and so they became increasingly behaviouristic, phenomenological, and restricted to what can be observed and described. At present it may be said that the principle, which is also a moral principle, that every discipline must be as scientific as its subject matter will allow it to be, or abandon all claim to be taken seriously, is now established everywhere in scholarship.⁴

The idea of *viśrānti* in Kashmir Śaivism bringing us to the thresholds of realization is an adaptation of this principle in realizing the śaiva *tattvas*

and developed especially in aesthetics: *asau rasanā carvaṇā nirvṛtiḥ pratitih pramāṛtāviśrāntireva* IPVV, vol II, p. 178., (that aesthetic experience, the contemplation, the bliss, the perception is only the *viśrānti*, stillness or cessation of the knower).

8. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE STILLNESS PRINCIPLE

The necessity of going this far in respect of the aesthetic experience is pointed out by Hiriyanṇa:

'This transcendence of the egoistic self in the contemplation of art profoundly alters the nature of the pleasure derived from it. Being altogether divorced from reference to personal interests, one's own or that of other's, art experience is free from all the limitations of common pleasure due to prejudice of everyday life such as narrow attachment and envy. In a word, the contemplation being disinterested, the pleasure which it yields will be absolutely pure.'⁵

Hiriyanṇa supplies the clue to the necessity of the passive principle in other contexts. Knowledge realized on this principle alone is free from the colourings of the mind or the compelling patterns of past knowledge. Ultimately, this is the only way that we can come to know anything beyond ourselves. It is a basic presupposition for any form of realization.

In the aesthetic experience, the stillness comes when the ego-centered emotion (*bhāva*) peaks, the ego relation falls away and the experiencer falls into pure aesthetic experience, an experience of his own self unconditioned by the colourings of the mind. This is similar to a threshold in spiritual disciplines where the aspirant, pursuing some goal, not reaching it, finally decides that he has had enough and because of that rather than the attainment of his end, enters into a further stage of experience. This is referred to in YS 3.50, *tadvairāgyādapi doṣabījakṣaye kaivalyam*. Here 'tad' refers to the distinction between *puruṣa* (spirit) and *prakṛti* (matter) and its concrete results, that is, the insight gained from perceiving such a distinction. *Vairāgya* then means indifference to that. When that happens, the next stage, *kaivalya* (isolation or enlightenment in yogic terms) is immediately reached. The same basic conception lies behind the view of brahman realization. The actual moment of this is glossed over in the explanation of the destruction of *ajñāna* being the nature of realization rather than the acquisition of the knowledge of brahman. If brahman knowledge were produced it would not be eternal. Is it the systematic exploitation of this principle that constitutes the essence of the *nivṛtti marga*?

9. THE STILLNESS PRINCIPLE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF MIND AND BASIC METAPHYSICS

Coleridge describes the nature of the operation of the mind (imagination) as follows:

'Most of my readers will have observed a small water-insect on the surface of rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted shadow fringed with prismatic colours on the sunny bottom of the brook; and will have noticed, how the little animal wins its way up against the stream by alternative pulses of active and passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to gather strength and a momentary *fulcrum* for a further propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of the mind's self-experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other are active and passive; . . . '6

In the samkhya yoga system, the *puruṣa* or passive principle and *prakṛti* the active entity which serves the *puruṣa* in two aspects as *bhoga*, experience and *apavarga*, literally, the transcendence of that, are postulated as basic entities. In advaita there is a complete denial of the reality of the active principle all together in favour of brahman. The active side of things is only a beginningless illusion. Its exploitation is at a preliminary level of understanding only for those whose lower selves are impure.

10. THE CONCEPT OF PERCEPTION IN THE ŚĀSTRAS (SECTION 6)

In the Indian metaphysical knowledge systems such as vedānta, brahman is a tentative goal. This is explicitly expressed under the preliminary discussion of whether the *śāstra* should be begun or not. The argument runs that if brahman is already known then this *śāstra* is unnecessary. If he is not known then it would be useless to begin this *śāstra* to know him (the implication of 'not known' is 'not knowable'). The answer to this query is that brahman is generally known. That means that he is known through the means of ordinary knowledge, here 'word', meaning that we know 'about' him. The purpose of this *śāstra* is to know him specifically, to know brahman which means to experience or perceive him directly. This is not possible as brahman is not a perceptible object. The perception of him is subjective and not amenable to the means of ordinary experience. This direct experience is irrevocable, being of the nature of perception. The *śāstras* lead to this experience and are meaningful only when their propositions are affirmed through the resources of direct perception.

11. EXAMINATION OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

Let us examine closer the reasons for considering this final stage of memory as a form of heightened perception. It has been stated earlier in the paper that perception is a passive act oriented towards the object rather than an act of mind drawing on memory stores. It has also been stated that perception enjoys primary validity amongst the other means of knowledge. YS 3.3 defines samadhi as: *tadevārthamātranirbhāsam svarūpaśūnyamiva samādhiḥ*. Samadhi is where the object alone appears, the mind, devoid as it were of any other content. In the definition, the word '*nirbhāsam*' means something close to 'appears' implying something emanating from the object as opposed to an active understanding that would emanate from the mind. The word '*eva*' and '*mātra*' both mean 'only' and are thus emphatically restrictive. *Svarūpaśūnyam* is taken as referring to the mind; that is, the mind being empty of its contents (content or movement being the nature of the mind), the object is not coloured by the mind, the mind being in an empty or passive state. The word '*iva*' is used because the mind, being of the nature of movement, cannot really ever be empty. Now considering that samadhi has been developed previously in the sutras as a form of heightened perception by which not only the gross form of objects can be perceived but their subtle form and subtle qualities belonging to them such as time, sequence and so on, it is incumbent to accept that while the dynamic samadhi possesses the qualities of perception as noted, still it is a form of heightened perception — both the perceptible and the non-perceptible or unmanifest right up to *prakṛti*, the ultimate form of matter, come under its range. The knowledge that arises from it; *prajñā*, which is also simultaneous with it in the higher stages of samadhi, enjoys the status of perception and takes precedence over knowledge acquired from other sources (YS 1.50). The samadhi knowledge is a particular knowledge, which, as stated earlier, enjoys greater validity (YS 1.49). It is through this greater validity that samadhi leads to *kaivalya* (yogic enlightenment) or *nirbhījasamādhi* (objectless samadhi or samadhi having no further productive potency) described in YS 1.51. Samādhi on some particular thing leads to exact knowledge of it. Exact knowledge of that thing eliminates all the affective associations that have been connected with it or general knowledge about it and the samadhi knowledge, being of the nature of perception, is stronger than other

knowledge. For example, if someone tells you that the world is illusion, still the perception of the reality of the world leaves that knowledge of illusoriness a mere mental construct. The samadhi knowledge, being a perception of the true nature of the world and more valid than the perception of its reality which is now seen to be a mental construct involving memory and surface aspects, then becomes a direct experience of this illusoriness. In this fashion, the samadhi knowledge is applied first to the perceptibles, then to the process of knowing and finally to the perceiver himself (YS 1.17). That is, samadhi is used as an examination and separation of the constituents of every act of knowledge which consists of the object, the act of knowing and the knower and is attested through language describing 'knowing' as 'I know this'. From each of these applications, *saṃskāras*, latent impression or memory items arise which are different from the memory items which have arisen from our previous perception of the same objects. These new memory impressions, based on this heightened perception are stronger and prevent the occasions where previous more or less haphazard memory perceptions would arise. Eventually, the memory content of the mind is rearranged and as the process of samadhi becomes stronger as greater penetration powers are acquired, the *saṃskāras* are eliminated altogether (YS 1.49-51). That means essentially a mind in which the *saṃskāras*, latent impressions or memory content are eliminated in favour of a perceptual process. The word 'vision' is the analogue of the idea of heightened perception in English.

12. EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF YOGA IN THE YS FROM THE ABOVE POINT OF VIEW

Let us return to the sutra giving the definition of yoga mentioned earlier: *yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ*. This defines yoga as the obstruction of the *vṛttis* of the mind. The commentators explain that word '*nirodha*', obstruction, is used instead of *nāśa*, destruction, because the mind, being of the very nature of *vṛtti*, movement, the mind's movement cannot be destroyed without destroying the mind itself and that sort of destruction is not intended in this *śāstra*. For that reason, the word 'obstruction' is used. This argument, though plausible, seems suspicious. *Kaivalya* (yogic enlightenment) has an absoluteness about it that does not quite match the sense of *nirodha*. Another explanation has been put forward:

'According to Frauwallner, Vyāsa under the influence of Vindhyavāsī did not differentiate between the psychological conceptions *manas*, *citta*, and *buddhi* but identified them and to a greater part marked them as *citta*. In contrast to this, Patañjali differentiates them in the sense that *manas* stands in relation to the sense organ as the central organ, *buddhi* stands in relation to the subject as a realized thought. *Citta* is the name for the subjective apparatus with a memory fund which stores the experienced impressions.'

Vācaspati confirms this stating: *cittasabdenāntaḥkaraṇam buddhimupalakṣayati* in YS 1.1, (by the word *citta* here the *antaḥkaraṇam* and the *buddhi* are also referred to). By this, he explains that he differs from Vyāsa without explicitly criticizing him.

If we consider that memory and perception are the two basic activities of the mind as is traditional in the *śāstras*, then it is clear that perception is necessarily drawn upon up to and for the experience of the *puruṣa*. The *nirodha* referred to then would necessarily refer to the memory function of the mind. The restraint is directed to the obstruction connected with the adventitious, perhaps unconscious memory fund because it causes deviate perception. The end of the practise of yoga is the exhaustion of the memory fund. The control of perception in itself is no more than a mechanical act that could be accomplished by a scalpel. It seems, then, that *citta* could only refer to the memory fund and that further reference is not only unnecessary but almost illogical.

Thus within this framework and the unsystematic evidence within the sutras themselves,⁸ the definition of yoga would be more like 'obstruction of the (haphazard) operations connected with the memory function of the mind', this, of course, in favour of samadhi perception eliminating all mixed contents. Here again there is an echo of the term *kaivalya* or isolation. When the samadhi perception is developed fully, the content is greater than memory anyhow because objects can be perceived in all their aspects in their whole time sequence from origin to dissolution. The memory content is the incessant 'chatter' of the mind. The mind cannot have two contents at once; memory is eradicated in favour of perception.

13. THE THIRD STAGE OF LEARNING – THE SYNTHETIC FUNCTION OF THE MIND CONNECTED WITH SAMADHI

Now in regard to the process of thought as a whole there must be some unifying factor which can bring things together. On the surface we can think

of this as memory. Memory has that synthesizing quality needed to explain a continuity of our thought. Alternative to that we have perhaps something like 'imagination' which would be capable of explaining the same. Here, instead of imagination we have samadhi. Samadhi is carefully built up and brought on at will. Imagination is less consecutive, more akin to 'inspiration'. The process of samadhi is a rearranging of the memory store and gradual elimination of that for a process of heightened perception. It has been mentioned that the third function of memory is a synthetic function. The word samadhi itself etymologically comes from *sam ā dhā*. *Sam* has the sense of *samyak*, 'correctly' or *sammuccaya*, 'the collection all together'; *ā* means 'in' or 'on' and *dhā* means something like 'placed upon'. Thus, etymologically, the term samadhi means something like 'placed together on' which has the sense of synthesis.⁹ By this etymology, samadhi could be fitted within the object-knowing-knower complex of *saṃprajñāta* but *nirbīja* (seedless or objectless) again qualifies that in a different way. *Nirbīja* must be taken as a special perception that may be applied anywhere anytime — a subjective perception. Samadhi then corresponds in expression form and idea with the slang designation 'together' and 'not together'.

14. HISTORIC PARALLELS TO THE PERCEPTION CONNECTED WITH THE THIRD STAGE OF LEARNING

There is a historic parallel which practically makes this phenomena into a cultural phenomena documented in cultural history in the terms *śruti* and *smṛti*. N states:

sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayaḥ babhūvuh / te (a)varebhyo (a)sākṣātkṛtadharmasya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ / upadeśāya glāyanto (a)vare bilmagrahāyemaṁ granthaṁ samāmnāṣiṣuḥ

(The *ṛṣis* realized *dharma* directly (that is 'by direct perceptive understanding). They, by instruction passed the mantras on to those who could not realize them directly. These others again, who had even less knowledge, composed treatises to understand them) N 1.20.

Yāska, here, refers to the period in time when the learning of the veda receded from a process of direct insight (*sākṣtkṛta*); a *śruti* method of learning where the mantras are learned directly or understood intuitively to a *smṛti* method where instead of knowing the mantras directly they learn about them. The *śruti* method is a technique emphasized in North American Universities where, in literature, for example, the students are encouraged to speak out on what a

work stands for without the aid of critical material. This is a heritage of the New Criticism school. In European schools, under greater historical influences, there are compendia telling about the author, the work, the time period, the interpretations and so on. This constitutes valid knowledge as opposed to deemed superficial 'insights' into the work. The *smṛti* literature is not what is memorized by rote but the *purāṇas* and so which are compendia about the original *śruti* literature. It is not merely that the veda is *apauruṣeya* (of divine origin) and therefore infallible but simply that *śruti pramāṇa* (authoritative statement based on divine texts) is the recorded direct insight of seers, not merely direct insight but heightened perception or vision, samadhi if you will, and because of that it has authority over the other means of knowledge.

15. THE CONNECTION OF THE PERCEPTION PROCESS WITH MEMORY

There remains at this point one question. Why should this samadhi or 'vision' be called a function of memory? What necessity and what evidence is there for such a consideration? The problem posed here is like that in the Indian syllogism which includes both induction and deduction within the syllogism itself and thus, makes Indian logic something more than a mere classification of what is already known. Deductive logic strengthens inductive logic and with that the possibility of knowing anything more than was already known. The metaphysical knowledge systems effect a peculiar synthesis of memory and perception from the presupposition that memory, in fact, conditions our perception and the elimination of that conditioning is through the purification of memory (YS 1.43). The contents of knowledge in the Indian system were extended to ultimate entities — they were metaphysical knowledge systems and purported to teach all that could be known. St. Augustine, determining to know god states:

'I will pass then beyond this power of my nature (sense organs and reason) also, rising by degrees unto him, who made me. And I come to the fields and spacious palaces of my memory . . . for all those are present within me, heaven, earth, sea . . . wherefore we find, that to learn those things whereof we imbibe not the images by our senses, but perceive within by the senses, without images . . . now seeing that this very memory itself is mind . . . I will pass then beyond memory also. And where shall I find Thee? . . . If I find Thee without my memory, then do I not retain Thee in my memory. And how shall I find Thee if I remember Thee not? Where in the end do we search but in the memory itself?'¹⁰

St. Augustine states that the only possible place for realization to take place is within us through memory. It is with this necessity in mind that the Indian *śāstras* teach a form of understanding or realization that refines itself until capable of penetrating through the mind to ultimate entities or principles. The whole knowledge system is directed towards the discipline of memory.

This sense of memory is not unknown either. In the description of samadhi in the first book of the YS, we have the sutra describing samadhi within the knowledge relation of the knower, the process of knowing and the objects known. After that we have the sutra for samadhi which is outside of knowledge relations. Then we have YS 1.20 *śraddhāvīryasmṛtisamādhiprajñāpūrvaka itareṣāṃ*, stating that the samadhi outside of knowledge relations (*asamprajñāta*) for yogis is preceded by (means accomplished by) faith, energy, memory, samadhi and *prajñā*. It is the term *smṛti*, memory, that interests us here. *Smṛti* has been defined as one of the *vyrttis* (movements of the mind) in YS but it does not seem to be that *smṛti* that is defined that is referred to here. The context here, the terms 'faith' and so on which surround the term make it seem out of place if taken in a mechanistic functional sense as it has been defined earlier in the sutras. If it were taken in that sense, then it should refer to the *smṛti* that arises after samadhi, that is, of the samadhi knowledge. It precedes that here. Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu gloss the term as *dhyāna* (meditation). This shows how easy it was for the commentators to consider that *dhyāna*, meditation, loosely considered, was a memory discipline and how *smṛti*, memory, by the same token was a means of knowledge beyond the mechanistic sense in which it is defined in YS 1.11. If we consider the question further, then to gloss the term *smṛti* here by *dhyāna* seems very odd as Patañjali has given the definition of *dhyāna* in YS 3.2. Would he not have stated that directly if that had not been his intention? The meaning of the term *smṛti* is not really clear in the bounds of the *śāstra* itself (that excludes historical considerations) and the commentators are forced to interpret also. It is possible like the term *citta* which we have mentioned earlier, that the term *smṛti* has both specific and general reference. Vyāsa in YS 4.9 states *te (saṃskārāḥ) ca karmavāsanānūrūpāḥ / yathā ca vāsanāstathāsmṛtiḥ*, (these latent impressions *saṃskāras* correspond to karma and *vāsanās* (deeply rooted impressions that are part of our condition as humans) — as the *vāsanās* so the memory). Here if we consider the tacit *śāstric* definition of memory, *saṃskāramātrajanya*, then this statement is going to refer to a sense of the term *smṛti* somewhat

beyond the scope of the mechanistic definition. On the other hand, Vācaspati on YS 1.7 states that *vivekakhyāti*, perhaps the final form of knowledge that is in essence revelatory, to be considered as a function of memory according to the development put forward here, is to be included under *pratyakṣa* or direct perception *etacca sāksātkāropalakṣaṇaparam / tathā ca vivekakhyātirapi lakṣitā bhavati*, (this (statement about the particular being predominant in perception) is to show that direct perception is also included. Accordingly *vivekakhyāti* is also of the nature of perception).

This exact phenomena, of transforming memory into a form of direct perception is evident in the naiyayika treatment of the *vyāpti*, or logic syllogism. The *vyāpti*, originally considered to participate in the inferential process as a memory knowledge was later considered to be *jñānāsatti*, a form of *alaukika*, extraordinary perception. As mentioned earlier, the realization of brahman is reminding us of our true selves only. It is a form of recognition and a form of direct perception as well.

There is a realization that the memory fund determines our capacity for perception. The heightened perception or vision is an imprint brought about through memory under control.

16. THE LEARNING PROCESS AS A WHOLE

There remains one further point to make here now. The idea of synthesis has been developed throughout this paper and the implication of that synthesis is that it is a synthesis of the whole process of learning beginning from the rote memory discipline. But this very synthesis is often objected to in Indian tradition. Yāska states:

sthānurayam mahābhārah kilābhūtadhītya vedam na vijānāti yo (a)rtham

(He is an ass fit only for carrying a load, who having studied (meaning memorized) the vedas, does not know the meaning) N 1.18.

There are similar statement in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Mahābhāṣya*. I have collected direct remarks of a similar nature in my dissertation can ascertain that there is a general scorn for people who memorize in India. In fact, those involved in the analytical aspect of knowledge disrespect the others and vice versa. A synthesis of these forms is seldom seen. But the YS triad of *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* (YS 3.1,2,3) and the fourth sutra calling for a unification of them bears a striking resemblance to the whole system outlined here.

Śankara describing the change from one form of learning to another in his commentary on TU 1.3, states:

athāntaram adhyāyanalakṣanavidhānasya purvavṛttasya, atah yato (a)tyartham grantha-bhāvitabuddhir na śakyate sahasārthajñānaviśaye (a)vatārayitum

(*atha* means after the injunction to memorize has been completed. *Atah* means since the mind is heavy from memorizing, it is not able to switch over suddenly to subjects in which knowledge is predominant)

He shows that there is a definite building of one process on the other. He also indicates the immense step that it was passing from one to the other. This is a fact born out by experience of anyone who memorizes large portions of material and later tries to investigate the meaning of that. Each stage of the process tends to become an end in itself. This perhaps explains the situation in the numerous quotes and reflects the actual situation in India. Few could pursue such a discipline all the way through.

17. SUMMARY

Let us recapitulate here. A unified learning process is presented here, the principles of which are consistently applied through three distinct periods; the acquisition of knowledge, the analytical examination of it and a third stage where knowledge might be called wisdom. The last stage has been referred to as a synthetic function of memory, the stage where the significance of knowledge is revealed; an understanding of the whole, the capacity for understanding details within the whole, a generative stage of knowledge similar to language, a revelatory knowledge, metaphysical, samadhi, heightened perception, vision.

Throughout these stages the passive aspect of mind is emphasized as a practical learning technique in acquisition, analysis and understanding. That is exploited at a physical level in asanas, in the three thinking processes and in metaphysical realization. Quotes illustrate this aspect as a basic principle of the mind, of metaphysics and of the acquisition of knowledge at different levels. This principle is used to explain aesthetic experience and ultimate realization. The reason for its predominance and the metaphysical presuppositions that perhaps cleared the way for systematic training in this technique have been given. It is of interest to note that systematic training in this technique still occurs in India today.

This process is a peculiar union of memory and perceptive capacities. Essentially, the haphazard memory fund is eliminated for a form of creative and exact thinking or knowledge. This unification of memory and perception has given this paper its name. This learning process has as its aim not the accumulation of knowledge but guidance in correct thinking. It stems from the realization that our perception is conditioned by our memory, that is, the limitations of our knowledge. That conditioning, like *ajñāna*, prevents us from knowing what we do not know. The transformation involved requires an instantaneous understanding which, while remaining aware of the objects of perception and the process of perception, really centres in the perceiver himself.

An old Lapp song brings out the paradox in memory:

And its we too,
Our memory, memory of ourselves . . .
Disappears, disappears . . .
We remember and we've forgotten.
We are both old.

The Chandogya states: *smaramupāssva* Ch. U 7.13.1, devoted yourself to memory.

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NOTES

- ¹ This is contrary to modern psychological studies on rote memory. I have discussed this at some length in 'A Study of Memory', Diss. Pune University, 1977.
- ² Compare Coleridge's statements in Owen Barfield, *What Coleridge Thought* (Wesleyan University Press, 1971), p. 18.
- ³ Compare Northrop Frye in *The Stubborn Structure* (Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974), p. 74f.
- ⁴ Frye, p. 22 & 23.
- ⁵ M. Hiriyanna, *Art Experience* (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1954), p. 32.
- ⁶ S. T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria* Vol III of the *Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Prof W. G. T. Shedd (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1884), p. 237.
- ⁷ A. Janacek, 'The Meaning of Pratyaya in Patanjali's Yoga Sutras', *Archiv Orientalni* 25 (1957), p. 206 referring to E. Frauwallner, *Geschichte der Indische Philosophie*, p. 411.

⁸ This can only be determined by an interpretation of the sutras themselves without the commentaries. This does not involve mere word substitution but a full scale imaginative reconstruction of the sort P. M. Modi has done in *Critique of the Brahmasutras*.

⁹ See ed. R. Lipsey, Coomaraswamy Vol. II. Bollingen Series LXXXIX, (Princeton University Press), p. 349. 'It is in connection with the architectural symbolism that there can be found the explanation of the important term and concept *samādhi* (sam – ā – dhā, to put together, mend, heal, literally and etymologically "synthesis").

¹⁰ *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, trans. E. B. Pusey (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1957), p. 210–221.

PHILOSOPHY IN BRITAIN

Universities wouldn't be the same if everybody had the money they needed. Everyone knows that there's never quite enough to provide for that extra lectureship, extra space for the department, for hi-tech information facilities, a second secretary and all the good things like that.

No-one ever has enough, and everyone knows it. So it is only natural that the international philosophical community should not have been unduly alarmed by the recent moaning and groaning heard from British Universities. So they have problems. That's bad. But, well, we have problems too.

Yet this time it really is serious for the British universities, and I would like here both to spell out the full magnitude of the crisis we are facing here, and to canvass on behalf of a charitable scheme that is trying to help the philosophers affected by it.

Because of government policy on higher education, British Universities have faced, and must face cuts in real income of 2% per year over the period 1980-1990. By any standard this is a drastic reduction. However, government policy has been *not* to cut scientific research where possible. And since science takes up the largest part of the university budget anyway, the whole burden of the cuts must fall upon the low-spending Humanities departments. This has had a catastrophic effect upon staffing levels.

In 1985, Dr. David Milligan of the Philosophy Department at the University of Bristol wrote to all philosophy departments at U.K. universities in order to assess the effects of these cuts. The results of his survey were not altogether surprising. He found that in 1980-1 there were about 400 full-time staff, whereas there are now (1986) about 320. This is a reduction of about 20%. Furthermore, he discovered that only 13 philosophers had been appointed to their *first* full-time post over the period 1980-5.

Since most British university staff were recruited in a large wave during the 1950s and 60s, so that the majority of them are now over 45, we can therefore make the following unpleasant inference. Most of the present staff will have retired by 2005. But, given the present rate of recruitment (i.e. 13 per five years) there will be only about 50 philosophers to replace them.

Even this relies upon a generous assumption. Universities were to some extent protected from the 1981 cuts both by their own financial reserves and by generous government early retirement grants. This time there are no reserves, and no grants. It seems certain that there will be *no* vacancies for full-time posts in the foreseeable future. The British philosophy profession is about to be destroyed. In Russell's words "Some of us think that this would be a bad thing."

In fact, there are a large number of philosophers aged between 25-45 who have survived by 'job-hopping'. If a tenured member of staff goes on sabbatical his or her

post is offered on a part-time basis for the duration of his absence, often at a drastically reduced salary (we have heard of a number of people earning the U.S. equivalent of \$4000). Dr. John Williams, for instance, is 38. For the last ten years he has taught at five different universities, and now holds a post that terminates automatically in June 1986. This is his reward for an outstanding contribution to British philosophy that includes a large number of conference lectures, conference organisation, guest editorship of journals and innumerable published papers.

There is Dr. Julia Burnett who is just 26. Despite an impressive array of awards and prizes earned during graduate and undergraduate study, she has been unable to find a full-time position, and is now teaching part-time at a university in East Anglia. She has taken a qualification in librarianship to safeguard her position.

And there are, of course, those who have given up hope altogether. Dr. Edward Granger writes to me "... I judge that my chances of gaining a permanent post in the foreseeable future are about nil. I am 29 years old and I have managed to come to terms with my sense of injustice." This is despite a large number of published articles and two books on the *Philosophy of Health* – a field which he is pioneering.

PLATO (Philosophy Lecturing And Teaching Opportunities) is a charitable scheme formed in December 1985 by philosophers from Bristol and Manchester universities who were concerned about this situation. The aims of PLATO are, in general, to represent the many talented philosophers who are now working in circumstances of economic hardship and insecurity. Specifically, we are trying to raise enough money privately to provide for academic fellowships at British Universities. This, we hope, will save at least some of the available talent until more permanent arrangements can be made.

A pilot scheme is now being planned at the University of Bristol. If enough money can be raised by October 1986, at least one philosopher will take up a place at the department there.

PLATO desperately needs the support of the international philosophical community. If you want to help, please send a donation to

The Secretary,
PLATO,
University of Bristol,
Department of Philosophy,
9 Woodland Road,
Bristol BS8 1TB,
England.

Our bank has instructions to accept cheques made out in either pounds sterling or U.S. dollars (\$1 = £0.70). All contributions will be acknowledged. Any contribution of \$20 or over automatically buys a subscription to the PLATO newsletter.

We are hoping for the generous support of philosophers in all countries.

PLEASE HELP SAVE BRITISH PHILOSOPHY

GADĀDHARA BHATṬĀCĀRYA'S

VIŚAYATĀVĀDA

(Continued from Vol. 14, No. 2)

Text edited and translated with explanations by

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA

12.123. *Objections to the Alternative Answer and Their Reply*

Text:

Na caivaṃ jātivādinā manastvādi-prakāraka-smaraṇa-mātrasyaiva svarūpatas tat-prakārakatvāpattiḥ iti kevalaṃ jātīmān ityākārakasya smaraṇasya vilopa-prasaṅga iti vācyam. Svarūpatas tat-prakāraka-smaraṇe udbodhaka-viśeṣasyaiva niyāmaka-tvāt mana ityādyākāraka-smaraṇaṃ yatrā 'nubhava-siddhaṃ tatraiva tādrśo-dbodhakasya phalabalena kalpanīyatvāt, anyathā jātivena svarūpato manastva-prakāraka-kramikā-'nubhava-dvayā-hita-saṃskāra-vataḥ puṁśo bhavan-mate 'pi svarūpato manastvā-'prakāraka-jātīmān-ityākāraka-manastva-prakāraka-smaraṇa-vilop-āpattiḥ. Na ca jātivena manastva-prakāraka-saṃskārāt svarūpato manastvā-'prakāraka-smaraṇaṃ na sambhavati tatra manastvā-'mśe jātītva-bhāne bādhakā-'bhāvad iti vācyam. Tad-amśe jātītva-bhāne 'pi jātīmān-manaś ce tyākārakasya tad-amśe dvi-vidha-viśayatā-śālinas smaraṇasya sambhavāt.

Translation: It cannot also be said that —

All memory cognitions having *manastva* under the mode of universalness as its qualifier will have *manastva* in itself as its qualifier; hence, a memory cognition of the form, 'universal-possessing' will be impossible.

For, memory cognitions with that in itself as their qualifier are controlled by special exciters which are, therefore, to be postulated on the strength of the resulting cognition only where a memory cognition of the form 'manas' is confirmed in introspection. Otherwise a person having two kinds of impressions caused by two successive cognitions — one with *manastva* under the mode of universalness, the other with *manastva* in itself as the qualifier — cannot have, even on your theory, a memory cognition without having

manastva in itself as its qualifier as in 'universal-possessing'; and with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier.

It cannot be said that —

It is not possible to have a memory cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier from an impression with *manastva* under the mode of universalness; in that case, as there is no impediment to the cognition of universalness in that part (as the mode of the qualifier) in the conjunctive cognition of the form 'universal-possessing and *manas*' it is possible to have a memory cognition with two types of objecthood in that part (i.e. of the qualifier).

Explanation: It can be argued against this theory that it leads to various difficulties. If every memory cognition which has *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier, becomes a cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, then there can be no memory cognition of the form 'universal-possessing'. The point here is that only if a person has a memory cognition of *manas* under the mode of *manastva* which is again cognised under its mode of being a universal, he can have the memory cognition of something (*manas*) under the mode of a universal. This means that only if a person has cognised *manastva* as a universal can he remember *manas* as possessing a universal, i.e. as being instance of a universal. If a person has cognised *manastva* in and through itself, without cognising it to be a universal, he cannot cognise *manas* as having a universal.

The reply to this objection is to be found in the conditions under which impressions give rise to memory cognitions. In order to produce a certain memory cognition the impression has to be made active by certain factors. Now the factors which activate the impressions will determine the form of the resulting memory cognition. Whether one will have a memory cognition with *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, or a cognition with *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier, will be completely determined by how the impression has been activated; thus the form of the memory cognition will be completely determined by the exciting factors which activate the impression. But it is only by a sort of back calculation that one can infer how the exciters have activated the impression. It is therefore necessary to know first what form of memory cognition one has, and then to infer the presence of the corresponding exciters.

If it be not admitted that it is only on the strength of the form of the resulting memory cognition that the exciters are postulated, then there

will be the following difficulty. Suppose someone has two successive (informative) cognitions — first he has a cognition of *manastva* under the mode of being a universal, as its qualifier and, next he has the cognition of *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. In such a case, these two cognitions will leave their impressions on the self of that person. This person may, therefore, have the (conjunctive) memory cognition of *manastva in itself* as a qualifier, and *manastva* in itself as not a qualifier.

An objection to this theory is that if the impression has *manastva* under the mode of being a universal as its qualifier then it cannot cause the memory cognition having *manastva* in itself as its qualifier. The reason is that there is nothing to prevent the mode of *manastva* — its being a universal — getting manifested in the memory cognition.

The answer to this objection is to be found by examining a more complex example of memory cognition. It is possible to have a memory cognition of a conjunctive type of the form 'universal-possessing and *manas*'. This memory cognition being a conjunctive cognition has two objecthoods resident in *manas*. Although in one conjunct, universal-possessing, *manas* is cognised under the mode of being a universal, in the other conjunct, *manas*, is cognised under the mode *manastva* which is as a matter of fact a universal but is not cognised under the mode of being a universal.

12.124. *Further Explanation of the Theory: Objections and Replies*

Text: Vastutastu jātītvāmṣe moṣa-daśāyām tathāvidha-saṃskārān mana ityākāraka-smaraṇam nirābādham eva. Tad-amṣe moṣaś ca tad-bhāsako-dbodhakā-'samavadhānam. Na ca kiñcid-rūpeṇa tat-prakāraka-saṃskārād api svarūpatas tat-prakāraka-smaraṇasya moṣa-vaśād utpattau jātītvādi-sāmānya-pratyā-satti-janya-tat-prakāraka-nikhile-jāti-viśayakā-'nubhavāhita-saṃskārāj-jātītvā-dy-amṣe moṣa-daśāyām svarūpato nikhila-jāti-prakāraka-smaraṇa-sambhavāt sārva-jñā-pattiriti vācyam. Udbodhakasya phalabala-kalpanīyatayā jātītvā-dy-amṣe moṣa-daśāyām nikhila-jāti-bhāsako-dbodhakasyā 'kalpanenā patti-virahāt ity alaṃ pallavitena.

Translation: Really there is no difficulty in holding that a memory cognition of the form 'manas' results from an impression in which the mode of universal-ness has been suppressed (not recollected) but which has

otherwise the same form. Suppression of that part is due just to the absence of its excitor.

It cannot be said that even if a memory cognition with that in itself as its qualifier results from an impression with that as its qualifier under some mode when the mode of the qualifier is suppressed, still if one has a cognition of all universals under the mode of universal-ness, resulting from universal-ness by *sāmānya lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*, then one may have a memory cognition with all universals in themselves as its qualifier, when the mode of universal-ness is suppressed in the memory cognition. But this will result in one's being omniscient.

For, as it is the result to be explained which completely determines what excitors have to be postulated, during the suppression of universal-ness there is no objection to non-postulation of excitors for the recollection of all universals. No further discussion on this point is necessary.

Explanation: But there is a simpler solution. A memory cognition is caused by an impression of a previous (informative) cognition. The problem here is that of finding out how the form of the impression is related to the form of memory cognition which it produces. The assumption of the critics was that the impression and the resulting memory cognition must have exactly the same form. If in the impression the qualifier *manastva* were under the mode of being a universal the resulting memory cognition will have exactly the same form, e.g., will have *manastve* under the same mode as its qualifier.

Now the solution lies in noticing that an impression may fail to produce a memory cognition of exactly the same form. This is because parts of the impression may not be activated in producing the memory cognition. This is possible because impressions produce memory cognition only when they are activated. Otherwise there will be no regularity in production of memory cognition; for a person always has a very large number of impressions in his self. If there is no control over which impression is to be active at a certain moment of time in a certain situation then any one, or more, of the impressions will produce memory cognitions almost in a chaotic fashion. Thus it is necessary to postulate some excitors of impressions, some factors which activate an impression in a given situation, to produce a corresponding memory-cognition.

It may so happen that certain excitors make a complex impression active but not in all its parts. In such a case the complex impression will produce

a memory cognition which will fail to have exactly the same form as the impression. In modern terminology, the memory cognition in such a case will have less structure than the impression. Thus even though the impression has *manastva* under a mode as its qualifier the resulting cognition may have *manastva* in itself as its qualifier, its mode not being reproduced in the memory cognition because of the inadequacy of activating factors.

It may be objected here that if an impression with a qualifier under a mode can produce a memory cognition with a qualifier in itself without any mode because of inadequate exciting factors then one may become omniscient in the following way. According to Nyāya when one perceives an object as an instance of a universal, he also perceives the universal. Moreover he also perceives in a special way all instances of the universal also; this is borne out by the fact that after perceiving only one instance of the universal when he perceives another he *recognises* it to be an instance of the same universal. Now as recognition is impossible without a prior cognition, it has to be admitted that when one perceives one instance of a universal one perceives also, in an extraordinary fashion, all instances of the universal, not however their special features, but only *as instances of the universal*.

Now, suppose one perceives universalness and through this mode cognises all universals. Thus he will have an impression of all universals under the mode of universal-ness. If this mode is not reproduced in the memory cognition because of inadequate exciting factors then one will have a memory of all universals as the qualifier. This will amount to omniscience.

The reply to this objection is to be found by noticing that exciters are postulated only to explain certain features of a memory cognition. There is, therefore, no harm in not postulating the existence of exciters which activate impressions in such a way that they produce the memory cognition of all universals under no mode as its qualifier. Certainly, there is no such memory cognition, and, hence, there is no need to postulate exciting factors to explain it.

12.2. *The Theory Established: Not of Navya-Nyāya*

Text: Itthaṃ ca viśiṣṭa-saṃvidas sambandhā-ṇavalambitā na kathamecid
api kañcid anirvāhaṃ āvahantīti yukti-tantraṃ na tantra-siddhānta-
virodhaḥ prati-ruṇaddhi.

Translation: And in this way the argument that a qualified cognition does

not have the relation as its object does not lead to any insoluble difficulty anywhere, hence contradicting the established theory of the system cannot prevent (invalidate) this theory justified by arguments.

12.21. Another Type of Objection

Text: Kecit tu — viśiṣṭa-saṃsarga-buddhau viśiṣṭa-saṃsarga-ghaṭaka-viśeṣaṇīya-saṃsargatāyāṃ prakāratātvam tathā-vidha-viśeṣyīya-saṃsargatāyāṃ viśeṣyatātvam āvaśyakam, anyathā kambugrīvādi-matvā-dy-avacchinnatva-rūpeṇa pratiyogitā-saṃsargaka-kambugrīvādimān nāstī tyādyākāraka-buddher bharmatvā-nupapatteḥ, tathā hi — tādrśa-jñānam abhāvā-’mṣe pratiyogitā-sambandhena na ghaṭasya bhramaḥ tena sambandhenā-’bhāvasya ghaṭa-vattvāt, nā ’pi kambugrīvādi-matvā-’vacchinna-pratiyogitā-sambandhena tad-amṣe tasya bhramaḥ, viśiṣṭa-sambandhā-’prasiddheḥ, nā ’pi svā-’vacchinna-pratiyogitakatva-sambandhena tad-amṣe kambugrīvādi-matvasya bhramaḥ, tad-amṣe tasyā-’prakāratvāt, tathā sati tādrśa-dharma-viśiṣṭatvenā-’bhavo-llekḥā-patteḥ. Ata eva pratiyogitā-’vacchedakatva-sambandhena tādrśa-dharmā-’mṣe ’bhāvasya bhrama ity api na, tad-dharmā-mṣe ’bhāvasyā-’prakāratvāt. Nā ’pi pratiyogitvā-’mṣe kambugrīvādimatvā-’vacchinnatvasya pratiyogitā-’vacchedaktvā-’mṣe kambugrīvādi-matvasya vā bhramaḥ, tasya saṃsarga-ghaṭakatayā-’prakāratvād iti. Tasmāt tat-saṃsargatā-viśeṣe prakāratātvā-viśeṣyatātve svikṛtya paścāt-prakṣipta-pakṣa evā-’pekṣaṇīya iti saṃsargasyā ’pi viśiṣṭa-dhī-viṣayatā-siddhiḥ prakāratā-tvāder viṣayatātvā-vyāpyatvād ity āhuḥ.

Translation: Some hold: In a cognition of a qualified relation the relationness of the qualifier is a constituent of the qualified relation, and must be regarded also as a modeness. So also the relationness of the qualificandum must be regarded as qualificandumness. For otherwise the cognition of the form ‘conch-shell-necked (thing) does not exist in the relation of counter-positiveness as being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness’ cannot be explained as an erroneous cognition. There is no error in the cognition of the jar by the relation of *counterpositiveness* to the negation, for, the jar is related to the negation by that relation. Nor can it be said that the error is in the cognition of the negation as related to the jar by the relation

of *counterpositiveness limited by conch-shell-neckedness*, for there is no such qualified relation. Nor can it be said that the error is in the cognition of the negation as related to conch-shell-neckedness by the relation of *being a determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself*, for, it is not a qualifier of that. If it were a qualifier of the negation then the error would have been stated as being qualified by such a prop

Therefore it cannot also be said that there is erroneous cognition of negation in such a property by the relation, *being the limitor of counterpositiveness*, because negation is not the qualifier of that property. Nor can it be said that the cognition is erroneous, the error being of being limited by conch-shell-neckedness in counterpositiveness, nor of conch-shell-neckedness in the limitor-ness of counter-positive-ness; because that is not a mode, being a constituent of the relation. Hence it is necessary to postulate qualifier-ness and qualificandum-ness in particular relation-ness and then to postulate objecthood of qualified cognition in relation, qualifier-ness etc. being pervaded by objecthood.

Explanation: Here Gadāhara explains a theory of objectivity of relations propounded by a section of Navya-Nyāya philosophers. The argument of these philosophers is complicated, hence requires a detailed explanation. There are three parts of this argument.

In Part I these philosophers argue that the constituent relations of a qualified relation cognised in a qualified cognition have qualierness and qualificandumness of the qualified cognition.

In Part II they show why this ascription of qualierness and qualificandumness to constituent relations is necessary.

In Part III they argue that as qualierness and the qualificandumness are kinds of objectivity, and as they have been ascribed to the constituent relations of the qualified relation, the qualified relation itself must be ascribed objectivity. Hence relations of qualified cognitions must have objectivity, at least in the special case of qualified relations. Now we shall explain these three parts of their arguments.

PART I

In every qualified cognition a relation of a qualifier to (in) a qualificandum gets cognised. Now this relation itself may be a simple relation or may be cognised as a relation qualified in some way or the other. This qualified

relation itself must have a qualifier and a qualificandum both of which are relations. These relations are called 'constituents' of the qualified relation. It is necessary here to explain the Navya-Nyāya concept of constituent element (*ghaṭaka*).

A constituent element of a complex object is defined in terms of a certain relation (pervasion) between the cognition of the element and the cognition of the complex object. Whenever one has a cognition of a complex object one has a cognition of the element too. These two cognitions are related by the relation of pervasion and not of succession. This means that every cognition of the complex object is also a cognition of the element. But the converse of this is not necessarily true. One may have a cognition of the element which is not a cognition of the complex object. Thus the technical definition is as follows:

Def: x is a constituent of $y = x$ is the object of every cognition which is also a cognition of y , in symbols:

$$(C)(z) [Czyt_1 \supset Czx t_1].$$

Whenever a qualified relation is cognised, the qualifier relation is also cognised; hence the qualifier relation is a constituent of the qualified relation. So also the qualificandum relation is a constituent of the qualified relation. The point here is that when a relation is qualified it has two constituent relations. Now these philosophers argue that these constituents relations which are cognised as relations must also be cognised as a qualificandum and a qualifier. Thus the qualifier relation will be a relation as well as a qualifier. This is stated in the technical language of Navya-Nyāya in the following way. The qualifier relation has relationness. This relationness has to be also a modenness (for, the qualifier relation is a qualifier or a mode), and hence the relationness resident in the qualifier relation possesses mode-ness-ness. So also the qualificandum relation is a relation and also a qualificandum of the qualified relation. Thus the relation-ness resident in the qualificandum relation of the qualified relation possesses qualificandum-ness-ness.

PART II

The reason for postulating both relation-ness and qualifier-ness in the qualifier relation is this. In the example of a cognition of the form 'a conch-shell-necked thing (which is a jar) does not exist' is the cognition of the negation of the

conch-shell-necked thing. This means that there is a relation between the negation and the conch-shell-necked thing indicated by 'of'. Here the negation is the qualificandum and the conch-shell-necked-ness is the qualifier of the cognition. Because this is a qualified cognition a relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum has to be cognised. The conch-shell-necked thing is the counter-positive of the negation, and is related to the negation by the relation of *being the counterpositive of* or simply *counterpositive-ness*. This is because the counterpositiveness is assumed to be ontologically identical with the negation of the negation of the counterpositive, and hence the negation of the counter-positive is itself the counterpositive of the counter-positive. Hence the counterpositive as the second term is related to the negation as the first term by the relation of counterpositive-ness. This is because the second term of a relation of this kind is related to the first term by the abstract property of the first term. Now if the negation as the first term is related to the conch-shell-necked thing as the second term by the relation of *counterpositiveness* then this relation is a simple relation and not a qualified relation. Therefore, this relation of *counterpositive-ness* has to be made more complex with the addition of a qualifier. This is to cognise the counterpositive-ness *as* being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness. This point may be explained by a simpler example.

Suppose we cognise that the ground is pot-possessing, i.e., that a pot is on the ground by the relation of contact. Now this contact holds between the ground as its first term and the pot as its second term. To say that the pot is the second term *of* contact is to say that there is a further relation between pot and contact. Now the pot is cognised under the mode of pot-ness and has also the property of being the second term of contact — being the successor of contact. This means that the successor-ness resident in the pot is limited by potness. So instead of cognising the relation of contact to pot as simply successor-ness, we may also cognise successor-ness *as* limited by pot-ness as the relation between pot and contact. Although successor-ness is a simple relation, still successor-ness *as* limited by pot-ness is a qualified relation in which successor-ness is the qualificandum and being limited by pot-ness, the qualifier. Thus in the complex qualified relation, successor-ness *as* limited by pot-ness, there are two constituent relations — the qualifier relation is *being limited by pot-ness*, and the qualificandum relation is *successor-ness*.

In the present example of a cognition of the form 'a conch-shell-necked

thing does not exist' the relation between the negation as the first term and the conch-shell-necked thing as the second term is not simply *counterpositive-ness*, but the qualified relation *counterpositive-ness as limited by conch-shell-necked-ness*.

Now this cognition of the negation as the qualificandum and conch-shell-necked-ness as the qualifier related by the qualified relation is an erroneous cognition. According to Navya-Nyāya only a qualified cognition can be erroneous. Yet it is usual to analyse the erroneous qualified cognition into a qualificandum which is cognised correctly and a qualifier which is cognised as related to the qualificandum by a certain relation when it is not so related. Thus every erroneous cognition is erroneous only in the qualifier but not in the qualificandum. It is usual, therefore, to speak of two *parts* of a cognised object, the qualificandum and the qualifier and to say that the cognition is erroneous in the qualifier part.

In the example given in the text the cognition of the form 'a conch-shell-necked-thing does not exist by the said relation' is erroneous, but the problem here is that in this erroneous cognition the qualifier cannot be said to be not related by that relation. The problem arises because of the assumption made here:

Assumption: A heavy property cannot be a limitor in the case where a lighter property can be found.

In this example the property of having a conch-shell-neck is much heavier than jar-ness. Yet a conch-shell-necked-thing is ontologically identical with a jar. Hence to cognise that a conch-shell-necked-thing does not exist is to have a cognition of a negation the counter-positive of which is the conch-shell-necked-thing and the limitor of the counterpositiveness should apparently be conch-shell-necked-ness. Yet because of the Assumption the limitor here of the counterpositiveness will be jar-ness which is a simple unanalysable universal and is much lighter than the analysable complex property of having such a neck. Hence it cannot be said that the mistake here lies in ascribing the jar to the negation in the relation of counter-positive-ness, for the jar is really the counterpositive of the negation.

It cannot also be said that the cognition is mistaken in ascribing the jar to the negation in the relation, *counterpositive-ness limited by conch-shell-necked-ness*; for such a qualified relation is not possible as the counterpositive-ness *cannot* have conch-shell-necked-ness as its limitor for it is a very heavy

analysable property. Hence the complex relation counterpositiveness *limited by conch-shell-necked-ness* is impossible.

It cannot also be said that the mistake lies in ascribing conch-shell-necked-ness to the negation in the relation *being the determiner of the counterpositive-ness limited by itself* because this is not the qualifier of the negation. In the cognition of negation of conch-shell-necked-thing, conch-shell-necked-ness is the limiter of a counterpositiveness resident in a conch-shell-necked-thing. The negation itself is the determiner of this counterpositiveness. Thus the relation between the negation as the first term and the conch-shell-neckedness (the qualifier) as the second term is the property resident in the first term — i.e., being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself (conch-shell-necked-ness). Yet the cognition cannot be mistaken in thus ascribing the second term (the qualifier) to the negation, because the qualifier is not so ascribed to the negation. It is true that every negation is necessarily a *negation of* a counterpositive yet the abstract property resident in the counterpositive is not a qualifier of the negation. Thus in the cognition of negation of a jar, jar-ness is not a qualifier of the negation. For, if it were so, then the negation would have been stated as jar-ness-possessing i.e. negation of jar-ness. But the negation of a jar cannot be said to be jar-ness-possessing — only a jar can be so — and hence jar-ness, and in the example discussed in the text, conch-shell-necked-ness, cannot be a qualifier of the negation.

It cannot also be said that the mistake lies in ascribing negation to conch-shell-necked-ness, for the negation is not its qualifier but is rather its qualificandum. The qualifier and the qualificandum of a cognition cannot be interchanged without changing the cognition.

It cannot be also said that the mistake lies in ascribing the property of being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness to counterpositiveness, for it being a constituent of the relation cannot be a qualifier. If one could say this then the explanation of the mistake committed in the cognition could have been explained. For example, in the cognition of negation of a jar, the jar is the counterpositive, i.e., possesses counterpositive-ness. This counterpositive-ness is limited by jar-ness. A cognition of such a negation can be shown to be erroneous if one could say that the ascription of jar-ness to counterpositive-ness were mistaken, for to be limited by jar-ness is to be qualified by it — jar-ness is the limiter of counterpositiveness if and only if, it is the mode under which the counterpositive is cognised. Yet in the

present case such an explanation is impossible, for being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness is a part of the relation and hence cannot be the qualifier also.

Similarly it cannot be said that a cognition is mistaken insofar as it ascribes conch-shell-necked-ness to limitor-ness of counterpositiveness.

Thus all possible ways of explaining the erroneous-ness of such a cognition lead to no solution. The only way left is to admit that even a relation can be a qualifier or qualificandum of the cognition in such cases of qualified relations. If this is admitted then one can easily say that the cognition is mistaken in ascribing the property of being limited by the conch-shell-necked-ness which although being a constituent relation, is still a qualifier, to the counterpositive-ness. This ascription is a mistake, for as we have already explained, the assumption is that the heavy property cannot be a limitor.

PART III

Now we come to the last part of the argument of these philosophers. Having shown that it is necessary to regard a relation as a qualifier or a qualificandum of a qualified cognition they argue that objectivity, too, has to be ascribed to the cognised relation. The argument is this: Qualifier-ness and qualificandum-ness are kinds of objectivity. And if they are to be ascribed to constituent relations then the qualified relation of which they are constituents must also be ascribed objectivity of the qualified cognition.

12.211. *The Objection Examined: an Alternative Theory*

Text: Tad api na śobhanatayā pratibhāti, ukta-buddhau pratiyogi-viśeṣanātā-pannasya kambuḡrīvādi-mattvāder abhāvāmṣe prakāratopagame kṣati-virahena tad-amṣe tad-bhramatvasyaiva sambhavāt, svātantryeṇa prakāratā-sthala eva viśeṣaṇa-vattvena viśeṣollekhāt. Ata eva daṇḍī caitraḥ kuṇḍalī tyādi-viśiṣṭā-'nuyogika-vaiśiṣṭya-buddhau samāna-kālīnatva-sambandhena viśeṣyatā-'vacchedaka-daṇḍ-āder vidheya-kuṇḍalādyamṣe prakāratve 'pi na daṇḍa-vat-kuṇḍalī-ty-ādy-ākāra-katā. Na ca prakāratāyāḥ pāratantryam durnirvacam iti vācyam. Ukta-sthale pratiyogi-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakāratā-'vaccedenaiivā 'bhāvāmṣe kambuḡrīvādi-mattvā-deḥ prakāratopagamāt tad-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakāratā-'vacchinatvasyaiva tat-pāratantrya-padārthatvāt.

Translation: This, too, does not appear to be correct, for there is no harm in holding that in that cognition conch-shell-necked-ness which is a qualifier of the counter-positive has also a modeness of the negation. Hence it is possible that a mistake be in that with regard to the negation, for, it is only in the case of independent modeness that the qualificandum is mentioned as possessing the qualifier. Hence in the qualified cognition with a qualified predecessor as in 'Stick-possessing Caitra, possesses ear-rings', the stick which is the limitor of qualificandum-ness by the relation of simultaneity has mode-ness with regard to ear-rings; and yet it does not produce a qualified cognition of the form 'stick-possessing is ear-ring-possessing'. It cannot also be said that the dependence of mode-ness cannot be explained. For in the above instance mode-ness can be ascribed to conch-shell-necked-ness with regard to the negation as something limiting the mode-ness determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the counter-positive; for dependence (of mode-ness) on that belongs only to that which is limited by modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in that.

Explanation: The above theory that a relation is also a qualifier of the qualificandum of the cognition is rejected. A simpler, hence, better, alternative theory is proposed here. This theory is based on a distinction between an independent mode of a qualificandum and a dependent mode. A negation is the qualificandum of which the counterpositive is the qualifier. The qualifier resides in the negation by the relation of being the determiner of the counterpositive-ness. For example, in the negation of the jar the jar is the counterpositive of the negation. This means that the negation is the determiner of the counterpositive-ness resident in the jar. To cognise negation of the jar is to cognise that the negation is jar-possessing by the relation *being determiner of counterpositive-ness*.

But what about jarness? Jar being the counterpositive of the negation, jarness is the limitor of this counterpositive-ness. The jar has counterpositive-ness limited by jarness. Jarness, therefore, is a direct qualifier of the jar while the jar is the direct qualifier of the negation. But jarness is not a direct qualifier of the negation. The negation is *not* a negation of jarness. but of the jar.

It is now proposed to introduce a new concept of dependent modeness and to regard jarness as the dependent mode of the negation. Thus dependence of jarness is on the counterpositive, i.e. the jar; it is only by being a direct qualifier of the jar that jarness becomes a mode of the negation.

This difference between an independent mode and a dependent mode is reflected in the language expressing the cognition. In the case of an independent mode the qualificandum is always mentioned as the mode-possessing. For example, jarness is an independent mode of the jar, and hence the jar is always mentioned as jarness-possessing. Although a dependent mode is a mode of the qualificandum, the qualificandum is never said to be the dependent-mode-possessing. This difference between a dependent and an independent mode is explained by means of a complex example — Caitra with a stick (in his hand) has ear-rings. Here Caitra is the qualificandum and ear-rings its qualifier. The stick which is a property of Caitra is the limitor of the qualificandumness resident in Caitra. Thus both the stick and the ear-rings are qualifiers of Caitra. But the stick is a dependent mode of ear-rings. To admit this is not to say that the cognition is of the form 'stick-possessing is the ear-ring-possessor'. From *a* is an independent mode of *b* and *b* is an independent mode of *c*, we cannot get *a* is an independent mode of *c*, but get *a* is a dependent mode of *c*. Thus the relation, being an independent mode, is intransitive. The suffix '— possessing' can be used only with an independent mode.

Now what is the definition of being a dependent mode? We must notice that *a* has two modenesses, (i) the (independent) modeness of *b*, and (ii) the (dependent) modeness of *c*. Modeness dependent on *b* is that modeness which is limited by modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in *b*. Let us explain this definition.

a is a mode of *c*, simply because it is a mode of *b*. The two modenesses resident in *a* are related by the relation limitor-limited. The modeness of *c* resident in *a* is limited by the modeness of *b* resident in *a*. Now what is the modeness of *b* resident in *a*? This is a relation of independent modeness which is defined as modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in *b*. If *a* is the independent mode of *b*, then *b* is the qualificandum of *a*. This means that *b* has qualificandumness which determines the modeness resident in *a*. Now having defined independent modeness, modeness dependent on *b* resident in *a* is defined as the modeness resident in *a* which is limited by the independent modeness of *b* resident in *a*.

So also in the example discussed by the supporters of the earlier theory, negation of conch-shell-necked-thing, conch-shell-necked-ness which is the limitor of the counterpositiveness becomes a dependent mode of the negation itself. This explains why the cognition is erroneous for this dependent mode

is a wrong mode of the negation. It is, therefore, not necessary to postulate that a relation cognised in a qualified cognition of a special type is also a qualifier of the qualificandum of the cognition.

12.212. Another Defintiion of Dependent Modeness

Text: Yattu — tatra pratiyogi-viśeṣyatayā 'bhāva-viśeṣyatayā ca nirūpitā ekaiva prakāratā svīkriyate, svāntantryeṇa prakāratā-sthale tu viśeṣya-bhedena prakāratā-bhedaḥ, tādṛśa-prakāratāyā ekaika-sādhāraṇatvāt. Evañca tadīya-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakāratā-'bhinnatvam eva, tat-pāratantryam. Na caivam sati tādṛśa-jñānasyā 'bhāvāmśa iva pratiyogy-amśe 'pi svā-'vacchinna pratiyogitākātva-sambandhena kambu-grīvādi-mattva-prakārakatv-āpattiḥ, abhāva-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-tat-sambandhā-'vacchinna-prakāratāyā eva bhavan-mate pratiyogi-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakārat-ātmakatvāt tathā ca tādṛśa-jñānam pratiyogy-amśe 'pi tasya bhramah syād iti vācyam. Tādṛśa-jñānasya hi pratiyogi-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-tat-sambandhā-'vacchinna-kambu-grīvādi-mattva-prakāratā-śālitve 'pi pratiyogi-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpitā yā tādṛśa-saṃsarga-niṣṭha-saṃsargatā tannirūpaka-tad-dharma-prakārakatvam nāsti tādṛśa-saṃsarga-niṣṭha-saṃsargatāyā abhāva-viśeṣyatayaiva samaṃ nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvo-'pagamāt. Itthaṃ ca tan-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-tat-saṃsarga-niṣṭha-saṃsargatā-nirūpaka-tat-dharma-prakārakatvam eva tad-amśe tat-sambandhena tad-dharma-prakārakatvam ato na darśitā-'tiprasaṅga iti.

Translation: (Another objection) In that case the mode-ness determined by qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive is the same as that determined by the qualificandumness resident in the negation. But in the case of *independent modeness* it differs with the different qualificanda and hence the above-mentioned two mode-nesses are different, each being common to each. So also dependence (of modeness) on that is merely the non-difference of the modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in that.

It cannot also be said that — in that case just as a cognition of that form has conch-shell-necked-ness as modeness with regard to the negation, so also it has modeness with regard to the counterpositive by the relation, *being determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself*. As in your theory

the modenness limited by that relation and determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the negation is identical with the modenness determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive, a cognition of that form would be erroneous with regard to the counterpositive too.

For, a cognition of that form does have the mode-ness — conch-shell-necked-ness — limited by that relation and determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive. Yet it does not have the property of being a determiner of mode-ness of that property which is the determiner of the relation-ness which is resident in such a relation, and is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the counterpositive. The relation-ness resident in such a relation has determiner-determined relation only with the qualificandum-ness resident in the negation. Thus modenness of that property, in that relation, and with regard to that, is merely the modenness of that property which is the determiner of the relationness which is resident in that relation and is determined by qualificandum-ness resident in that.

Hence there is no over-extension as has been alleged.

Explanation: Here an alternative theory of dependent and independent modenness is proposed. In negation of b there are two qualificandum-nesses; the negation is the qualificandum of b and has, therefore, this qualificandum-ness; b which is the counterpositive of the negation is in its turn, qualified by b -ness (in the symbolic representation, a) which is the limitor of the counter-positive-ness resident in b . Hence b , too, has the qualificandum-ness of b -ness (i.e. a). In the earlier theory the two modennesses resident in b -ness (i.e. a) were related to each other by the limitor-limited relation. Now it is proposed that instead of relating two modennesses resident in the same object by this relation, it would be better to identify these two modennesses. These two modennesses are indeed determined by two different qualificandumnesses, b -ness (a) is the independent mode of b , i.e. the modenness resident in b -ness (a) is determined by qualificandum-ness resident in b which is the counterpositive of the negation. Again, b -ness (a) is the dependent mode of the negation, i.e. this modenness resident in b -ness (a) is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the negation. These two modennesses — one determined by the qualificandumness of the counterpositive, and the other by that of the negation — being resident in the same object — b -ness (a), are to be regarded as identical. This is the theory propounded by Jagadīśa, an earlier contemporary of Gadādhara who rejects this theory.

This identification of two modennesses resident in the same object is


recommended only in the case of dependent modeness. In the case of independent modenesses, even if they are resident in the same object, they cannot be identified. For example, in the cognition that both *a* and *b* are *c*, *c*-ness is the mode of both *a* and *b*, i.e. has two modenesses — one determined by the qualificandumness resident in *a*, and the other by that resident in *b*. But as these two modenesses are independent modenesses they cannot be identified even though they both reside in *c*-ness. So in the case of independent modeness it varies with varying qualificanda. Thus the definition of dependence of modeness on some object is: being identical with the modeness determined by qualificandum-ness resident in that object.

The definition of dependence of modeness is in terms of independent modeness. A property which is an independent mode of some object becomes a dependent mode of another object if and only if the former object is an independent mode of the latter object. Thus much is accepted by both Jagadīśa and Gadādhara. They differ in their analysis of the two modenesses which the dependent mode has. According to Jagadīśa the dependent modeness and the independent modeness although of two different objects are still identical. But two modenesses are to be distinguished even if they belong to the same object, if they are independent modes of two different objects. Gadādhara, however, wants to have the same relation obtaining between two modenesses belonging to the same object, whether both these two modenesses be independent modenesses, or, one dependent, the other independent.

Now Gadādhara points out the difficulty in this theory. As the two modenesses resident in conch-shell-necked-ness are identical, the modeness determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the conch-shell-necked-thing which is the counter-positive of the negation — negation of a conch-shell-necked-thing — may be a wrong mode of the counterpositive. It is really a wrong mode of the negation, but if this mode-ness be identified with the mode-ness with regard to the counterpositive then as the modeness is wrong with regard to the negation, it will be wrong with regard to the counterpositive also. But this is absurd. For conch-shell-necked-ness necessarily belongs to a conch-shell-necked-thing, although it may fail to belong to the negation. Thus the modeness resident in conch-shell-necked-ness with regard to conch-shell-necked-thing is necessary. Hence this mode cannot be a wrong mode of the counterpositive. Yet if this modeness be identified with the merely contingent modeness resident in conch-shell-necked-ness with regard

to the negation, conch-shell-necked-ness becomes a contingent, possibly wrong, mode of the conch-shell-necked-thing.

The reply to this objection which is really to the effect that the definition of dependence of mode-ness is too wide as it is identical with independent mode-ness resident in the same object, is found by adding more structure to this definition. We shall explain this further point with a simple example. In the cognition of negation of a jar the jar is the counterpositive, jar-ness is the limiter of counter-positiveness. Jar-ness is related to the jar by inherence. The jar which is the counterpositive of the negation is related to it by the relation being the determiner of the counterpositiveness resident in the jar. The jar-ness is related to the negation by being the determiner of counter-positiveness limited by itself. The relation-ness resident in the relation between jar-ness and negation is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the negation, but not by the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar which is the counterpositive.



R_1 = being the determiner of the counterpositiveness resident in the jar
(for the negation determines this counterpositiveness)

R_2 = Inherence

R_3 = being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself.
Relationness resident in

R_2 is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar
Relationness resident in

R_3 is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the negation.
So if having modeness (of a property in the relevant relation with regard to that) by a cognition is defined as having modeness of that property which is the determiner of the relation-ness resident in the relevant relation determined by the qualificandumness resident in that then this defect of being a too-wide definition is avoided.

Now it cannot be said that conch-shell-necked-ness is a mode of the conch-shell-necked thing in the relevant relation *being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself*, i.e. R_3 . For the relation-ness resident in R_3 is *not* determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive – the conch-shell-necked thing. So the charge of the definition being too wide is avoided.

12.2121. *Rejection of the Alternative Definition*

Text: Tad asat. Tathā sati pratiyogy-amśe tādṛśa-jñānīya-kambu-grīvādi-mattva-prakāratāyā api abhāva-pāraṇtryāpatteḥ tad-viśiṣṭa-bodhaka-śabdena pratiyogy-anullekhāpatteḥ.

Translation: This theory is untenable. If it were true then the modenness in conch-shell-necked-ness in a cognition of that form, with regard to the counterpositive would also become dependent upon the negation, and also of not mentioning the counterpositive by an expression producing the cognition of something qualified by that.

Explanation: Even this clarification does not really save this theory for if the dependent modenness resident in conch-shell-necked-ness be identified with the independent modenness resident in it, then the independent modenness becomes the dependent modenness. In the example under discussion conch-shell-necked-ness which is dependent upon the counterpositive in order to be a mode of the negation, can be regarded as dependent upon the negation in order to be a mode of the counterpositive. But the fact is that it, being an independent mode of the counterpositive, becomes the dependent mode of the negation, its dependence being on the counterpositive. Now if the dependent and independent modennesses be identified, then one would be justified in saying that it being an independent mode of the negation, becomes the dependent mode of the counterpositive, its dependence being on the negation.

Moreover, the qualificandum is not mentioned as the-dependent-mode-possessing; hence the counterpositive ought not be mentioned as conch-shell-necked-ness-possessing. Yet a conch-shell-necked thing is necessarily mentioned as 'conch-shell-necked-ness-possessing'.

12.22. *Argument for the Main Objection*

Text: Atha pratiyogi-viśeṣaṇībhūta-dharmasyā 'bhāvāmṣe nirukta-prakārātā-kalpanāpekṣayā saṃsargatāyām prakāratātvādi-kalpanam evo citam dharmi-kalpanāto dharma-kalpanāyā laghutvāt. Na ca bhavan-mate 'pi tad-dharmā-'vacchinnatvāmṣe pratiyogi-saṃsargī-bhūta-pratiyogitva-viśeṣanatayā saṃsargatāyāḥ kalpanīyatayā dharmi-kalpanam āvaśyakam iti vācyam. Bhavan-mate 'py avacchinna-pratiyogitāktvāmṣe tad-dharma-niṣṭha-prakārātā-nirūpita-saṃsargatāyāḥ kalpanīyatayā saṃsargatā-kalpanasya tulyatvād iti cen na.

Translation: (Another objection) It would be lighter to postulate modeness-ness in relationness rather than the postulating mode-ness, of the above mentioned form, of a property which is the qualifier of the counterpositive, with regard to the negation; for it is lighter to postulate a property than to postulate an entity possessing the property.

It cannot also be said that — even on your theory a relation-ness being limited by that property, has to be postulated as the qualifier of the counterpositive-ness which has become the relation of the counterpositive; and hence it is necessary to postulate a substratum of a property.

For even on your theory in the part — the property of being a determiner of limited counterpositive-ness — relation-ness determined by mode-ness resident in that property has to be postulated, as postulation of relation-ness is equally present in both.

Explanation: Here an objection to a theory of dependent and independent modes is stated. It is pointed out that postulation of something possessing a property is heavier than the postulation of merely the property. The philosophers who advocate the theory of dependent modeness, postulate a kind of modeness, and also its property modeness-ness. But if relation-ness is assumed also as modeness, then only modeness-ness is postulated in relation-ness. Hence this theory is lighter, and is, therefore, justified.

An objection to this claim can be raised in the following way. Those who regard a cognised relation also as a mode, consider cases only of qualified relations. The relation mentioned in the example under discussion is, counterpositiveness *as* being limited by conch-shell-necked-ness. But what does 'as' mean here? It must mean some sort of relation possessing relation-ness, as a qualifier of counterpositiveness which itself is a relation to the

counterpositive. So if relation-ness is postulated, relation-ness-ness, too, has to be postulated. Thus relation-ness becomes something which possesses a property, and its postulation makes this theory as heavy as the other theory.

This objection is answered in the following way. In the other theory of dependent modeness, too, additional relationness has to be postulated, and hence so far as postulation of relation-ness is concerned, both the theories share the same heaviness. Now we shall explain how the other theory, too, has to postulate additional relation-ness.

According to this theory the relation between the dependent mode and the negation is being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself. Now what does 'by' mean here? It means that itself is the limiter, i.e. has limitorness resident in it and the counterpositiveness has limitedness resident in it. The relation between limitorness and limitedness is determiner-determined relation which is to be cognised under the mode of relation-ness. Thus even this theory has to postulate additional relation-ness; thus the two theories stand or fall together on this account.

12.22. *Argument Continued*

Text: Abhāvāmśe pratiyogi-viśeṣaṇa-dharmasya prakāratā-mate pratiyogi-prakāratā-nirūpitā yā pratiyogitva-niṣṭha-saṃsargatā, saiva pratiyogi-viśeṣaṇa-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpitā yā avacchinnavatva-niṣṭha-saṃsargatā tan-nirūpitā 'pi, etāvataiva tādṛśa-dharmasya svā-'vacchinna-pratiyogitakatva-rūpa-saṃsarga-bhāna-nirvāhāt. Evañ ca tad-dharmā-'vacchinnavatva-viśeṣita-pratiyogitā-nirūpakatve pratiyogi-saṃsargatā-vādinā tava mama cā 'vacchinnavatva-pratiyogitva-nirūpakatveṣvekaika-saṃsargatā-kalpanasya tulyatayā tava tādṛśā-'vacchinnavatva-niṣṭha-saṃsargatā-nirūpita-tattad-dharma-niṣṭha-saṃsargatā-nirūpita-tad-dharma-niṣṭha-prakāratā-kalpanasya tulyatayā bhavatām saṃsargatāyām prakāratātvādi-kalpanasyā 'dhikyāt. Na ca bhavan-mate 'pi tādṛśa-prakāratāyāḥ pāratantrya-nirvāhāya tatra pratiyogi-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakāratā-'vacchinnavatva-kalpanam adhikam iti vācyaṃ. Bhavan-mate 'pi tattad-dharma-niṣṭha-prakāratā-viśeṣātmake-saṃsargatāyām avacchinnavā-'nuyogika-sambandha-viśeṣā-'vacchinnavasyā-dhikasya kalpanīyatayā sāmīyāt.

Translation: On the theory that the qualifier property of the counterpositive has modeness with regard to the negation, the relationness which is resident in the counterpositiveness and is determined by modeness of the counterpositive also determined by the relation-ness which is resident in limitedness and is determined by the modeness resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive. This is sufficient to explain such a property being cognised as the relation — being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited by itself. So also, as your theory advocates relation-ness of the counterpositive to (in) being the determiner of the counterpositiveness qualified by limited-ness by that property, so also my theory recommends the postulation of one counterpositive-ness in being the determiner of the counterpositiveness limited in that way; hence in this respect the two theories are at par. Again both the theories are the same in postulating modeness which is resident in that property and is determined by relationness resident in that property and by relation-ness resident in being limited in that way. But you have to further postulate modenessness in relationness, which is an additional reality.

It cannot also be said that — even on your theory to explain dependence of that type of modeness, you have to postulate an additional limited-ness of modeness determined by qualificandum-ness resident in the counterpositive.

For even on your theory in the relationness which is the particular mode-ness resident in each of those properties, the additional property of being limited by the particular relation with limitedness as the predecessor, has to be postulated; and hence both the theories are equal in this respect.

Explanation: The chain of arguments for and against the theory that cognised relations cannot be accorded objecthood of these cognitions ends here. We shall give a detailed analysis of all the arguments for and against this theory.

In all these arguments a basic example of a cognition of negation is analysed and explained. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse this example in detail. As this example is of a cognition of a negation we shall begin by studying a simple example of a negation. In the cognition of the negation of (a) jar we have to note the following.

R_2 = being the determiner of the counterpositiveness
 the jar $\xrightarrow{R_2}$ negation of the jar
 (counterpositive).

In 'negation of the jar' the 'of' stands for a relation. The first task is to be clear about two different ways in which the relation between the jar and its negation can be explained. The arrow in the diagram is to be interpreted in a manner which is opposite to the usual Western method of representation. The tip of the arrow indicates the predecessor (*anuyogi*) of the relation instead of the successor. Thus the arrow indicates a relation between the counterpositive and its negation with the negation as its predecessor and the counterpositive as its successor. In the idiom of Navya-Nyāya the counterpositive is *related in* the negation by the relation, being the determiner of the counterpositiveness resident in the counterpositive, for the negation is that which determines this counterpositive-ness. This is because the negation and its counterpositive are correlatives. This is the usual analysis.

But there is a different analysis based on the law of double negation, thus:

R_2^* = counterpositiveness.

the jar \longrightarrow negation of the jar
(= negation of the negation of the jar)

In this diagram the negation of the jar itself has become the counterpositive of the jar which is identical with the negation of the negation of the jar. Here R_2^* is simply counterpositive-ness, because the negation (of the jar) is the counterpositive of the jar. Thus we have two different analyses of the relation between the negation and its counterpositive:

(a) R_2 = being the determiner of the counterpositiveness

(b) R_2^* = counterpositiveness.


It is to be noted here that the converse of R_2 is R_2^* in the usual analysis, thus:

the jar \longleftarrow negation (of the jar)
 R_2^*
(counterpositive)

for the jar is the counterpositive of the negation according to the usual analysis.

With this explanation of the two different relations obtaining between the negation and its counterpositive, we now study the more complicated example of negation discussed in these arguments. This negation is the

negation of a conch-shell-necked thing. The first argument against the theory analyses this negation in the following way:




where conch-shell-necked-ness is the limiter of the counterpositiveness resident in c-s-n thing. This limiter, c-s-n-ness, is the qualifier of the c-s-n-thing. The argument uses the relation between the c-s-n-thing and its negation, not simply R_2^* , but $R^A = R_2^*$ as being limited by c-s-n-ness.

i.e., R_2^* as R_1 -possessing

Now R^A is a qualified relation in which R_2^* is the qualificandum and R_1 is the qualifier. This argument tries to prove that there must be a mode-ness-ness in the relation-ness resident in R_1 , a constituent relation in R^A , and a qualificandum-ness-ness in the relation-ness resident in R_2^* the other constituent relation in R^A . This simply means that R_1 is also to be a mode over and above being a relation and R_2^* a qualificandum over and above being a relation in the cognition of this negation.

The argument which tries to refute this theory of additional mode-ness-ness etc. in the constituent relation-ness establishes a distinction between a dependent mode and an independent mode in the cognition of the negation of c-s-n thing, thus:



Where the counterpositive is an independent mode of the negation by the relation R_2 , and c-s-n-ness is the independent mode of the counterpositive by

R_1 . The problem is to understand the nature of R_3 . The previous argument introduced the concept of a qualified relation in order to explain the relation of c-s-n-ness to the negation through R_2^* . But the present argument introduces the concept of dependent mode in order to explain the nature of R_3 . C-s-n-ness is a dependent mode of the negation, its dependence being on the counterpositive. Thus c-s-n-ness has two modenesses, one independent modeness of the c-s-n-thing and the dependent modeness of the negation. This argument has used the relation of *being limited by* between these two different modenesses.

A different theory of dependent modeness (resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive) with regard to the negation is then proposed. It identifies the independent modeness with the dependent modeness resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive.


Then the merits and demerits of these two theories are discussed. The real problem emerges here as the problem of analysing what may be represented in set theoretic terminology as the relative product of two relations. In the above diagram, R_3 may be regarded as the relative product of R_1 and R_2 . Three different analyses are given by Gadādhara on this point.

(i) According to the theory of qualified relation, there is no R_3 ; R_2^* is cognised only as R_1 , i.e. as being limited by c-s-n-ness. Thus the concept of qualified relation eliminates the need for relative product. This is possible only because Navya-Nyāya deals only with cognitions of relations, and cognitions of the so-called relative product of relations may be, and is, analysed differently in terms of qualified relations.

(ii) According to one theory of dependent modeness a relative product of R_1 and R_2^* is itself a relation between R_1 and R_2^* . R_1 and R_2^* are related in a certain way to form a chain relation. But according to Navya-Nyāya, a relation by definition produces a qualified cognition the object of which involves a qualifier and a qualificandum. Thus when R_1 and R_2^* are related to form a chain relation in the above example R_1 becomes the qualifier of R_2^* . Again, to be a qualifier an object has to be a term, usually the second term, of a relation cognised. Thus if R_1 becomes the qualifier then there must be a relation, S_1 , of which it becomes the second term and R_2^* the first term.

(iii) The other theory using the first form of the relation between dependent and independent modenesses explains the relative product of R_1 and R_2 in an altogether different way. Here R_1 and R_2 do not need

to be related by a further relation as qualifier and qualificandum. The explanation given here uses the converse of R_2 instead of R_2 thus:



The counterpositive is an independent mode of the negation by R_2 (not by R_2^*). The relation-ness resident in R_2^* is determined by the modenness resident in the counterpositive.

Being limited by, again, is a relation (R_1) and therefore, has a relation-ness resident in it. This relation-ness is determined by the independent modenness resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive. This theory of dependent modes, now, asserts that the relation-ness resident in R_1 is also the determiner of the relation-ness resident in R_2^* . That is, the relation-ness resident in R_2^* is determined by both the independent modenness resident in the counterpositive and also the relation-ness determined by independent modenness resident in the qualifier of the counterpositive, namely, the limitor of the counterpositiveness resident in the counterpositive. It is claimed, on behalf of this theory, that we cognise R_3 as one relation only because of this dual determination of the relationness resident in R_2^* .

The problem here is this. We may represent R_3 as R_1/R_2 . Yet R_1 and R_2 are two relations, then how is it that they constitute one relation R_3 ? The usual set theoretic definition is that

$$(SD) \quad xR_3y \equiv (\exists z)(xR_1z \cdot zR_2y); \quad \text{or,} \\ (\exists z)(xR_1z \cdot yR_2z).$$

In the above diagram, using the arrow in the way explained above, we have the following:

- (a) $c R_1 l$
- (b) $c R_2^* n$

(where 'c' is short for 'counterpositive', 'n' for 'negation', and 'l' for 'limitor of the counterpositiveness').

Now using R_2 (the converse), instead of R_2^* in (b), we get

$$(a) \quad n R_2 c$$

Then from (a) and (c), we get

$$(d) \quad n R_2/R_1 l.$$

where R_2/R_1 is R_3 , with n as its predecessor and l as its successors. This Navya-Nyāya theory assures the existence of a z in (SD), by stipulating that the relation-ness resident in R_2^* be determined by (i) the modeness resident in c , (the predecessor of R_2^*) and, (ii) the relation-ness which is resident in R_1 (with c as its predecessor) and determined by l (the successor of R_1).

This Navya-Nyāya explanation of why R_3 is cognised as one relation differs radically from the explanation given in (i). There it was claimed that when R_1 and R_2^* combines in a certain way to constitute R_3 , additional relations are to be postulated to explain how R_1 can become the qualifier of R_2^* . The present Navya-Nyāya theory does away with the need of additional relations. The cognition of R_3 is not a cognition of a qualified relation, but of a complex relation in which the constituent relations, or rather the relation-nesses residing in them, are related as the determiner and the determined, not as a qualifier and a qualificandum. To say that the relation-ness resident in R_2^* is determined by modeness resident in c , and also by the relation-ness resident in R_1 and determined by l , is to say that c is predecessor both R_2^* and R_1 (in (a) and (b)). To get the relative product, it is necessary to use the converse of R_2^* , and hence R_3 becomes *being the determiner of the counterpositiveness (R_2 , not R_2^*), limited by itself (l)*, of which n is the predecessor and l the successor.

We must emphasize a fundamental difference of Navya-Nyāya from set-theory. If Navya-Nyāya philosophers wanted merely to say that c is the first term of both R_2^* and R_1 , they could have said so directly (by using 'anuyogi'). They would not have needed to bring in modeness, relation-ness, etc. It is necessary for them to bring in these concepts only because they are dealing with *cognitions* of relations, not with relations.

If relations are cognised, their terms are also necessarily cognised as qualifiers and qualificanda. A mode is a special kind of qualifier, modeness

a special kind of qualificierness. To say that *c* is *cognised as* a term of a relation and also as a mode of *n*, is to say that the relationness resident in *c*-ness (R_2^*) is *determined by* the modeness resident in *c*; and so also with the relation-ness resident in R_1 .

12.3. Final Reply

Text: Athavā kim etāvātā sūkṣma-gaveṣaṇāyāsena, astu saṃsargatā-viṣeṣāṇāṃ prakāratādi-viṣeṣarūpatā, nai tāvatā 'pi saṃsargasya viśiṣṭa-dhī-viṣayatā-siddhiḥ. Jhaṭiti vighaṭita-niryuktika-siddhāntā-'nuro-dha-nis-saṃkhyā-śrīṅkhalānāṃ viṣayatātvasya prakāratatvā-di-vyāpakatā-bhaṅga-bhirūtayā durabhibhavatvāt iti vadanti.

Translation: Or, what is the use of such subtle arguments given so far? Granted that particular relationness has particular modeness etc. but by this objecthood (of qualified cognition) of relations is not established. It is difficult to overcome objecthoodness of innumerable chains postulated to save the hasty illogical theory, for fear of violating pervaderiness by modeness-ness etc. (of objecthoodness).

XVI RELATION-NESS AND QUALIFIERNESS ETC.

13. Gadādhara's Theory

Text: Saṃsargatayā ca samāṃ prakāratāyā viṣeṣyatāyāś ca nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvākhyas sambandha-viṣeṣo bhyupagantavyaḥ. Sa ca sambandhaḥ kāryatva-kāraṇatvā-dheyatvā-dhāratva-pratiyogitvā-'nuyogitvādīnāṃ mithas tādṛśa-sambandha iva svarūpa-viṣeṣaḥ padārthāntaram eva vā, anyathā tatra tena sambandhena tat-prakārakam ityetaḍ arthasya durvacatvāt.

Translation: It is also to be admitted that there is a relation of determiner-determined-ness between relationness on the one hand and modeness as well as qualificandumness on the other. And that relation is either a particular self-linking relation or a separate ontological reality, just like the relation with cause-ness and effect-ness, super-stratumness and substratumness, successor-ness and predecessor-ness. Otherwise the meaning of 'having that as a mode by that relation' cannot be explained.

Explanation: In a qualified cognition the object is of the form — a as b -possessing by the relation R , where a is the qualificandum, b the qualifier and R the relation between a as the predecessor and b as the successor. Now the fact is that a is the qualificandum of *this* cognition, and b is the qualifier of the qualificandum in this cognition, and R is the relation cognised between a and b as cognised in this cognition. Thus the qualifier, the qualificandum and the relation between them, are relative to each other and also to the cognition. This relativity of the qualifier etc. is analysed in Navya-Nyāya in terms of the relation — *the determiner-determined-ness*. This relation holds not between the qualifier, the qualificandum and the relation, but between the qualificianness resident in the qualifier and qualificandum-ness resident in the qualificandum. So also the relationness which is simply the objecthood of the cognised relation, i.e., the relation of the cognition to the cognised relation, is determined by the qualifier-ness and the qualificandumness.

Whenever a new relation is postulated, Navya-Nyāya philosophers discuss the ontological question of its reality. Gadādhara postulates a determiner-determined-ness as a relation between relationness on the one hand and qualifier-ness and qualificandumness on the other. He therefore has to settle the question of the ontological status of this new relation. Gadādhara's position is that as this relation is an epistemological relation, its ontological status may be left open. It may be regarded as a self-linking relation, i.e. may be reduced to one of its terms ontologically; or, it may be accorded a separate ontological reality. But his point is that unless such a relation is admitted we cannot explain the meaning of 'that is the qualifier relative to that (qualificandum) by that relation'.

Here we may note the fundamental difference between the Navya-Nyāya theory of modes of cognition and Frege's theory of modes of presentation of the object referred to by a name. Frege has introduced the concept of mode of presentation of the object in order to distinguish between the cognitive values of two types of true identity statements. Frege's theory of mode of presentation of the object has the following characteristics.

- (i) Every name presents an object under a definite mode of presentation.
- (ii) This mode of presentation of the object by a name is the sense of the name.
- (iii) The sense illuminates only one aspect of the object referred to by the name, provided the object exists.

- (iv) This sense cannot be identified with physical properties of the physical objects.
- (v) The sense of the name is a route from the name to the object.
- (vi) The sense of a name offers a criterion of identity of the object referred to by the name.

According to Navya-Nyāya the mode of cognition of an object is not necessarily tied to its presentation by a name. The mode of presentation of the object is necessarily a property of the object, for otherwise the object cannot be correctly presented under that mode. A property, according to Navya-Nyāya, is the successor of a relation of a certain sort, namely, occurrence-exacting relation, of which the predecessor is that which possesses that property. According to Navya-Nyāya a fundamental mode of cognition is of an object as some-property-possessing. But to say that an object possesses a property is to say that the object is related to that property by an occurrence-exacting relation. So whenever any property is cognised as a mode it is always cognised as the successor of an occurrence-exacting relation. Thus every cognition of some object under some mode is a cognition of that object possessing a property by a certain relation. Now according to Gadādhara this cognised relation will be related to the cognition by relation-ness, which will be relative to the qualifier-ness and the qualificandum-ness determined by the cognition. Thus the cognition determines the qualifier-ness of its qualifier, the qualificandum-ness of its qualificandum and the relationness of the relation. Moreover there is internal relativity of these properties which again determine each other. What Gadādhara insists here is that the relation-ness, too, must be relative to the qualifier-ness etc.

13.1. *Criticism and Reply*

Text: Na ca tat-saṃsargakatve sati tan-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-tat-prakāratākatvam eva tatra tena sambandhena tat-prakāratatvam iti vācyam. Tathā sati bhūtaladau saṃyogena ghaṭādikam samavāyena ca rūpādikam avagāhamānāyā dhiyo bhūtalāmśe saṃyogena rūpādi-prakāratatvasya samavayena ca ghaṭādi-prakāratatvasy-āpatteḥ. Evaṃ samavāyena kapālāmśe saṃyogena ca bhūtalāmśe ghaṭam avagāhamānāyā buddheḥ samavāyena bhūtalāmśe saṃyogena ca kapālāmśe ghaṭa-prakāratatvā patteḥ. Tat-svīkāre ca tan-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita- tadīya-saṃsargatā-nirūpitā yā tadīya-prakāratā tat-pratīyogitvam eva tad aṃśe

tena sambandhena tat-prakāratvam, yasya yaḥ sambandho
yatra bhāsate tadīya-viśeṣyatā-tadīya-prakāratābhyām eva tadīya-
saṁsargatāyā nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvān noktā-'tiprasaṅgaḥ.

Translation: It cannot be said that to have that as its mode of that by that relation is merely to say that the cognition has as its object that relation and also that as its mode, the modeness being determined by the qualificandumness resident in that.

For, if that were the case, then the cognition cognising a jar on the ground by the relation of contact and colour by the relation of inherence, can be interpreted as a cognition having colour as its mode, the modeness being by contact, and the jar as its mode, the modeness being by inherence. So also a cognition cognising a jar in its halves by the relation of inherence and on the ground by the relation of contact can be interpreted as a cognition with jar as its mode with respect to the ground by inherence and with respect to its halves by contact. If that is admitted then having that as its mode in that relation with respect to that is being the counterpositive of that which is determined by the relation-ness with respect to that which (relationness) is, in its turn, determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in that. If a relation of that in (to) that is cognised, then the qualificandumness of that, and the qualificierness of that are related by the determiner-determined-ness relation to that relation; hence there is no ever-extension.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara presents an argument against the theory that a relationness of a cognised relation is related by the determiner-determined-ness relation to the qualifier-ness and the qualificandumness. Here there is no disagreement on the theory that the qualifier, qualificandum and the relation are all cognised in a qualified cognition. The dispute is only on the question whether relationness is to be so related to the qualificierness etc.

The counter-theory proposed here tries to explain what is meant by having a qualifier of a qualificandum in or by a certain relation. The definition proposed of this is that the cognition will be of that relation and will have qualificierness resident in whatever be the qualifier determined by the qualificandumness resident in whatever be the qualificandum. That is, the relation will be cognised but the relationness resident in it will neither determine nor be determined by the qualificierness or the qualificandumness. This will have the effect of keeping the relation in the cognised structure

completely independent of the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition.

Gadādhara, therefore, points out the following absurdities in this counter-argument. He chooses examples of cognition in such a way that different relations with different qualifiers or qualificanda get cognised in each of them. The first example that Gadādhara gives is a cognition which has two qualifiers in two relations. When one cognises that a jar is on the ground by contact and colour in the ground by inherence, then there are two qualifiers of the same qualificandum, the ground, by two different relations. Now if it is enough for the cognition to cognise the relation to make it the relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum, then in the present case, one could easily say that colour is the qualifier of the ground by contact and jar by inherence.

The second example is of a cognition which has one qualifier of two different qualificanda by different relations. When one, for example, cognises that the halves and also the ground are jar-possessing, the former by the relation of inherence and the latter by contact, one can very well say, that one has cognised the halves as jar-possessing by contact and the ground by inherence.

These absurd consequences are avoided, Gadādhara asserts, if one accepts the theory that the cognised relation is *cognitively* related to the qualifier and the qualificandum of the cognition. Thus a cognition will be of a relation between a qualificandum and a qualifier if and only if the relation-ness resident in the relation either determines, or is determined by, the qualificierness resident in whatever be the qualifier and so also with the qualificandum-ness. Thus a relation cognised as holding between a qualifier and a qualificandum of a cognition will have its relation-ness determining, or determined by, the qualificierness resident in the qualifier of that cognition as well as the qualificandum-ness resident in the qualificandum. If this is admitted, then it is easy to see how the difficulties of the theory of the opponents are avoided. Thus a cognition that the ground possesses the jar by contact and colour by inherence, cannot now be construed as a cognition that the ground possesses the jar by inherence and colour by contact. For, the relationness resident in contact determines, or is determined by, the qualificierness resident in the jar, not in colour. So also with inherence.

13.1. Criticism and Reply Continued

Text: Na ca prakāratāyāḥ saṃsarga-viśeṣā-'vacchinnatayā tat-saṃsargā-'vacchinna-tadīya-prakāratā-nirūpita-tadīya-viśeṣyatākatvam eva tena sambandhena tad-aṃśe tat-prakāratatvam astu, kimukta-nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvo-pagameneti vācyam. Saṃsarga-niṣṭhā-'vacchedakatā-nirūpakatva-rūpa-saṃsargā-'vacchinnatvasya prakāratāyāṃ svīkṛtā veva saṃsargatā-prakāratayor nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva-siddheḥ, saṃsargatāyās saṃsarga-niṣṭhā-'vacchedakatā-rūpatvāt. Na caivam api prakāratayaiva samam tasyā nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvo 'stu, na tu viśeṣyatayā 'pi samam ukta-buddhi-nirūpitāyāḥ samavāya-niṣṭha-saṃsargatā-nirūpita-ghaṭa-prakāratāyā bhūtala-viśeṣyatā-nirūpitatva-virahāt, samyoga-niṣṭha-saṃsargatā-nirūpita-tat-prakāratāyās ca kapāla-viśeṣyatā-nirūpitatva-virahāt uktā-'ti-prasaṅga-vāraṇād iti vācyam. Vinigamanā-virahenaiva viśeṣyatayā 'pi samam tasyā nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāva-siddher niṣpratyūhatvāt. Evañ ca, viśeṣyatā-prakāratayos sākṣān nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvō 'prāmāṇikaḥ, kintu prakāratāyāṃ viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-saṃsargatā-nirūpitatvam eva viśeṣyatā-nirūpitatvam, viśeṣyatāyāṃ prakāratā-nirūpita-saṃsargatā-nirūpitatvam eva ca prakāratā-nirūpitatvam. Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvā-'vacchedakakotau yatra prakāratā-viśeṣyatayor niveśas tatra saṃsargasyā-'py avāśyam niveśāt, tayor nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvā-'nabhyupagame 'pi gauravā-'navakāśād iti tu dheyam.

Translation: It cannot also be said that as modeness is always limited by a specific relation, a cognition having that as its mode in that by that relation is simply its being the determiner of the qualificandum-ness of that determined by qualificierness of that, limited by that relation. Why, then, is it necessary to postulate the determiner-determined relation? For to say 'modeness is limited by a relation' is to admit that modeness determines the limitorness resident in the relation. Hence the relation of determiner-determined-ness between relationness and modeness is proved; relationness being identical with limitorness resident in the relation.

It cannot also be said that — let the relation of determiner-determined have relationness with (to) modeness, but not also with (to) qualificandum-ness. The mode-ness of the jar determined by the relation-ness resident

in inherence does not possess the property of being determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the ground, the modeness determined by the relation-ness resident in contact does not possess the property of being determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the halves; and hence the over-extension is avoided.

For, there being no reason for preference, the relation of determiner-determined-ness of relationness with qualificandumness is established without difficulty. So also there is no reason to admit the determiner-determined relation directly between qualificandum-ness and qualifier-ness; but being determined by the relationness determined by the qualificandumness is the modeness's being determined by the qualificandum-ness, and qualificandum-ness's being determined by mode-ness is merely its being determined by the relation-ness determined by the mode-ness.

Where in a part of the limitor of cause-ness and effectness, mode-ness and qualificandum-ness are to be introduced, there relation has to be necessarily introduced; hence even if one does not admit the relation of determiner-determined-ness between them, one is not involved in heaviness. Hence this theory merits serious consideration.

Explanation: The opponents here argue that it is not necessary to postulate that relationness determines, or is determined by, mode-ness and qualificandum-ness. It is a well-established theory of Navya-Nyāya that the mode-ness in a qualified cognition is limited by the specific relation which is cognised in the qualified cognition. This ensures that the cognised relation is not epistemically unrelated to the mode and the qualificandum of the cognition. Hence in the cognition 'the ground possesses the jar by contact and colour by inherence' we cannot switch the relations, and render it necessarily false. For the modeness resident in the jar is limited by contact and that determines the qualificandum-ness resident in the ground, and the modeness resident in colour is limited by inherence, and that determines the qualificandumness resident in the ground. We cannot say that the modeness resident in the jar is limited by inherence or vice versa. Thus we can very well explain how the cognised relation is epistemically related to the mode and the qualificandum of the same cognition.

The reply to this theory of the opponent is to be found in the fact that the limitor is the correlative of the limited; i.e. limitorness determines, or is determined by, limitedness. Thus in order to explain the epistemic relation between the cognised relation and the modeness in terms of the limitor-limited

relation we really use the determiner-determined relation between limitorness and limitedness.

Now it may be argued that even though it be admitted that relationness determines, or is determined by, mode-ness, there is no need to postulate further that it determines, or is determined by, the qualificandumness also. For example, the cognition 'the halves (of the jar) possess the jar by inherence and the ground by contact' can be adequately explained by the fact that the modeness resident in the jar and determined by relationness resident in inherence is not determined by the qualificandumness resident in the ground. Here although the modeness and the qualificandumness have been admitted to be related by the determiner-determined-ness relation, and relationness is so related to modeness, still it is not so related to qualificandumness. Why, then, is it necessary to postulate such a relation?

The reply given here is that there is no reason for preferring the one alternative to the other. Just as one can hold that relationness is so related to modeness but not to qualificandumness, so one can equally hold that relationness is so related to qualificandumness alone. And there is no ground for choosing one alternative rather than the other. Hence it will be unreasonable to reject any one of the alternatives.

Now if it is admitted that relationness determines, or is determined by, both modeness and qualificandumness of a qualified cognition, then there will be no reason to hold the theory that modeness and qualificandumness are directly related by the determiner-determined-ness relation. Gadādhara expresses here the view that such a direct relation between modeness and qualificandumness is not justified at all. They are related to each other only indirectly through their relation to relationness.

XVII. TWO KINDS OF MODENESS

14. *Arguments and Counterarguments*

Text: Prakāratā ca dvividhā — nir-avacchinnā viśeṣaṇāntarā-’vacchinnā ca. Tatra nir-avacchinnā ghaṭa ity-ādy-ākāraka-jñānīya-ghaṭatvādi- prakāratā, tatra svarūpata eva ghaṭatvāder-bhānāt. Tādṛśī ca prakāratā jāty-akhaṇḍōpādhi-bhinne na svikriyate. Sāvacchinnā ca ghaṭavad-ity-ādi-jñānīya-ghaṭādi-prakāratā tatra ghaṭatvāder avacchedakatvāt. Na ca tādṛśa-prakāratāyā ghaṭatvādinā samam

avacchedyā-’vacchedako bhāvo niryuktikaḥ dravyavad ity-ādi-jñānāt tādṛśa-jñānasya ghaṭāmśe vibhinna-prakāratayaiva vailakṣaṇayō papatter iti vācyam. Tādṛśa-jñānīya ghaṭādi-prakāratāyā ghaṭatvādy-avacchinnatvā-’nupagame dravya-vad-bhūtaḥ ghaṭaś cety-ādy-ākāraka-samūhālambanātmaka-jñānāt ghaṭavad-bhūtaḥ dravyaṇi ceti samūhālambana-jñānasyaiva vailakṣaṇyā-’nupapatteḥ, ubhayor eva ghaṭāmśe dravyatva-ghaṭatvō-bhaya-prakāratatvād bhūtaḥ ghaṭa-prakāratatvāc ca, man-mate punar ādye dravyatvā-’vacchinnā ghaṭīyā prakāratā antye ca ghaṭatvā-’vacchinnā seti prakāratā-vailakṣaṇyāt tayor vailakṣaṇyam.

Translation: Modeness is of two kinds – not limited, and limited by another qualifier. Of these, the not limited modeness is the modeness resident in jar-ness in the cognition ‘the jar’. For here jar-ness is cognised in and through itself. Modeness of this kind is not admitted in anything different from universals (*jāti*) and unanalysable imposed properties (*akhandopādhi*).

The mode-ness of the jar in the cognition ‘jar-possessing’ is itself limited, jar-ness being the limiter of the modeness.

It cannot be said that there is no reason to postulate limiter-limited relation of that type of modeness with jar-ness. The difference of that cognition from the cognition ‘substance-possessing’ can be explained in terms of having different modes of the jar.

For, if the modeness resident in the jar in that cognition is not admitted as limited by jar-ness, then the difference between two conjunctive cognitions ‘substance-possessing is the ground and the jar’ and ‘jar-possessing is the ground and the substance’ cannot be explained, for in both the cognitions substance-ness and jar-ness are both modes of the jar and the jar is the mode of the ground. But, on my theory, in the first cognition the modeness of the jar is limited by substance-ness and in the second by jar-ness; and hence the two cognitions are different because of difference in the mode-ness.

Explanation: In this section Gadādhara distinguishes between different forms of degenerate cognitions. Ordinarily a cognition like ‘jar-possessing is the ground’ has the following objective elements:

- A
- (i) The qualificandum – the ground.
 - (ii) The limiter of the qualificandumness – ground-ness.

- (iii) The qualifier — the jar.
- (iv) The limiter of the qualifier-ness — jar-ness.
- (v) The relation between the qualificandum and the qualifier — contact.

The examples of cognition which Gadādhara now examines do not have these normal five elements. The first example is of a cognition '(the) jar'. It has only three elements, thus:

- B*
- (i) The qualificandum — the jar.
 - (ii) The limiter of qualificandumness — nil.
 - (iii) The qualifier — jarness.
 - (iv) The relation — inherence.

In this case, there are no elements corresponding to (ii) and (iv) of *A*.

The second example which Gadādhara gives here, namely, the cognition 'jar-possessor', has the following elements:

- C*
- (i) The qualificandum — the ground.
 - (ii) The limiter of qualificandumness — nil.
 - (iii) The qualifier — the jar.
 - (iv) The limiter of the qualifier — jarness.
 - (v) The relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum — contact.

The difference between these two cognitions is to be found in the fact that in the second, there is a limiter of the qualifier. So Gadādhara distinguishes between two cognitions by saying that while the modeness in the first is not limited (by anything) that in the second is limited (by jarness). This is because of the Navya-Nyāya theory that a universal and an unanalysable imposed property, if not mentioned by any word referring to them, are cognised in and through themselves without any mode. In the first cognition, jar-ness being the qualifier and a universal, does not require any further mode to be cognised. In the second case, the mode is a jar which requires a further mode, jarness, in order to be cognised as a mode of the ground. Thus whether a cognition will have a mode with its modeness not limited by any other higher order mode depends upon the ontological status of the mode itself.

Thus to say that a mode has its *modeness limited* by some property, is to say that the mode is to be cognised under a higher order mode. Now a

question is raised whether cognitions cannot be differentiated from each other in terms of their modes only, without introducing the concept of the limiter of mode-ness resident in modes which would then require further higher order modes. It is argued in favour of the simple theory that the two cognitions, 'jar-possessor' and 'substance-possessor' can be distinguished merely in terms of their modes, namely, the jar in the first case, and substance in the second case. There is, therefore, no need for the concept of limiter of modenness at all.

In reply to this argument for the simpler theory of cognitions Gadādhara points out that this theory is inadequate for more complex cases. Gadādhara gives examples of two conjunctive cognitions, 'substance-possessing is the ground and the jar' and 'jar-possessing is the ground and substance'. Now, in both these examples, it is *the jar* which is cognised *once as a substance and again as a jar*. So in both these cognitions substance-ness and jar-ness are the two modes of the jar, and the jar is the mode of the ground in both the cognitions. So if cognitions are to be differentiated only in terms of the modes then these two different cognitions cannot be distinguished for the modes are really, factually, the same in both. It is, therefore, necessary to introduce two concepts of limiter of modenness, or modes of modes, in order to exhibit the structure of the cognised complex. If the concept of limiter of modenness be introduced in exhibiting the structure of the cognised complex, then more structure will be revealed, and cognitions will be distinguished in all cases. Of the two examples under consideration, in the first cognition, though the mode is factually the jar still it is cognised as a substance; i.e., the modenness resident in the jar is limited by substance-ness, while in the second cognition, the modenness resident in the jar is limited by jarness. Hence the two cognitions are different, for their modennesses are different, being limited by different limitors, i.e. the modes being cognised differently under different higher order modes in the two cognitions.

14.1 Conclusion

Text: Vastutas tu ghaṭatvādi-niṣṭha-prakāratā-nirūpitatvam eva ghaṭādi-prakāratāyāṃ ghaṭatvādy-avacchinna-tvam. Na ca prakāratā-viśeṣyatayor eva nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvo na tu prakāratayor apī ti vācyam. Tatra ghaṭādi-niṣṭhāyāḥ bhūtalādi-niṣṭha-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakāratāyā eva ghaṭatvādi-prakāratā-nirūpita-viśeṣyatātmakatvāt tādṛśa-prakāratayor nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvō-papatteḥ.

Translation: Really the modeness of the jar, etc. being limited by jarness etc. is simply being determined by the modeness resident in jarness etc.

It cannot be said that the determiner-determined relation holds only between modeness and qualificandumness, but not between two modenesses.

For, in this case, only the modeness which is resident in the jar and is determined by the qualificandumness resident in the ground is identical with the qualificandumness determined by the modeness resident in jarness. Hence the determiner-determined relation can hold between such modenesses.

Explanation: Gadādhara has distinguished between two kinds of modenesses — modeness limited by a property (limitor) and modeness not so limited. Now the question arises: what is it for a modeness to be limited by a limitor? Gadādhara's reply here is that the limitor of a modeness is itself a higher order modeness determining the lower order modeness. This simply means that a limitor of a modeness is really a mode of the mode. For example, in the cognition, 'jar-possessing is the ground' the jar is the mode of the ground, and jarness which is the limitor of modeness resident in the jar, is simply the mode of the jar. The ground has been cognised as jar-possessing and the jar has been cognised as jarness-possessing.

Now an objection to this theory of Gadādhara may be raised. It may be pointed out that the determiner-determined relation can hold only between a qualificandumness and a modeness; it does not make sense to say that one modeness determines, or is determined by, another modeness. This simply means that we can have a mode of a qualificandum but not a mode of a mode.

Gadādhara's reply to this objection amounts to pointing out that the modeness which is determined by a higher order modeness, is identical with the qualificandumness of this higher order modeness. Thus in the above example the jar is a mode relative to the ground which is its qualificandum, and is a qualificandum relative to its own mode, jarness. Thus the jar has modeness determined by the qualificandumness resident in the ground, and also a qualificandumness determined by modeness resident in jarness. The modeness resident in the jar and the qualificandumness resident in it, are, only in such cases, identical. This simply means that the jar which is a mode of the ground is the qualificandum of jarness. That is why, in such cases, one can talk of a mode of a mode.

14.2. *Some Alternative Theories*

Text: Kecit tu – ghaṭatva-prakāratā-nirūpita-viśeṣyatā-’vacchedena bhūtal-āmṣe ghaṭasya prakāratā ghaṭavad ity etādṛśa-jñāne svīkriyate, ata-evōkta-jñānāyor bhedaḥ ityāhuḥ. Taccintyam.

Translation: Some say that in the cognition ‘jar-possessing is the ground’ the modeness of the jar relative to the ground is limited by the qualificandumness determined by the modeness resident in jarness; and hence two cognitions mentioned above are distinguished.

This theory deserves serious consideration.

Explanation: Gadādhara has identified the modeness resident in the jar relative to the ground with the qualificandumness resident in it relative to jarness. Now he mentions an alternative theory according to which the modeness resident in the jar relative to the ground is not identical with the qualificandumness determined by the modeness resident in jarness, but is limited by it. This theory also can explain the difference between the two cognitions ‘substance-possessing is the ground and the jar’ and ‘jar-possessing is the ground and the substance’. Gadādhara recommends that this theory, too, merits serious thought. He does not himself offer any criticism.

14.2. *Some Alternative Theories Continued*

Text: Paretu – ghaṭavad-ity-ādy-ākāraṇaṃ viśiṣṭa-viśeṣaṇaka-jñānaṃ dvi-vidhaṃ – viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-bodhātmakaṃ, kevalaṃ viśeṣye viśeṣaṇaṃ tatra ca viśeṣaṇāntaramiti rītyā ghaṭatvādy-avagāhi ca. Tatra prathame ghaṭatvādeḥ prakāratā-’vacchadakatvam. Dvitiye tu prakāratātmaka-viśeṣyatā-nirūpitaṃ prakāratvaṃ na tu prakāratā-’vacchedakatvam api ityāhuḥ.
Sa ca viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-vicāre sphuṭībhaviṣyati.

Translation: Others say – the cognition of a qualified qualifier like ‘jar-possessing is the ground’ is of two types – a cognition of a qualified qualification, or, cognises jarness etc. only as a qualifier in a qualificandum and again a qualifier in that qualifier. Of these, in the first type, jarness is the limiter of modeness. In the second the modeness (resident in jarness) is determined by qualificandumness which is identical with the modeness (resident in the jar), but not a limiter of this modeness.

This will become clear in the discussion of qualified qualification.

Explanation: Gadādhara mentions here another theory of limiter of modeness. According to this theory a complex cognition of the form 'jar-possessing is the ground' has a qualified qualifier. A cognition of this form can be analysed in two ways:

- (i) The jar is the qualifier of the ground but itself is qualified by jarness. Thus it is a cognition of '¹(jarness-qualified-jar) – qualified – ²ground'.

Here one forms first the qualified cognition of jarness as qualifying the jar and next this whole becomes a qualifier of the ground. Here jarness becomes the limiter of the modeness resident in the jar relative to the ground.

- (ii) The other way of analysing the same complex cognition is to have first the jar as a qualifier of the ground, and then to have jarness as the qualifier of the jar. So we have here first the cognition 'jar-possessing is the ground' and then jar-ness as the qualifier of the jar – jarness-possessing-jar-possessing is the ground, i.e. ²jarness – qualified – jar – ¹qualified-ground.

The difference between the first and the second analyses lies in this – in the first analysis the qualifier of the ground is itself a qualified entity; while in the second it is merely the jar, which, *then*, is qualified by jarness.

- First Analysis: (i) jarness qualified jar
 (ii) (jarness-qualified-jar) qualified ground
 Second Analysis: (i) jar-qualified-ground
 (ii) jarness-qualified-jar
 ≡ jarness-qualified-jar-qualified-ground.

Thus although the resulting cognitions are the same in both, still the complex cognitions are not the same, because they have been produced differently.

Now the advocates of this new theory hold that only in the first case, jarness is the limiter of the modeness resident in the jar. In the second case, however, jarness is not the limiter of the modeness resident in the jar, but has modeness determined by the qualificandumness which is identical with modeness resident in the jar.

In the second analysis (i) the jar is the mode of the ground, hence, has modeness relative to the ground.

In (ii) jar is the qualificandum of jarness, has qualificandum-ness relative to jarness, i.e. jarness is the mode of the jar, has modeness relative to the jar.

Thus the jar has both modeness (relative to the ground) and qualificandumness (relative to jariness), and these two are identical.

This modeness resident in the jar is, therefore, *determined* by the qualificandumness which is identical with the modeness resident in the jar. So jariness is not *the* limiter of modeness. That is, in this analysis, jariness is simply a mode of the jar but is not a limiter of the modeness resident in the jar.

XVIII. KINDS OF QUALIFICANDUMNESS

15. *Distinction Between Limitor of Characterisedness and Modeness*

Text: Viśeṣyatā ca kvacin niravacchinnā kvacicca viśeṣaṇāntarā-
'vacchinnā. Tatra nirdharmitā-'vacchedake ghaṭa ity-ādy-ākāraka-
jñāne ghaṭatvādi-prakāratā-nirūpita-viśeṣyatā niravacchinnā. Ayaṃ
ghaṭa ity-ādy-ākāraka-sa-dharmitā-'vacchedakaka-ghaṭatvādi-
viśiṣṭa-buddhau ca ghaṭa-tvādi-prakāratā-nirūpita-viśeṣyatā
idantvādy-avacchinnā. Ata eva idantvā-dikaṃ tatra dharmitā-
'vacchedakam ity uccate, viśeṣyatā-'vacchedakatāyā eva dharmitā-
'vacchedakatā padārthatvāt. Viśeṣyatā-nirūpitam avacchedakatvaṃ
ca na tan-nirūpita-prakāratvam, tathā sati ghaṭa-ity-ādi-jñāne
'yaṃ ghaṭa ityādi-jñāne ca ghaṭatvasya dharmitā-'vacchedakatvā
patteḥ nirdharmitā-'vacchedaka-viśiṣṭa-buddhi vilopa-prasaṅgāc
ca, kintu pratiyogitvādi-nirūpitā-'vacchedakatva-vat svarūpa-
viśeṣaḥ padārthāntaram eva vā.

Translation: Qualificandumness, too, is sometimes not limited (by any limiter), and sometimes limited by another qualifier. Of these, in the cognition of the form 'the jar' without any limiter of characterisedness, the qualificandumness determined by modeness resident in jariness is not limited (by any limiter). In the cognition of the form 'this (is a) jar' — a qualified cognition having jariness with the limiter of characterisedness the qualificandumness determined by the modeness resident in jariness is limited by thisness. Hence thisness etc. in such a case, is called 'limitor of characterisedness, the limiter of the qualificandumness is the same reality as the limiter of characterisedness. Limitorness determined by (i.e. of) qualificandumness is not modeness determined by it; if this were the case, then in the cognition 'the jar' etc. and the cognition 'this is a jar', jariness

would be limitor of characterisedness, and qualified cognitions without limitor of characterisedness would be impossible. But limitorness is of the nature of a term, or an independent reality like the limitorness determined by (i.e. of) counterpositiveness.

Explanation: Like two kinds of modeness, there are two kinds of qualificandumness — one not limited by any limitor, the other so limited. As an example of the first kind, Gadādhara analyses the cognition 'the jar'. The objective structure of this cognition is as follows:

- A
- (i) The qualificandum — the jar
 - (ii) The qualifier — jarness
 - (iii) The limitor of qualificandumness — nil
 - (iv) The limitor of qualificierness — nil
 - (v) The relation between the qualifier and the qualificandum — inherence.

Thus this is an example of a degenerate cognition without any limitor either to the qualificandum-ness or to the qualificierness. This is why this was given earlier as an example of a cognition without any limitor of qualificierness.

A very important point about cognitions in Indian philosophy in general and Navya-Nyāya in particular has to be noted. In Western philosophy 'the jar' will not express any judgement at all. In a judgement something must be *asserted* of something. A declarative sentence expresses a judgment and hence contains a finite verb which expresses assertion. So a sentence is radically different from a list of names.

Now according to Navya-Nyāya a list of words like 'the jar, the ground, contact' expresses a (conjunctive) cognition as much as the single term 'the jar'. One wonders how this can express a cognition without an element for assertion. 'The jar' does not assert anything. This puzzlement over cognition in Indian philosophy in general and Navya-Nyāya in particular is due to an inadequate understanding of the nature of cognition in these philosophies. There are two fundamentally different types of analysis of cognition (knowledge) — one in terms of objects under modes of cognition; the other in terms of saying something about something.

(i) According to the first type of analysis, something is cognised *as* something — there is no assertion here; *a as b-possessing* expresses this sort of cognition without *asserting* b-ness of *a*. B-ness is, of course, attributed

to *a*, but this attribution is not in the form of an assertion, but only in the form of a compound term. So 'the jar' expresses the cognition — something *as* jar-ness-possessing. Thus the fundamental difference made between two types of cognition in Indian philosophy is that between a cognition in which an object is not cognised under a mode and a cognition in which an object is cognised under a mode. Thus in the second type of cognition, called determinate or qualified cognition, an object as related to another is cognised. To be related, again, is not to pass from an object to a fact in the sense of the *Tractatus*. By being related to something, one object becomes a qualified object. The brown table and the table being brown are one and the same qualified object. Thus the Navya-Nyāya concept of determinate or qualified cognition corresponds roughly to that of proposition in the sense of Johnson, which contains only a characterising tie, but no assertive tie. Analysis of the meaning of a sentence in Indian philosophy does not reveal any assertive element; for what the hearer understands by hearing a sentence is analysed into a complex object with a qualifier. To cognise something as related to something is not to assert anything, but to cognise something *as* characterised by something, not that something *is* characterised by something. According to Navya-Nyāya, no uncharacterised object, no object in isolation, can be denoted by any word or term. Hence even a single word denotes an object as characterised by some property which is therefore an object of qualified, i.e. determinate, cognition.

After this long digression, let us return to the topic under discussion. 'The jar', expresses a cognition of something as qualified by jar-ness, *as* jar-ness-possessing. 'This (is a) jar', on the other hand, expresses a more complex cognition — something as this-ness-possessing cognised as jar-ness-possessing. Here we have the following elements:

- (i) The qualificandum — this
- (ii) The limitor of qualificandumness — thisness
- (iii) The qualifier — jar-ness
- (iv) The limitor of qualificierness — nil
- (v) The relation — identity.

Here, because of (ii), the qualificandumness is limited by thisness. The qualificandum here is characterised by the limitor of qualificandumness; hence this limitor is also called the limitor of characterisedness.

Now the question arises what should be the relation between the limitor

of qualificandumness and the mode of the qualificandum. The limitorness is determined by the qualificandumness but this is not the same as the modenness determined by the qualificandumness. The reason for distinguishing between limitorness and qualificierness, although both are determined by the same qualificandumness, is this. If they were identified then in the cognition 'the jar' in which jar-ness is the mode must be regarded as the limitor of qualificandumness, too. But as we have already seen this cognition does not have any limitor of qualificandumness. So also in the cognition 'this (is a) jar', jar-ness is the mode but cannot be regarded as the limitor of qualificandumness. As there cannot be any qualified cognition without a mode, if the mode were identified with the limitor of qualificandumness, then there cannot be any qualified cognition without a limitor of its qualificandumness. But Navya-Nyāya admits such cognitions, hence the mode and the limitor of qualificandumness cannot be identified.

In a cognition of the form '*a* is *b*-possessing', *a* is qualified by *b*, i.e. *b* is the qualifier of *a*; *a*-ness is the limitor of the qualificandum-ness which is resident in *a*, and which is determined by the mode-ness (qualifier-ness) resident in *b*.

Now to say that *a* is qualified by *b*, is to say that *a* is characterised by *b*. Thus *a* is the qualificandum of *b*, and is characterised by *b*. Thus *a*-ness which is the limitor of qualificandum-ness resident in *a*, is the same as the limitor of characterisedness resident in *a*.

This limitor-ness resident in *a*-ness is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in *a*. But this limitor-ness cannot be regarded also as mode-ness resident in *a*-ness; i.e. the limitor of qualificandumness is not a mode. If the limitorness determined by the qualificandumness were identical with modenness so determined, then everything which has modenness would have limitorness. Thus in the cognitions of the forms 'the jar' and "This is a jar" etc. the jar-ness which is a mode of the jar, would also be the limitor of the qualificandum-ness resident in the jar. Thus cognition with unlimited qualificandum-ness would be impossible, for every qualified cognition necessarily has a mode, and hence would have a limitor of qualificandum-ness. The limitorness determined by qualificandumness may be regarded either as reducible to the limitor, or as a separate ontological (abstract) entity, just as limitor-ness of counterpositiveness can be conceived in either way.

15.1. *Alternative Theories of Others*

Text: Athavā prakāratā-viśeṣa eva tat, anyathā sa-dharmitā-’vacchedaka-jñānasya dharmitā-’vacchedaka-prakāratatvō papattaye tan-niṣṭha taj-jñāniya-prakāratā-’ntara-kalpane gauravāt. Na ca jñānāntara-klpta-tad-dharma-niṣṭha-prakāratayaivō-papatter nātirikta-prakāratā-kalpanam iti vācyam. Evam api tad-dharmitā-’vacchedaka-samāna-viśayatākānanta-jñāneṣu tādṛśa-prakārata-pratīyogitva-kalpanā-’pekṣayā tāvat-sādhāraṇaika-dharmitā-’vacchedakatāyām prakāratātva-kalpane lāghavāt. Na caivam ayam ghaṭa ityādi-jñāne idantvādeḥ sva-syā ’pi dharmitā-’vacchedakatvā pattir iti tato ’yamayam ityādyākāraka-smaraṇa-prasaṅga iti vācyam. Yatas tadīya-prakāratā-nirūpitāyā-dharmitā-’vacchedakatāyā āśraya eva tadīya-dharmitā-’vacchedakaḥ, ukta-sthale ca dantvaniṣṭha-dharmitā-’vacchedakatāyāḥ svātmaka-prakāratāyām nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvo-virahān nā-’tiprasaṅgaḥ. Na caivam api idantvādikam ghaṭatvāder api dharmitā-’vacchedakam na syāt, tan-niṣṭha-dharmitā-’vacchedakatāyā ghaṭatvādi-prakāratāyā api nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāve mātā-’bhāvāt, paramparayā nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvasya ca prakṛte ’pi sattvād iti vācyam. Etad anurodhenaiva dharmitā-’vacchedakatva-viśeṣaṇīya-prakāratvayor-api nirūpya-nirūpaka-bhāvō pagamāt. Yat-prakāratā-nirūpitatvā-’vacchedena viśeṣyatāyā yad-avacchedyatvam sa eva tad-dharmitā-’vacchedakaḥ. Ukta-sthale ca sva-prakāratā-nirūpitatvā-’vacchedena na viśeṣyatāyās svā-’vacchedyatvam ato na svāmṣe svasya dharmitā-’vacchedakatvā pattir itya pyāhuḥ.

Translation: Or, that is indeed a kind of modeness; otherwise in order to explain how a cognition with a limiter of characterised-ness can have this limiter as its mode, one has to postulate a different modeness of that cognition resident in that. But this makes the theory heavy.

It cannot also be said that in order to explain how such a cognition can have a modeness of that, it is sufficient to postulate a modeness resident in that property necessarily implied by a different cognition, and hence there is no need to postulate an additional modeness.

For, even then in an infinite number of cognitions with similar objecthood to the limiter of characterisedness resident in that, to postulate modeness-ness

in one limitor-ness of the characterised-ness common to all will be lighter than to postulate successor-ness to modeness of that kind.

It cannot also be said that in the cognition 'this is a jar' this-ness would become its own limitor of characterised-ness and hence from that a memory-cognition of the form 'this (is) this', would follow.

For the limitor of the characterised-ness, resident in that, is really the locus of the limitorness of the characterised-ness, determined by the modeness resident in that. In the case mentioned above, between the limitor-ness of the characterised-ness resident in this-ness and the modeness which is identical with the characterised-ness, there is no relation of determiner-determined-ness. And hence there is no wider application.

It cannot be also said that — this-ness would not be the limitor of characterisedness even of jar-ness, as there is no justification for assuming the determiner-determinedness relation between the limitorness of characterised-ness, resident in that, and the modeness resident in jar-ness. If the relation of determiner-determined-ness be regarded as indirect then even in the present case this relation will hold.

For the sake of this, the determiner-determined-ness relation has to be assumed to hold between limitorness of characterisedness and the modeness of the qualifier. The limitor of characterised-ness of that is only that which limits the qualificandum-ness covered by determinedness by modeness of that. In the above example, thisness cannot be regarded as the limitor of its own characterisedness, as it is not the case that the qualificandum-ness as covered by determinedness by modeness of itself, is limited by itself. This is also what they (the propounders of this alternative theory) say.

Explanation: Gadādhara has not accepted that the limitor of qualificandumness is a mode but is now granting that this theory, too, is tenable. In the cognition '*a* is characterised by *b*' *a*-ness is the limitor of characterised-ness resident in *a*. But this cognition is also a cognition in which this limitor is *also* a mode of *a*. To explain this aspect of the cognition, Gadādhara explains an alternative theory which we now explain.

As *a*-ness, the limitor of characterisedness resident in *a*, is also a mode of *a*, it will be simpler to postulate modeness in this limitor (i.e. to postulate that to be the limitor is the same as to be a mode); for, otherwise, one will have to postulate an additional modeness resident in the limitor which will make the theory heavier.

Now it may be argued in favour of a separate modeness in the limitor

that this modeness need not be an additional modeness. For, we may hold that *a-ness* has been cognised as a mode of *a* in a different cognition. For example, in the cognition of the form '*a*', *a-ness* is the mode of *a*, there being no limitor of qualificandum-ness or characterisedness in this cognition. It may be claimed that the modeness of *a-ness* when it has been cognised as the limitor of characterisedness as in the cognition '*a* is characterised by *b*' is really the modeness common to the other cognitions in which *a-ness* was cognised as a mode of *a*. Therefore, no additional modeness in *a-ness* has to be postulated to explain how *a-ness* which is the limitor of characterisedness resident in *a* is also a mode of *a*, for this modeness is really the modeness of the other cognition.

The reply to this argument is that it makes the theory heavy. Take, for example, the case of an infinite number of cognitions having objecthood similar to the limitor of characterisedness of a cognition. We may, for example, cognise '(this is a) jar' any number of times, and hence have any number of cognitions having so many this-nesses as limitors of characterisedness. But all these cognitions will have this-ness as their modes. Now if we accept the proposed theory, then we shall have to postulate *having* this-ness as the mode by all these infinite cognitions. That is, an infinite number of cognitions will have to be related to the mode-ness resident in *a-ness*. It will be much simpler to suppose that in all these cognitions, there is one common this-ness as the limitor of characterisedness and this one limitor is the mode in all of them; one has to postulate modeness-ness in one limitor-ness of characterised-ness common to all such cognitions.

It may be objected to this identification of the limitor of characterised-ness with modeness that this-ness would become its own limitor of characterisedness, in the cognition 'this is a jar'; for this-ness is the limitor of characterisedness resident in this. The objection is that this-ness would become its own limitor of characterisedness; hence the cognition 'this is a jar' would produce the memory cognition of 'this is this'.

The reply to this objection requires an analysis of the concept of the limitor of characterisedness *belonging to, being of*, something. The limitor of characterisedness is the locus of this limitorness. The limitor of characterisedness is *of* that, the modeness of which determines the limitorness of the limitor. In the cognition, 'this is a jar', this-ness is the limitor of

characterisedness *of this*, for the limitorness resident in this limitor is determined by the modeness (resident in thisness) *of this*. This-ness is *not* the limitor of characterisedness *of this-ness*, because the limitorness resident in the limitor (this-ness), is not determined by the modeness *of this-ness* — the modeness resident in this-ness is ontologically the same reality as the limitorness resident in it. This simply means that this-ness is *a mode* of this only *as a limitor of characterisedness* resident in this. So this-ness is not the limitor of characterised-ness of itself.

In the cognition of the form '*a* is characterised by *b*', *a-ness* is the limitor of characterisedness not merely *of a*, but also *of b*. For *a* is characterised not merely by *a-ness*, but also by *b*. So *a* has characterisedness by *b*, too. Hence the limitor of characterisedness resident in *a* is that *of b*. To explain this admitted fact, the definition of 'the limitor of characterisedness of *a*' has to be modified. Let the *qualificandum-ness* resident in *a* be limited by *a-ness*. Now *a-ness* will be the limitor of characterisedness *of that* which has the property of being determined by the modeness *of that*. As *b* also is a mode of *a*, *a-ness* which is the limitor of characterisedness resident in *a*, has its limitorness determined by the modeness resident in *b*, because *b* is a mode of *a*. Being determined by mode₁ is different from being determined by mode₂. In deciding *of* which the limitor of characterisedness is the limitor, we have to take into account *all* these different determinednesses by different modes. Hence the limitor of characterised-ness resident in *a* will be *of every characteristic*, of every mode of *a*. Thus *a-ness* is the limitor of characterised-ness resident in *a* *of b*, i.e. *a-ness* is the limitor of characterised-ness resident in what is characterised by *b*.

XIX. VARIATION OF QUALIFICANDUMNESS

16. *Conjunctive Cognition and Other Types of Cognition*

Text: Viśeṣyatā ca samūhālambane prakāra-bhedād bhidyate samūhālambanasya pratyeka-prakāraka-jñāna-sāmagrī-samāja-niyatatayā pratyeka-prakāraka-jñāniya-nānā-viśeṣyatā-pratiyogitvasyaiva . tatra sattvāt. Ayam ghaṭo, daṇḍi kuṇḍalītyādy-ākārakaika-dharmitā-'vacchedakā-'para-dharma-prakāraka-jñāne dharmitā-

'vacchedakatāyāḥ prakāratā-viśeṣyatva-mate ubhaya-prakāratā-nirūpitā ekaiva viśeṣyatā. Dharmitā-'vacchedake jñānāntara-sādhāraṇa-prakāratā-svikāra-kalpe tu prakāra-bhedena viśeṣyatā-bhedah. Yadi ca samūhālambana-vilakṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā-'vacchedaka-bhāvā-'nāpanna-khadga-kunḍalā-dy-ubhaya-viśiṣṭa-viṣayakaḥ khadgī kunḍalī Caitra ity-ādy-ākāraka-bodhō 'nubhava-siddhas tadā tatrā 'py-ubhaya-prakāratā-nirūpitaika-viśeṣyatā, anyathā samūhālambanāt tad-vailakṣaṇyā-'nupatteḥ. Evaṃ mithō viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā-'vacchedaka-bhāvā 'nāpanna-khadga-kunḍalō-bhaya-dikaṃ yatra śauryādi-dharmitā-'vacchedakatayā bhāṣate, khadgī kunḍalī Caitraś śura ity-ādy-ākārake tādṛśa-bodhe ca khadga-kunḍalō-bhaya-dy-prakāratā-nirūpitaika-viśeṣyatā, tādṛśa-viśeṣyatā ca tādṛśō-bhaya-dy-avacchinna-śauryādi-prakāratā-nirūpita-viśeṣyatatā bhinnā veti tu pūrvokta-vad-ūhanīyam. Evaṃ khadgā-dyekatara-dharmitā-'vacchedakatā pannasyaivā 'parasya kunḍalāder vidheya-dharmitā-'vacchedakatvaṃ yatra, tatra khadgādi-prakāratā-nirūpita-kunḍalā-dy-avacchinna-viśeṣyatā-vidheya-prakāratā-nirūpitō-bhaya-dharmā-'vacchinna-viśeṣyatayor bhedah, anyathā mitho viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā-'vacchedaka-bhāvā-nāpanna-khadga-kunḍalō-bhaya-dharmā-'vacchinna-viśeṣyaka-śauryādi-vidheyaka-bodha eva tatra svātantryeṇa kunḍalasya khadga-dharmitā-'vacchedakatayā bhāṇaṃ tādṛśa-samūhālambanāt tasya vailakṣaṇyā-'nupapatteḥ. Evañ ca sati khadgādeḥ khadgādi-prakāratā-nirūpita-viśeṣyatāyā avacchedakatve 'pi yathā na tasya svadharma-dharmitā-'vacchedakatvaṃ tathō-papāditam prāg eva. Tatrōkta-viśeṣyate bhinne eva, kintv eka-viśeṣyatā 'para-viśeṣyatā-vacchedaka-bhāvā panne ti samūhālambanād viśeṣa ity apy āhuḥ.

Translation: In conjunctive cognition the qualificandumness varies with the modes. A conjunctive cognition is regularly produced by the collection of the totality of causal factors of cognition having each as its qualifier; and hence there are different successor-nesses to qualificandumnesses of each of the cognitions having modes in that (conjunctive) cognition. In the cognition of the form 'this is a jar', 'stick-possessing (is) ear-ring-possessing', etc. where the limiter of characterisedness is one property and the mode

is another, there will be one qualificandum-ness determined by both modenesses according to those who admit a kind of modeness in the limitor of characterisedness.

Those who hold that the modeness in the limitor of characterisedness is that which is common to a different cognition, are of the view that the qualificandum differs with different modes.

If, however, a cognition of the form 'sword-possessing, ear-ring-possessing (is) Caitra' which is different from conjunctive cognition, not having the modes related as limitors of qualificandumness and qualifiers, but having as its object qualified by both sword and ear-ring, is really evidenced by introspection, then, even there will be one qualificandumness determined by two quali-fi-nesses. Otherwise there will be no difference of this type of cognition from conjunctive cognition.

So also in a cognition of the form 'sword-possessing, ear-ring-possessing (is) brave Caitra' in which both the sword and the ear-ring, not mutually related as qualifier and limitor of qualificandumness, are yet cognised as the limitor of characterisedness of bravery, there, too, there will be one qualificandumness determined by the modeness of both sword and ear-ring. Whether this qualificandum-ness is, or is not, different from the qualificandum-ness determined by modeness of bravery limited by those two, is to be decided as stated earlier.

Thus where the sword, etc. acquires limitorness of characterisedness of the other, and ear-rings, etc. acquire the limitorness of the predicative characterisedness, there the qualificandumness determined by the modeness of the sword and limited by ear-ring, and the qualificandumness limited by both properties and determined by predicative modeness are the same. Otherwise this cognition cannot be distinguished from the following conjunctive cognition which, (i) has its qualificandumness limited by both the sword and the ear-rings which are not mutually related as qualifier and limitor of a qualificandumness, and (ii) has bravery as its predicate, and (iii) in which the ear-rings are cognised independently as the limitor of the characterisedness of the sword.

So also the sword etc. has limitorness of qualificandumness determined by modeness resident in the sword etc. Why, then, does it not have limitorness of characterisedness resident in itself has been explained earlier. It may

also be said that the two qualificandumnesses mentioned there are, indeed, different; but one qualificandumness is the limiter of the other qualificandumness, hence that cognition is different from a conjunctive cognition.

Explanation: In this paragraph, very important distinctions between different types of qualified cognition admitted in Navya-Nyāya are explained. We first note these different types of cognitions and then their differences in terms of limitors of qualificandum-ness, characterised-ness, predicative modeness etc.

(1) The *usual type* of qualified cognition is of the form 'b-possessing (is) a', where *a* is the qualificandum, *a-ness* the limiter of characterisedness and *b* is the mode. (a) Those who hold that the limiter of characterisedness, i.e. *a-ness*, is also a mode admit two modes of the qualificandum i.e. of *a*; according to them, this cognition is the cognition of *a* cognised under the mode of *a-ness* as cognised under the second mode, *b*. Thus *a* has *one* qualificandumness determined by both the modenesses — one resident in *a-ness* and the other resident in *b*. (b) Those who hold that the limiter of characterised-ness has modeness common to a different cognition, hold that the analysis of the cognition 'b-possessing (is) a' is different; *a-ness* is, of course, a mode of *a*, but the modeness resident in *a-ness*, the limiter of characterisedness resident in *a*, is due to a different cognition. Thus the qualificandum-ness determined by *a-ness* and that determined by *b* are *different* qualificandum-nesses. In this cognition, *a* has *two qualificandum-nesses*, although *a* is the *qualificandum* of both *a-ness* and *b*.

(2) There is, however, an altogether different type of qualified cognition, namely, *conjunctive* cognition. A conjunctive cognition is of the form '(the) jar and (the) ground'. We have already explained that a cognition of '(the) jar' is a qualified cognition without limiter of qualificandum-ness or characterised-ness; but it does have a mode, namely, jar-ness. So also with the cognition of '(the) ground'. Thus, a conjunctive cognition is a cognition in which qualificandum-ness resident in the jar (which is determined by jar-ness, the mode of the first conjunct), is different from the qualificandum-ness resident in the ground, determined by ground-ness. Thus in a conjunctive cognition of this type there will be as many qualificanda as there are conjuncts.

(3) A different type of cognition is that in which there are two or more *unrelated* modes of the same qualificandum. The example of such a type of

cognition is 'Catira (is) sword-possessing and ear-ring-possessing', Navya-Nyāya philosophers usually interpret a cognition of this type as an instance of conjunctive cognition. For it is naturally analysable into 'Caitra (is) sword-possessing and (is) ear-ring-possessing'. But there are some Navya-Nyāya philosophers who hold that a cognition of this type is not a conjunctive cognition. Whether this cognition is of a different type can be ascertained only in introspection. If someone claims that in his introspection, he finds that this type of cognition is different from conjunctive cognition, then an explanation of this difference will be necessary. Gadādhara gives this explanation here without deciding the issue whether this type of cognition is, or is not, a conjunctive cognition. He merely says that if this is introspectively cognised as a cognition different from a conjunctive cognition, then the following analysis will be valid. We first note the exact nature of this type of cognition.

(i) This cognition has two modes, sword and ear-rings which are not related to each other as a qualifier and the limiter of qualificandum-ness. In the ordinary type of qualified cognition of type (1) like '(the) sword-possessing (person) is ear-ring-possessing', the sword is the limiter of qualificandum-ness and ear-ring is the qualifier, and both of them are modes of the same person. Here the two modes are related in the way stated. But in the present case the two modes, sword and ear-ring are *not* thus *related*, and both are qualifiers of Caitra. Then both are modes of Caitra, their common qualificandum. The qualificandum-ness resident in Caitra, and determined by the mode-ness resident in sword, and that determined by the modeness resident in ear-rings, are one. For if these qualificandumnesses are regarded as different, then the cognition would become the conjunctive cognition, 'Caitra is sword-possessing and Caitra is ear-ring-possessing', where two qualificandum-nesses are resident in Caitra. So to differentiate this type of cognition from the corresponding conjunctive cognition, the qualificandum-ness in the former has to be regarded as one qualificandum-ness relative to two modes.

Now Gadādhara gives a more complex example, 'sword-possessing, ear-ring-possessing (is) brave Caitra'. In this cognition sword and ear-ring are not related to each other as qualifier and limiter of qualificandumness. This means Caitra is not cognised as the sword-possessor having the ear-rings.


But both sword and ear-rings are cognised as the limiter of characterisedness of bravery, i.e. of characterisedness resident in the brave, namely, Caitra.

Diagrammatic Presentation of Different Forms of Cognition:

A. Cognition without modes

- (i) Jarness
- (ii) Jar-jarness (one amorphous unanalysed whole)
- (iii) Jar Jarness (two unrelated objects)

B. Cognition with modes




There are two interpretations of how many qualificandum-nesses are in the ground.

(4)

Conjunctive Cognition

Form 1.

'(the) jar and
(the) ground'



Two independent qualificanda, with two unrelated qualificandumnesses, resident in two different objects, determined by two independent modenesses resident in two unrelated modes.


Form 2.

'stick-possessing,
ear-ring-possessing
(is) Caitra'

Symbolised as
'Sc & Ec'

Where


x possesses a stick = Sx
x possesses ear-rings = Ex
Caitra = c.



Caitra has two different qualificandumnesses, one determined by the modeness resident in stick, the other determined by the modeness resident in ear-ring.

Form 3(a)

'Stick-possessing
ear-rings-possessing
(is) Caitra' =
'(Stick and ear-ring)-
possessing Caitra'
Symbolised as
(S & E) c.




Here, too, Caitra has the same two qualificandumnesses as in Form 2.

Form 2 and Form 3(a) are the same conjunctive cognition.

Non-conjunctive Cognition

Form 3(b)




Where Caitra has one qualificandum-ness limited by both stick and ear-rings. Thus 'Sc & Ec' is different from '(S & E)c' where there is only qualification (predication) while in 'Sc & Ec' there are two qualifications (predications). The difference between 3(a) and 3(b) is admitted only by some Navya-Nyāya philosophers.

In Western logic the example:

- (S 1) sword-possessing, ear-ring-possessing Caitra (is) brave will be symbolised as a conjunction with one more conjunct than in Form 2, thus:

Sc & Ec & Bc.


Yet Navya-Nyāya dealing with *cognitions*, has a different interpretation of a cognition of the Form (S 1).



Although there are three modes of Caitra, still these modes are not unrelated in the cognition. Sword and ear-ring are the limitors of characterisedness of bravery, i.e. of characterisedness resident in the brave, i.e. Caitra. This merely means that the sword and ear-rings are modes of Caitra as indicative of bravery which, too, characterises him. Here, there are two qualificandumnesses in Caitra, instead of three – having a sword, having ear-rings and bravery, – for the sword and the ear-rings are taken together as one mode. The two qualificandumnesses resident in Caitra are:

- (a) the qualificandum-ness determined by the modeness of both the sword and the ear-rings
- (b) the qualificandum-ness determined by the modeness of bravery which is resident in and is limited by both the sword and the ear-rings.

The same example is interpreted differently from Form 4.




Here, (i) the sword has become the limiter of characterisedness of ear-rings, i.e. the characterised-ness which resides in Caitra as ear-ring-possessor. (ii) Ear-rings, again, have become the limiter of predicative characterisedness of bravery, i.e. the characterised-ness resident in Caitra of whom bravery is predicated. Thus here there are two qualificandum-nesses:

- (i) The qualificandum-ness, resident in Caitra, determined by the modeness resident in sword and limiter by ear-rings.

This is because ear-rings have become here the limiter of qualificandumness resident in Caitra, and the sword has become his (i.e. the ear-ring-possessor's) mode. (Caitra, the ear-ring-possessor, has the sword.)

- (ii) The qualificandum-ness, resident in Caitra, determined by the modeness of the predicate (bravery), and limited by both the sword and the ear-rings.

This is because both the ear-rings, and the sword have become limitors of characterisedness resident in Caitra as brave, i.e. are the limiter of the characterisedness of bravery which is the predicate of Caitra. These two qualificandum-nesses are to be identified, for, it is argued by some that, otherwise, this cognition cannot be distinguished from the following *conjunctive* cognition.



Here there are two cognitions (a) and (b) which are conjoined giving rise to the conjunctive cognition.

Cognition (a):

- (i) Sword and ear-rings *both* are limitors of qualificandum-ness resident in Caitra, i.e. the qualificandum-ness resident in Caitra is determined by modeness resident in both.

(ii) Bravery is the predicate of Caitra.

(Caitra the brave possesses both the sword and the ear-rings.)

Cognition (b) which is independent of cognition (a):

Here the sword is the limitor of characterisedness of ear-rings, i.e. of characterised-ness resident in Caitra as ear-ring-possessor. (Caitra the ear-ring-possessor possesses the sword.)

By comparing Form 5 with Form 5A, we find that (i) of 5 is the same as cognition (b) of 5A, where both the sword and the ear-rings are the modes of Caitra.

(ii) of 5 is a conjunction of (i) and (ii) of cognition (a) of 5A. Hence the problem is how to distinguish between these two different cognitions.

One answer suggested here is to hold that the two qualificandum-nesses in Form 5 are identical, but the corresponding two qualificandum-nesses of cognition (a) and cognition (b) of Form 5A are different. Hence the two cognitions are different.

The other answer is that we may admit that the two qualificandum-nesses in Form 5 are also different, but they are related by limitor-limitedness relation with each other, while those of Form 5A are unrelated and independent.

XX. PREDICATEHOOD AND QUALIFIERNESS

17. Gadādhara's Theory

Text: Itthaṃ prakāratādivat vidheyatvam api viśayatā 'ntaraṃ na tū-
kta-prakāratvam eva tat, dharmitā-'vacchedakasyā 'pi tathātvā
patteḥ.

Translation: Thus predicatehood like qualifierness, is different object-hood but not identical with qualifier-ness; for, then, even a limitor of characterised-ness will have predicatehood.

Explanation: Gadādhara has used in the previous paragraph a new concept, namely that of predicate-hood. The analysis of cognition so far has been in terms of a qualifier, a qualificandum and a relation between them. This means that every cognition has been conceived so far of something as something, some object cognised under some mode. But the concept of a predicate of a cognition, introduces an entirely new perspective for studying cognition. A predicate is usually that which is cognised about something which is the

subject. In Western philosophy a judgment, a proposition, a statement or a sentence is analysed into subject and a predicate. To know, to say, to state something of something is to *assert* something about something. In Indian philosophy in general, and Navya-Nyāya in particular, the assertive element in cognition is just certainty, a subjective state opposed to doubt or vacillation. There is no concept of logical assertion corresponding to, say, Frege's assertion sign. This is because the structure cognised, although relational, is still a complex object, never a fact in the sense of the *Tractatus*. Thus even if the concepts of subject and predicate be introduced in the analysis of cognised structure, over and above the usual concepts of qualifier, qualificandum etc. no element of assertion is introduced into cognition.

This follows from a theory of predicatehood which Gadādhara criticizes, which identifies predicatehood with qualifierness. Gadādhara's own theory is that the predicate of a cognition cannot be identified with its qualifier, i.e. predicatehood cannot be just a kind of qualifierness.

The only reason that Gadādhara adduces here in support of his theory is based on the theory that the limiter of characterisedness is also a qualifier, but cannot be regarded as a predicate. For example, in the cognition 'pot-possessing (is the) ground' ground is the qualificandum and groundness is the mode under which the ground is cognised as the qualificandum. Groundness, therefore, is the limiter of the qualificandumness or characterisedness resident in the ground. This means that unless the thing which is the ground is cognised *as* ground, it cannot be said about it that it is pot-possessing. Thus any property which functions as limiter of characterisedness, even though it is a qualifier, cannot be a predicate. It is the presupposition of any predicate being predicated of the subject.

17.1. *Different Theories of Predicatehood Examined*

Text: Atha viśeṣyatā-'vacchedakatā-bhinna-mukhya-viśeṣyatā-nirūpita-prakārataiva vidheyatā, parvato vahnimān ity-ādau ca parvatatvādī-rūpa-dharmitā-'vacchedaka-niṣṭha-prakārata dharmitā-'vacched-akatātmikaiva, dharmitā-'vacchedakatāyāḥ prakārataṭvasya vyavasthāpitatvād ato na tatra parvatatvāder vidheyatā pattih. Tādṛśa-jñāne vahnayāder iva vahnitvāder vahnī-mat-parvatavān deśa ity-ādau vahnervidheyatā-vāraṇāya mukhya-viśeṣyatā-nirūpitatvaṃ viśeṣaṇam. Mukhyatvaṃ ca viśeṣyatāyāṃ prakārata-'navacchinnatvaṃ, prakārata-bhinnatvaṃ vā. Na ca viśeṣyatā-

'vacchedakatā-bhinnatvā-dy-upasthitim vinā 'pi parvato vahnimān
ityādy anumityanantaram parvate vahnim anuminomī ty-ādy-
ākārakasya vahnnyādi-vidheyakatvā-'vagāhino 'nuvyavasāyasyō
tpatyā nirukta-prakāratāyā vidheyatātmakatvam nō papadyata
iti vācyam. Vahni-prakārakā-numititvasyaiva tādrśā-'nuvyavasāya-
viśayatvō pagamāt. Na caivam vahnimān parvato ghaṭavān ity-
anumity-anantaram api tādrśānuvyavasāyā pattir iti vācyam.
Nirukta-tan-niṣṭha-prakāratākatvasya tat-prakārakā-'numititva-
vyañjakatayā tādrśapatty-asambhavāt.

Translation: Objection: Predicatehood is just qualifier-ness which is determined by the principal qualificandum-ness and which is different from limitor-ness of qualificandum-ness. In 'fire-possessing (is the) hill' the qualifier-ness, resident in hill-ness which is the limitor of the characterised-ness is identical with the limitoriness of characterised-ness; for it has been established that the limitoriness of characterised-ness has qualifier-ness-ness, and hence hill-ness cannot be said to have predicateness here. To prevent predicate-ness of fire-ness in that cognition, and of fire in 'the country possessing the hill possessing fire' the adjective 'being determined by the principal qualificandum-ness' is given. Principal-ness of qualificandum-ness is: being not limited by qualifier-ness or being different from qualifier-ness.

It cannot be objected that even without the recollection of difference from limitoriness of qualificandumness, etc. immediately after the inference 'fire-possessing (is the) hill' the secondary cognition of the form 'I am inferring fire on the hill' cognising predicatehood of fire etc. arises; and hence predicatehood of that qualificierness is not proved.

For the objecthood of such secondary cognition is admitted only of inference-ness with fire as its qualifier.


It cannot be said that immediately after the inference of the form 'the fire-possessing hill (is) jar-possessing'. There will be a secondary cognition of that form.

For the secondary cognition having modenness resident in that merely reveals inferenceness having that as its qualifier, hence no such objection is possible.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains a theory of predicatehood which reduces it to a form of modenness. Gadādhara has already stated his opposition to this theory, still he explains the theory and its justification. The theory is this.


A predicate is a mode of the principal qualificandum and is different from the limitor of qualificandum-ness. For example, in the inference, 'fire-possessing is the hill' the hill is the qualificandum and hill-ness is a mode of the hill. But this modeness resident in the hill-ness which is the limitor of characterised-ness resident in the hill is identical with the limitor-ness of the characterised-ness. In simple language, hill-ness is the mode of the hill only as the limitor of characterised-ness resident in the hill. Hence hill-ness is not a predicate in this inferential cognition. Fire is the predicate here for it is a mode of the only qualificandum, the hill, and is different from hill-ness which is the limitor of the qualificandum-ness.

But fire-ness is not a predicate of the hill, for fire-ness is not a mode of the hill; the modeness resident in fire-ness is not determined by the qualificandumness resident in the hill. Fire-ness is a mode of the fire which is a mode of the hill. As *being the mode of* is not a transitive relation, the mode of a mode of something is not necessarily a mode of that thing. This may be explained by the following diagram:



This shows that fire is both a mode and a qualificandum — a mode relative to the hill, and a qualificandum relative to fire-ness. The mode-ness resident in fire-ness is, therefore, determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in fire. The qualificandum-ness resident in fire is not the principal qualificandum-ness. Hence fire-ness is not a predicate in the inferential cognition.

Similarly, in the cognition 'the country possessing the hill possessing fire', fire is not a predicate for the same reason. Thus:



The modeness resident in fire is determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the hill; but this qualificandum-ness is not the principal qualificandum-ness in this cognition.

The term 'principal qualificandum-ness' has been used above in the definition of a predicate of a cognition. Now what is this principal qualificandum-ness? Two answers are given corresponding to two theories of *intermediate* qualificandum-ness. The hill possesses a qualificandum-ness, relative to the fire, i.e. determined by the modeness resident in fire; but it is *also* a mode of the country; i.e. possesses modeness determined by the qualificandum-ness resident in the country. The modeness and the qualificandum-ness resident in the hill may be regarded as identical. Being a mode of the country, and being a qualificandum of fire are one and the same abstract property *ontologically*. Or, it may be held that the modeness and the qualificandum-ness (of course, relative to different things) resident in the same reality, are not identical but are mutually related as limitor-limited. The definition of principal qualificandum-ness of a cognition, has, therefore, the correspondingly different definitions:

- D1. *a* is the principal qualificandum-ness if and only if it is not identical with any modeness that may reside in it.
- D2. *a* is the principal qualificandum-ness if and only if it is not limited by modeness that may be resident in it.

Thus the qualificandum-ness resident in the country is the principal qualificandum-ness because there is no modeness resident in it at all. The qualificandum-ness resident in the hill, however, is not the principal qualificandum-ness of this cognition because it has modeness relative to the country resident in it, and the qualificandum-ness and the modeness resident in the hill are identical or related by the limitor-limited-ness relation.

Now it may be objected that a predicate cannot be identified with a mode of the cognition, for in some cases even the qualificandum becomes the predicate. The mode in a cognition is the successor of the relation cognised in that cognition. So if the converse of that relation is cognised then in this new cognition, the mode of the previous cognition becomes the qualificandum and vice versa. Yet the predicate is not affected by this interchange of the mode and the qualificandum. Thus in the inference 'fire-possessing is the hill', the hill is the qualificandum and fire the mode. But in the cognition 'fire is on the hill' it is fire which is the qualificandum and the hill the qualifier. The difference between 'a fiery-hill' and 'a hilly-fire' brings out clearly the interchange of the mode and the qualificandum. Yet in the inference of a fiery-hill fire is the predicate just as in the inference of the hill-fire. The

objector points out that the inference of the form 'fire-possessing is the hill' may be introspectively cognised as 'I am inferring fire on the hill' (i.e. hilly-fire) where the fire is no longer a mode, but the principal qualificandum. Thus there is no cognition of modeness and still fire is the predicate in the introspective cognition.

The reply to this objection is that in introspective cognition the inference with fire as its mode is cognised as such. Hence the inference 'fire-possessing is the hill' is to be introspectively cognised as 'I am inferring the hill as fiery' where the fire remains the mode of the hill even in the introspective cognition. Hence there is no difficulty in defining the predicate of the cognition as above.

A further objection to this theory is that the inference 'jar-possessing is the fiery-hill' may be cognised in introspection as a cognition with fire as the mode of the hill. Hence fire would have to be regarded as the predicate of the hill, though it is not so in this inferential cognition.

The reply to this objection is that an introspective cognition has that as its mode which is the mode of the primary cognition; for, introspective awareness merely reveals the structure of the primary cognition. Hence what is not a mode in the primary cognition cannot be so revealed in introspection.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Bhavan-mate 'pi tad-vidheyakā-'numitau yathā-kathāñ cid-upasthita-tat-tad-vidheyakatva-graha-vāraṇāya tatra tad-vidheyakatvasya hetutāyā āvaśyakatvāt. Na ca tādṛśā-'nuvyavasāye tan-niṣṭha-vilakṣaṇa-viśayatā-rūpa-vidheyatāyāḥ pratiyogitā-sambandhena hetukatva-kalpanā-peksayā nirukta-tan-niṣṭha-prakāratāyā guru-śarīrāyās tat-sambandhena hetutā-kalpane gauravād vilakṣaṇa-viśayatā-siddhir iti vācyam. Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-lāghavā-'nurodhena jātyatirikta-padārtha-siddheḥ siddhānta-viruddhatvād anyathā dhūmādi-paramarśa-janyatā-'vacchedakatayā 'py ālokādi-līṅgakā-'numiti-vyāvṛtter vilakṣaṇa-viśayatā-siddhi-prasaṅgāt. Na ca nirukta-prakāratāto 'tiriktaiva vidheyatākhyaviśayatā, anyathā dharmitā-'vacchedakatā-bhinnatvādy-anupasthiti-daśāyāṃ vahnimān parvato ghaṭavān ity-ady-anumity-anantaram parvate ghaṭam anumini na vahnim ity-ady-ākārakasya

vahni-vidheyakatvā-'bhāvā-'vagāhino 'nuvyavasāyasyā-'palāpa-
 prasaṅgāt, vahny-ādi-prakārakā-'numiti-viśayakasya tasya vahni-
 prakāratva-sāmānyā-'bhāvā-'valambanatvā-'sambhavad iti
 vācyam. Dharmitā-'vacchedakatā-bhinnatv-ādy-anupasthiti-
 daśāyām tādṛśa-pratiteḥ prāmāṇikatve nirukta-prakāratāyām
 eva vidheyatātvākhyā-dharma-viśeṣam svīkṛtya tena rūpeṇa
 nirukta-prakāratāyāḥ pratiyogitā-sambandhā-'vacchinnā-
 'bhāvasyaiva tādṛśa-pratiti-viśayatāyāḥ svīkaraṇīyatvāt.
 Bhavanmate 'pi sambandhādi-bheda-bhinna-vidheyatānām
 arūgamāyā tādṛśā-'tirikta-dharma-svīkārasyā-'vāsyakatvāt.
 Anyathā vidheyatānām anati-prasakta-sāmānya-dharmā-
 vacchinnā-'bhāvā-'sambhavena tat-tad-vyaktivā-'vacchinnā-
 'bhāva-kūṭasyaiva tādṛśa-pratīti-viśayatāyāḥ svīkaraṇīyatayā-
 'bhāva-kūṭasya viśiṣya yuga-sahasreṇā 'pi grahitum āśakyatayā
 tādṛśa-pratīter evā-'nupapatteḥ. Vidheyatā-pratiyogikā-
 'bhāvatvena tāvad-abhāvānām tad-viśayatvō-pagame tādṛśa-
 pratīteḥ pratiyogitā-'vacchedakatā-'navagāhitayā vahnim
 anumīnomī tyādi-pratīter virodhitvā-'nupapatter iti cen na.

Translation: On your theory, too, to prevent (introspective) cognition of predicatehood somehow represented in an inference not having that as the predicate, it is necessary to postulate as the cause a cognition having that as predicate.

It cannot also be said that it is heavier to postulate that the modeness which is resident in that as stated above and which has a richer structure is the cause in that relation than to postulate that predicatehood as a separate reality, resident in that, is the cause, in the relation of successorness, of the introspective cognition of that form.

For it is against Navya-Nyāya theory to postulate an additional reality other than a universal for the sake of light-ness of the causal relation. Otherwise an additional objecthood can be regarded as established in order to distinguish inference with light as its probans from limitorness of the effectness of consideration of smoke.

It cannot also be said that the objecthood called predicatehood is indeed different from the said modeness, for otherwise, in the absence of memory-cognition of difference from limitorness of characterised-ness, the introspective cognition of negation of having fire as the predicate in 'I am inferring a jar on the hill, not fire' immediately succeeding the inference 'jar-possessing

is the fiery-hill' would be impossible. For, the introspective cognition which has, as its object, inference with fire as its mode, will be impossible, if its object be the general negation of *having fire as a mode*.

In the absence of memory-cognition of difference from limitorness of characterised-ness, if that type of introspective cognition be accepted as genuine then only by ascribing predicatehoodness to the modeness as described can it be explained how the negation limited by the relation of counterpositive-ness of modeness, as that, (i.e. as possessing predicatehoodness) can the object of that kind of cognition. And this explanation is inevitable.

On your theory, too, it is necessary to postulate such an additional property in order to explain what is common to the predicatehoods which are different *not* due to difference in relations.

Otherwise, it would be impossible to have a negation limited by a common property not wider than the predicatehoods. Hence it has to be admitted that the object of that cognition is the totality of all negations limited by the particularities of the particulars; but the totality of negations as particulars cannot be cognised even in thousands of years, and hence such a cognition would be impossible.

Hence it would follow that the object of that cognition is all the negations as negations having predicatehood as their counterpositive, hence that cognition would not cognise the limitorness of the counterpositiveness. This would fail to explain how it can contradict the cognition 'I am inferring fire'.

Explanation: Here Gadādhara explains various arguments and counter-arguments about the theory that the predicate of a cognition is the mode of the principal qualificandum and different from the limitor of qualificandum-ness. The present argument was about the possibility of having an introspective cognition in which an object is cognised as predicate of the primary cognition although it was not so cognised in the primary cognition. The argument given here is that even on Gadādhara's theory it has to be admitted that predicatehood of the primary cognition is the cause of its cognition as having predicatehood in the introspective cognition. The reason for admitting such a causal connection between the predicatehood of the primary cognition and the predicatehood of the primary cognition as cognised in introspection is this. Without such a causal connection a predicatehood presented somehow in the primary cognition would be cognised as predicatehood of the primary cognition as cognised in introspection.

Next a counter-argument against this theory is given. There are two

alternatives here. (a) One is to suppose that the predicatehood postulated as an additional objecthood resident in some object will be a cause of its introspective cognition by being related to it by the successor relation. A cognition is the successor of the relation between the object and the cognition. Thus the introspective cognition will be the successor of the primary cognition which is its object. (b) The other alternative is to conceive of predicatehood as modeness determined by the principal qualificandum-ness and different from the limiter of qualificandum-ness. To regard this very complex predicatehood as causally related with its introspective cognition as its successor, is to accept a very heavy theory. For according to Navya-Nyāya a cause has to be under a specific mode in order to be a cause. Now if predicatehood be conceived as a very complex property then this very complex property becomes the limiter of cause-ness resident in the predicatehood. Thus this theory involves a very heavy property as the limiter of cause-ness of the introspective cognition.

The reply to it is that heaviness or light-ness of the limiter of causeness is a consideration relevant for determining whether a real entity is a universal or not. But this consideration is irrelevant for other purposes. This is the accepted Navya-Nyāya position.

If someone rejects this Navya-Nyāya position, then he might argue for a different objectivity in the following case. We may infer fire on the hill on the basis of smoke. Here the consideration will have smoke as its object. This consideration will also be the cause of inference. The limiter of causeness resident in this consideration will be different from the limiter of causeness resident in another consideration in which light is the probans for fire. But this postulation of a different objecthood as an independent reality will not be justified. Thus no independent reality other than universals can be postulated on the basis of limiter of cause-ness, or light-ness or heaviness of this limiter.

Another counter-argument is based upon the introspective cognition of fire not being the probandum, 'I am inferring a jar on the hill not fire' which immediately succeeds the primary inferential cognition 'jar-possessing is the fiery-hill'. Now at the time of the introspective cognition there is no memory-cognition of the so-called defining properties of predicatehood. Now in this introspective cognition the object is the negation of predicatehood of fire. But fire is a qualifier in the introspective cognition. This would be impossible if predicatehood were identified with qualifier-ness (modeness). Hence predicatehood cannot be identified with a certain kind of modeness.

Reply: It is doubtful if such introspective cognition is genuine. If it is genuine and occurs in the absence of the memory of the defining properties of predicatehood, even then there would be no difficulty in explaining the cognition of negation of predicatehood. For only by admitting predicatehood of the modeness can we explain the negation of this modeness as cognised under the mode of predicatehood, as the object of the introspective cognition. It is important to note here that when we cognise a negation of something it is necessary to cognise that something under a specific mode. Otherwise, cognition of negation of a thing would not contradict that of its presence. Thus it will be necessary even for the other theory to postulate such a limiting property of counter-positiveness resident in fire as predicate of the introspective cognition. Otherwise if such limiting property of counter-positiveness of a negation be not admitted then to explain the cognition of the negation of a jar, for example, it will be necessary to postulate a collection of particular negations which may be infinite in number. For when we say that there is no jar on the ground, we cognise the counter-positiveness resident in the jar as limited by jar-ness. This is known as general negation. If we do not rise to the level of counter-positiveness and its limiter then we shall have to say that there is the negation of this jar on the ground and the negation of that jar and so on and so forth. But in this way we can never enumerate exhaustively all the negations of particular jars, for the negations are infinite in number. So everyone has to postulate a property. As we have explained above, the cognition of the limiter of counter-positiveness, as opposed to the cognition of the simple counterpositive in the cognition of a negation of something, will fail to explain how the cognition of negation of something prevents or blocks the cognition of that thing.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Nirukta-prakāratāyā eva vidheyatāve pṛthivyām jalādi-bhedo, hrade dhūmā-'bhāva ity-ādy-ākāraka-sādhya-viśeṣyakā-'numitinām tad-vidheyakatvā-'nupapatteḥ. Tathā-vidhā-'numiti-viśeṣyatāyām vidheyatātvō pagamān neyam anupapattir iti cet. Tarhi tādrśā-'numiti-viśeṣyatāyās tat-samāna-prakāraka-samāna-viśeṣyaka-pṛthivyādi-sādhya-kā-'numitāv api sattvena tasyā api itara-bhedādi-vidheyakatvā-'patteḥ.

Translation: If modeness as described above be identified with predicatehood,

then in inferences having the probandum as qualificandum as in 'difference from water in earth', 'absence of smoke on a lake' etc. how the probanda can be predicates becomes inexplicable.

If it is said that in such inference the qualificandumness should be regarded as predicatehood, then in inferences, with earth etc. as probanda, having the same mode and the same qualificandum, such qualificandum-ness would be regarded as having difference from non-earth as its predicate.

Explanation: Gadādhara explains here an objection to the theory that modeness of a cognition, as stated above, should be identified with its predicatehood. The objection is based on a type of inference in which the probanda, instead of being the predicate, become the subject. Examples of such inferences are: difference from water (is) in earth, absence of smoke (is) on a lake, etc. These inferences are different from the other type which is of the form: 'earth is different from water', 'the lake possesses absence of smoke', where the probanda are modes. According to Navya-Nyāya, whether the probanda are modes or qualificanda in the conclusion, they remain the predicates. This is because the distinction between subject and predicate of a cognition is independent of the distinction between qualifier and qualificandum. Thus even if a probandum be a qualificandum in the conclusion of an inference, it still remains a predicate in the conclusion. Thus it appears that in *such* inferences the predicatehood has to be identified with qualificandumness, instead of with modeness.

But thus identifying the predicate with the qualificandum in the conclusion of such inferences leads to difficulties in the case of inferences where both the qualificandum and the mode are the same. For example in the inference where the conclusion is '(there is) difference from non-earth in earth', where earth, being the mode of the right type, is the predicate.

Now the conclusion '(there is) difference from non-earth in earth' can be interpreted in two ways,

- (i) as having difference from non-earth as the probandum; or
- (ii) as having earth as the probandum, difference from non-earth which is the qualificandum and also the probandum in (i) would become the predicate even in (ii), which is absurd; for the predicate in the conclusion is the probandum, here in (ii) earth is the probandum.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Atha pṛthivyādi-pakṣaka-tādṛśā-'numiti-tat-sādhya-ka-tādṛśā-'numityor bhinna-bhinnaiva tādṛśī viśeṣyatā, evaṁ ca sādhyā-viśeṣyakā-'numiti-viśeṣyatāyām eva vidheyatātvam abhyupeyata iti noktā-'tiprasanga iti cen na.

Translation: Now, the qualificandumness in an inference with earth as its locus and the qualificandumness in an inference with earth as probandum are different; hence predicatehood-ness has to be ascribed to the qualificandum-ness only in inferences having the probandum as the qualificandum. So there is no too-wide-ness of the definition.

Explanation: The difficulty of the theory that the predicate be identified with the qualificandum of the conclusion if it is the probandum was that in inferences where the qualificandum and the mode are the same *thing* interchanged, but the probanda differ, it will not be clear with which to identify the predicate. Now the answer is that inferences with earth as the locus and inferences with earth as the probandum do not have the same qualificandumness. Hence in (ii) of the above, differences from non-earth will not have the same qualificandumness as in (i). Hence the above difficulty will not arise.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Sādhyā-viśeṣyakā-'numitāv atirikta-vidheyatātmaka-viśeṣyatō pagame itara-bhedaḥ pṛthivyām ity-ādy-ākāraka-pṛthivī-sādhya-ka-'numitau vidheyatā-'nātmakaṁ viśeṣyāntaraṁ, tathā-vidha-pratyakṣe cā 'nyad-viśeṣyatvam iti tiṣṇāṁ viśeṣyatānāṁ kalpanā-'pekṣayā pratyakṣā-'numiti-sādharaṇyā eka-viśeṣyatāyāḥ sādhyā-viśeṣyaka-sādhya-viśeṣanakā-'numiti-sādhāraṇyā ekasyā vidheyatāyās ca kalpanasyaivo citatvāt. Na cā-'sman-mate 'numitau yā vidheyatā-'nātmika viśeṣyatā saiva pratyakṣe 'pīti na viśeṣyatā-traya-kalpanam iti vācyaṁ. Pratyakṣe vidheyatātmikā tadanātmikā vā viśeṣyatā kalpata ity atra vinigamanā-virahāt.

Translation: If an additional qualificandumness of the nature of predicatehood be admitted in inferences with the probandum as qualificandum,

then a different qualificandumness not of the nature of predicatehood has to be admitted in the inference with earth as its probandum, of the form '(there is) difference from non-earth in earth'; similarly in the perception of that form a different qualificandum-ness has to be postulated. Thus it will be logical to postulate one qualificandum-ness common to perception and inference and one predicatehood common to inferences with the probandum as qualificandum or as qualifier, rather than to postulate three different qualificandum-nesses.

It cannot be said that on our view the qualificandum-ness not of the nature of predicatehood postulated in inference is the same qualificandum-ness in perception of that form; and hence three different qualificandumnesses need not be postulated.

For there is no reason for deciding whether the qualificandum-ness in perception is of the nature of predicatehood or not.

Explanation: Gadādhara shows here that identification of predicatehood with the qualificandumness in the conclusion of inferences having the probandum as qualificandum, leads to the postulation of three different types of qualificandumnesses in different types of cognitions.

- (i) There is first the qualificandum-ness identical with predicatehood in inferences where the probandum is the qualificandum.
- (ii) Then there is a qualificandum-ness which is not to be identified with predicatehood where the probandum is the qualifier and the locus is the qualificandum. This is so because the conclusion of the same form may be interpreted in two different ways, as explained above. For example, in the inference 'there is difference from non-earth in earth' the probandum may be: difference from non-earth, or also, earth. Because of this ambiguity in the conclusion the qualificandum-ness resident in difference from non-earth has once to be identified with predicatehood and again not to be identified with it. Thus difference from non-earth must have two different qualificandum-nesses.
- (iii) Moreover one can perceive that there is difference from non-earth in earth; and there is a perceptual qualificandum-ness in difference from non-earth.

Gadādhara argues that instead of postulating three different qualificandum-nesses in difference from non-earth, in order to explain the three different types of cases, it will be lighter to postulate that there is one qualificandum-ness common to both inference and perception, and one additional

predicatehood, not identical with either modeness or qualificandum-ness, which will be common to two types of inferences, namely where the probandum is the qualificandum and where it is not.

In support of the identification of predicatehood with qualificandum-ness in inferences of one type, it may be argued that there will be one qualificandum-ness not identical with predicatehood in inferences of the other type and also in perception; and hence there is no need to postulate three different qualificandum-nesses; postulation of two qualificandum-nesses is sufficient.

But Gadādhara points out the inadequacy of this reply. He argues that there is no way of deciding whether the qualificandum-ness in perceptual cognition is or is not to be identified with predicatehood.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Yattu sādhyā-viśeṣaṇakā-'numitau klpta-nirukta-prakārataiva vidheyatā, atirikta-vidheyatā tu sādhyā-viśeṣyakā-'numitāv eva, ananta-sādhyā-viśeṣakā-'numiti-vyaktiṣu atirikta-vidheyatā-sambandha-kalpanā 'pekṣayā tannirūpita-svalpa-tara-nirukta-prakārātāsu vidheyatāva-kalpane lāghavād iti.

Translation: The theory that the predicatehood in inferences with their probanda as qualifiers is indeed identical with the modeness as described above which is to be postulated; additional predicatehood is to be postulated only in the case of inferences where the probanda are qualificanda. It will be lighter to postulate predicatehood-ness in the modeness as described above which are fewer in number than to postulate relations of the additional predicatehood to the infinite number of inferences individually with the probandum as qualificandum.

Explanation: Here an objection is raised against postulating predicatehood as an additional reality. If such a predicatehood be postulated then it has to be related to all particular inferential cognitions which have their probanda which in a type of cases, will be infinite in number, as their qualificanda. This will make the theory very heavy. For example, in one interpretation, the inference 'there is difference from non-earth in earth'. difference from non-earth is the probandum and is also the qualificandum. Yet as there are infinite instances of difference from non-earth in all earth-particulars, if predicatehood of the inference be postulated as an additional entity then

it has to be related to all the different inferences by an infinite number of relations. It will be lighter to postulate predicatehoodness in the modenesses determined by those infinite qualificandum-nesses; for the number of such modenesses will be fewer than the number of qualificandum-nesses.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Tad api na cāru. Tādṛśa-prakāratāyā vidheyatātvōpagame parvato-vahnimān, parvato nirdhūmas syad ityākāraka-samūhālambanā pattyātmaka-jñānasya vahny-ādi-vidheyakatvā patteḥ. Na ceṣṭā pattiḥ. Tathā sati tādṛśa-pattyanantaram parvate dhūmā-'bhāvam āpādayāmi na tu vahnim ityākāraka-vahni-vidheyakatvā-'bhāva-pratiter anupapatteḥ. Etena sādhyā-viśeṣyā-'numitir evā-'prāmāṇikī, aprasiddha-sādhyaka-sthale viśeṣye viśeṣaṇam iti rityā sādhyā-viśeṣaṇakā-'numitir evotpadyate viśiṣṭa-buddhi-sāmānye viśeṣaṇa-jñāna hetutāyā niryuktikatvāt, tathā ca nirukta-prakārataiva vidheyatā, bhāva-sādhyaka-sthale tu sādhyā-viśeṣyā-'numiter atyantā-'prāmāṇikatayā tatra sutarāmeve ty api nirastam.

Translation: But this theory, too, is not good. For if predicatehood-ness in modeness of that form is postulated then in the conjunctive reductio ad absurdum of the form 'fire-possessing is the hill and the hill would be smokeless', fire would become the predicate.

This cannot be treated as a desirable consequence.

For in that case there would not be introspective cognition of the form 'I am counterfactually assuming absence of smoke, but not fire, on the hill' in which there is cognition of absence of predicatehood of fire.

By this, is refuted the theory — there is no reason to admit inferences with their probanda as their qualificanda at all. In the case of inferences where the probandum is not previously cognised, there too, inference with probanda as qualifiers results by the rule: qualifier in the qualificandum; for it is unjustified to postulate causeness of cognition of qualifiers for qualified cognition in general. Hence predicatehood is identical with modeness of that form; in the case of positive probanda it is totally unjustifiable to postulate inferences with probanda as qualificanda; hence in such cases, *a forteori*, the predicatehood is identical with modeness.

Explanation: Gadādhara shows the inadequacy of the suggested theory to explain a case of the following type. A conjunctive cognition where one

conjunct is an inference of the form 'the hill is fiery' and the other conjunct a reductio of the form 'the hill is smokeless'. Thus the conjunction will have the form 'the hill is fiery and the hill is smokeless'. Now in this conjunctive cognition fire becomes the predicate on the suggested theory. This cannot be regarded as a desirable consequence for it cannot be asserted that fire is the predicate of the conjunctive cognition which is of the nature of a reductio. In a reductio ad absurdum argument there is one counterfactual assumption, i.e. an assumption which is known to be false. This assumption leads to a consequence which is also known to be false. This type of reductio argument is used primarily to remove a doubt about a pervasion. Suppose one doubts if smoke is really pervaded by fire, this doubt is removed by showing that the consequence of supposing the opposite would contradict a well-established fact. For example, the reductio argument in this case will take the form:

- (1) If smoke deviated fire, it would not be caused by fire
- (2) But it is an accepted fact that smoke is caused by fire
- (3) Therefore smoke cannot deviate fire, i.e. smoke is pervaded by fire.

Here (1) shows the nature of a counterfactual assumption leading to an absurd consequence. This is a universal relation between deviation of fire by smoke and smoke not being caused by fire. As this argument is given by someone who already knows that smoke is pervaded by fire, the assumption that smoke deviates fire, is a counterfactual assumption for in this the counterfactual assumption is called an imposed ground (*āpādaka*).

Now in the present case the conjunctive cognition as a whole is of the nature of a counterfactual assumption. Hence in this cognition fire cannot be the predicate. As the introspective cognition of this conjunctive cognition is of the form 'I am counterfactually assuming absence of smoke on the hill and not fire' in which fire is not the predicate. Yet according to the theory suggested in the preceding paragraph, it is fire, which is the probandum of the inference which is the first conjunct of the conjunctive cognition and is also its mode. Therefore according to this theory fire ought to be the predicate in this conjunctive cognition, but this contradicts the introspective evidence.

The logical point is that the suggested theory has failed to distinguish between cases where an inference is the whole of a cognition and where the inference is a part of a cognition where the whole cognition is not of the nature of an inferential conclusion.

Gadādhara's argument with the help of a more complex cognition in which the conclusion of an inference is only an element also disposes of the following theory.

This theory is that inferential conclusions with the probanda as qualificanda are not to be admitted at all, for there is no justification for admitting such inferences. In all inferences the probanda are necessarily the modes of the conclusions; and as modeness of this type is identical with predicatehood, there is no difficulty in explaining how the probanda are predicates in inferential conclusions.

The supporters of this theory do not admit the radical difference between two types of inference where the probandum is already cognised and where it is not. The difference between these two types of inferences may be explained with two examples. The first example is of an affirmative conclusion and the second example is of an inference with a negative conclusion.

First example

- (i) Smoke is pervaded by fire
- (ii) The hill has smoke
- (iii) The hill has smoke pervaded by fire
- (iv) Hence the hill possesses fire.

In this example the probandum fire is already cognised in (i) and (iii). Hence an inference of this type is called an inference with the probandum already cognised.

In this type of inference the probandum is necessarily the mode in the conclusion. To assume that there can be an inference of this type in which the probandum is the qualificandum of the conclusion is wholly unjustified.

Second example

- (i) Whatever has negation of difference from non-earth has negation of smell.
- (ii) Earth has smell.
- (iii) Earth has difference from non-earth.

In this example of an inference with a conclusion based on a negative pervasion, the probandum, difference from non-earth is not cognised anywhere in the previous steps. What occurs in (i) is 'negation of difference from non-earth'. There is a difference among Navya-Nyāya philosophers about the meaning of this expression.

According to some negation of difference from any object, 0, is identical

with 0. In ontology negation of difference of 0 is just 0. According to others, however, it is not 0 but 0-ness which is the limitor of counterpositive-ness of difference. In the present example, 'negation of difference from non-earth' means either non-earth or non-earth-ness. But in any case it is not the probandum which is difference from non-earth. So inferences of this type are called inferences in which the probandum is not previously cognised in the premises. It is obvious that in such inferences the pervasion must be negative.

The difficulty here is that the conclusion (iii) is a qualified cognition of which earth is the qualificandum and difference from non-earth is the qualifier. Yet in this qualified cognition the qualifier has not been previously cognised in the premises. How then can the Navya-Nyāya rule that every qualified cognition requires a prior cognition of its qualifier as its cause be justified? The opponents reject this Navya-Nyāya principle. According to them a qualified cognition can arise in different ways. One of the ways is that we cognise the qualificandum and then cognise the qualifier as belonging to it. For this a prior cognition of the qualifier is not necessary.

Now according to Navya-Nyāya it is necessary to transform (iii) into (iii*) there is difference from non-earth in earth, where the probandum, difference from non-earth, has become the qualificandum and earth the mode.

In this way even though the probandum is not already cognised in the premises, still there is no difficulty in explaining how the inference can be a qualified cognition; for the qualifier (earth) is already cognised in (ii).

Now the opponents of Gadādhara hold (iii*) to be impossible; the conclusion can only be (iii). According to them there is no type of inference, based on affirmative or negative pervasion, in which the probandum is the qualificandum. As the probandum which is the predicate in the conclusion is necessarily a mode, predicatehood can be identified with mode-ness.

Gadādhara has already refuted this theory by the instance of a conjunctive cognition already discussed.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Yattu anumitāvāpattau ca tad-vyāpya-vattā-jñāna-janyatvameva tad-vidheyakatvam iti.

Translation: In inference and also in counterfactual assumption being a predicate of that is being produced by the cognition of having pervaded-ness by that.

Explanation: A new theory of predicatehood is here suggested. To be a predicate of a term is the result of knowing that the term is pervaded by it. For example in the inferential cognition that all men are mortal, mortality is the predicate of humanity because humanity is pervaded by mortality. So also in the inferential cognition 'the hill is fire-possessing' fire is the predicate of the hill because this hill-ness is pervaded by fire — whatever is this hill has fire. This may be explained in terms of modern Western logic thus. For example, the singular sentence, 'Socrates is wise' symbolised as '*Ws*' is equivalent to ' $(x) (x = s \supset Wx)$ ', which shows, in Navya-Nyāya terminology, that being (identical with) Socrates is pervaded by wisdom. Hence wisdom is the predicate of Socrates.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Tadasat. Yato 'tirikta-vidheyatā-'nabhyupagame tadvyāpya-vattā-jñānasya svā-'nantarotpanna-tat-prakārakā-'numititvādikameva janyatā-'vacchedakam vācyam, na tu tatra tad-vidheyatā-niveśa-sambhavaḥ, ātmāśraya-prasaṅgāt. Tathā ca siddhy-abhāvā-pādyavyatireka-niścaya-rūpa-kāraṇā-'samavahita-vahni-vyāpya-vattā-jñānā-'ntarotpannayor vahni-mat-parvatatvā-'vacchinna-pakṣaka-ghaṭādi-vidheyakā-'numityā pattyor api tādṛśa-jñāna-janyatayā vahni-vidheyakatva-prasaṅga iti pakṣatā-viśeṣādi-janyatvasya vidheyatā-śarīra-'ghaṭakatve pakṣatā-dy upasthiti-virahakāle 'pi sarvā-'nubhava-siddhāyā vahniṃ nānuminomī tyādyākāraka-pratīter apalāpa-prasaṅgāt.

Translation: This theory is wrong. If predicatehood be not admitted as an additional reality, then *being the inferential conclusion* which has that as its mode, and which arises immediately after the cognition of being pervaded by that, will have to be admitted as the limiter of effectness; it is not possible to introduce 'predicatehood of that' in it (the limiter), because of self-dependence (circularity of a sort). Then, too, if causal factors like (i) absence of certain knowledge of the probandum, and (ii) certainty of absence of the imposed ground, are absent, then it may be that the cognition of being pervaded by fire, immediately succeeded by the origination of the

inferential conclusion and also of the counterfactual assumption, having the jar as its predicate and the locus as limited by the fiery mountain. Now both these cognitions being produced by the cognition of fire being pervaded by this hill-ness, would have fire as the predicate in both these types of cognition. To avoid this, if in the structure of predicatehood, being produced by particular locus-ness be introduced, then, too, in the absence of memory-cognition of locus-ness, etc. the universally accepted introspective evidence 'I am not inferring fire' would have to be contradicted.

Explanation: Gadādhara shows the inadequacy of this new theory by citing complex examples. He first shows that the effect of a cognition of being pervaded by fire, for example, is the inferential conclusion having fire as its mode. Now the limiter of the effect-ness in this case will be being the inference having fire as its mode. It cannot be said that the limiter of effect-ness is being the inference having that as its predicate. For this would mean that predicatehood is being defined in terms of itself. Now an inference requires that the conclusion is not already known, i.e. that in the conclusion it is not cognised with certainty that the probandum is in the locus by the relevant relation. This absence of certainty about the presence of the probanda in the locus is what makes the locus the locus. For anything which is cognised with certainty to possess the probanda cannot be the locus of the probandum again.

In the case of counterfactual assumption it is necessary to be certain that the object concerned is not present there. Thus one can counterfactually assume that the hill is smokeless only if one is certain that the hill is not smokeless. Thus absence of smoke-which-is counterfactually-assumed has to be cognised with certainty.

Now Gadādhara assumes a case where neither the necessary condition of locus-ness (absence of certainty of the presence of the probanda in the locus) nor that of counterfactual assumption (certainty that the assumed object is not there) is present and yet the cognition of being pervaded by fire is present. Now from the presence of this cognition alone, even though the above mentioned necessary factors are absent, the inferential cognition having the jar as its predicate and the locus as being limited by being the fiery hill follow, as also the reductio of the same form. In these two cognitions which are produced by the cognition of pervasion by fire, fire becomes the predicate. But it is clear that fire is not the predicate in these cognitions.

This undesirable consequence of the theory may be sought to be avoided

by defining predicatehood in such a way as to include reference to locus-ness within it. If this is done then in the above two cases fire would not be a predicate as there was no locus-ness in them (for locus-ness is defined in terms of absence of certainty of the occurrence of the probandum. In the above inference however there was no such locus-ness). This introduction of locus-ness into the structure of predicatehood, however, cannot save the theory. For everybody has the introspective cognition 'I am not inferring fire' which does not involve any reference to a locus where I am not inferring fire. Yet in this inference the jar is the predicate, and if reference to locus-ness is necessary for predicatehood then such introspective evidence will have to be denied.

17.1. Examination Continued

Text: Na ca pakṣatā-viśeṣādi-janyatva-viśiṣṭa-sva-vyāpya-vattā-jñāna-janyatva-sambandhena vahny-ādi-mad-anyatvam eva tādṛśa-pratīti-viṣayō- 'stu, tatra ca na pakṣatādyupasthitir apekṣā-sambandha-jñānasya viśiṣṭa-buddhāv-ahetutvād iti vācyam. Ananta-padārtha-ghaṭita-tādṛśa-dharmasya sambandhatve mānā-'bhāvāt.

Translation: It cannot be said that the object of that type of cognition is different from fire in the relation *being produced by a cognition of pervasion by itself*, qualified by the effectness of particular locusness. In this case, there is no dependence on the memory-cognition of locus-ness, etc. for cognition of relations is not a cause of qualified cognition.


For there is no justification for postulating such a relation constituted by an infinite number of reals.

Explanation: An attempt may be made to salvage the theory by both introducing locus-ness into the structure of the predicate, but only indirectly, and hence avoiding the necessity of a cognition of this locus-ness as causally necessary for the production of inferential cognition. The technical device is not to introduce a reference to locus-ness in the structure of predicatehood, but to have it all the same by including it in the relation in which the predicate is to be the predicate. This stipulated relation is indeed a complex relation formed from the following sentences, having the following constituent parts.

- (i) The inference is produced by the cognition of (smoke) being pervaded by fire.
- (ii) The inference is also produced by a particular locus-ness.

So the inference is a cognition produced by a particular locus-ness *and* also by the cognition of being pervaded by *fire*.

So *fire* (as the successor) is related to the inference (as the predecessor) by the relation — *being produced by the cognition of being pervaded by itself, qualified by being produced by a particular locus-ness*.



But Gadādhara's reply to this attempt is that the postulation of such a complex chain relation constituted by so-many different types of reality is totally unjustified. One cannot construct a relation of arbitrary complexity in order to explain the possibility of cognitions.

17.2. Sentence Meaning and Predicatehood

Text: Evam etan mate śābda-bodhasya sa-vidheyakatvā-'nupapattiḥ, tasya vyāpya-vattā-jñānā-'janyatvāt. Na ca tatra nirukta-prakārataiva vidheyate ti vācyam. Parvate vahnir ityādi-vākya-janya-śābda-bodhe vahnnyāder vidheyatvā-'nupapatteḥ. Na ca tatra vahnny amṣe parvatā-dheyatvam eva vidheyam, na tu parvatā-'mṣe vahnir iti vācyam. Śābada-bodhe carama-nirdiṣṭa-padārthasyaiva vidheyatvāt. Ata eva "nakkārō hyayameva me yad arayah" ityādaḥ vidheyatvena tātparya-viśayasya nyakkārādeḥ prān-nirdiṣṭa-padopasthāpyatayā tad-vidheyakā-'nvaya-bodhā-'sambhavād ālaṅkārikā vidheyā-'vimarśa-doṣam udāharanti. Ata eva "guṇāṇām guṇatvam" ityādaḥ guṇatvasyaivō ddeśyatā-'vacchedakatayā vidheyatayā cā-'nvaya-bodhā-'nupapattir āśaṅkitā, Vardhamāno' pādhyāyāiḥ. Viśeṣyasya vidheyatve tatra guṇatvasya tad-anupapattiyā tādrśā-śaṅkanā-'saṅgateḥ. Na ca parārthā-'numāne guṇatva-rūpa-lakṣyatā-'vacchedaka-dharmā-'vacchinne itara-bheda sādhanāya prayuktād itara-vyāpakībhūtā-'bhāva-pratiyogi-guṇatva-vān ayam ity etādrśō panayā-'vayavād anvaya-bodhā-'nupapattir eva tair āśaṅkitetī vācyam. Tatra daṇḍavān rakta-daṇḍavān ityādvā iva vidheyā-'mṣe vyāpti-bhānā-'dhikyena guṇatva-sambandhina evā-'bheda-sambandhena vidheyatayā cā-'nvaya-bodhā-'nupapatti-virahāt. Na ca nāmārthayoḥ sāksād anvayasyā-'vyutpannatayā parvate vahnir ityādaḥ parvatādy amṣe katham

vidheyatāyā-'nvaya iti vācyam. Sākṣād viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvenā
'nvayasyaiva nāmārthayor anabhyupagamāt, atra paramparaiva
viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāvō pagamāt.

Translation: Moreover on this theory it cannot be explained how cognition of sentence meaning can have a predicate, for this cognition is not produced by a cognition of any pervasion.

It cannot be said that here the modeness as characterised above is the predicatehood.

For it cannot explain how in the cognition of the meaning produced by the sentence 'on the hill (there is) fire', fire has the predicatehood.

It cannot be said that in this cognition being a superstratum of the hill is the predicate of fire, and not fire the predicate of the hill.

For in the cognition of meaning of a sentence it is the referent of the last word which is the predicate. Hence in the sentence 'Shame, indeed, on me verily this — that there are foes', self-condemnation being presented by a word coming first in the word order has yet been intended by this speaker as the predicate; still it being impossible to cognise a connection among the reference with that as its predicate has been regarded as a defect of unconstructed predicates by the rhetoricians.

Hence Vardhamana Upādhyāya has feared the impossibility of having a connected meaning from the sentence 'of the attributes attribute-ness' as here attribute-ness being the limiter of subject-ness cannot be regarded as the predicate.

If the qualificandum be regarded as the predicate then in that cognition inexplicability of attribute-ness as the predicate cannot have been feared.

It cannot be said that in inference for the sake of others proving exclusion from others in what is limited by attribute-ness which is the limiter of objects to be defined, there cannot be any cognition of sentence meaning from *upanaya* which is of the form 'this possesses attributeness which is the counterpositive of the negation which is the pervader of exclusion by others'. This is what he feared.

• For, as in 'the stick-possessor is the red stick-possessor' where in the predicate there is something more which is cognised in the pervasion, so also there would have been no difficulty in explaining the cognition of related objects by understanding the meaning of the sentence as the relation of attributeness have predicatehood by the relation of identity.

It cannot be said that the referents of two nouns cannot be directly related; hence in 'on the hill fire' how can predicatehood be related to the hill?

For, the rule is that the referents of two nouns cannot be directly related as the qualifier and the qualificandum; hence here the relation of qualificandum-qualifier-ness can be explained only indirectly.

Explanation: Gadādhara now shows the inapplicability of the concept of predicatehood as formulated in the theory in terms of being produced by a cognition of pervasion, to cognition which a person has by hearing a sentence. According to Navya-Nyāya to understand the meaning of a sentence is to cognise a related structure. This cognition is radically different from inference. To know something second-hand from others is not to know *that thing* by an inference, and hence there is no need for a cognition of something being pervaded by something. So if predicatehood is defined as what is produced by a cognition of pervasion then there can be no predicates in the cognition of sentence meaning.

It is not possible to revert to the older theory according to which predicatehood is identical with a certain type of modeness. From hearing the sentence 'on the hill (there is) fire' one gets the cognition in which fire is the predicate. Yet in this cognition fire is not a mode at all, it is the qualificandum and yet a predicate; this cannot be explained if a predicate is necessarily a mode.

In support of this theory it may be pointed out that in the cognition of that sentence-meaning fire is not the predicate of the hill but being the superstratum of the hill is the predicate of fire. To say that 'on the hill there is fire' is to say about the fire that it is on the hill; i.e. that being the superstratum of the hill is predicated of fire.

Now this interpretation of fire as the subject and being on the hill as its predicate is not acceptable to Navya-Nyāya philosophers. For according to them there is a semantical rule of word-order in a sentence. Sanskrit, being an inflectional language, permits inversions of various sorts without affecting the terms of the relations and the relations themselves meant by the sentence. If in a sentence a word is to refer to what is to be the predicate in relation to something which is the referent of another word, then the predicate word has to succeed the subject word. Hence the rule is that in the understanding of a sentence-meaning the referent of the last word is the predicate. Gadādhara then justifies this rule by showing that authors like Vardhamāna have adhered to this rule.

17.2. Sentence Meaning and Predicatehood Discussion Continued

Text: Atha śābda-bodhe carama-nirdiṣṭa-padārthasya vidheyatve “vapur virūpākṣam” ityādāv akṣṇo vairūpyasya vidheyatvā-
 ’nupapattiḥ. Vairūpya-viśiṣṭasyā-’kṣṇa eva tatra vapuraṃśe
 vidheyatve “alakṣya-janmate” tyatrā ’pi alakṣya-janmatāyā
 eva vidheyatayā tātparya-viśayatvam ityasya vaktum śakyatayā
 alakṣyatāyā a-vidheyatvenā-’vimṛṣṭa-vidheyāmśō dāharaṇatāyā
 anupapatteḥ. Yadi ca tatra śuddhasya janmano vivakṣita-
 mahādevā-’pakarṣā-’sarpādakatayā na vidheyatvena vivakṣitatvam
 api tu janmanō ’lakṣyatāyā eveti manyate, tadā tulyaṃ prakṛte
 ’pi iti cen na.

Translation: Now if in cognising sentence-meaning, the referent of the last word be the predicate, then in “body with malformed-eyes”, etc. malformed-ness cannot be the predicate of eyes. If, here, malformedness-qualified eyes be the predicate of body, then in ‘of unknown origin’, too, it can be said that the whole of unknown-origin is the predicate as the object of intention (i.e. as intended by the speaker); then it cannot be explained how this is cited as an example of unestablished predicate because unknownness cannot be regarded as predicate.

If, however, it is held that, here, pure birth is conceived as not imputing lack of excellence to Mahādeva and hence not intended as a predicate, but unknown-ness is intended as predicate of birth, then, the situation is the same even in the present instance.

17.2. Sentence Meaning and Predicatehood Discussion Continued

Text: Samāsā-’tiriktasthale carama-nirdeśasya vidheyatā-niyāmakatvāt.

Translation: This is not correct, for, the rule is that the referent of the last word is the predicate only in non-compound words.

Explanation: Gadādhara has explained the Navya-Nyāya rule that the referent of the last word in the sentence is the predicate. Now the objection is that in various compound words, the referent of the last word cannot be regarded as the predicate. Gadādhara agrees with this objection, but, then, states the Navya-Nyāya rule of interpretation of sentence-meaning more fully. The rule is that the referent of the last word will be the predicate

except in compound words. In compound words the referent of the last word in the compound is not the predicate. Hence the objections raised here are not really relevant.

17.2. Discussion Continued

Text: Evaṃ nirukta-prakāratāyā vidheyatātve “dvitīya-maurvīm ive” tyādaṁ vidheyatvena vivakṣitasya samāsa-ghaṭaka-pūrva-padena pratipādana vidheyā-’vimārśaḥ, “maurvīm dvitīyam ive” ty-asamastapadena pratipādana doṣōdhāra ityālaṅkārika-pravāda-virodhaś ceti. Vidheyatāvat tannirūpitō ddeśyatā ’pi prakāratā-di-bhinna-ṣṣayatā-viśeṣa eva. Na caivaṁ viśeṣyatāivō ddeśyatā parvate vahnir ityādi-vākya-janya-śābda-bodhe sādhyā-viśeṣyakā-’numiteḥ prāmāṇikatvena tatra ca parvatasyō ddeśyatā-’nupapatteḥ. Na ca vidheyatā-nirūpakatvam uddeśyatvaṁ, tacca tadamśe vidheyatvaṁ, tasya viśeṣyatve prakāratve cā ’kṣatam eveti kim uddeśyatā-khyā-’tirikta-ṣṣayatvō pagameneti vācyam. Uddeśyatvam evā-’tiriktaṁ tannirūpakatvam eva vidheyatvam ityasyā ’pi vaktuṁ śakyatayā vinigamanā-viraheṇō bhayasyaivā ’tiriktatā-siddheḥ.

Translation: Thus if predicatehood be identified with modeness of a particular kind, then in ‘like a second-chord’, etc, if the reference of the first word in the compound be intended as predicate, then there is no difficulty, whereas in treating it as non-compound ‘a chord second’ and thereby resolving the difficulty, one goes against the position of the rhetoricians.

Like predicatehood, subjecthood, too, is independent objecthood different from modeness, etc. It cannot be said that qualificandumness is subjecthood. For, then, in the cognition of meaning of the sentence ‘on the hill, fire’, as a conclusion with the probandum as the qualificandum has been justified, the subjecthood of the hill cannot be explained.

It cannot also be said that — subjecthood is determinerhood of predicatehood, and that is predicate of that; in this way, their qualificerhood and qualificandumness, too, remain unharmed. What, then, is it necessary to postulate subjecthood as an additional objecthood?

For one can equally say that subjecthood is independent, and predicatehood is its determiner; and in the absence of any reason for preference, independence of both is established.

Explanation: Gadādhara now explains the new distinction between subject

and predicate. An object cognised in a qualified cognition has been analysed so far into a qualifier, a qualificandum and a relation between them. Gadādhara has propounded the theory that all these three have different objecthoods and these are all additional, ontologically real, abstract properties. Now he introduces this new distinction in the structure cognised, and also holds that subjecthood and predicatehood, like qualificierness, etc. are ontologically real abstract properties. They cannot be reduced to the first pair.

17.11. *Gadādhara's Final Position*

Text: Idantv avadheyam. Astu vidheyatvam uddeśyatvancā 'tirikṭam, taylor viśayatātve mānā-'bhāvaḥ. Parvato vahnimān ityanumitau parvato-vahnyādiṣu tathāvidha-pratyakṣa-sādhāraṇa-viśeṣyatā-prakāratā-svīkāraśyāśyakatayā tat eva tādrśa-jñānasya tad-viśayaktvō-papatteḥ. Prakāratādīnām tatrā-'nupagame tādrśa-'numityādīnām bādhādy-apratibaddhyatva-prasaṅgaḥ, virodhi-jñānā-'pratibandhakatva-prasaṅgaś ca, prakāratādīnāmeva tādrśa-pratibadhya-pratibandhaka-bhāvā-'vacchedakatvād iti dīk.

Translation: One ought to ponder over this. Let predicatehood and subjecthood be independent reals, but there is no justification for ascribing objecthood to them. In the inference, 'the hill is fire-possessing', it is necessary to admit qualificierness and qualificandumness in the hill and the fire, for this distinction is common to perceptual cognition; simply by admitting this distinction their objecthood is explained.

If qualificierness etc. be not admitted in the inference, then it cannot be explained how it can be blocked by cognition of the absence of the probandum in the locus, and also how it can block a contradictory cognition; it is modeness etc. which is the limiter of such preventer-preventedness. This is only a hint.

Explanation: Gadādhara concludes his treatise by just stating briefly a very important topic. He has propounded the theory that the two pairs of terms, qualifier and qualificandum, and, subject and predicate, cannot be reduced to one pair. Ontologically their properties are all real entities.

But now he raises the further point: Is the distinction between subject and predicate an epistemological distinction? By denying that the *object* of cognition has this distinction, he has given a negative answer to the question.

He has argued that it is necessary to introduce the qualifier-qualificandum distinction into what is cognised, for otherwise the preventer-prevented relation among cognitions cannot be explained. But why should a further distinction between subject and predicate be introduced into what is the *object* of cognition? We hazard the guess here, that this distinction might be merely psychological. This does not mean that the distinction is unreal or subjective. It merely means that the distinction between the subject and the predicate in what is cognised may be *relative to the cogniser*, instead of being *in* what is cognised. The subject is that *about* which one *wants* to cognise something, and the predicate is that which is cognised about it. Although Gadādhara has accepted the syntactical-semantic rule that the referent of the last word in a non-compound expression is necessarily the predicate, still this does not mean that the predicate is an element, a constituent, of the object. A different *word order* necessarily changes the subject and the predicate, but this change does not imply that there has been any change in the qualifier-qualificandum distinction. This latter distinction is essential to objecthood, for different types of cognitions are distinguished from each other in terms of them. But no such function is ascribed to the subject-predicate distinction. Hence Gadādhara, in his concluding passage, suggests, but does not develop, the point that there is no reason why subjectness and predicateness be ascribed objecthood of cognitions.

But there are difficulties in thus conceiving the subject-predicate distinction as not belonging to the object of cognition. It is true that Sanskrit, being an inflectional language, permits inversions of various types (and this makes it difficult, in many cases impossible, to represent the point that the Navya-Nyāya philosophers are making in this context, as the word-order in Sanskrit cannot always be preserved in English) and the word-order is determined, within the permissible limits, by the intention of the speaker which can even override the syntactic-semantic rule. But this factor is totally absent in perceptual cognition, for there is no speaker-hearer distinction in that type of cognition. So many Navya-Nyāya philosophers deny the subject-predicate distinction in perceptual cognition.

But difficulties arise in the analysis of inferential cognition. For an inference is analysed into three terms, the probandum, the probans and the locus of an inference, in order to exhibit its structure without which no inference can be judged valid or invalid. Now this analysis of the structure of inference is wholly in terms of the subject-predicate distinction. As

Gadādhara himself has accepted the Navya-Nyāya theory that the probandum of an inference is the predicate in the conclusion, he could not identify predicatehood with modeness (qualifierness); for the probandum may, or may not, be a mode in the conclusion. Now in an inference for one's own sake no language is used according to Navya-Nyāya philosophers; whether one agrees with them on this point or not, it is clear that in an inferential situation there is no hearer-speaker distinction. Thus the distinction between subject and predicate in the conclusion of an inference is determined by what the person inferring *wants* to infer. The probandum of an inference is completely independent of the word-order of the sentence in which the inference is expressed; and further, the word-order of the sentence gives *no* indication of what *is* the probandum or the locus of an inference. Thus the distinction between the subject and the predicate in an inference is absolutely necessary for its analysis, even though it is determined by what the person inferring wants to infer. Thus at least in inference, the subject-predicate distinction plays a vital role; and *if* the probandum-locus distinction in the conclusion of an inference is an epistemological distinction, then it follows that the subject-predicate distinction, too, is an epistemological distinction which determines the *objective* structure of the inference.

BOOK REVIEW

The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki, *An Epic of Ancient India*, Volume I, Bālakāṇḍa. Introduction and Translation by Robert P. Goldman; Annotation by Robert P. Goldman and Sally J. Sutherland. (Princeton Library of Asian Translations.) Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1985. \$65.00

Here, then, is the first instalment of the long-awaited translation of the *Rāmāyaṇa* by Goldman and his colleagues in the *Rāmāyaṇa* Translation Consortium. Goldman notes in his preface that he began work on it around 1974 and goes on to declare "Now, some seven years later, I can say with satisfaction that it has proceeded . . . very much as it was first envisioned". This, along with its appearance in the publisher's lists long before its actual arrival, suggests that the process of publication has been protracted. We must hope that nonetheless the other volumes will soon be published; work on them has evidently been proceeding concurrently.

The present volume divides into three nearly equal parts of introduction, translation and annotation, supplemented by a glossary of names and epithets, a bibliography and an index; the translation covers a greater number of pages but is laid out on more generous lines. The relatively equal weighting given to these three parts accords both with the aims that Goldman sets out for this project (cf. p. 96) and with those that he formulated in his review article on the first volume of van Buitenen's translation of the *Mahābhārata* (JAS 35, 1976, pp. 463–70, especially p. 464).

The first part includes, besides Goldman's essays on the *Rāmāyaṇa* as a whole, its history and historicity, the *Bālakāṇḍa*, and the translation and annotation, a clear and helpful survey of the Critical Edition by Sheldon Pollock (in which he takes a rather more positive attitude to it than is sometimes displayed in the notes) and a brief and banal piece by Leonard Nathan on 'Translating the *Rāmāyaṇa*'. Goldman himself provides a clear and helpful introduction to the epic, though one that is based somewhat more on assessment of previous scholarship than on the "new leads and discoveries, based upon the author's intimate contact with the text over

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many years" that he looked for in van Buitenen's work. There is thus frequent but by no means exhaustive reference to earlier literature. Since Goldman explicitly declares that this translation is aimed at a scholarly as well as the general public, it might have been helpful if the references had been made as complete as possible. An example is the extended discussion of the relationship of the *Rāmopākhyāna* to the *Rāmāyaṇa* (pp. 33–39), where not only does he not cite the important older work of Sluskievicz (included nevertheless in the bibliography) but he states that the view of Vaidya and van Buitenen "has been subjected to little published criticism", thus passing over articles by his collaborator van Nooten and myself in *Indologica Taurinensia* (8–9, 1980–81, pp. 293–305 and 6, 1978, pp. 79–111 respectively). Similarly, the footnote to his discussion of the "purāṇic" quality of the *Bālakāṇḍa* could have included W. Kirfel, 'Rāmāyaṇa Bālakāṇḍa and Purāṇa' (*Die Welt des Orients* 1, 1947, pp. 113–128) which supplements Lesný's article, while – to give one further example – the passage on R̥ṣyaśṛṅga and Daśaratha's sacrifices (pp. 74–77), where he is opposing the general view, would have benefited from fuller documentation, e.g. D. Schlingloff, 'The Unicorn, Origin and Migrations of an Indian Legend' (*German Scholars on India*, II, Bombay, 1976, pp. 294–307), Satyavrat Shastri, 'Putreṣṭi in the Rāmāyaṇa: was it really necessary' (IT 6, 1978, pp. 279–82), and more generally P. E. Dumont, *L'Āśvamedha* (Paris, 1927). Personally, I find his arguments for the priority of the *putrīyā iṣṭi* over the *āśvamedha* unconvincing, since it seems to me that the Vaiṣṇava element, which he recognises as a late addition, is intimately linked with the *putrīyā iṣṭi*.

In general, however, this section on the *Bālakāṇḍa* does provide a good and thoughtful analysis of its layers, although it is questionable whether Goldman has fully made out his case for its composition extending over "at least four hundred years", beginning as early as the fifth century B.C. He sees the oldest portions as consisting of *sargas* 5–8, 17–30 and 65–76, excluding some later episodes within them, such as most notably the encounter with Rāma Jāmadagnya. He has certainly made out a good case for believing that the *Bālakāṇḍa* is more complex than has often been supposed.

The section on translation and annotation provides both some analysis of the style of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (but with insufficient emphasis on differences between the *Bālakāṇḍa* and the *Ayodhyā* to *Yuddha kāṇḍas*) and a justification of the style adopted for the translation and of the decision to include so

much material from the commentators in the notes. Goldman rightly protests against the tendency to over-translate *mahātman* but perhaps swings too far in the other direction with his "great" (which is indeed sometimes inapposite, as in "of the great Dwarf" for *vāmanasya mahātmanah* at 28.2b); perhaps something like "noble" is the best compromise, whereas his "righteous" for *dharmātman* is appropriate.

The translation itself is laid out with each verse normally being numbered separately and starting a new line — a layout which appears antiquated (it went out of fashion for other translations years ago), wasteful of space, distracting to read and, at times, misleading. Usually, of course, the *śloka* is end-stopped and to that extent encourages such a layout, but essentially it is a narrative metre and this is obscured by such paragraphing of a prose translation. More particularly, while *ślokas* which are linked grammatically are translated and numbered as a group, no account has been taken of the fact that on occasion what is numbered in the Critical Edition as three 2-line *ślokas* in fact consists of two 3-line *ślokas*; the grouping of such passages found in the translation then distorts the structure for the reader. An example occurs in the very first *sarga* where 17 and 18–19 are grouped thus but grammatically and by sense divide as 17–18b and 18c–19. Another point is that Goldman has chosen not to translate the *passages which Bhatt subsequently wished to include in the text (59*, 70*, 71*, 75*, 96* and 97*, see Crit. Notes, pp. 426–7) but has not seen fit to provide any comment, by contrast with his not infrequent caustic remarks elsewhere about the application of editorial principles.

The translation is generally close and accurate, but somewhat pedestrian. There is little sign of the activity of the Editorial Consultant, Leonard Nathan. Goldman has even eschewed the device of an easy versification for stanzas in longer metres, which he commended in van Buitenen's work, and which could well be desirable in the other books, which have higher proportions of such verses. Inevitably, there are occasions when I would disagree with the emphasis or even the precise significance assigned to a verse but normally such cases are well discussed in the notes and the reader is thus given the chance to differ, so I will not pursue such cases further. Sometimes, indeed, the notes help to clarify an obscurity in the translation (as at 2.24, where which "he" is which is unclear without the notes). In many cases the notes add alternative renderings from one or another of the commentators or indicate that the translation adopted follows one of them. However, there

are occasions when, to my mind, excessive reliance has been placed on the commentators. For instance, of 13.18 it is said in the notes that "The implication appears to be that there is one post of *devadāru* wood and one of *śleṣmātaka* wood", which is in fact the plain sense of the first line, but in the translation the sense has been forced in order to agree with the ritual details (even though, as noted on verse 26, the description is not in accord with the ritual texts). Similarly, *hiraṇmaya* at 36.18 and *hiraṇya* at 73.15 have been accepted as meaning "silver". on the strength of the commentators' opinions, without any real argument, when in the second case there is no necessity to include silver and a simple alternative would be to regard *suvarṇa* as adjectival, qualifying *hiraṇya*; the first instance is more difficult, admittedly, since two metals are required for symmetry with the next verse and gold, as *kāñcana*, is already mentioned, but this does not positively identify *hiraṇmaya* as silver. In yet another instance, at 52.4d *gauḍāni* is taken to mean "silver"; quite apart from questions of variant readings (which are discussed in relation to *bhājanāni* but not *gauḍāni* in the notes), another way of understanding the term would be as a separate substantive, "(sweets) made from molasses".

Errors in translation are rare and not crucial; I noticed only "celestial *gandharvas*" instead of "gods and gandharvas" for *devagandharva*- at 1.27c, "doubly" for *bahudhā* at 17.35 (where I was also unhappy with the interpretation of *rājarsiśabdēna*, which I would take with *tapasā*: "by penance under the title of royal sage", i.e. while still a *rājarsi*), "churn" for *manthāna* at 44.17 (where Mt. Mandara is the churning stick or paddle), and the omission of *tasya* at 63.9 (which must qualify *śabdēna*, thus necessitating also some amendment to the note on p. 383). At 48.9 the translation of the last *pāda* and the notes remain as obscure as the text. Also, the changes of futures to presents at 1.72-75 and to a past at 64.17b merit a footnote. More common are over-translations amounting to a gloss (e.g. "sensing that he had found a friend" for *praṇayād*, "confidently", at 1.49), while occasionally a translation seems unduly weak, such as "the conversation with Śūrpaṇakhā" at 3.11, since *saṃvāda*, "debate", would naturally mean something more like "dispute" in this context.

The notes are in general full and helpful, although the frequent descriptions of the critical apparatus of the Critical Edition cannot be easily intelligible without access to it and are somewhat superfluous if you have it (perhaps in

this respect the notes are aimed at students more than other scholars). A bonus is that the notes include translation of selected *passages and App. I passages. Regrettably, there is a scattering of errors in the notes. While it is helpful to have identified the passages alluded to in *sargas* 1 and 3, some of these are incorrect by a *sarga* or two, for example on pp. 283–4 “the meeting with Bharadvāja” is 2.48 not 2.47, “the lamentation of Rāghava” is 3.58 as well as 59 (but perhaps Goldman agrees with me that 3.58 is a later insertion), and “the installation of Sugrīva” is at 4.25 rather than 4.22. These are of little importance, but more seriously on p. 336 (ad 24.9) 668* is identified as an insert of M4 not M3; this is not just a misprint since the note begins by commenting on M4 as a *misch-codex* (it is not in fact the only manuscript of this type from Kerala). Among other lesser inaccuracies, the note on 65.14 is confused by the miskeying of “plowing a field” to *kṣetram śodhayatā* instead of *kṛṣataḥ kṣetram*.

Goldman has not managed to overcome the problem he noted in van Buitenen’s *Mahābhārata* translation of failure to mark the notes in the text (although with his numbering of each verse it ought to have been easier). Here too one must look at the notes before — or after — reading each chapter. At some points one looks for comment in vain. The significance of the masc. pl. *sarveṣāṃ* used by R̥ṣyaśṛṅga of the prostitutes at 9.15d cannot be got from the translation and is passed over in silence in the notes. Equally, while the notes regularly discuss grammatical points, there is virtually nothing on stylistic features even where both might be treated together (e.g. at 63.8). The note under 65.13 at p. 385 is slightly misleading, for the story about Janaka and Menakā here found at 1208* (read by D1. only) is not quite so “isolated” as is suggested, since it is also found at 2.2385* and 2388* (read by most N mss.). Finally, the delay in naming Rāma Jāmadagnya at 73.16–19 (p. 392) may be “uncharacteristic” but it is dramatically effective and so is scarcely a “textual difficulty”.

To sum up, this volume represents the first product of a major undertaking which will be of great significance to the whole of Sanskrit studies and Indology, not just to epic studies. As such, it needs to be as accurate as possible and it generally achieves very high standards in that regard: the translation is clear, the introduction and notes helpful. The detailed criticisms offered above are intended as aids in achieving this accuracy. One final word should be said about its price; Goldman was unhappy with van Buitenen’s

Ādiparvan costing \$15 in 1973 – is it only the ravages of inflation that make the price of this volume more than four times as much? Accessibility remains just as desirable. So worthwhile a work – and its successor volumes – deserve as wide a public as possible.

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BOOK REVIEW

Gaṅgeśa's Philosophy of God, John Vattanky, S. J., The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1984, xiii + 422 pp.

Considering the evident importance of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* for the history of Indian philosophy it is remarkable that to date there exists no complete translation of any of its four sections, much less of the entire work. Scholarly analyses in Western languages have been published piecemeal, as readers of this *Journal* should especially be aware, since a number have appeared here. Still, if one were to summarize the situation on *Maṇi* scholarship at present, it presents a patchwork quilt appearance. To my knowledge, there is no English rendition of *any* part of the final two books of the *Maṇi*, the *Upamāna* and *Śabda Khaṇḍa*. The situation for the *Pratyakṣa Khaṇḍa* is not much better, with the monumental exception of J. N. Mohanty's *Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth* (Santiniketan, 1966), a translation and masterful analysis of a part of the section on *prāmāṇya*. Most of the work available outside Sanskrit sources has been brought to bear on the *Anumāna Khaṇḍa*, but even here scholarship has been confined to rendering into English certain portions of the text along with various attempts to represent the peculiarities of Navya-Nyāya exegesis through symbolic logic (Ingalls, Staal, Matilal), diagrams (Goekoop), or comparisons with Western logicians (Sibajiban Bhattacharya). We have also benefitted from summaries of a few sections in articles by Gopikamohan Bhattacharya, Kisor Chakrabarti and others. And I have not tried to do justice to the pioneering work of past scholars such as Satischandra Vidyabhusana and Saileswar Sen. Still, despite the impressive quantity of writing devoted to the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, the general reader coming to the text in search of a translation of a whole section will be disappointed, and even if he looks for a specific treatment of a particular section chances are he will not find what he is looking for.

With this situation in mind it is a great pleasure to welcome a new name among the major interpreters of Gaṅgeśa, that of John Vattanky. Dr. Vattanky has provided us in the work under review with a translation of the section

near the end of the *Anumāna Khaṇḍa* which concerns God (*īśvara*). This is one of the sections previously untranslated. The major effort to present Navya-Nyāya thinking about theism prior to this has been by Gopikamohan Bhattacharya, whose *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism* (Calcutta 1961) provides a good general view of the subject. Professor Bhattacharya has himself provided an appreciative Introduction to the Vattanky volume. Vattanky received his M. A. at Oxford and his Ph.D. at Vienna. His combination of traditional Indian and modern Western training in Sanskrit scholarship combines for a readable yet highly technical rendition of the text.

The book contains a good deal more than a translation. The text is provided in running form along with the translation so that the reader can make easy comparison. Vattanky himself provides three different forms of assistance, ranging from a 12-page analysis of the topics treated, through a line-by-line commentary on the text, to a lengthy study on the development of theism in India in which he locates Gaṅgeśa's place in the entire history of Indian debate from the time of the *Nyāyasūtras* on. Vattanky is a thoroughly knowledgeable historian and commentator, giving us extended accounts of the arguments of Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Vācaspati Miśra, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, Udayana, Vallabha and Śaśadhara among Gaṅgeśa's predecessors, as well as a glimpse of the commentarial literature on the *Īśvaravāda* afterwards, especially of Jayadeva and Pragalbha, both of whom are almost entirely unknown today. As Vattanky himself notes, his treatment here is of "probably . . . the longest single section of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* so far . . . worked out" and, it is clear, a section of great general importance to students of Indian philosophy and religion.

As anyone who has tried to render Navya-Nyāya exegesis into English has discovered, there is no way to provide a readable translation of this kind of material. In the present case this is not so much because of any special techniques such as haunt the efforts of those dealing with the definitions discussed at the outset of the *Anumāna Khaṇḍa*, but just because of the sheer denseness of the argumentation. As a result, one cannot merely browse through the translation and get an idea of what Gaṅgeśa has done: one must consider at length and in depth each argument, trying to understand where it is coming from, what it is pertinent to, what it turns on and what it implies.

If philosophy is at its heart the consideration of arguments, Navya-Nyāya is the pinnacle of philosophy, if such heights are to be judged through the intensity and single-mindedness with which arguments are propounded and discussed.

A special treat is the historical study. Here Vattanky, not subject to the constraints of text, is able to explain lucidly the history of theism as a theme addressed by a variety of Indian schools. The result is a paradigm of what will have to be done for many, many such themes before a proper history of Indian philosophy can ever be written. Vattanky's approach takes each philosopher as worthy of respect for his arguments, a welcome change from the all too frequent tendency among some recent writers to feel they must make their writing lively by taking certain classical authors to task for their style, or by elevating implicitly certain authors at the expense of others. E.g., Uddyotakara has been criticized by more than one scholar as being too polemical, while the Nyāya authors between Udayana and Gaṅgeśa are sometimes dismissed generically as mere scholiasts of little intrinsic interest. Vattanky emphasizes Uddyotakara's originality as well as the debt that Gaṅgeśa owes, for example, to Śaśadhara, an immediate predecessor whose work is just now being made known to us through the work of Prof. Matilal.

All in all, then, this is an important book in its own right and one to be emulated in planning further studies of similar themes that lead to a section of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* or, for that matter, to any one of many, many later scholastic Indian works of analytic philosophy.

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BUDDHAPĀLITA'S EXPOSITION OF THE MADHYAMAKA

I. INTRODUCTION

Buddhapālita is the earliest identifiable author whose commentary (*Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*) on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (MMK) survives today. (The *Akutoḥbhayā* may well be older, but its authorship is disputed.) He was active probably around 500 A.D.¹ Tāranātha² tells us that he was born in South India and gives a very brief account of his life, but it is not clear how reliable his information is. Although both Tāranātha and the colophon to the Tibetan translation of the *Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*³ say that he composed commentaries on many works, only his commentary on the MMK has come down to us. Aside from a few very brief quotations in the *Prasannapadā*, it exists only in an early ninth-century Tibetan translation by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan.

A portion of chapter two has been translated and edited by Musashi Tachikawa.⁴ Chapter eighteen has been translated and edited by Christian Lindtner.⁵ A translation of chapter one by Judit Fehér was published recently in *Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica* XXIX/1.⁶ One should also mention Akira Saito's unpublished dissertation.⁷

Buddhapālita is best known to modern students of Buddhism as the object of Bhāvaviveka's criticism and Candrakīrti's defense. The main subject of controversy was Buddhapālita's use of *prasaṅga*, or *reductio ad absurdum*, arguments rather than independent syllogisms (*svatantra-anumāna*).⁸ The followers of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti became known as *Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas*, while those who followed Bhāvaviveka were called *Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas*.⁹

In this paper we shall take a different approach to Buddhapālita. We shall look at what he has to say about certain major themes of the Madhyamaka. (For the most part, the school is referred to as Madhyamaka; a follower of the school is a Mādhyamika.) Buddhapālita was not a great innovator. In his commentary, he stays close to the thought of Nāgārjuna as expressed in the MMK. Candrakīrti often, though not always, followed Buddhapālita's line

of thought in his own commentary on the MMK, the *Prasannapadā*. Not infrequently, he improved on Buddhapālita's arguments or clarified his explanations. Thus to those already familiar with Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, Buddhapālita presents few surprises.

Nevertheless, in addition to its historical importance, Buddhapālita's commentary contains a number of striking passages which set forth central themes of the Madhyamaka in a lucid and straightforward way. Indeed, his work's relative lack of the elaboration of Bhāvaviveka's commentary or the subtlety of Candrakīrti's often makes it clearer and more accessible to the modern reader. Moreover, for one seeking to understand Madhyamaka thought, Buddhapālita's exposition of the Madhyamaka is of interest in its own right.

It is a curious fact that Buddhapālita's commentary on the last five of the twenty-seven chapters of the MMK is nearly identical to the corresponding chapters of the *Akutoḥbhayā*. (This is particularly true of the last four chapters.) The style and the brevity of these chapters much more resemble the first twenty-two chapters of the *Akutoḥbhayā* than they do the first twenty-two chapters of Buddhapālita's commentary. Thus it seems likely that Buddhapālita, in fact, wrote only the first twenty-two chapters of the commentary ascribed to him. The remaining chapters were presumably taken from the *Akutoḥbhayā* and added later. Hence I have quoted passages only from the first twenty-two chapters in this paper.

The quotations, together with discussion and commentary, have been organized under different headings. Since most of these topics are closely related, many of the quotations are relevant to more than one of them. Thus it has sometimes been necessary to refer to or even to repeat earlier quotations. The Tibetan text of the passages quoted is given at the end of the paper, along with references to the Peking and Derge editions. All translations in this paper are my own.

II. DEPENDENT ORIGATION AND NONORIGATION

Throughout the MMK, Nāgārjuna lays great stress on the notion of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), the observed fact that things originate in dependence on causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*). Dependent origination is, of course, a fundamental doctrine in early Buddhism. Thus in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya*, the Buddha says, "Ānanda,

this dependent origination is profound and looks profound.”¹⁰ And in the *Mahāhattipadopama Sutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*, Sāriputta says, “This, indeed, was stated by the Blessed One: ‘He who sees dependent origination sees the Dharma; he who sees the Dharma sees dependent origination.’”¹¹

The most striking statement of the importance of dependent origination for the Mādhyamikas occurs in MMK 24–18:

What dependent origination is, that we call emptiness (*śūnyatā*).
That is dependent designation (*prajñaptir upādāya*); precisely that is the middle way.¹²

It may therefore come as a surprise to find that Nāgārjuna also speaks of nonorigination (*anutpāda*). More than that, he says that dependent origination is characterized by nonorigination!¹³ On the face of it, this seems to be a flat contradiction. If so, it is a contradiction which Nāgārjuna as a Mahāyānist cannot escape, for the Mahāyāna sūtras, especially those of the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) class, are full of references to the nonorigination of all dharmas.¹⁴

How then does Buddhapālita, as Nāgārjuna’s commentator, deal with the apparent contradiction between dependent origination and nonorigination? On the one hand, like Nāgārjuna, he underlines the importance of dependent origination. Thus he refers to

- (1) . . . the teacher [Nāgārjuna], wishing to explain dependent origination, seeing as it really is the profundity of dependent origination . . .

He speaks of

- (2) . . . the supremely profound ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*)¹⁵ called “dependent origination” . . .

Since dependent origination is the truth, the knowledge of it sets one free:

- (3) The teacher [Nāgārjuna], having a compassionate nature and seeing that beings are afflicted by various sufferings, wished to teach the real state (*yāthātathya*) of entities (*bhāva*) in order to liberate them. Therefore he undertook the teaching of dependent origination, because it has been said, “One who sees the unreal is bound; one who sees the real is liberated.”¹⁶

On the other hand, Buddhapālita makes it clear that dependent origination has to be understood correctly. Some have made the mistake of taking the Buddha’s teaching too literally:

- (4) It is true that the Tathāgata himself has explained and taught dependent origination. Nevertheless, he explained and taught it according to worldly convention (*lokavyavahāra*) by means of expressions such as "origination." In that connection, even to this day, some whose minds are attached to mere verbal expressions do not understand the supremely profound dependent origination, but think that entities indeed exist because their origination and cessation and going and coming are spoken of . . . In order to teach them the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of dependent origination, the teacher [Nāgārjuna] has composed this [treatise], which is connected with [both] reasoning (*yukti*) and scripture (*āgama*).

Here Buddhapālita probably has in mind non-Mahāyāna Buddhists in general and especially the Vaibhāṣikas with their pronounced tendency to make the Buddha's words stand for ontologically real entities.

Buddhapālita reiterates the point that not all statements of the Buddha can be taken literally:

- (5) Therefore the blessed Buddhas have said various things according to worldly convention. Therefore those who wish to see reality (*tattva*) should not be attached to what has been said according to worldly convention but should grasp just that which is reality.

Applying this principle to a specific case, he says,

- (6) The Blessed One has taught the three times [i.e., past, present, and future] according to worldly convention; but in reality the three times are not possible.

Even if we grant that the teaching of dependent origination cannot be taken quite literally, Buddhapālita has so far not told us how it is to be taken; and we seem to be no closer to understanding how dependent origination can be reconciled with nonorigination. Here the crucial point is that, for the Mādhyamikas, the fact that a thing has originated in dependence on causes and conditions implies that it has no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). Because its existence depends on things other than itself, it is nothing in itself, that is, when it is considered in isolation from everything else. If we focus on a particular thing in an effort to distinguish its own intrinsic nature from that of other things, we find that it disappears. The process of excluding from consideration everything but the thing in question removes the very conditions on which its existence depends. Thus we do not find any inherent identity in it, any intrinsic nature which makes it what it is and which is independent of anything else.

What is probably Nāgārjuna's clearest statement of this point occurs in MMK 15-1 and 2:

The arising of intrinsic nature by means of causes and conditions is not logically possible (*yukta*).

An intrinsic nature arisen from causes and conditions would be artificial (*kṛtaka*). [15-1]

But how will intrinsic nature be called artificial?

For intrinsic nature is noncontingent (*akṛtrima*) and without dependence on another.¹⁷ [15-2]

Nāgārjuna also says, in MMK 7-16ab,

Whatever comes about dependently is tranquil by intrinsic nature (*śāntam svabhāvataḥ*).¹⁸

Here Buddhapālita glosses "tranquil by intrinsic nature" as

(7) . . . without intrinsic nature, empty of intrinsic nature . . .

As we have seen in quotations (1), (2), and (4), Buddhapālita characterizes dependent origination as "profound." While this is no doubt an allusion to the Buddha's statement quoted earlier, Buddhapālita seems to understand the profundity of dependent origination in a specifically Madhyamaka sense, as referring to the connection between dependent origination and the absence of intrinsic nature. This is especially clear in quotation (4).

Buddhapālita uses the principle that dependent origination implies lack of intrinsic nature in a number of particular cases. For example, he says,

(8) Because action (*karman*) arises from the afflictions (*kleśa*)¹⁹ as [its] cause and the afflictions arise from error (*viparyāsa* or *viparyaya*) as [their] cause, therefore [we] say that action and the afflictions are without intrinsic nature.

In another passage, Buddhapālita explains these causal relationships in more detail:

(9) Those actions and afflictions, moreover, arise from false conceptualization (*abhūtavikalpa*) but do not exist by intrinsic nature. An affliction arises from superficial conceptualization (*ayoniśo vikalpa*), for even in regard to one single object, some will desire, some will hate, and some will be confused. Therefore, afflictions arise from conceptualization. What the body, speech, and mind (*manas*) of one whose mind (*citta*) is afflicted perform is called "action" . . . Therefore action and afflictions arise from false conceptualization as [their] cause.

According to the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth, the actions which one performs under the influence of the afflictions cause one to be reborn in *samsāra*. Thus action and the afflictions can be said to be the cause of the bodies in which one is reborn. With regard to bodies, Buddhapālita says:

- (10) We have shown that the causes of bodies, that action and those afflictions, are empty of intrinsic nature because they are dependently originated. It must be held that a result possesses the nature of the qualities of [its] cause. Therefore if the causes of a body, action and the afflictions, are themselves empty, they being empty, how can one say that a body has intrinsic nature?

The term “appropriation” (*upādāna*) is sometimes used to designate the five *skandhas*, the five psychophysical aggregates²⁰ which constitute an individual’s body and mind. They are “appropriated” as the basis for imputing a self although, in fact, no permanent, unitary self exists. Once again, Buddhapālita infers their lack of intrinsic nature from the fact that they originate in dependence on causes and conditions:

- (11) Even that appropriation, which [you] suppose exists, does not exist [by] intrinsic nature because it is dependently originated.

Thus Buddhapālita is critical of those who accept dependent origination but do not see that it implies that there is no intrinsic nature in things:

- (12) Do you not see the horse even though you are mounted on it? You say that entities are dependently originated, but you do not see their lack of intrinsic nature.

Again, Buddhapālita is presumably thinking of the *Vaibhāṣikas* and other non-Mahāyāna Buddhists. And it is probably with them in mind that he says,

- (13) It is not possible for the proponents of dependent origination [to say] that that [which is called] “this action” has arisen from causal conditions; nor is it possible for the proponents of origination without a cause [to say] that that [which is called] “this action” has arisen without a cause.

In the preceding passage, the “proponents of dependent origination” (*pratītyasamutpādvādins*) are evidently those who accept the principle of dependent origination but not that of emptiness, the absence of intrinsic nature in things. Elsewhere Buddhapālita seems to equate the “proponents of dependent origination” with the *Mādhyamikas* themselves. Thus he says,

- (14) Therefore, for those who see entities and nonentities, *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* and bondage and liberation are not possible, because the views of permanence and annihilation²¹ follow [if there are entities and nonentities]; but *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, called "bondage and liberation," are established only for the proponent of dependent origination.

Likewise he says,

- (15) For the proponents of dependent origination, the entity which is originating (*utpādyamānabhāva*) does not exist; and the origination (*utpatti*) of the entity which is originating does not exist.

Moreover, when Buddhapālita refers to dependent origination, he usually takes it for granted that it implies, indeed, is virtually identical with, absence of intrinsic nature. Thus he goes on to explain "does not exist" in quotation (15) as meaning "empty of intrinsic nature." And he also says,

- (16) . . . all conceptual constructions (*rtog pa*, probably *kalpanā*) of entities and nonentities lead to the faults of permanence and annihilation; but dependent origination stands outside of views of entities and nonentities. Therefore it is free from the faults of the views of permanence and annihilation.

And similarly,

- (17) Therefore we teach that because [the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas*]²² are dependently originated, they are free from the faults of existence and nonexistence, not annihilated [and] not eternal . . .

Thus having said in quotation (4) that Nāgārjuna composed the MMK in order to explain dependent origination, Buddhapālita can also say without any inconsistency,

- (18) Therefore the teacher [Nāgārjuna] composed this [treatise] in order to explain entities' lack of intrinsic nature.

And having said in quotation (3) that Nāgārjuna taught dependent origination because he wished to teach the real state of entities, Buddhapālita goes on to ask,

- (19) *Question:* What is the real state of entities?
Answer: [Their] lack of intrinsic nature.

Thus from Buddhapālita's Mādhyamika perspective, dependent origination and absence of intrinsic nature are not two separate facts but are rather aspects of the same fact.

But what is the connection between lack of intrinsic nature and non-origination? And in what sense are things both dependently originated and nonoriginated? Buddhapālita's clearest answer to these questions occurs in his commentary on MMK 17–21ab:

- (20) Because action (*karman*) lacks intrinsic nature, therefore it does not originate. For if the intrinsic nature of action existed, [its] origination would also be possible [so that one could say,] "This is the origination of action." But if the intrinsic nature of action does not exist, what would originate? But even if it originates, it would not originate as intrinsic nature. That which does not originate as intrinsic nature is not action, since it lacks the intrinsic nature of action.

The fact, drawn from ordinary experience, that things originate in dependence on causes and conditions means that they do not originate having intrinsic nature. Thus, as far as intrinsic nature is concerned, nothing at all originates. Hence on the everyday, conventional level, it is legitimate to say that something originates in dependence on its various causes. But if we look for the independent essence of that "something," for that which makes it what it really is independently of anything else, we find nothing at all. It simply does not exist as an independent, self-contained entity. Therefore, in that sense, there is no such thing and no origination of it.

If there is no origination, there is no cessation, either, since there is nothing which could cease. In chapter seventeen of the MMK, Nāgārjuna criticizes a Buddhist Abhidharma school which took the "nondisappearance" (*avipraṇāśa*) of action, of which the Buddha spoke, to be a distinct entity. Buddhapālita's commentary here is illuminating:

- (21) Therefore, not having understood reality (*tattvārtha*), having become attached to the mere word "nondisappearance" as an entity, [you] have uttered so many numerous and varied and worthless [statements]. For action is simply without intrinsic nature. Because it is without intrinsic nature, therefore it is unoriginated; and because it is unoriginated, therefore it does not disappear.

Buddhapālita reiterates that lack of intrinsic nature implies nonorigination and noncessation. He refers to

- (22) . . . one who sees that all entities are unoriginated and unceasing because they are empty of intrinsic nature . . .

And conversely,

- (23) . . . by saying that it is without beginning or end, the Blessed One taught that *saṃsāra*, also, is empty of intrinsic nature. For if any entity called "*saṃsāra*" existed, it would undoubtedly have both a beginning and an end . . . Therefore, because [the Buddha] said that it is without beginning or end, no entity called "*saṃsāra*" is possible.

Both Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita often make statements which appear to be flat negations of origination, without any qualifications such as "by intrinsic nature." The same holds true of action, agent, and many other objects of negation. Such statements have to be understood in the overall context of Madhyamaka philosophy. In his commentary on MMK 1-1, Buddhapālita says,

- (24) Thus because the origination of entities is not possible in any way, therefore, since origination does not exist, the expression "origination" is a mere conventional usage (*vyavahāra*).

He concludes his commentary on chapter one of the MMK by saying,

- (25) . . . it is established that the expression "origination" is a mere conventional usage.

Thus Buddhapālita does not wish to abolish all talk of things' originating, but to relegate it to the conventional level. Such notions are useful as long as they are not pushed too far. It is only when we ask what is ultimately real that we are led to the conclusion that there is no real origination since no intrinsic nature ever originates.

III. INTRINSIC NATURE

While we have concluded our study of Buddhapālita's explanation of the relation between dependent origination and nonorigination, several questions remain. Though Buddhapālita almost always negates intrinsic nature, the alert reader may have noticed that in quotation (4), he says that Nāgārjuna wrote the MMK in order to teach the intrinsic nature of dependent origination. Moreover, he concludes his commentary on MMK 18-9 by saying,

- (26) Therefore one should understand that the defining characteristic of reality (*tattva-lakṣaṇa*) is the cognition of such an intrinsic nature, known by oneself, not learned from another (*aparapratyaya*).

What are we to make to these apparent affirmations of intrinsic nature? Buddhapālita does not explain; but the idea seems to be that things' very lack of intrinsic nature is, in a sense, their intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna has said in MMK 15-2 (quoted earlier) that intrinsic nature is noncontingent and not dependent on another. Moreover, he says in MMK 15-8cd,

Indeed, alteration (*anyathābhāva*) of intrinsic nature (*prakṛti* = *svabhāva* here) is never possible.²³

Commenting on this verse, Buddhapālita says,

- (27) For the opposite (*pratipakṣa*) of change is intrinsic nature. Therefore intrinsic nature must be unchanging, permanent; but alteration appears in entities. Therefore existence by intrinsic nature is not possible for them.

Thus since they are contingent, dependent, and changing, entities do not exist by intrinsic nature. On the other hand, their lack of intrinsic nature is a permanent, albeit negative, fact. Though it depends on the general principle of dependent origination, it is not dependent on any particular circumstances. It is always the case that all entities lack intrinsic nature. Thus this fact itself, the absence of intrinsic nature in things, fits the definition of intrinsic nature!²⁴

Hence Buddhapālita can equate things' lack of intrinsic nature with reality (*tattva*):

- (28) If to see entities and nonentities were to see reality, there would be no one who would not see reality; therefore that is not the vision of reality. Therefore entities' lack of intrinsic nature is reality, and only by seeing that will one be liberated.

And likewise he says,

- (29) Thus because the view of existence and nonexistence of entities will have many faults, therefore that "lack of intrinsic nature of entities" is the vision of reality; it is the middle path; and just that is the attainment of ultimate reality (*paramārtha*).

Finally, we have already seen in quotation (19) that Buddhapālita says that the real state of entities is their lack of intrinsic nature. Thus the very lack of any ultimate reality in things serves as their ultimate reality; and when one finds no ultimate reality in any entity, the quest for reality is fulfilled.

IV. THE TWO TRUTHS

We have already seen references to "convention" versus "reality" in quotations (4), (5), and (6). This distinction is based on the well-known Madhyamaka doctrine of the two truths, the truth of ultimate reality (*paramārthasatya*) and the truth of relative or superficial reality (*saṃvṛtisatya*). Nāgārjuna's classic statement on the two truths occurs in MMK 24–8, 9, 10. Unfortunately, as explained earlier, we apparently have no commentary by Buddhapālita on chapter twenty-four. Nevertheless, in his commentary on the first twenty-two chapters, Buddhapālita makes a number of statements related to the idea of the two truths.

As far as ultimate truth is concerned, we have seen that the lack of intrinsic nature in things is said to be reality (*tattva*) in quotations (28) and (29) and the real state (*yāthātathya*) of entities in quotation (19). In quotation (2), dependent origination is said to be ultimate truth; but we have shown how dependent origination and absence of intrinsic nature are inseparable for the Mādhyamikas. Likewise, Buddhapālita says of emptiness (meaning the fact that things are empty of intrinsic nature),

(30) Therefore emptiness is reality . . .

On the other hand, one must bear in mind that ultimate reality is beyond the reach of conceptual formulation. As Buddhapālita said in quotation (26), it must be directly experienced for oneself. Thus ultimate reality cannot, strictly speaking, be captured by verbal designations such as "emptiness," "lack of intrinsic nature," and the like. Buddhapālita says, paraphrasing MMK 22–11,

(31) "Empty" should not be said; nor should "nonempty" be said; nor should "both empty and nonempty" and "neither empty nor nonempty" be said. [But] they are said for the sake of rejecting false conceptualizations (*abhūtasamkalpa*) and for the sake of designating (*prajñapti*) ultimate reality (*paramārthatattva*).

Likewise, in a long commentary on MMK 13–8, Buddhapālita states that emptiness is a mere expression, a name for the cessation of views about entities, and that

(32) . . . there is not any entity called "emptiness."

He concludes by saying,

- (33) As for those who are attached to emptiness as an entity, that attachment cannot be removed by anything else. For example, if someone is told that there is nothing and says, "Give [me] that same nothing!" how can he be made to grasp the nonexistence [of any gift for him]? . . . Those who see that even emptiness is empty see reality; for them, emptiness is accomplished.

As for conventional truth, Buddhapālita says,

- (34) It is established that the appearance of entities is like a magical illusion, a mirage, a city of the *gandharvas*, or a reflection.

If one claims that the existence of real entities is established by direct perception, Buddhapālita replies,

- (35) Even that which is called "apprehension by direct perception" (*pratyakṣopalabdhī*) [or "apprehension of the immediately evident"] is seeing, like seeing mirages and dreams due to the fault of one's own confused mind; but here there is nothing real at all. In order to remove the attachment, "this is real (*satya*)," the Blessed One has said . . .

Thus the conventional truth is not ultimately true. Nevertheless, the Mādhyamikas do not propose to abolish the conventional truth but to show that it is *merely* conventional. Here Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 14–7ab, where he discusses the concept of "difference," is instructive:

- (36) Dependent origination has the following nature: To begin with, because [one thing] is called "different" in dependence on [something] different [from it], therefore, according to worldly convention, it is said to be "different". . . Because a jar's "difference" in relation to a straw mat is relative to the straw mat, because it is dependent on the straw mat and not established by itself, [therefore] difference does not exist in the jar. Difference, being incompatible with nondifference, also does not exist in an isolated, "nondifferent" jar which is unrelated to a straw mat. Therefore, according to ultimate reality, it is said that difference does not exist.

Things that exist in relation to each other are real enough conventionally. They are not real ultimately because they do not exist by their own intrinsic natures. In his commentary on MMK 19–4, Buddhapālita considers a number of relative categories: past, present, and future; best, middling, and worst; beginning, middle, and end; far and near; former and later; oneness and

separateness; identity and difference; cause and result; long and short; small and large; self and nonself; conditioned and unconditioned; one and two and many. He concludes by saying,

- (37) Therefore all those, too, are not established by themselves in reality. They are stated according to worldly convention.

While conventional reality cannot claim ultimate validity, it must be acknowledged on its own level. Buddhapālita remarks that

- (38) . . . all expressions are not possible. [But] they are also possible according to worldly convention.

Therefore, as we saw in quotations (4), (5), and (6), the Buddha often teaches according to worldly convention. Otherwise, he could not communicate with people who understand nothing else. Commenting on MMK 18–8ab, Buddhapālita says,

- (39) . . . the Blessed One, also, though he saw that entities are empty of intrinsic nature, said, “This is real (*tathya*); this is unreal; this is both real and unreal.”

For the Mādhyamika, the understanding of emptiness does not lead to a refusal to deal with conventional reality (which would scarcely be compatible with Mahāyānist compassion) but to nonattachment. Buddhapālita says,

- (40) For us, engaging in conventional activities (*tha snyad byed pa*) without attachment to existence and nonexistence, it is not the case that [liberation] is impossible.

While conventional truth has to be recognized in conventional matters, it is no criterion of ultimate truth. When one inquires into ultimate truth, stricter standards are necessary. As we have seen, on the conventional level it is sufficient for things to be established in relation to each other. When one seeks for ultimate reality, one seeks for things that exist by intrinsic nature. Thus Buddhapālita sometimes uses the phrase “when one examines how things really are” (*yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du brtags na*) to indicate that the object of investigation is ultimate truth, not conventional validity. He also remarks,

- (41) Because this is an investigation into reality (*de kho na bsam pa*, probably *tattvacintā*), what is the use of [arguing on the basis of] worldly expressions here . . . ?

The following passage also clarifies the distinction between the two levels of investigation, the conventional and the ultimate:

- (42) According to that same worldly superficial truth (*lokasaṃvṛtisatya*) by which it is said, "The jar exists; the grass hut exists," it is also said that they are impermanent: "The jar is broken; the grass hut is burned." When one investigates reality, then the jar and the grass hut are not possible since they are dependent designations. How would it be possible for them to be broken or burned? Moreover, the Tathāgata, also, is said to be impermanent according to worldly superficial reality (*lokasaṃvṛti*): "The Tathāgata is old; the Tathāgata has passed into nirvāṇa." When one investigates according to ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ*), then the Tathāgata himself is not possible. How could his old age and nirvāṇa be possible?

V. DEPENDENT DESIGNATION

In MMK 24--18, as we have seen, Nāgārjuna equates emptiness not only with dependent origination but also with dependent designation (*upādāyaprajñapti*). "Dependent designation" refers to the principle that names and concepts are imposed on reality, rather than simply corresponding to it. Candrakīrti²⁵ gives the example of a cart which is designated in dependence on its parts, such as the wheels, the axles, and so on, but does not originate by its own intrinsic nature. (Once again, it is unfortunate that we do not have Buddhapaṇita's commentary on chapter twenty-four.) Similarly, the self or person is designated in dependence on the five *skandhas* or psychophysical aggregates.

Buddhapaṇita often uses the idea of dependent designation instead of or in addition to dependent origination. As with dependent origination, dependent designation is incompatible with existence by intrinsic nature:

- (43) If the Buddha is designated in dependence on [his] *skandhas*, doesn't that mean that the Buddha does not exist by intrinsic nature? For what use does something which [already] exists by intrinsic nature have for also being designated dependently? It would be designated by just that which is its intrinsic nature. Because that [Buddha] is without intrinsic nature, therefore he is designated by means of [his] appropriation. Therefore, the Tathāgata does not exist by intrinsic nature.

This is true not just for the Buddha, but also for the whole world:

- (44) Because the Tathāgata is designated in dependence on [his] *skandhas* but is not established by himself, therefore he has no intrinsic nature.

These worlds, also, are designated in dependence on this and that; but they are not established by themselves at all; therefore the world also, like the Tathāgata, is without intrinsic nature.

The fact that something is designated dependently excludes its being established by intrinsic nature. Nevertheless, the principle of dependent designation does establish things in the only way in which they can be established, that is, as valid conventionally but not ultimately. Buddhapālita asserts,

- (45) Therefore, one should grasp that which we have thoroughly ascertained: An entity is a dependent designation. Thus the teachings about agent, action, result, experiencer [of the result], affliction, and body are possible; but the faults of permanence and annihilation will not follow; and also saṃsāra is established.

In quotation (14), Buddhapālita made a similar statement about dependent origination.

Dependent origination or dependent designation establishes things as existing in relation to each other but not by intrinsic nature; and a relative, conventional existence is the most that things can possess. Buddhapālita's commentary following MMK 8–12 emphasizes these points:

- (46) The agent depends on the action, is based on the action (*las la gnas*); in relation to the action, [he] is designated as and said to be an agent. The action of that [agent] also arises in dependence on that same agent; and it is designated as and said to be the action of that [agent]. Therefore those two are designated in relation [to each other]; but they have no establishment or nonestablishment by intrinsic nature [or: "no establishment by intrinsic nature or nonestablishment"]. Therefore since, in that way, those two are not maintained to be existent or nonexistent, [this] is designated as the middle way. Apart from that designation, we see no other defining characteristic of the establishment of those two.

The same analysis is applied to the "appropriator" and the "appropriation," that is, the self and the five *skandhas*:

- (47) . . . as the agent is designated in dependence on the action, so the appropriator, also, is designated in dependence on the appropriation. As the action is designated in dependence on that same agent, so the appropriation, also, is designated in dependence on that same appropriator. For those two [i.e., the appropriator and the appropriation], also, we see no defining characteristic of establishment apart from that.

Time, also, is dependently designated but does not exist as an independent entity. Buddhapālita says,

- (48) If those, former and later and so on, are the marks (*liṅga*) of time, in that case, time is designated simply in dependence on an entity; but it is not established by itself.

He concludes his commentary on chapter nineteen, "Examination of Time," by saying,

- (49) Therefore one should understand that there is not any entity called "time;" it is established as a dependent designation.

We should bear in mind that dependent designation does not establish the real existence of anything, but only its conventional, relative existence. Thus Buddhapālita says in his commentary on MMK 22—8,

- (50) When the Tathāgata is sought for in five ways ²⁶ in that same appropriation by which he is designated, [one finds that] he does not exist in the appropriation, [since he is] inexpressible as being identical to or different from [it]. [Then] how can it be said that the Tathāgata exists? Therefore it is not possible [to have both] dependent designation and existence.

Here the argument is that real entities, possessing intrinsic nature, would have to be identical or different. As Buddhapālita puts it,

- (51) Those two things which are not established as being identical or different, are not established, because establishment in a [manner] different from those two [alternatives] is not possible.

On the other hand, something which is dependently designated cannot be held to be identical to or different from anything, since it has no intrinsic nature:

- (52) For us, dependently designated entities, which are empty of intrinsic nature and are like magical illusions and mirages and reflections, have no identity or difference. To what would that entity belong? From what would it be different?

If we are to use the dependently designated's lack of identity and difference to prove that it lacks intrinsic nature, we cannot, at the same time, use lack of intrinsic nature to prove lack of identity and difference. Thus we need another argument to show that something which is dependently designated is not identical to or different from its basis of designation. In the following

passage, Buddhapālita puts such an argument into the mouth of a hapless opponent:

- (53) *Objection:* . . . The appropriator and the appropriation are not said to be identical or different. To begin with, they are not said to be identical because the agent-noun is different [from the noun denoting the action or the object of the action]. Nor are they said to be different, because they are not established separately. Therefore both exist, but they cannot be said to be identical or different.

Answer: Do you call an enemy as a witness, with the idea [that he is] a friend? You undertake to establish the appropriator and the appropriation by means of that same [fact] due to which it is impossible to establish them! For if an appropriation and an appropriator existed, they would undoubtedly be either identical or different. How could those which do not exist either as identical or as different exist in [some] other way? Therefore the appropriation does not exist, and the appropriator also does not exist. Even if one speaks of the appropriator and the appropriation according to convention, it must be said that they are neither identical nor different . . .

Finally, it should be pointed out that in MMK 18–10 and Buddhapālita's commentary on it, an argument is made that something which arises in dependence on another thing is not identical to or different from it. Therefore, once again, parallel arguments are made concerning dependent origination and dependent designation.

VI. NIHILISM AND MADHYAMAKA

Both ancient and modern critics of the Madhyamaka have charged that it is nihilistic. They hold that the doctrine of emptiness amounts to a negation of everything. If everything lacks intrinsic nature, nothing exists in any real sense. This undermines the ontological basis of the world of ordinary experience. Moreover, it makes any kind of spiritual life impossible since there can be no transcendent entity to serve as the goal of spiritual practice. We are left with an unreal, meaningless existence in an unreal, meaningless world.

In his commentary following MMK 18–7, Buddhapālita has an opponent raise the issue of nihilism in classical Indian terms:

- (54) *Objection:* What difference is there between one who has the view that 'this world does not exist; the other world does not exist; apparitionally

born beings do not exist" and so on and one who has the view that all entities are unoriginated and unceasing?

The ensuing discussion is rather long; and we shall summarize and paraphrase, rather than translate, most of it. Buddhapālita replies that there is a great difference. The nihilist speaks without really having seen, without really having experienced any "nonexistence" of the world, etc. On the other hand, one who has seen, who has had a direct experience of the fact that things are unoriginated and unceasing because they are empty of intrinsic nature speaks of what he knows. The nihilist is merely uttering words whereas the Mādhyamika's statements are based on actual knowledge. Buddhapālita gives the example of two witnesses in court. Both give the same testimony; but one actually saw the events in question, whereas the other testifies because he has been bribed or because he is partial to one side in the case. The second witness, though his words are correct, is considered to be a liar because he has no actual knowledge of the events of which he speaks.

So far it might seem that Buddhapālita is simply saying that the Mādhyamika is a "knowledgeable nihilist." His position is the same as that of the nihilist, but it is based on correct knowledge rather speculation. What Buddhapālita goes on to say, though a little difficult, will shed some light on this issue:

- (55) We see that entities are nonexistent like the horns of a hare; but in order to avoid faults of speech, we do not say "neither existence or nonexistence." For we speak according to seeing that existence and nonexistence are like reflections because they are dependently originated.

The first statement, that entities are nonexistent like the horns of a hare (which do not exist even conventionally), seems to support the idea that the Mādhyamika's position differs little, if at all, from that of the nihilist. Nevertheless, such a statement has to be understood in the context of the whole passage and, even more, of Buddhapālita's entire commentary. Thus the passage ends with Buddhapālita's saying that existence and nonexistence are like reflections because they are dependently originated. Here Buddhapālita evidently rejects the idea that the Mādhyamika's position is a simple affirmation of nonexistence. Perhaps he meant in the first sentence that entities in no way exist by intrinsic nature, since they lack intrinsic nature, rather than that they are nonexistent in every sense.

If this is Buddhapālita's position, what fault is there in his saying "neither existence nor nonexistence"? Presumably he is seeking to avoid the fourth

of the four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*) which the Mādhyamikas reject. In terms of existence and nonexistence, the four alternatives are: existence; nonexistence; both existence and nonexistence; and neither existence nor nonexistence. In many ways, the fourth alternative is similar to what the Mādhyamika wants to say. It is rejected probably because it might be taken to mean that there is an entity to which neither the predicate of existence nor the predicate of nonexistence applies. This is not acceptable since it violates the law of the excluded middle and since the whole purpose of the Madhyamaka dialectic is to rule out *any* sort of entity.²⁷

In quotation (55), Buddhapālita said that existence and nonexistence are like reflections because they are dependently originated. Throughout his commentary, Buddhapālita makes the point that the fundamental Madhyamaka principles of dependent origination, dependent designation, and emptiness are not doctrines of nonexistence. With regard to dependent designation, we have the following exchange between Buddhapālita and a hypothetical opponent:

(56) *Objection:* If time does not exist and cause and effect and the group [of cause and conditions: *sāmagrī*] also do not exist, what other exists? Therefore that [view of yours] is just nihilism (*nāstivāda*).

Answer: It is not. Your conceptual construction that time and so on exist by intrinsic nature is simply not possible, but they are established as dependent designations.

Well, what can we say about the existence or nonexistence of things which are dependently designated? Strictly speaking, nothing, according to Buddhapālita:

(57) Therefore the meaning of dependent designation is precisely that an entity which is dependently designated cannot be said to be existent or nonexistent because it is completely empty of intrinsic nature. [But] there is no fault in a conventional statement (*tha snyad kyi tshig*, probably *vyavahāra-vacana* or *-vākya*).

In the following passage, Buddhapālita spells out in more detail why a dependently designated thing cannot be said to be either existent or nonexistent. This discussion is couched in terms of the Tathāgata and his *skandhas* or appropriation:

(58) How is it logically possible to say that the Tathāgata, who is dependently designated, either exists or does not exist? For if a Tathāgata existed,

he would just exist, even without an appropriation, but he does not exist without an appropriation. How can one who does not exist without an appropriation be said to exist? How, too, can a Tathāgata who is dependently designated be said not to exist? For a nonexistent *uḍumbara* flower cannot be designated.

With regard to an agent and his action, Buddhapālita says,

- (59) We do not say that agent and action are nonexistent. We have rejected the conceptual construction that their activity (*kriyā*) is really existent (*śadbhūta*) or really nonexistent. We maintain that agent and action are dependent designations . . . those two are not maintained to be either existent or nonexistent . . .

Likewise, with regard to a person and his six sense faculties (the five physical senses plus the mind), Buddhapālita says,

- (60) No [person] who is established by himself – [so that one could say,] “He is this” – exists when he is sought for in every way, [whether he is supposed to exist] prior to the visual faculty, etc., or at the same time as the visual faculty, etc., or at a time later than the visual faculty, etc. The suppositions that he is designated as existent or as nonexistent by means of the visual faculty, etc., do not apply to that [person]. To begin with, because he is not established by himself, how can it be said that he exists? Also, because he is made manifest by the visual faculty, etc., how can it be said that he does not exist? Therefore, in his case, the suppositions that he exists or does not exist are not possible. Therefore, like agent and action, that appropriation [i.e., the sense faculties and so on] is also simply designated; but apart from that, no other establishment [of it] is possible.

Thus Buddhapālita is at pains to insist that the principle of dependent designation establishes neither real existence nor real nonexistence. Real existence would require that things not depend on anything else for their existence. Real nonexistence would require that things not even appear. Dependently designated things, however, appear in dependence on other things, which are themselves dependently designated. Because, in the sense stated, neither existence nor nonexistence is asserted, Mādhyamaka is not a doctrine of nihilism, that is, of nonexistence. In another sense, as we have seen, Mādhyamikas deny that things exist by intrinsic nature but assert that they can nevertheless be said to exist conventionally. This is simply a different verbal formulation of the same idea.

Buddhapālita also discusses the question of existence and nonexistence

as it relates to dependent origination, as well as dependent designation. Sometimes, in fact, he uses a formulation which combines elements of both:

- (61) . . . by this dependent origination, it is designated as an entity according to causes and conditions; but entities do not exist by intrinsic nature . . .

And similarly in the following passage,

- (62) The teaching of the blessed Buddhas is that an entity is simply designated due to causes and conditions, but it does not exist or not exist.

Speaking purely in terms of dependent origination, Buddhapālita, in a passage quoted in part earlier, asserts that the Mādhyamikas propound neither existence nor nonexistence:

- (63) We do not say that the *skandhas*, *dhātus*, and *āyatanas* are nonexistent. Rather we reject the doctrine that they exist. Both [existence and nonexistence] have great faults . . . Therefore we teach that because [the *skandhas*, *dhātus*, and *āyatanas*] are dependently originated, they are free from the faults of existence and nonexistence, not annihilated [and] not permanent; but we do not say that they are nonexistent.

Likewise, he asks rhetorically,

- (64) How is it possible to say that the dependently originated exists or does not exist?

In his commentary on MMK 12–8, Buddhapālita denies that the Mādhyamikas hold that suffering (*duḥkha*) is nonexistent; rather, they say that it is dependently originated. Moreover, according to quotation (55), existence and nonexistence are like reflections because they are dependently originated. Thus Buddhapālita obviously distinguishes between the ontological status of dependently originated things, on the one hand, and real existence or nonexistence, on the other. The nature of the distinction, though, is not so clearly spelled out as it was in the case of dependent designation.

Buddhāpalita also holds that emptiness is different from both existence and nonexistence. Thus he says in his commentary on MMK 18–8cd,

- (65) How can it be said that entities which are empty of intrinsic nature, which are like magical illusions and dreams and mirages and reflections and echoes, are real (*tathya*) or unreal? Therefore that [i.e., “not real, not unreal”] is the teaching of the blessed Buddhas, free from the faults of existence and nonexistence, not in common with any Tīrthakāras [i.e., non-Buddhists], elucidating ultimate reality (*paramārtha*).

Likewise, in his commentary on MMK 13–2, with regard to the Buddha's statement that all conditioned things are false (*mṛṣā*), Buddhapālita says,

- (66) Therefore, by saying "false," [the Buddha] did not teach that entities do not exist. That statement by the Blessed One . . . that what is deceptive (*moṣadharman*) is false teaches entities' emptiness of intrinsic nature, which is not understood by any Tīrthakāras [and] is free from the faults of existence and nonexistence.

Occasionally, Buddhapālita seems to say that emptiness implies or is equivalent to nonexistence. A case in point is his commentary on MMK 20–18, in which he argues that an empty result of a cause cannot be said to arise or cease:

- (67) How will that result, which is empty of intrinsic nature [and] not established by itself, arise? How will it cease? But if one supposes that that result, even though it is empty of intrinsic nature, arises and ceases, to that [the following] must be said: Does something else, apart from the nature of the result, arise and cease? But if something else, apart from the nature of the result, arises, what would that do for the result? For the "non-result" which arises would not be the result. Therefore, even if one supposes that the result is empty, because it *does not exist* [my emphasis], it would also follow that it is unceasing and unoriginated; [but] that, also, is not accepted [by you]. Therefore an empty result, also, will not arise; nor will it cease.

In MMK 21–9ab and its commentary, an almost identical argument is made, except that the terms used for origination and cessation are *saṃbhava* and *vibhava*, rather than *utpāda* and *nirodha*. Here, too, "empty" seems to imply "nonexistent;" but then "nonexistent" is immediately equated with "nonexistent by intrinsic nature." (Again, I have supplied the emphasis.)

- (68) To begin with, it is not possible for an entity which is empty of intrinsic nature to have origination and cessation. Why? Because it *does not exist*. For how could what *does not exist by intrinsic nature* have those [i.e., origination and cessation]? How could it be said that "something arises, something ceases," in reference to that which lacks even the conventional designation "this" because it *does not exist by intrinsic nature*? Therefore origination and cessation are not possible for what is empty.

Thus even in these passages, Buddhapālita evidently equates "emptiness" with "nonexistence by intrinsic nature" rather than with "nonexistence" pure and simple. In fact, not only Buddhapālita but also Nāgārjuna and

Candrakīrti as well as other Mādhyamika writers often make flat statements that such-and-such does not exist. As we have seen in the case of Buddhapālita, these statements have to be understood in the context of the whole Madhyamaka philosophy. Sometimes the author does, indeed, intend to deny that something exists even on the conventional level. More often, such statements are made in the context of an investigation into ultimate reality. Then what is meant is that the thing in question does not exist by intrinsic nature, that it lacks intrinsic nature. Hence, despite some appearances to the contrary, the Madhyamaka position is not a nihilistic assertion of the nonexistence of everything. Rather it is a middle way between existence by intrinsic nature, on the one hand, and pure nonexistence, on the other.²⁸

VII. LIBERATION ACCORDING TO THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

So far we have considered the question of whether the Madhyamaka school holds that nothing exists. The soteriological aspect of the question of nihilism is whether the Madhyamaka position undercuts the possibility of liberation, the goal of Buddhist spiritual life. Buddhapālita defines liberation as follows:

- (69) By the cessation of saṃsāric existence (*bhava*), [re] birth ceases; that is called "liberation." That one who thus sees [things] as they really are, understands reality (*tattva*). By understanding reality, one will be liberated.

Moreover he says,

- (70) For one who sees reality, there is nothing [further] to be done.

Thus Buddhapālita accepts the common Buddhist view that liberation is the cessation of rebirth in saṃsāra and that the cessation of rebirth is brought about by a direct experience of reality. The difficulty is that, from the Madhyamaka point of view, what reality can there be? In his commentary on MMK 15–6, Buddhapālita has an opponent make the point as follows:

- (71) *Objection:* Here [you] have said that by seeing reality, one will be liberated. "Reality" (*de kho na, tattva*), moreover, is the nature of that (*de' i dngos po*, probably *tadbhāva* or *tadvastu*), thatness (*de kho na, tattva*); the meaning is that it is the intrinsic nature of an entity (*dngos po'i ngo bo nyid, bhāvasvabhāva*). As to that, if the intrinsic nature of an entity simply does not exist, in that case won't the vision of reality be impossible for you? If there is no vision of reality, how can liberation be possible? Therefore that view that entities are without intrinsic nature is not good.

Buddhapālita replies,

- (72) Those who thus see intrinsic nature and the nature of another and nonexistence [or "a nonentity": *abhāva*] do not, even in that way, see the reality (*tattva*) in the supremely profound teaching of the Buddha. [The preceding sentence paraphrases MMK 15–6.] We see entities' lack of intrinsic nature as it really is, illuminated by the risen sun of dependent origination. Therefore, because just we have the vision of reality, only for us is liberation also possible.

His reply continues in his commentary on MMK 15–7. This has been quoted in part in quotations (28) and (40), but it seems worth repeating in full in the present context:

- (73) Those who see entities as existent and nonexistent do not see reality. Therefore, for them, liberation is also not possible. For us, engaging in conventional activities (*tha snyad byed pa*) without attachment to existence and nonexistence, it is not the case that [liberation] is impossible. If to see entities and nonentities were to see reality, there would be no one who would not see reality; therefore that is not the vision of reality. Therefore entities' lack of intrinsic nature is reality; and only by seeing that will one be liberated.

Here Buddhapālita has made a very significant point. It is true that the Madhyamaka analysis fails to find an intrinsic nature in any entity. This does not mean, however, that the search for reality, and thus for liberation, ends in failure. Since the fact that things do not have intrinsic nature is the way things really are, that fact itself *is* reality. Rather than being a cause for despair, the thorough comprehension of things' lack of intrinsic nature is itself the fulfillment of the quest for reality and liberation. According to the Mādhyamikas, it is those who base their search for liberation on views of existence and nonexistence, entities and nonentities, whose quest will fail. Thus far from being an obstacle to liberation, the realization that there is no intrinsic nature in things alone makes it possible.

In the Indian context, any theory of liberation has to deal with the actions (*karman*) which bind one to *samsāra* and the passions — in Buddhist terminology, the afflictions (*kleśa*) — which produce them. Buddhapālita says,

- (74) Here, since action and the afflictions are the cause of [re] birth, it is said [in MMK 18–5a] that liberation is due to the ending of action and the afflictions.

What does seeing that things have no intrinsic nature have to do with putting an end to action and the afflictions? Buddhapālita explains,

- (75) When the unwise, whose intellectual eye is obscured by the darkness of confusion, conceptually construct intrinsic nature in entities, desire and hatred are produced in them. When the light of the knowledge of dependent origination has dispelled the darkness of confusion and one sees with the eye of discernment (*prajñā*) entities' lack of intrinsic nature, then that [person's] desire and hatred do not arise in regard to [something] without a basis.

According to the Mādhyamikas, insight into the absence of intrinsic nature in things causes one no longer to have desire and hatred for them. The afflictions cease, and therefore actions motivated by them cease, and therefore rebirth ceases, and this is liberation.

Buddhapālita sums up his position on the question of liberation in a passage quoted in part earlier:

- (76) Therefore emptiness is reality, and only by the meditative cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of emptiness will one comprehend reality. The comprehension of reality is called "liberation."

Thus the Madhyamaka critique of claims that entities have intrinsic nature is not "philosophy for its own sake" but is conceived of as a means to liberation. Therefore, as Buddhapālita said in quotation (3), it is taught to others in order to liberate them; and the motivation for doing so is compassion.

Finally, it should be pointed out that there is a sense in which the Madhyamaka critique *does* undercut the project of gaining liberation. If liberation or nirvāṇa is conceived of as an entity to be acquired by another entity called the "self," then, according to the Mādhyamikas, such a liberation is quite impossible. For one thing, the insight into reality which is essential for liberation shows that the self does not exist as a real entity. Buddhapālita says,

- (77) In brief, seeing that a self (*ātman*) and what belongs to a self (*ātmiya*) do not exist externally or internally is the highest reality (*de kho na' i dam pa*). By the meditative cultivation of the view of reality, one will comprehend reality.

And

- (78) Thus not to see a self and what belongs to a self externally or internally is the vision of reality. That [yogi] meditatively cultivates that and makes it firm.

To seek liberation in a way which perpetuates one's clinging to notions of "I" and "mine" is self-defeating. For liberation to occur, one must thoroughly understand that self and other are only conventional designations. Buddhapālita discusses this problem in his commentary on MMK 16–9:

- (79) Here the complete cessation of appropriation is called "nirvāṇa;" but the root of all appropriation is the grasping of self and what belongs to a self. Therefore those who vainly imagine, "I will enter final nirvāṇa (*parinirvāṇa*) with no appropriation! May final nirvāṇa be mine!" continue to embrace a grasping of a self and what belongs to a self. Therefore, that very grasping of theirs, of a self and what belongs to a self, is an appropriation which is not well grasped. How would liberation be possible for one who has an appropriation? Who is that one who would enter final nirvāṇa with no appropriation? And of whom would there be final nirvāṇa? All these are produced by the craving and ignorance of the one [who grasps in that way].

NOTES

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¹ See Ruegg (1981), p. 60, and Ruegg (1982), p. 512.

² Tāranātha, pp. 105–6.

³ *Bstan 'gyur Dbu ma Tsa*, Peking (Vol. 95 of Japanese reprint) 317a–8; Derge (Vol. 1 of Japanese reprint) 281a–3.

⁴ See Tachikawa (1974).

⁵ See Lindtner (1981).

⁶ Not available to me at the time of writing this paper.

⁷ See Saito (1984), which contains a complete edition of the text and a translation of the first sixteen chapters.

⁸ See, for example, Ruegg (1981), pp. 64–65, 76–78.

⁹ Ruegg (1981), p. 58.

¹⁰ *Gambhīro cāyam Ananda paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrābhāso ca* D II 55.12,13.

¹¹ *Vuttaṃ kho pana etaṃ Bhagavatā. Yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati, yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati* M I 190.37–191.2.

¹² *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tāṃ pracakṣmahe | sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā* | La Vallée Poussin (1913) [abbrev.: LVP], 503.10,11.

¹³ *anīrodham anutpādam . . . pratītyasamutpādam . . .* (LVP 11.13,15). If one understands *anīrodha* and *anutpāda* as *karmadhāraya* compounds in apposition with

pratītyasamutpāda, one translates "... dependent origination, which is noncessation, nonorigination ...". On the other hand, if one follows the Tibetan translation (LVP 11 n. 6) and takes them as *bahuvrīhi* compounds, then one translates "... dependent origination, which is without cessation, without origination ...".

¹⁴ See, e.g., Robinson (1967), pp. 177–8 and Lamotte (1962), pp. LXIV–LXV, 287–291.

¹⁵ In passages quoted from Buddhapālita, Sanskrit words in parentheses are reconstructed from the corresponding Tibetan terms. Where the Sanskrit original is uncertain, Tibetan may be given instead of or in addition to Sanskrit.

¹⁶ I have not been able to identify the source of this quotation.

¹⁷ *na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ | hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet | svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ kathaṃ | akṛtrimāḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paraatra ca |* (LVP 259.9,13; 260.3; 262.11).

¹⁸ *pratītya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ* (LVP 159.17).

¹⁹ The afflictions are undesirable emotional states. The three most often mentioned are desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), and confusion (*moha*). See quotation (9).

²⁰ The five *skandhas* are material form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception/conception (*saṃjñā*), mental formations (*saṃskārāḥ*), and cognition (*viññāna*).

²¹ The view of permanence is the view that there is a self which persists after death; the view of annihilation is the view that there is a self which is annihilated at death. The Buddha taught dependent origination as a middle way between these two extremes. By extension, the view of permanence connotes the view that there are enduring entities. The view of annihilation connotes the view that there are entities which are annihilated, resulting in a nonentity, the absence of an entity.

²² The twelve *āyatana*s, "sense-fields," are the six sense faculties (the five physical senses and the mind) with their corresponding objects (visible form, sound, etc., plus dharmas for the mind). The eighteen *dhātus*, "elements," are the twelve *āyatana*s plus the six corresponding cognitions, that is, visual cognition, auditory cognition, and so on up to mental cognition.

²³ *prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jatūpapadyate* (LVP 271.7).

²⁴ For a more detailed treatment of this problem in the context of Candrakīrti's thought, see Ames (1982). See also Section 4, pp. 91–94, in Huntington (1983).

²⁵ See LVP 504.8–10.

²⁶ The five ways in question are five possible relationships between two things: sameness; difference; the first possessing the second; the first existing in the second; and the second existing in the first. See MMK 10–4.

²⁷ For a detailed discussion of these questions, see Ruegg (1977), especially pp. 15–19.

²⁸ For a treatment of the question of Madhyamaka and nihilism in the works of Bhāvaviveka, see Eckel (1980).

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TIBETAN TEXT OF QUOTATIONS FROM BUDDHAPĀLITA

- P = *Bstan 'gyur Dbu ma Tsa*, Peking edition (in volume 95 of *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition*, D. T. Suzuki (ed.). Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1957-1961).
- D = *Bstan 'gyur Dbu ma Tsa*, Derge Edition (in volume 1 of *Sde dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka Bstan hgyur*, K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima (eds.). Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1977).

(1) ... slob dpon rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba rjes su ston par bzhed pas rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i zab mo nyid yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du gzigs pas ... (P178b-4, 5; D158b-2).

(2) ... rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba zhes bya ba don dam pa'i bden pa mchog tu zab pa ... (P179a-1, D158b-5, 6).

(3) slob dpon thugs rje'i bdag nyid can gyis (P: gyi) sems can mams sdug bsngal sna tshogs kyis nyen par gzigs nas de dag mam par grol bar bya ba'i phyir dngos po mams kyi yang dag pa ji lta ba nyid rab tu bstan par bzhed pas rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba

rjes su bstan pa brtsams te| yang dag ma yin mthong ba 'ching| | yand dag mthong ba mam par grol| | zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro (P omits ro)| | (P179a-6, 7, 8; D159a-3, 4).

(4) de bzhin gshegs pa nyid kyis rten cin 'brel bar 'byung ba bshad cing rab tu bstan pa bden mod kyil 'on kyang 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyī dbang gis skye ba la sogs pa'i brjod pa dag gis bshad cing rab tu bstan pas| de la da (P: de) ltar nyid kyang brjod pa tsam la mngon par zhen pa'i blo can kha cig rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba mchog tu zab pa ma rtogs pa na| dngos po rnams ni yod pa kho na yin te| gang gi phyir de dag gi skye ba dang 'gag pa dang 'gro ba dang 'ong ba dag brjod pa'i phyir ro| | ... de dag la rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i ngo bo nyid rab tu bstan pa'i phyir slob dpon gyis rigs pa dang lung sngon du btang ba 'di brtsams so| | (P179b-8 to 180a-4, D159b-3 to 6).

(5) de lta bas na sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyis 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyī dbang gis kyang de dang de dag gsungs pas| de'i phyir de kho na mthong bar 'dod pa mams kyis 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyī dbang gis gsungs pa dag la mngon par ma zhen par bya ste (P: byas te)| de kho na gang yin pa de gzung bar bya'o| | (P277a-5, 6; D245a-5, 6).

(6) bcom ldan 'das kyis 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyī dbang gis (P omits gis) dus gsum bstan pa mdzad kyil de kho nar ni dus gsum mi 'thad do| | (P278b-6, 7; D246b-4, 5).

(7) ... ngo bo nyid dang bral ba ngo bo nyid kyis (D omits kyis) stong pa ... (P216a-7, D192a-1).

(8) gang gi phyir las ni nyon mongs pa'i rgyu las byung ba yin la| nyon mongs pa mams ni phyin ci log gi rgyu las byung ba yin pa de'i phyir las dang nyon mongs (P omits dang nyon mongs) ngo bo nyid med do (D omits ngo bo nyid med do) zhes smra'o| | (P269a-8 to 269b-1, D238a-2,3).

(9) las dang nyon mongs pa de dag kyang yang dag pa ma yin pa'i rnam par rtog pa las byung ba yin gyi ngo bo nyid kyis yod pa ni ma yin no| | nyon mongs pa ni tshul bzhin ma yin par rnam par rtog pa las byung ba yin te| ji ltar yul gcig kho na la yang la la ni chags par 'gyur| la la ni sdang bar 'gyur| la la ni rmongs par 'gyur bas| de'i phyir nyon mongs pa rnams ni rnam par rtog pa las byung (P: 'byung) ngo| | nyon mongs pa can gyi sems dang ldan pa'i lus dang ngag dang yid kyis mngon par 'du byed pa dag ni las zhes bya ste ... de lta bas na las dang nyon mongs pa dag ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i rnam par rtog pa'i rgyu las byung ba yin no| | (P272b-8 to 273a-4, D241a-6 to 241b-2).

(10) kho bo cag gis lus kyī rgyu las de dang nyon mongs pa de dag rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i phyir| ngo bo nyid stong ngo| | zhes bstan pas| 'bras bu ni rgyu'i yon tan gyi bdag nyid can du 'dod par bya ba yin pas de'i phyir gal te lus kyī rgyu las dang nyon mongs pa dag nyid stong zhing de dag stong na lus ngo bo nyid yod do| | zhes bya ba de ji ltar brjod de| ... (P269b-4, 5, 6; D238a-6, 7).

(11) nye bar blang ba gang yod do snyam du sems pa de yang rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i phyir ngo bo nyid med do| | (P298b-4, 5; D264a-3, 4).

(12) ci khyod rta la zhon bzhin nyid (P omits nyid) du rta ma mthong ngam| khyod dngos po rnams rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba zhes kyang smra la| de dag (P, D: dag gang) gi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang ma mthong ko| | (P253b-2, 3; D224a-3).

(13) ... rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba smra ba rnams la las 'di zhes bya ba de rkyen las byung ngo zhes bya ba mi srid la| rgyu med pa las byung bar smra ba rnams la yang las 'di zhes bya ba de rgyu med pa las byung ngo| | zhes bya ba mi srid pa ... (P270a-7, 8; D239a-1, 2).

(14) de lta bas na dngos po dang dngos po med par mthong ba dag ni rtag pa dang

chad par lta bar thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir de dag la 'khor ba dang mya ngan las 'das pa dang beings pa dang thar pa dag mi 'thad kyi\ rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba smra ba nyid la ni 'khor ba dang mya ngan las 'das pa bcings pa dang thar pa zhes bya ba dag 'grub po\ | (P261b-5, 6; D231a-5, 6).

(15) rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba smra ba mams la ni dngos po skye bzhin pa yang yod pa ma yin la\ dngos po skye bzhin pa'i skye ba yang yod pa ma yin no\ | (P216a-5, 6; D191b-7).

(16) . . . dngos po dang dngos po med par rtag pa thams cad ni rtag dang chad pa'i skyon dang rjes su 'brel pa yin la\ rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni dngos po dang dngos po med par lta ba dag las phyi rol du gyur pa yin pas\ de'i phyir rtag pa dang chad par lta ba'i skyon las mam par grol ba yin no\ | (P271a-3, 4; D239b-3, 4).

(17) See quotation (63).

(18) de lta bas na slob dpon gyis dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rab tu bstan pa'i phyir 'di brtsams so (D: brtsam mo)\ | (P179b-6, 7; D159b-2).

(19) dngos po rnams kyi yang dag pa ji lta ba (D; ba bzhin) nyid gang yin\ bshad pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid de\ (P179a-8, D159a-4).

(20) gang gi phyir las ngo bo nyid med pa de'i phyir skye ba med de\ 'di ltar las kyi ngo bo nyid yod na ni las kyi skye ba 'di yin no\ | zhes skye ba yang 'thad par 'gyur na\ las kyi ngo bo nyid med na ci zhig skye bar 'gyur\ ci ste skye na yang ngo bo nyid du ni skye bar mi 'gyur rol\ | gang ngo bo nyid du skye bar mi 'gyur ba de ni las nyid ma yin te\ las kyi ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir rol\ | (P267a-3, 4; D236a-1, 2).

(21) de lta bas na de kho na'i don nam par ma shes nas chud mi za ba'i tshig tsam la dngos por mngon par zhen par (D: zhi bar) byas nas mang po dang sna tshogs pa dang snying po med pa de snyed cig smras so\ | 'di ltar las ni ngo bo nyid med pa kho na yin te\ gang gi phyir ngo bo nyid med pa de'i phyir ma skyes pa yin la\ gang gi phyir ma skyes pa de'i phyir chud za bar mi 'gyur te\ (P267b-7 to 268a-1, D236b-4, 5).

(22) . . . dngos po thams cad ngo bo nyid (P omits ngo bo nyid) kyis stong pa'i phyir ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags par mthong ba . . . (P275a-4, D243a-7).

(23) . . . thog ma dang tha ma med par gsungs pas bcom ldan 'das kyis 'khor ba yang ngo bo nyid stong par bstan rol\ | 'di ltar gal te 'khor ba (P, D: ba pa) zhes bya ba dngos po 'ga' zhig yod par gyur (D; gyur pa) na de la thog ma yang yod (P: yod pa)\ tha ma yang yod par 'gyur bar the tshom med do\ | . . . de lta bas na thog ma dang tha ma med par gsungs pas 'khor ba zhes bya ba dngos po 'ga' yang mi 'thad do\ | (P238b-6 to 239a-1, D211a-4, 5, 6).

(24) de (P: da) ltar gang gi phyir dngos po skye ba rnam pa thams cad du mi 'thad pas (P: pa'i) de'i phyir skye ba med pas skye bar brjod pa ni tha snyad tsam yin no\ | (P182b-2, D161b-6, 7).

(25) . . . skye bar brjod pa ni tha snyad tsam du grub po\ | (P190a-1, D168b-2).

(26) de'i phyir de lta bu'i rang bzhin shes pa rang rig pa gzhan las (P: la) shes pa ma yin pa gang yin pa de ni de kho na'i mtshan nyid yin par shes par bya'o\ | (P277b-3, 4; D245b-2, 3).

(27) 'di ltar 'gyur ba'i ngyen po ni rang bzhin yin pas de'i phyir rang bzhin ni mi 'gyur ba (D omits ba) rtag pa yin pa'i rigs na\ dngos po rnams la ni gzhan du 'gyur ba snang bas de'i phyir de dag la ngo bo nyid kyis yod pa nyid mi 'thad do\ | (P255b-3, 4; D226a-1).

(28) See quotation (73).

(29) de ltar gang gi phyir dngos po rnams la yod pa nyid dang med pa nyid du lta ba skyon du mar 'gyur ba de'i phyir dngos po mams ngo bo nyid med pa zhes bya

ba de ni de (P omits de) kho na mthong ba ste dbu ma'i lam yin la de nyid don dam pa 'grub pa yin no | (P256a-7, 8; D226b-3).

(30) See quotation (76).

(31) stong ngo zhes kyang brjod mi bya | mi stong ngo zhes kyang mi bya | stong pa dang mi stong pa dang | stong pa yang ma yin mi stong pa yang ma yin no zhes kyang brjod par mi bya'o | yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pa spang ba'i phyir dang | don dam pa'i de kho na gdags pa'i don du ni de dag brjod par bya ste ... (P299b-2, 3, 4; D264b-7 to 265a-1).

(32) ... stong pa nyid ces bya ba'i (D; ba) dngos po 'ga' yang med do | (P248b-4, D219b-7).

(33) gang dag stong pa nyid la dngos po nyid du mngon par zhen pa de dag la ni gzhan gang gis kyang mngon par zhen pa de bzlog par mi nus te | dper na ci yang med do zhes smras pa na ci yang med pa de nyid byin cig ces zer ba gang yin pa de la med pa nyid 'dzin du gzhu par ji ltar nus pa bzhin te ... gang dag gis stong pa nyid kyang stong par mthong ba de kho na mthong ba de dag la ni stong pa nyid du grub po | (P249a-1, 2, 3; D220a-3, 4, 5).

(34) ... dngos por snang ba ni sgyu ma dang | smig rgyu dang | dri za'i grong khyer dang | zgugs brnyan bzhin du grub po | (P242a-1, 2; D213b-6, 7).

(35) mngon sum du dmigs pa zhes gang smras pa de yang rang gi sems kun tu rmongs pa'i skyon gyis sgyu ma dang rmi lam mthong ba bzhin du mthong ba yin gyi | 'di la yang dag pa (D; par) cung zad kyang med de | 'di bden no snyam du mngon par zhen pa de spang ba'i (P: spangs pa'i) phyir | bcom ldan 'das kyis ... gsungs te | (P298b-8 to 299a-2, D264a-6, 7).

(36) rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni bdag nyid 'di lta bu yin te | gang gi phyir re zhig gzhan la brten nas gzhan zhes bya ba de'i phyir 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyi dbang gis (P: gi) gzhan yin no zhes smra'o | ... gang gi phyir re lde la ltos (P: ltos, here and in the next two instances) te bum pa gzhan zhes bya ba ni re lde la ltos pa'i phyir dang | re lde la rag lus pa'i phyir dang | rang las rab tu ma grub pa'i phyir bum pa la gzhan nyid yod pa ma yin no | gang gi (P omits gi) phyir re lde la mi ltos pa bum pa gzhan ma yin pa zhes bya ba 'ba' zhig la yangi gzhan ma yin pa dang mi mthun pa gzhan nyid med pa de'i phyir don dam pa'i dbang gis (P: gi) gzhan med do zhes smra'o | (P250b-6 to 251a-2, D221b-5 to 222a-1).

(37) de lta bas na de dag thams cad kyang de kho nar rang las rab tu 'grub pa yod pa ma yin no | 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyi dbang gis ni brjod par bya'o | (P280b-6, 7; D248-1, 2).

(38) ... brjod pa thams cad kyang mi 'thad do | 'jig rten gyi tha snyad gyi dbang gis ni de dag thams cad kyang 'thad de | (P282a-5, D249b-4, 5).

(39) ... bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang dngos po mams ngo nyid stong par gzigs kyang | 'jig rten gyi tha snyad kyi dbang gis 'di ni yang dag pa nyid do | 'di ni yang dag pa nyid ma yin no | 'di ni yang dag pa nyid dang | yang dag pa nyid ma yin no | zhes gsungs so | (P276b-7, 8; D244b-7 to 245a-1).

(40) See quotation (73).

(41) 'di ni de kho na bsam pa yin pas 'di la 'jig rten pa'i brjod pa ... dag gis ci bya | (P236a-1, D208b-5, 6).

(42) ... 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob kyi bden pa gang gis bum pa yod do sab ma yod do zhes brjod pa de nyid kyis bum pa chag go sab ma tshig go zhes de dag mi rtag par yang brjod do | gang gi tshe de kho na bsam pa (P, D: sab ma tsam pa for bsam pa) de'i tshe ni bum pa dang sab ma dag brten nas gdags par bya ba yin pas mi 'thad na de

dag chag pa dang tshig pa lta 'thad par ga la 'gyur| gzhan yang de bzhin gshegs pa yang 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob kyi dbang gis de bzhin gshegs pa bgr'es so| de bzhin gshegs pa mya ngan las 'das so| zhes mi rtag par yang brjod do| gang gi tshe don dam par bsam pa de'i tshe ni de bzhin gshegs pa nyid mi 'thad na bgr'es pa dang mya ngan las 'das pa dag lta 'thad par ga la 'gyur te| (P301b-5 to 8, D266b-6 to 267a-1).

(43) *gal te sangs rgyas phung po rnams la brten nas gdags par bya ba (P: ba ma) yin na| de'i don ni sangs rgyas ngo nyid las med pa ma yin na| 'di ltar ngo bo nyid las yod pa la ni yang (P omits yang) brten nas gdags pas ci bya ste| de'i ngo bo nyid gang kho na yin pa de kho nas gdags par bya bar 'gyur ro| gang gi phyir de ngo bo nyid med pa de' phyir nye bar len pas (D: pas gang) gdags par bya (D: bya ba) ste| de lta bas na de bzhin gshegs pa ngo bo nyid las yod pa ma yin no| (P296b-3, 4, 5; D262a-6, 7).*

(44) *gang gi phyir de bzhin gshegs pa phung po rnams la brten nas gdags par bya ba yin gyi rang las rab tu grub pa med pa de'i phyir ngo bo nyid med do| 'gro ba 'di dag kyang de dang de dag la brten (P: rten) nas gdags par bya ba yin gyi 'di dag la rang las rab tu grub (P: 'grub) pa cung zad kyang med pas de'i phyir 'gro ba yang de bzhin gshegs pa bzhin du ngo bo nyid med do| (P301a-8 to 301b-2, D266b-2, 3, 4).*

(45) *de lta (P omits lta) bas na kho bos (P: bo) dngos po brten nas gdags pa yin no| zhes shin tu nges par byas pa de gzung bar bya'o| de lta na byed pa po dang las dang 'bras bu dang za ba po dang nyon mongs pa dang lus bstan pa dag kyang 'thad la| rtag pa dang chad pa'i skyon du yang thal bar mi 'gyur zhing 'khor ba yang 'grub po| (P271a-4, 5, 6; D239b-4, 5).*

(46) *byed pa po ni las la brten cing las la gnas| las la ltos (P: bltos here and in the next instance) nas byed pa po zhes gdags shing brjod do| de'i las kyang byed pa po de nyid la brten nas 'byung (P: byung) zhing de'i las zhes gdags shing brjod do| de'i phyir de gnyis ni ltos pa can du gdags pa yin gyi ngo bo nyid du grub pa dang ma grub pa med do| de'i phyir de ltar de gnyis yod pa dang med pa nyid du khas ma blangs pas dbu ma'i lam du gdags pa yin no| gdags (P: dgags) pa de ma gtogs par de gnyis 'grub pa'i mtshan nyid gzhan ma mthong ngo| (P227a-8 to 227b-2, D201a-7 to 201b-2).*

(47) *... ji ltar byed pa po las (D omits las) la brten nas gdags pa de bzhin du| nye bar len pa po yang nye bar blang ba la brten nas gdags so| ji ltar las byed pa po de nyid la brten nas gdags pa de bzhin du nye bar blang ba yang nye bar len pa po de nyid la brten nas gdags te| de gnis la yang de ma gtogs par 'grub pa'i mtshan nyid ma mthong ngo| (P227b-3, 4, 5; D201b-2, 3, 4).*

(48) *gal te snga ma dang phyi ma la sogs pa de dag dus kyi rtags yin na| de lta na dus ni dngos po kho na la brten nas gdags pa yin gyi rang las rab tu grub pa ma yin no| (P281b-1, D249a-2, 3).*

(49) *de lta bas na dus zhes bya ba dngos po 'ga' yang med par shes par bya ste| brten nas gdags (D: brtags) par ni 'grub po| (P282a-5, 6; D249b-5).*

(50) *de bzhin gshegs pa gang nye bar len pa gang (P: gang dag) gis gdags par bya ba de (D omits de) de nyid la mam pa (P omits pa) lngas btsal na de nyid dang gzhan nyid du brjod par bya ba ma yin pa nye bar len pa la med na ji ltar de bzhin gshegs pa yod do zhes brjod par bya| de lta bas na brten nas gdags pa dang yod pa nyid kyang mi 'thad do| (P298b-1, 2; D264a-1, 2).*

(51) *gang dag la gcig pa nyid dang gzhan nyid du grub pa yod pa ma yin pa de dag la grub pa med de| de dag las gzhan du 'grub pa (D: la) mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro| (P287b-5, 6; D254b-2, 3).*

(52) *kho bo cag la ni dngos po* (D: *po la*) *brten nas gdags pa ngo bo nyid stong pasgyu ma dang smig rgyu dang gzugs brnyan lta bu rnams la dngos po de gang gir 'gyur te* (P omits *te*) *dngos po de gang las gzhan du 'gyur te de nyid dang gzhan nyid du 'gyur ba med do* | (P294a-5, 6; D260a-5, 6).

(53) *smras pa* . . . *nye bar len pa po dang nye bar blang ba ni de nyid dang gzhan nyid du mi brjod do* | *re zhig de nyid du mi brjod de byed pa po'i tshig tha dad pa'i phyir ro* | *gzhan nyid du yang mi brjod de* (D: *dam*) *so sor 'grub pa med pa'i phyir ro* | *de lta bas na de gnyi ga yang yod de de nyid dang gzhan nyid du ni brjod par mi nus so* | *bshad pa* | *ci khyod mdza' bshes kyi blos dgra bo dpang du len nam* (D: *tam*) | *khyod gang kho nas nye bar len pa po dang nye bar blang ba* (D: *blangs pa*) *dag rab tu 'grub par mi 'thad pa de kho nas de dag rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir rtsom par byed ko* | *'di ltar gal te nye bar blang ba dang nye bar len pa po zhig yod par gyur na gcig pa nyid dam* | *gzhan nyid du 'gyur bar the tshom med do* | *gang dag gcig pa nyid du yang yod pa ma yin la gzhan nyid du yang yod pa ma yin pa de dag gzhan du ji ltar yod par 'gyur* | *de lta bas na nye bar blang ba yang yod pa ma yin pa nyid la nye bar len pa po yang yod ma yin pa nyid do* | *tha snyad kyi dbang gis* (P: *gi*) *nye bar len pa po dang nye bar blang ba* (D: *blangs pa*) *dag rjod* (P: *brjod*) *par byed na yang de nyid kyang ma yin pa gzhan nyid kyang ma yin* (P omits *pa gzhan nyid kyang ma yin*) *par brjod dgos te* . . . (P298a-2 to 6, D263b-2 to 6).

(54) *smras pa* | *gang 'jig rten 'di med do* | *'jig rten pha rol med do* | *sems can rdzus* (P: *brdzus*) *te skye ba med do* | *zhes bya ba la sogs par lta ba de dang* | *gang dngos po thams cad ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa zhes bya bar lta ba de gnyis la khyad par ci yod* | (P274b-7, 8; D243a-3, 4).

(55) *kho bo ni dngos po rnams ri bong gi rwa bzhin du med pa nyid du mthong la tshig gi skyon rnams* (P omits *rnams*) *yongs su spang ba'i* (P: *spangs pa'i*) *phyir yod pa nyid kyang ma yin la med pa nyid kyang ma yin no zhes mi smra'i* | *'di ltar de dag rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i phyir ji ltar yod pa nyid dang med pa nyid dag gzugs brnyan dag bzhin du mthong ba de ltar smra bas* | (P275b-7 to 276a-1, D244a-2, 3).

(56) *smras pa* | *gal te dus kyang med rgyu dang 'bras bu dang tshogs pa yang med na gzhan ci zhig yod de* | *de lta bas na de ni med par smra ba nyid yin no* | *bshad pa* | *ma yin te ji ltar khyod dus la sogs pa dag ngo bo nyid las yod par yongs su rtog par byed pa de ltar mi 'thad par zad kyi* | *de dag brten nas gdags par ni 'grub po* | (P289a-1, 2; D255b-3, 4).

(57) *de lta bas na brten nas gdags par bya ba'i don ni dngos po gang brten nas gdags par bya de ni nam pa thams cad du ngo bo nyid stong pa'i phyir yod pa dang med par brjod par bya ba ma yin pa de nyid yin te* | *tha snyad kyi tshig la skyon med do* | (P299a-7, 8; D264b-4, 5).

(58) *de bzhin gshegs pa brten nas gdags par bya ba gang yin pa de* | *yod do zhe'am* | *med do zhes ji ltar brjod par rigs* | *'di ltar gal te de bzhin gshegs pa zhig yod par gyur na* | *nye bar len pa med par* (D: *pa*) *yang yod pa kho nar 'gyur ba'i rigs na* | *nye bar len pa med par ni yod pa ma yin no* | *gang nye bar len pa med par* (D: *pa*) *ni* (P omits *ni*) *yod pa ma yin pa de ji ltar yod do zhes brjod par bya* | *de bzhin gshegs pa gang* (D: *gang la*) *brten nas gdags par bya ba de ji ltar med do zhes kyang brjod par bya stel* | *'di ltar u-dum-ba-ra'i* (D: *u-dum-bā-ra'i*) *me tog med pa ni gdags su med do* | (P299b-7 to 300a-1, D265a-3, 4, 5).

(59) *kho bo ni byed pa po dang las dag med pa nyid du mi smra'i* | *kho bos de dag gi bya ba yin par gyur pa dang* | *ma yin par gyur pa yons su rtog* (D: *rtogs*) *pa spangs*

pa de (P: des) byas te\kho bo ni byed pa po dang las dag brten nas gdags par 'dod de\... de gnyis yod pa nyid dang med pa nyid du khas ma blangs pas ... (P227a-6 to 227b-1, D201a-6 to 201b-1).

(60) gang zhig po lta ba la sogs pa dag gi snga rol dang lta ba la sogs pa dag dang\ da ltar lhan cig dang\lta la sogs pa dag gi phyi dus rnam pa thams cad du btsal na\ de 'di'o zhes rang gis rab tu grub pa med pa de la lta ba la sogs pa dag gis yod do med do (P omits med do) zhes gdags pa'i rtog pa dag ldog par 'gyur te\re zhig rang nyid rab tu ma grub pa'i phyir de (P omits de) yod do zhes ji (P: ji ji) skad brjod par nus\lta ba la sogs pa dag gis (P: gi) gsal bar byed pa'i phyir de med do zhes kyang ji skad brjod par nus te\de'i phyir de la yod do med do zhes rtog pa dag mi 'thad (P: mthad) do\ de lta bas na byed pa po dang las dag bzhin du nye bar len pa de yang gdags par zad kyi\ de ma gtogs par 'grub pa gzhan mi 'thad do\ (P231b-2 to 5, D205a-2, 3, 4).

(61) ... rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba 'dis rgyu dang rkyen gyi (P: gyis) dbang gis (P: gi) dngos por gdags (D: brtags) pa yin gyi\ dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid kyi yod pa ma yin no ... (P248b-8, D220a-2).

(62) sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi bstan pa ni dngos po rgyu dang rkyen las gdags par zad kyi yod pa dang med pa ni ma yin no\ (P: te\l) (P227a-3, 4; D245a-4).

(63) kho bos phung po dang khamas dang skye mched dag med pa nyid du mi smra 'il de dag yod pa nyid du smra ba sel bar byed do\ de gni ga yang skyon du che stel ... de'i phyir kho bo ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung bas yod pa nyid dang med pa nyid kyi skyon dang bral ba chad pa ma yin (P: yin pa) rtag pa ma yin pa rjes su rab tu ston gyi (D: pa) med pa nyid du mi smra 'ol\ (P205b-3 to 6, D182a-7 to 182b-2).

(64) gang la rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba de la yod do zhe'am\ med do zhes smra bar ga la rigs\ (P270b-6, D239a-6, 7).

(65) dngos po ngo bo nyid stong pa sgyu ma dang\ rmi lam dang\ smig rgyu dang\ gzugs brnyan dang\ brag cha (P: ca) lta bu dag la ji ltar yang dag pa nyid dang\ yang dag pa nyid ma yin par brjod de\ (D: do\l) de'i phyir de ni sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi bstan pa yod pa dang med pa nyid kyi skyon dang bral ba\ mu stegs byed thams cad dang thun mong ma yin pa don dam pa gsal bar byed pa yin no\ (P227a-1, 2; D245a-2, 3).

(66) de lta bas na brdzun (P: rdzun, here and in the next instance) pa zhes gsungs pas dngos po rnams med par bstan pa ma yin no\ bcom ldan 'das ... slu (P: bslu) ba'i chos gang yin pa de ni brdzun pa'o zhes bya ba de gsungs pas ni dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid mu stegs byed thams cad kyi mi rtogs pa yod pa nyid dang med pa nyid kyi skyon dang bral ba yongs su (P omits su) bstan pa yin no\ (P246b-5, 6, 7; D218a-2, 3, 4).

(67) 'bras bu ngo bo nyid kyi stong pa bdag nyid kyi rab tu ma grub pa gang yin pa de (D: des) ji ltar skye bar 'gyur zhing\ ji ltar 'gag par 'gyur\ci ste 'bras bu de (P omits de) ngo bo nyid med kyang skye ba dang 'gag par rnam par rtog na de la smra bar bya dgos telci de (D: ste) 'bras bu'i ngo bo ma gtogs pa gzhan zhig skye ba dang 'gag par 'gyur ram\ci ste 'bras bu'i dngos po ma gtogs pa gzhan zhig skye bar 'gyur na ni des 'bras bu la cir 'gyur te\ di ltar 'bras bu ma (D: 'bras bur) yin pa skye ba 'bras bur mi 'gyur\ de lta bas na 'bras bu de stong par yongs su rtog (D: rtogs) na yang med pa'i phyir ma 'gags pa dang ma skyes par yang thal bar 'gyur bas\ de yang mi 'dod do\ de lta bas na 'bras bu stong pa yang skye bar mi 'gyur zhing 'gag par yang mi 'gyur ro\ (P287a-4 to 7, D254a-2 to 5).

(68) re zhig dngos po ngo bo nyid stong pa la 'byung ba dang 'jig pa dag yod par mi 'thad de\ci'i phyir zhe na\ yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro\ di ltar ngo bo nyid yod

pa ma yin pa la de dag gang gis yod par 'gyur ngo bo nyid yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir gang gi 'di'o zhes tha snyad (P omits tha snyad) gdags pa nyid kyang yod pa ma yin pa de la ci zhig 'byung ngo zhe'am ci zhig 'jig go zhes ji skad du brjod par bya de lta bas na stong pa la 'byung ba dang 'jig pa dag 'thad pa nyid ma yin no || (P291a-4, 5, 6; D257b-3, 4).

(69) srid pa 'gags pas skye ba zad par 'gyur ba de ni thar pa zhes bya'o || de lta yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba des de kho na rtogs pa yin la de kho na rtogs pas thar par 'gyur ro || (P272b-6, 7; D241a-5).

(70) de kho na mthong ba la ni bya ba ci yang med do || (P276a-4, D244a-a5).

(71) smras pa 'di la de kho na mthong bgs thar par 'gyur ro || zhes bya zhing de kho na zhes bya ba yang de'i dngos po ni de kho na ste (P: te zhes bya ba yang de'i dngos po ni de kho na te in place of ste) dngos po'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go || de la gal te dngos po'i ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yin na de lta na khyod la de kho na mthong ba mi 'thad par mi 'gyur ram de kho na mthong ba med na thar pa 'thad par (P: pa) ji lta 'gyur de lta bas na (P omits na) dngos po rnam ngo bo nyid med pa zhes bya bar lta ba de ni bzang po ma yin no || (P254b-7 to 255a-1, D225a-5, 6, 7).

(72) gang dag de lta ngo bo nyid dang gzhan gyi dngos po dang dngos po med pa nyid lta ba de dag ni 'di lta yang (P omits yang) sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa mchog tu zab pa la de kho na mthong ba ma yin no || kho bo cag ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i nyi ma shar bas snang bar gyur pa'i (P: 'gyur ba'i) dngos po rnam kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mthong bas de'i phyir kho bo cag nyid la de kho na mthong ba yod pas kho bo cag kho na la thar pa yang 'thad (P: mthad) do || (P255a-2, 3, 4; D225a-7 to 225b-2).

(73) gang dag dngos po rnam la yod pa nyid dang med pa nyid du rjes su lta ba de dag gis de kho na mi mthong bas de dag nyid la yang thar pa mi 'thad do || kho bo cag yod pa nyid dang (D omits dang) med pa nyid la mngon par zhen pa med par tha snyad byed pa dag la ni mi 'thad pa med (P omits pa med) do || gal te dngos po dang dngos po med par mthong ba de kho na mthong ba yin na ni de kho na (D: na la) ma mthong ba 'ga' yang med par 'gyur bas de ni de (P, D omit de) kho na mthong ba (D omits mthong ba) ma yin no || de lta bas na dngos po rnam kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ni de kho na yin la de mthong ba kho nas thar par 'gyur te || (P255a-6, 7, 8; D225b-4, 5).

(74) 'di la las dang nyon mongs pa dag ni skye ba'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir las dang nyon mongs pa zad pas thar pa zhes bya'o || (P272b-8, D241a-6).

(75) mi mkhas pa gti mug gi mun pas blo gros kyi mig bsgrigs pa ni dngos po rnam la ngo bo nyid du mam par rtog pa (D omits pa) de dag la 'dod chags dang zhe sdang dag skyed (P: bskyed) par byed do || gang gi tshe rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba shes pa'i snang bas gti mug gi mun pa bsal cing shes rab kyi mig gis dngos po rnam kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid mthong ba de'i tshe na gnas med pa la de'i 'dod chags dang zhe sdang dag mi skye'o || (P179a-8 to 179b-2, D159a-4, 5, 6).

(76) de lta bas na stong pa nyid ni de kho na yin la stong pa nyid bsgom (D: bsgoms) pa kho nas ni de kho na rtogs par 'gyur zhing de kho na rtogs pa nyid ni thar pa zhes bya ste || (P273a-7, 8; D241b-5).

(77) mdor na phyi dang nang la bdag med pa bdag gi med pa nyid du lta ba gang yin pa de ni de kho na'i dam pa yin la de kho na'i lta ba bsgom (D: bsgoms) pas ni de kho na rtogs par 'gyur ro || (P271a-8, D239b-7 to 240a-1).

(78) de lta phyi dang nang la bdag dang bdag gir mi lta ba de ni de kho na mthong

ba yin te | de de sgom (P: bsgom) par byed cing brtan (P: bstan) par byed do | | (P272a-3, D240b-3).

(79) *'di la nye bar len pa gtan du nye bar zhi ba gang yin pa de mya ngan las 'das pa zhes bya na | nye bar len pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba ni bdag dang bdag gir 'dzin pa yin pas | gang dag nye bar len pa med par yongs su mya ngan las 'da' bar bya'o | | nye bar len pa med pa'i yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa bdag gir gyur cig snyam du rlom sems su byed pa de dag ni bdag dang bdag gir 'dzin pa yongs su bzung ste nges par gnas pa yin pas | de'i phyir de dag gi bdag dang bdag gir 'dzin pa de nyid nye bar len pa legs par ma zin pa yin no | | nye bar len pa dang bcas pa la thar pa 'thad par ga la 'gyur te | nye bar len pa med par yongs su mya ngan las 'da' bar 'gyur ba de gang yin zhing yongs su mya ngan las 'da' ba gang gi yin par 'gyur te | de dag thams cad ni de'i sred (D: srid) pa dang ma rig pas bskyed pa yin no | |* (P261a-2 to 6, D230b-4 to 7).

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THE SERPENT AND THE ROPE ON STAGE: POPULAR, LITERARY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF REALITY IN TRADITIONAL INDIA

One of the most continually absorbing problems confronting students of culture is, or perhaps I should say, ought to be, the relationship between the attitudes and artifacts of a society's intellectual elites and those of the general population. For it is in an investigation of this question that we may more clearly see the fundamental attitudes and belief systems that characterize particular cultures and to a great extent, govern the shape of their ideologies and institutions.

The exact relationship between a people's elite and popular cultures, however, is often extremely complex and since the two are rarely either clearly bounded or sealed against the influence of the other, the tracing of a particular idea or attitude to one or the other can take on something of a chicken-and-egg quality. Do, for example, the philosophical positions of a Hegel and a Nietzsche or the poems of a Goethe derive from and somehow crystallize the ideas, attitudes, and aesthetic sensibilities of the German people, or would it be more correct to argue that the characteristic attitudes and concerns of the Germans have been molded by the writings of such intellectual giants as these? Or, on the other hand, is it that the attitudes of elite and popular culture continually both feed from and inspire each other to create a dynamic relationship that collectively defines one culture as opposed to another? It has been argued, for example, that the factors in German culture that led to the horrors of Nazism, are to be explained as the result of the works of such philosophers and artists as Nietzsche and Wagner. Yet, it might be more plausible to entertain the notion that these men derived their fundamental ideas from a substratum of German culture and that their work was successful insofar as it corresponded to the conditioned cultural, intellectual, and emotional responses of the Germans:

Questions such as these become much more complicated when they are applied to traditional cultures in which people's attitudes, ideologies, and emotive responses have been formed over a period of millenia rather than mere centuries and in which the roots of both the elite and the popular

traditions are frequently lost in the most hoary antiquity. The problem is further compounded by the fact that important sources of the elite tradition are often lost to us through the decay of written records while those of the popular tradition were generally never committed to writing at all.

Such a culture is India's, and the richness and antiquity of Indian intellectual, aesthetic, and religious traditions is so enormous that it provides a fertile field for exploration of this problem despite the many difficulties it places in the way of such an inquiry.

One potentially fruitful area for examination is the question of the characteristic philosophical stances that, if by no means unchallenged, come to permeate various strata of a culture's intellectual life, turning up significantly in the writings and debates of scholars and philosophers, the teachings and sermons of priests and pandits, the works of poets and playwrights, and even in the daily conversation of ordinary people.

One such stance that we have come to associate particularly with traditional India has to do with the way in which people are taught to perceive and evaluate sensory phenomena or, to put it another way, to interpret physical and psychological reality.

Several years ago during a small conference on Indian philosophy that I had convened in Berkeley, I became engaged in a minor philosophical debate with a very learned and extremely distinguished visiting Indian scholar who was one of our principal speakers. I had questioned a point he had made in paper and after a brief give and take, he became somewhat exasperated. Pointing at me accusingly he intoned — almost as if in imprecation — “Young man, you have descended to the level of empirical reality!” I was perplexed by this response and wondered how in any reasonable analysis an excursion into the realm of empirical truth could be considered a descent. But my learned colleague was speaking from the point of view of the traditional — specifically vedantic — ideology which holds that there are discrete levels of reality and that the empirically verifiable one is, if not the very lowest, still far from the highest.

The notion that this idea informs the consciousness of at least the custodians of traditionalist elite culture in India was confirmed for me recently during the VI World Sanskrit Conference held in Philadelphia. A considerable number of the Indian delegates to the conference, after listening to the scholarly papers being presented, responded, frequently with scant regard for the subject under discussion, by reminding the speakers

and audience alike of the difference between the *vyāvahārika*, or empirical level of reality, and the *pāramārthika*, or absolute level. One gentleman, himself a minor Śāṅkarācārya, gently chided the participants in a panel which I chaired on epic studies for failing to approach a specific question of literary history from "the astral plane." What was almost palpable in this was a kind of crying out, a seemingly desperate appeal, for reassurance that the view of reality which had been dunned into them during their early life and education, was a correct one and indeed, the only correct one. What, I wondered, was the basis for this need and how else might it be expressed in the culture?

The fact is that a number of ancient and influential philosophical schools associated with the complex religious traditions which we conveniently designate as Hinduism and Buddhism take for one of their more fundamental postulates an elaborately developed notion that the phenomenal world is, in fact, made up of a discrete number of different and hierarchically ordered levels of reality. These schools derive this idea in part from, and heavily base their exposition of it on, a universally accepted contrast between private or idiosyncratic perception such as people experience in dreams, fantasies and hallucinations, and public or shared experience such as our quotidian perception of the world around us. Everyone has experienced the feeling of waking from the powerfully compelling "reality" of a dream or nightmare to the utterly different reality of his daily life, and the exponents of these schools, most notably the writers on Advaita Vedānta and the Buddhist Mādhyamika schools have exploited this feeling, making it the basis of an analogy whereby they can posit a level of reality still "higher" than that of ordinary shared perception, a level which is supposed to bear the same relation to ordinary reality as ordinary reality bears to the idiosyncratic reality of a dream. Realization of this third, and highest level — perception of which is denied an ordinary waking person, as is ordinary reality a sleeper — becomes, for followers of these systems, the great goal and desideratum of human life.

The thrust of this ideology is that we are taught not to fully trust the evidence of our senses. The world we share and everything in it are, in the final analysis, real only relative to obvious delusions and the wise man is he who — to use the dream analogy — "wakes" from the dream that is this life into the reality that lies beyond it. The postulation of a level of reality that cannot be reached by the ordinary mind, or as is not infrequently urged

in the Indian context, by the mind at all, cries out, naturally enough for an elaboration of analogies. Since the subject under learned discussion is imperceptible to one's audience and moreover, through its postulated lack of articulable attributes (*nirguṇatva*, *anirvacanīyatva*, etc.), is not amenable to direct description, proponents of this theory must have constant recourse to the seductive but logically suspect technique of analogy. There are three analogies that presented themselves most readily to the ancient Indian exponents of the doctrine of levels of reality. These are the dream from which one awakes, the hallucination or optical misperception suddenly dispelled, and to a lesser extent, the play. The last two of these, the hallucination and the play, are of interest in that they play an important role in literary texts, many of which are themselves plays, and in the popular perception of the contrast between ordinary and "higher" levels of reality.

The play has always been a fascinating medium for the exploration of reality, and a number of Sanskrit playwrights, much like Pirandello, have taken advantage of the way in which their art lends itself to speculation on this subject. I remember once, towards the very beginning of my first trip to India, meeting a hearty middle-aged gentleman at a social gathering. When I asked him what he did, meaning, naturally, to inquire about his occupation, he startled me by responding, "You mean in the play?" I was utterly confused by this and it took some time before I realized that the "play" he was referring to was what I, in my ignorance, would simply have called the world. Upon learning that I was a Sanskrit scholar the man baffled me further with another question. "How," he inquired, "can you grasp what is beyond the mind with the mind?" I was not then, nor have I subsequently become able to answer this question, but the pretentiousness of both comments aside, the exchange showed me for the first time how the shibboleths associated with Vedānta can permeate even the most mundane of the genres of discourse, the chit-chat of a cocktail party. The tone of the conversation led me to believe that the man was a scholar, a professor of philosophy perhaps. But I was wrong. It turned out that — in the play, of course — he was a colonel of the Bombay Engineers and like many of his social station, was a student of Vedānta and took pleasure in showing off his absorption with "higher things" whenever possible.

In order to attempt to examine and understand the range and perhaps the significance of the notion that what we see is in some important sense not real, it may be helpful to very briefly review the history of this concept

in India and to explore the ways in which a tenet of absolute philosophical monism has penetrated the realm of literature and popular discourse.

A preoccupation with sorting out the real from the unreal is to be noted among authors of Indian texts from as early as the time of the later strata of the *Ṛgvedasamhitā*. The poet of the famous speculative hymn *Ṛgveda* 10.129 is deeply concerned with what he represents as a complex and esoteric relationship between what is real (*sat*) and what is not (*asat*). This simple binary distinction between the real and the unreal is perceptible through much of the metaphysical debates of the *Chāndogya* and other *Upaniṣads* and in the often quoted and impassioned vedic prayer, *asato mā sad gamaya*, "From the Unreal lead me to the Real" (*Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 1.3.28, *Akṣyupaniṣad* 2). But the binary division of the world into real and unreal is unsophisticated, and by the time of the *Upaniṣads*, serious attention was being given to perception of reality in various psychological states, particularly various sleep and dream states. As early as the time of the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, vedic metaphysicians were postulating theories of sleep and dreams according to which the state of sleep is an intermediate one between the realities of this world and the next, or higher realm.¹ A sequential and hierarchically ordered series of states of the true self is perhaps first clearly elaborated in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* passage at 8.7–12 where Prajāpati expounds successive explanations of the imperishable *ātman* to a rather thick-headed Indra. The teacher first identifies the real with the physical body and when the pupil, at first satisfied, comes to realize the spuriousness of such an identification, he successively proposes identifications with the self as perceived in dreams, the self in dreamless sleep, and only in the end, after one hundred and one years of the dull god's studentship does he preach the true self of upaniṣadic thought. Also suggested, although not explicitly stated in this passage, is the idea that all of the selves, or levels of reality propounded, are in some sense real. What makes some states more real than others (to paraphrase Orwell) is their degree of immutability. Thus the physical body is less real insofar as it is highly mutable and extremely perishable. The state of deep, dreamless sleep has the requisite characterlessness to qualify for a high degree but lacks the critical feature of self-awareness: Only the true *ātman* is imperishable, utterly characterless, and yet somehow self-aware and so, in the vedic and vedantic view, is the realest of the real.

The clear implication of this story is that the truly wise man must cultivate the habit of subjecting each level of reality to the closest possible scrutiny

until he reaches the only level that can genuinely stand up to it. Those who do not, like the foolish and too easily satisfied demon Virocana in the story, remain fixated at a lower level of truth which, in the *saṃsāric* universe of traditional India, can have the most dire consequences for their destiny. It is precisely this habit of mind, with its constant preoccupation with "higher" things, that leads to the concern, voiced in many of India's philosophical texts, with the nature and validity of sense perception. For, like exponents of any rigorously idealist philosophy, the proponents of Śāṅkarite Vedānta and Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka must attempt to come to terms with the problem presented by the fact that the universally perceived world is so different from what the philosophers assert to be real. This annoying intractability of the empirical universe can after all only be accommodated by an idealist if he makes some concession to the limited, but nonetheless practical, reality of perceived phenomena. Indeed it is this accommodation that has, on the popular or semi-popular level, given rise to what we may call a genre of idealist humor. In the West this is epitomized by the limerick parodying the Berkeleyan type of idealist philosopher who, having sat on a pin, "dislikes what he fancies he feels." In India we see a number of amusing bits of apocrypha such as the anecdote in which Ādiśaṅkarācārya flees a gathering at which he had been teaching the unreality of perceived phenomena when a tiger interrupts his discourse. He returns when the danger has passed and tells his puzzled disciples who had understood that the tiger was unreal:

evam! paraṃ tu palāyanam api mithyā

Quite so! However my running away was also unreal.

Even the most learned idealist metaphysician has to live in the material world and so must learn not to mix, as it were, his levels. In order to cope with the minimal demands of day to day existence, of one's *vyavahāra*, even the strictist *advaitin* must, however reluctantly, concede some measure of reality to it.² It is this level of reality that the vedantins call *vyāvahārika* and the Buddhists call *saṃvṛti* and which both traditions compare unfavorably with the higher level of absolute or *paramārtha* reality. But, since the higher reality can be apprehended only experientially after prolonged study and meditative praxis under the guidance of an authorized *guru*, it is a difficult matter to sell, as it were, to uninitiates still stuck at the level of vulgar *vyavahāra*. And so, as I mentioned earlier, even the most abstruse philosophers

must have recourse to the most homely of analogies as a pedagogical tool. These analogies are of course drawn from the realm of universal experience of the temporarily compelling power of demonstrably false perceptions. For the only clear and universally acknowledged distinction between levels of reality is that between the *vyavahārika* and the even "lower" level of vulgar misperception, the so-called *prātibhāsika* level; and it is here that the learned *śāstrins* come to rely so heavily on the cliché examples of the rope mistaken for a snake, mother of pearl confused with silver, and the false perception of flies in an empty begging bowl.

But the issue of levels of reality in the philosophical literature has been amply treated elsewhere and I do not, in any case, intend to discuss the purely philosophical handling of this concept.³ Rather, I propose to pursue this philosophical concern into the literary domain in an effort to see just how and to how great a degree such an ideology has permeated less rarefied strata of the culture.

By its very nature the theater is a congenial place for meditation on the nature and relationship of illusion and reality. Shakespeare used the medium of drama to give voice to the metaphor of the world as a stage, and many modern western dramatists have experimented with techniques for playing with and partially bridging the gap that separates the reality of the people in an audience from that being enacted by the players on the stage. With this in mind the characteristically Indian philosophical attitude towards the representation and perception of different levels of reality might be expected to find unusually clear expression in the traditional Indian theatre. This is, in fact, the case.

One interesting feature of major Sanskrit dramas in this regard is a technical one. This is the prologue or *prastāvanā* that immediately precedes the action proper of the play. Western writers at least from the time of Goethe have been impressed and sometimes influenced by this characteristic element of traditional Indian theatre. The striking fact about these prologues is that, whether they are the fully elaborated preambles of a Kālidāsa or a Bhavabhūti or the perfunctory vehicles for an invocatory verse as in the Trivandrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa, these introductions are never omitted. In these *prastāvanās*, unlike the little prologues of say, the Elizabethan stage, the members of the theatrical troupe always play themselves. Thus we always have the *sūtradhāra*, the stage-manager or director, speaking in his own right accompanied, in many cases, by one or more of his players.

Now one function of these prologues, as in the plays of Marlowe or Shakespeare, is partially informational. They provide background and context for the story to be enacted. But the purpose of having the actors first appear as themselves, or more correctly, as theatrical representations of themselves, it seems to me, is largely transitional. In appearing on stage as "himself," as a professional of the theatre preparing for the representation of a second order of reality, the play itself, the *sūtradhāra* is gradually drawing the consciousness of his audience away from the *laukika* concerns of its *vyavahāric* existence to the "higher" realm of aesthetic rapture, a realm not infrequently compared, by the way, with that of the *paramārtha*.⁴

The transitional function of the prologue can be perhaps most clearly seen in one of its more elaborate examples, the *prastāvanā* with which Bhavabhūti, the brilliant eighth century dramatic poet, introduces his masterpiece, the *Uttararāmacarita*. The dramatist's transition from the formalities of the festival-performance to the emotionally charged world of legendary Ayodhyā is unusually gradual. After an invocatory stanza in praise of the ancient seers and the immortal goddess Speech, the *sūtradhāra* eulogizes the playwright and gives his genealogy, announcing the title of the play to be performed. He then makes a formal announcement of the transition to the distant time and place of the epic story:

eṣo 'smi kāryavaśād āyodhyakas tadānīmstanaś ca samvṛttaḥ,

"Here now, in keeping with the requirements of the job at hand, I have become a citizen of Ayodhyā in that distant time."⁵

But even this transformation does not bring us to the action of the epic narrative. For the director has not become one of the characters of the story nor does he, like many *sūtradhāras*, introduce us directly to these characters. Instead he exchanges his role of a contemporary player for that of an ancient bard. In this guise he encounters an actor portraying a colleague and the two enter into a conversation that provides the necessary background for the action that is to follow. Finally, pursuing their assumed occupation, they draw near the palace gates where they overhear some people saying that King Rāma has gone to his residence to console the unhappy Queen Sītā. With this announcement the pair leave the stage and we move into the play proper.

Another interesting, although less elaborate use of the prologue as a transition, is to be found for example in Kālidāsa's famous play, *Śakuntalā*.

Here the poet does not introduce an intermediate order of characters to ease the audience into the highly charged emotional world of the drama. Instead he has his first-order characters, in this case the *sūtradhāra* and an actress, establish the aesthetic and emotive tenor of the play independently of and prior to the introduction of the primary characters and their world. After making his formal announcements, the director asks the actress to sing a song to please the audience. She responds with a song evocative of the gently erotic mood of the act that is to follow, and this has its desired effect on the audience who become frozen, their thoughts riveted upon the impassioned melody.⁶ The point is that the members of the audience are supposed to be completely removed from their ordinary daily reality to inhabit, for a time, a higher realm of pure aesthetic delight. The issue is evidently an important one as the poet stresses it by showing that even the professional and presumably hardened *sūtradhāra* is himself transported so that he utterly forgets which play he is supposed to stage. Reminded by the actress of his duties he remarks that her song had drawn him away. Then seizing upon the metaphor he compares his own being led astray to that of King Duṣyanta whom we at last see entering in pursuit of a fleeing deer.

In the plays ascribed to Bhāsa, where situation and plot development are more important than sustained cultivation of mood, we find that the *prastāvanā*, not needed to ease us into the emotional depths of a Kālidāsa or a Bhavabhūti, is a rather perfunctory affair. In many of the Trivandrum plays the prologue is used simply to set the scene of the drama while in several, including the finest of them, the *Svapnavāsavadatta*, the *sūtradhāra* is represented as being interrupted by offstage voices before he has had the opportunity to say anything of substance. Nonetheless, the transitional prologue is never omitted, and I shall attempt to demonstrate that Bhāsa, no less than his more profound colleagues, is deeply concerned with questions of perception and levels of reality.

In order to do this, I will examine and compare some of the elements in two very different plays, the *Svapnavāsavadatta* attributed to Bhāsa and the *Uttararāmacaritra* of Bhavabhūti. The first of these is a sort of a comedy of errors drawn from the generally light-hearted tradition of the *Bṛhatkathā* cycle of tales, and its complex story line revolves around an intricate series of calculated misrepresentations and persistent misperceptions of reality. The second play takes the universally known and sombre story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*'s *Uttarakāṇḍa* and lends it a still greater grandeur and gravity through its

author's all but unrelieved preoccupation with the emotion of grief. Despite the great differences in tone and language that separate the plays, both playwrights are fascinated with the questions of inner and outer realities that we find surfacing in the late vedic period.

The *Svapnavāsavadatta*, a sequel to Bhāsa's *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa*, follows the fortunes of the legendary Vatsa king, Udayana, and his beloved wife Vāsavadattā, daughter of his onetime enemy Pradyota, ruler of Avantī. Udayana, evidently more interested in his lovely queen than in dull affairs of state, has been overthrown and driven into exile. In order to restore his master to his rightful throne, the king's faithful and resourceful minister, Yaugandharāyaṇa, persuades the queen to join with him in an elaborate deception. Knowing that his master will never regain his kingdom without securing, through marriage to the princess Padmāvatī, an alliance with her brother, the powerful king of Magadha, and realizing that such a marriage has been rendered impossible by Udayana's exclusive devotion to Vāsavadattā, the minister stages a fire in which it is falsely reported to the king that both he and the queen have perished.

Yaugandharāyaṇa then escapes with Vāsavadattā, and in the guise of a brahman brother and sister from Avantī, they wander about the country until, by chance, they encounter Padmāvatī. The clever minister at once sees his opportunity to safely disengage himself from the encumbrance of the queen's company and leaves her in the care of the princess as one of her ladies in waiting. The grieving Udayana comes to marry Padmāvatī and after a series of near encounters with his disguised wife including one — the inspiration for the play's title — in which the king, half-asleep, cannot determine whether he has dreamt of or actually seen the queen, is at length reunited with her.

From the very beginning of the play the author is preoccupied with the misrepresentation and misperception of reality. As the first act commences and Yaugandharāyaṇa and Vāsavadattā enter in disguise, we realize that for the poet the distinction between illusion and actuality is not vast. Yaugandharāyaṇa is, after all, a brahman while the queen is, in fact, the "Lady of Avantī" that she deceptively styles herself. After a series of odd and comic misadventures arising from Yaugandharāyaṇa's clever plan, the play reaches its dramatic and emotional climax in the fifth act. Udayana, learning that Padmāvatī is unwell, goes to find her in the pavilion where

she is supposed to be resting. He finds the bed empty and overcome with fatigue, he lies down and falls asleep. Soon Vāsavadattā enters in search of the princess and seeing the sleeping form of the king she lies down to embrace it under the false impression that it is Padmāvatī. Disturbed by her touch, the king calls out Vāsavadattā's name. She realizes her error but cannot resist the temptation to remain for a moment with her husband, and an extraordinary conversation ensues between the queen and her sleeping king. At length they quarrel over some erstwhile love affair of the king, and Vāsavadattā decides she had better leave. Udayana awakes and pursues her but strikes his head on a low doorway and cannot determine whether he has actually seen or merely dreamed his lost love,

niṣkrāman sambhramenāham
dvārapakṣeṇa tāditaḥ/
tato vyaktaṁ na jānāmi
bhūtārtho 'yaṁ manorathaḥ//

Running out in such confusion, I have hit myself on the doorway. So now I can't be certain whether this was real or a fantasy.⁷

He decides that the experience was real but is dissuaded by his companion the clown Vasantaka who argues that the king must have had a visitation from a local *yakṣinī* named, ironically, Avantīsundarī, the lovely lady of Avantī.

Bhāsa's skillful playing with the issues of reality and perception provides the play with much of its charm. That this play is deliberate is suggested not only by the careful way in which it is worked into the texture of the plot but the playwright's tongue-in-cheek reference to the old vedantic problem of *prātibhāsika* and *vyāvahārika sattā* which derives much of its humor from a comical dramatization of the cliché maxim of the serpent and the rope.

In the prelude to the dream scene the king has Vasantaka lead him to the pavilion where he has been told Padmāvatī is resting. As the clown enters, he suddenly draws back with a shriek warning the king to stop. Udayana asks him what is wrong. Vasantaka replies,

eso khu dīpappabhāvasūidarūvo vasudhātale parivattamāṇo aam kāodaro

There's a snake wriggling on the ground in there. I can make it out in the lamplight.

Nothing daunted the king enters, looks around and says with a smile,

aho sarpavyaktir vaidheyasya!

rjvāyatām hi mukhatoraṇalolamālām
bhraṣṭām kṣitau tvam avagacchasi mūrkhā sarpam/
mandānilena niśi yā parivartamānā
kiñcit karoti bhujaḡasya viceṣṭitāni//

Ha! Only an idiot would take that for a snake. Imbecile, what you thought was a snake is nothing but a long straight garland fallen to the ground from the doorway. Moving in the gentle night breeze it only slightly resembles a serpent.⁸

Hearing this and looking closer the clown, like a man realizing the unreality of worldly life, exclaims, "You're right! It's not a snake."

Such an allusion to the commonplace illustration of false perception cannot have been lost on Bhāsa's intended audience, a cultivated, Sanskrit-knowing upper class with at least some familiarity with the traditional philosophical schools and texts. Indeed, although the episode further illustrates the cowardice and stupidity of the *vidūṣaka* and the king's courage and common sense, the whole point of the joke must have been its lighthearted allusion to the weighty tradition of vedantic scholarship.

On the surface the *Uttararāmacarita* has a number of things in common with the *Svapnavāsavadatta*. Both plays draw their themes from the heroic legends of ancient India and both are sequels to other plays of their authors. Both, moreover, deal with a noble king's grief for a beloved wife he believes to be lost forever, and both end with the reunion of the sundered couples. But these surface similarities are utterly submerged in the vast emotional gulf that separates the two works. Bhavabhūti's play is, despite its conventionally happy ending — a divergence from its epic source — the product of a much darker vision than was Bhāsa's. It is a longer and more difficult piece in a number of ways, and its language — prose and verse, Prakrit and Sanskrit — has a density, gravity, power, and emotional fervor seldom equalled in the literature, and certainly not in the simple verses and lighthearted banter of the *Svapnavāsavadatta*. Bhavabhūti's singleminded concentration on the *karuṇarasa*, the aesthetic mood of compassionate grief, a concentration that precludes even the traditional sallies into the comic so typical of the classical *nāṭaka* largely restricts him to the great standbys of the dramatic poet, the *śṛṅgāra* and *vīra rasas*, the erotic and heroic moods.

The play takes up the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa* shortly after Rāma's long delayed accession to the throne of Kosala and deals centrally with the events leading up to and following from his abandonment of Sītā. Bhavabhūti has been criticized for the agonizingly slow pace of his plot, and it has even been argued that this is more of a dramatic poem than a poetic drama. Clearly he has sacrificed dramatic action in his desire to slowly and exhaustively explore the limits of nostalgia, grief, and longing. Central to the accomplishment of this purpose is the author's use of time and memory. As the play opens Rāma and Sītā, their sufferings seemingly behind them, are reflecting on their earlier separation caused by Sītā's abduction and confinement in Rāvaṇa's island fortress. And it is a nostalgic viewing of their wedding portrait that inspires Sanskrit's most frequently quoted verse on the longing for a lost past with its haunting conclusion, *te hi no divasā gatāḥ*, "Those days we had are gone for good." This powerful sense of the past is sustained by the poet's device of allowing twelve years to elapse after the banishment of Sītā before picking up the action again. In this way the action subsequent to Act 1 harks sadly back to the opening portion just as the first act harks back to the bittersweet period of Rāma and Sītā's exile in the Daṇḍaka wilderness.

Bhavabhūti's obsession with the past is everywhere evident in this play and it is in fact essential to his purpose. What the poet is at pains to demonstrate through his characters' endless agonizing over days gone by is that, for the inner emotional life of a person the powerful feelings of one's early life may be more deeply felt as real than present experience. In this the playwright has no doubt hit upon an important fact of human life. The enormous and formative power of early affect and impressions and the determinative effect they exert on our later lives is a discovery that has become the very cornerstone of virtually all respectable modern theories of psychology and the emotions. Moreover, in a curiously displaced form, this discovery lies at the heart of the characteristically Indian theory of *karma* and *saṃsāra*.¹⁰

The setting of Act 1 is carefully chosen to allow the dramatist ample opportunity to explore the limits of his obsession with the power of past emotion. As the act opens we find Sītā, who is suffering the discomforts of the final stages of her pregnancy, saddened at the departure of her father — who had been visiting her — and all the principal elders of the Kosalan court, all off to attend a twelve year sacrificial session. In order to distract her thoughts from her woes, Rāma has Lakṣmaṇa guide them through a newly

completed picture gallery filled with scenes from the threesome's early lives. The device of the picture gallery is perfect for the suggestion of nostalgia and the poet is quick to capitalize on it. The various scenes remind the lovers of the many happy, tender, and dreadful moments they experienced – together and in separation – from the day of their wedding until the time the princess was rescued from the clutches of her monstrous abductor. It is here then that Rāma, viewing the group wedding portrait tearfully, utters the hauntingly nostalgic verse mentioned above.

But it is not simply nostalgia that is at issue here for the playwright is at great pains to show us that his characters are not simply remembering past events but actually re-experiencing them as keenly as when they actually occurred. Again and again a character reacts to a picture with all the expressions and manifestations of the powerful emotion he must originally have felt at the time of the events depicted. This issue is so vital to Bhavabhūti's purpose that he is not content simply to let his characters act it out. Periodically he has one or another of them state it unequivocally both in the Sanskrit verses and the prose dialogue that separates them. Thus Sītā, viewing a wedding portrait of Rāma and his brothers exclaims,

ammo jānāmi tassim jevva padese tassim jevva kāle vattāmi.

Ah! I feel as if I were in that very place and time once more.

Rāma replies,

evam:

samayaḥ sa vartate ivaṣa yatra mām
samanandayat sumukhi gautamārpitaḥ/
ayam agrhītakamanīyakañkanas
tava mūrtimān iva mahotsavaḥ karaḥ//

So do I: It seems to be that very moment once more when your hand, pretty lady, placed in mine by Gautama, and circled with lovely bangles delighted me like a great festival incarnate.¹¹

This idea of experiencing the past as the present is a leitmotif in the play. Moreover, it is not only pleasure but, perhaps more poignantly, suffering that returns to overshadow the reality of the present. Moving down the line of paintings, Lakṣmaṇa comes to a representation of the demoness Śūrpaṅkhā on whose account Rāvaṇa set in motion his whole fateful plot to abduct Sītā. Seeing the dreadful likeness the queen cries out,

hā ajjautta, ettiyaṃ de dasanam

Alas, my lord. I shall see you no more.

Rāma's response to this is interesting in the context of the question of the perception of reality and its levels. He replies comfortingly,

ayi viprayogatraste, citram etat.

Ah, you are afraid of separation. It's only a picture.

Like Udayana, Rāma must intervene to correct the misperception of another person; only here, unlike the fool Vasantaka, the queen has not mistaken one thing for another. She has, through the force of emotion, mistaken the representation of reality for the reality itself, an "error" that is, of course, fundamental to the success of an emotionally charged drama such as Bhavabhūti's. In a sense Sītā's appreciation of the painter's art has gone too far, and the aesthetic experience of *rasa* has given way before the raw power of *bhāva*, crude emotion. This is a problem to which the poet will return again with specific reference to his own medium later in the play, and indeed, it is central to the thinking of a number of traditional Indian rhetoricians on the subject of the emotive response to art.

Even Rāma, himself held up in the traditional literature as the paragon of strict emotional self control, is not exempt from this failure to distinguish art and memory from present reality. Even as he calls his wife's attention to the fact that it is just a picture she is seeing, as one would soothe a frightened child awakened by a nightmare, he sighs,

hanta, vartamāna iva me janasthānavṛttāntaḥ pratibhāti.

Ah, the things that happened to me in Janasthāna seem to be taking place right before my eyes.¹²

A few verses further on the king, overwhelmed by a fresh access of his old grief, cuts Lakṣmaṇa short as he describes Rāma's sorrow for his lost princess,

(āryeṇāsmin . . .)

virama viramātaḥ paraṃ na kṣamo 'smi
pratyāvṛttaḥ punar iva sa me jānakīviprayogaḥ//

(There my lord . . .) Stop, stop! I can't take any more. It is as though my separation from Jānakī were still going on.¹³

This is clearly an idea that the poet wishes to stress, and even the opportunity to do so afforded him by the picture gallery does not exhaust its possibilities for him. In the second act he has Rāma, now truly separated from Sītā once more, return in fact — as well as in emotion — to the scene of their early life in the forest. This naturally provides the author many fresh occasions to confront his suffering hero with reminders of the past, and he is not slow to take advantage of them. Here, as with the paintings, every tree, brook, and stone drives Rāma into fresh paroxysms of agony,

ghanībhūtaḥ śoko
vikalayati mām nūtana iva//

Now grown intense this (old) sorrow unmans me as if it were fresh.¹⁴

In Act 3, after a brief dramatic prelude (*viṣkambha*), the playwright resumes his preoccupation. We see Sītā once more in the Pañcavatī forest, the scene of her original exile with Rāma. Hearing that some mishap has befallen an elephant that she had fostered as a calf, she forgets the long years that have passed and cries,

ajjautta parittāhi parittāhi maha taṃ puttaṃ

My lord, save him! Save my little child!

Then, suddenly remembering that Rāma has been lost to her for twelve years, she laments,

haddhī haddhī tāṃ jjeva cirapacidāṃ akkharāṃ pancavaḍḍaṃsaṇa
maṃ maṇḍabbhāṇiṃ aṇubamḍhamti. hā ajjautta.

Alas, alas! At the sight of Pacavatī these words, to which I was so long accustomed, have come back to unlucky me. Alas, my lord.¹⁵

She faints.

Now Rāma enters on his flying chariot, and there ensues a scene that is in a number of ways reminiscent of the brief but striking dream scene of the *Svapnavāsavadatta*. Like Sītā, Rāma is overwhelmed by a welling up of emotion when he sees the familiar glade and he too faints. Sītā, recovering, rushes to revive him. But, through the magical power of the goddess Gaṅgā, the queen has become invisible. Aroused from his stupor by the touch of his beloved, the king is in much the same situation as is Udayana when awakened by the caress of Vāsavadattā. He too searches in vain for his lost wife and

is left wondering whether his perception of her presence was genuine or the result of a fantasy lent conviction through his constant preoccupation with her,

athavā kutaḥ priyatamā? nūnaṃ saṅkalpābhyāsapāṭavopadāna eṣa
rāmabhadrasya bhramah.

But how could it possibly be my dear one? No, it must be poor young
Rāma's hallucination, brought on by the constant habit of brooding.¹⁶

The parted lovers are at last together on the stage but Rāma can neither see nor hear Sītā. A woodland divinity reproaches him for his abandonment of Sītā, and he replies that although he gave her up to please the people without so much as mourning for her, the sight of the scenes of their past has reduced him to helpless tears.¹⁷ Although this statement does not correspond to the truth, it does serve to stress once more the poet's *idée fixe* which holds that memory is a more powerful force than direct experience. The strange partial encounter of Rāma and Sītā continues with more and more evidence of the author's concern with the power of inner reality to supervene over that of the outer world. At some points the two are simultaneously unable to distinguish the past from the present. Once, when they come across the remains of Jaṭāyus and the wreckage of Rāvaṇa's chariot, Sītā cries out that the vulture is being killed while Rāma, who cannot hear her, commands the long-dead Rāvaṇa to stop.¹⁸

This motif of the power of the past recurs repeatedly throughout the following three acts especially in the context of Janaka's lamentations and the encounter with Lava and Kuśa. However, it is in the seventh and final act, the narrative and emotional culmination of the play, that it is once more infused with renewed vigor. Here the setting is particularly striking in its explicit toying with the metaphor of the play as a representation of reality. For now Rāma is made to be a spectator at a performance of Vālmīki's play in which the *dénouement* of the Rāma story is revealed. Here is a variation of the theme of the play within a play for both plays are the same. Drawn wholly into the emotional world of Vālmīki's play, Rāma hears the *sūtradhārā* tell of Sītā's casting herself in despair into the Gaṅgā and cries out wildly to the actress playing Sītā to save herself out of concern for Lakṣmaṇa.¹⁹ Lakṣmaṇa intervenes and sounding now much like the Rāma of Act 1 in his advice to the trembling Sītā, tells him,

ārya, nāṭakam idam.

My lord, its only a play.²⁰

In the end it is the play alone that demonstrates, as nothing on the level of "ordinary" reality can, the truth of Sītā's chastity. It is through what he learns from Vālmīki's play that the Rāma of Bhavabhūti's is brought to the point of achieving a final reunion with his wife, a reunion that is seriously at variance with the ending of the great epic.

Bhavabhūti's incessant emphasis of the idea of the dominance of inner over outer reality and his fascination with the drama as a metaphor for higher reality leaves no doubt that it is this issue that so engrosses the attention of *vaidikas* and philosophers which most deeply informs his art. For him, as for theorists such as Abhinavagupta, art when it is properly executed is more rather than less real than life. Indeed, the powerful and overwhelming experience of deeply seated emotions through the refined perception of the aesthetic sense is seen as bearing much the same relation to the experiences of ordinary life as does the *paramārtha* level of reality to the *vyavahārika* or *saṃvṛti*. That an active awareness of these parallels was shared by playwrights and their audiences is clearly suggested by Bhāsa's slapstick fun with the cliché of the serpent and the rope and there can be little doubt then not only that these ideas were well diffused throughout at least the literate segments of ancient Indian society but that the Sanskrit drama was one of the principal non-technical media for their exploration.

An excursus of this sort is useful in that it enables us to step back somewhat from specific texts and schools to see to what extent characteristic or normative ideas of one type of literature inform wider cultural spectra. The purpose of the humanities is, one would think, to continually expand our understanding of humanity, its cultures, artifacts, and ideologies. An examination of the Indian philosophical concept of levels of reality from the point of view of non-philosophical texts opens to us, for example, questions of the origin, history, and significance of this actually rather peculiar notion. What is it after all that lent such fervor to the complaint of the learned professor mentioned above that I had descended to the level of empirical reality? Was it not the case with him, as with the philosophical colonel and the thousands of gurus, swamis, and their disciples, the Aurobindos, the Ramanamaharshis, the Satya Sai Babas, the Muktanandas, an so on that this obsession with "higher" and "lower," with mind and "supermind," with *vyavahāra* and

paramārtha, with gross bodies and subtle bodies, with physical and astral planes, with *māyā* and *jñāna*; in short with desperately denying the unqualifiable reality of the world in which we live, our bodies, our senses, and our emotions, was an expression of a deeply human rather than purely intellectual need?

When this is examined in a context wider than that of the small and largely inaccessible world of scholars trained in the language and world view of traditional Indian *darśanas*, in the more popular literature and theater and in the attitudes of ordinary people getting on with their ordinary lives, this brave effort of striving only for the "higher" truth begins to take on the unmistakable appearance of not a seeking for reality but a flight from it. Of the higher realm we can say nothing. It is beyond words; beyond even thought. The "lower" realm, however, is nothing but the world around us. What motive can we possibly find for so persistent and pervasive an attempt to escape it?

The reasons for the attempted flight from this world, for the denial of its ultimate reality are clear. The philosophical and religious literature and preaching of India from at least the time of the Indra-Prajāpati episode of the *Upaniṣads* make it very clear that this world is a fundamentally terrible place. Simple observation tells us, and the Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain scriptures confirm, that this is a vale of tears and the motives for attempting to escape or transcend it are the same in the religious systems of traditional India as in those of the rest of the world. What is characteristically Indian, perhaps, is the insistence that the phenomenal world is in some sense unreal, an illusion than can be dispelled through higher knowledge as is a hallucination through careful inspection and correct perception.

All of us have had the feeling when in some great trouble or pain that, "This can't be happening to me." When a situation becomes intolerable the mind often seeks relief in denial or derealization. Something in the general social and cultural climate of traditional India has fostered the diffusion of this attitude with all its negative consequences in the social arena. I suspect that the reasons for this are to be found in the same complex of ideas and attitudes that underlie many of the more pervasive and characteristic cultural phenomena of traditional India. As with my recent study of *karma*, mentioned above, I feel that we may gain new understanding of these phenomena and the culture that they represent if scholars depart somewhat from their old habits of thought and look for them in unfamiliar places.

NOTES

¹ Cf. for example *Br. Up.* 4.3.9, *tasya vā etasya puruṣasya dve eva sthāne bhavataḥ; idaṃ ca paralokasthānam ca; sandhyam trtiyam svapnasthānam.* . . .

² Thus Śaṅkara himself has to caution that unless and until a person can make for himself the gnostic realization of the *brahman* as the substratum of all being he must take the phenomena of the world as provisionally real. Cf. for example *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2.1.14.

³ For a concise presentation of the vedantic view of the three levels of reality see Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969, pp. 15–26). For a discussion of a late vedantic opinion of the degree of reality to be accorded the vedantic/Buddhist notion of *vyāvahārikī sattā* (empirical reality opposed on the one hand to *paramārthika* or absolute reality and on the other to *prātibhāsika* or illusion) see Phyllis Granoff's masterful treatment of the view of Śrī Harṣa in her *Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta: Śrī Harṣa's Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhādyā* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978, pp. 84–85).

⁴ Cf. For a discussion of Abhinavagupta's treatment of what he posits as the homology of *rasāsvada* and *brahmāsvāda*, see J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan (*Śāntarasa & Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics*, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1969, pp. 26, 67, 158, 175). The idea that the aesthetic and mystical experiences are, if not identical, closely related is also discussed by Mammaṭa, Jagannātha, Madhusūdana, and others.

⁵ *Uttarārāmacaritam* (Edited by S. K. Belvalkar, Cambridge: Harvard Oriental Series Vol. 22, 1915, after i.2. All references are to this edition).

⁶ *rāgabaddhacittavṛttir ālikhita iva sarvato raṅgaḥ. The Abhijñānaśākuntalam of Kālidāsa* (Edited by M. R. Kale, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969,) after 1.4.

⁷ 5.7. *Svapnavāsavadattam*, in *Bhāsanāṭakacakram: Plays Ascribed to Bhaṣa* (Edited by C. R. Devadhar, Poona: Poona Oriental Series No. 54, Oriental Book Agency, 1962.)

⁸ *Svap.* 5.3.

⁹ URC. 1.19.

¹⁰ For an elaborate discussion of the way in which the theory of *karma* depends on the unequalled power of early emotional experience, particularly painful experience, see my article, "Karma, Guilt, and Buried Memories: Public Fantasy and Private Reality in Traditional India," in the recent volume of the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* presented to Professor Ingalls, *JAOS* 105 (1985), 413–425.

¹¹ URC 1:18.

¹² URC following 1.27.

¹³ URC 1.33cd.

¹⁴ URC 2.26d.

¹⁵ URC following 3.6.

¹⁶ URC following 3.14.

¹⁷ URC 3.32.

¹⁸ URC preceding 3.44.

¹⁹ The idea of representing Rāma as being drawn emotionally into a literary or fictive representation of his own life story is borrowed, like much of Bhavabhūti, from the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki. In that poem (*Rām.* 1.4 27), we see Rama become wholly enthralled while listening to the recitation of the epic by his as yet unrecognized sons. The incident in the play is reminiscent of the phenomenon – reported by a number of

observers of rural life in nineteenth century India — of villagers becoming so engrossed in performances of the *Rāmīlā* that they leap onstage to assault the actor portraying Rāvaṇa.

²⁰ URC following 7.2.

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ŚAṆKARA'S THEORY OF SAMNYĀSA

Although the Vedānta tradition of Śrīngeri teaches the path of *karman* and *bhakti* as appropriate for ordinary *smārtas*, it advocates *saṁnyāsa* (world renunciation) as an ideal way of life for a select few. At present, Śrīngeri Maṭha, which appears to have been founded by Śaṅkara as an abode and place of study for *saṁnyāsins*, is chiefly a place of pilgrimage. It houses only three *saṁnyāsins*, including the junior and senior *jagadgurus*.¹ In Śaṅkara's authentic philosophical works, the way of life called *karma-saṁnyāsa* is recommended as conducive to the attainment of emancipation. In other words, this is the way of life that *ought to be* followed by every human male who can renounce the world. In this paper, through our discussion of Śaṅkara's theory of *saṁnyāsa*, we shall try to clarify the importance of this way of life as a path to emancipation. The discussion of Śaṅkara's theory of *saṁnyāsa* in this paper will rely principally on four of his unquestionably genuine philosophical works: the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, which is, according to Daniel H. H. Ingalls,² "a far more original piece of writing than his *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*," the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, which is his most authoritative work, the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, an independent work, and the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*.

KARMA, BHAKTI AND JÑĀNA

Before proceeding to our discussion of the characteristics of a *saṁnyāsin* (world renouncer), let us briefly note Śaṅkara's theory of the means of attaining salvation. In his philosophical works, Śaṅkara usually mentions the twofold cause of attaining knowledge (*jñāna*): "proximate causes of knowledge" (*pratyāsannāni vidyāsādhanaṇi*) and "remote causes" (*bāhyataraṇi*). The former, which consist in calmness (*śama*), self-control (*dama*) etc., are characteristic of a *saṁnyāsin*, while the latter, which comprise sacrifice (*yajña*) and so on, are characteristic of a householder.³ This difference reflects Śaṅkara's distinction of *jñāna-yoga* from *karma-yoga*. According to the Introduction to his *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, the forms of correct life

are twofold: *jñāna-yoga*, which is "the dharma characterized by non-action" (*nivṛttilakṣaṇa dharma*), and *karma-yoga*, which is "the dharma characterized by action" (*pravṛttilakṣaṇa dharma*). A *karma-yogin* must perform the *nitya-karmāṇi* and on due occasion *naimittika-karmāṇi*, and is permitted to perform *kāmya-karmāṇi*. The *jñāna-yogin* is exempt from all of these because of his knowledge and his disinterest in secular things. In the context of Śaṅkara's advaita philosophy, action (*pravṛtti*) leads to the "bondage" (*bandha*) of *samsāra* or transmigration, while non-action leads to *mokṣa* or emancipation.⁴ Śaṅkara agrees that desire (*kāma*) arises from "nescience" (*avidyā*) and action (*karman*) arises from desire and that both nescience and desire are the same by nature.⁵ Although Śaṅkara does not deny that *karma* may have significance on a mundane level, he holds there is no possibility of the attainment of *mokṣa* through *karman*. Hence all *karmanas* should be abandoned for the sake of attaining *mokṣa*. It is the knowledge of brahman that is the *parama pāvana* i.e., the highest purifier.⁶

Karma-yoga is performed by a *yogin* or by some other *karmin*, i.e., one who is inclined to action. Śaṅkara maintains that *karma-yoga* (1) cannot by itself lead to *mokṣa*, but (2) may be a preparatory step to its attainment. One who is qualified for *karma-yoga* and performs it in his daily life becomes gradually refined within. His ātman is figuratively said to be "gradually purified" (*krameṇa saṃskṛtātmā*) through the performance of *karman*.⁷ In his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, Śaṅkara says:

For the *śruti* passage, "Brāhmaṇas seek to know him [ātman] by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by gifts, by austerities, by fasting," indicates that sacrifice and so on are the means of knowledge. And from the connection of them with "seeking to know," it is understood that they are means of the initiation [of knowledge].⁸

tathā hi śrutiḥ "tam etaṃ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena dānena tapasā 'nāśanena" (Bṛh. Up., IV. iv. 21) iti yajñādīnāṃ vidyāsādhana bhāvaṃ darśayati/ vividiṣaṃyogāc caisāṃ utpattisā dhanabhāvo 'vasīyate . . .

In other words, such actions as sacrifices are regarded as the means of the "initiation" (*utpatti*) of knowledge through *sattva-śuddhi* i.e., purification of the mind.⁹ According to Śaṅkara,

In the case of the inability of an ignorant person, inclined toward action, to tread the previously taught path, renunciation of the fruit of all action is taught as a means to the ultimate [*śreyas* i.e., *mokṣa*], but it is not taught as the primary [means].¹⁰

ajñasya karmaṇi pravṛttasya
pūrvopadiṣṭopāyānuṣṭhānāśaktau
sarvakarmaṇām phalatyāgaḥ
śreyahsādhanaṁ upadiṣṭaṁ na
prathamam eva/

Thus, *karma-yoga*, in which action is performed without desire for obtaining its fruits, is recommended only for the ignorant (*ajña*) person, for whom abstention from action is difficult. If *yogins*, who are devoted to properly enjoined works but are free from egotism in all their deeds, act without attachment to any result, such deeds serve to purify them and prepare them for emancipation (*mokṣa*). Śāṅkara says:

It is stated that those *saṁnyāsins* who are in a state of perfect vision receive immediate *mukti*. Furthermore, the Lord has stated and will continue to state constantly [in the *Bhagavadgītā*] that *karma-yoga*, which is performed in complete devotion to the Lord and dedicated to Him, leads gradually to *mokṣa*, first by the purification of mind, then by the attainment of (the means of) knowledge, then by the renunciation of all action.¹¹

samyagarśananiṣṭhānām saṁnyāsinām sadyomuktir uktā/
karmayogaś ca īśvarārpitasarvabhāvena
īśvare brahmaṇy ādhāya kriyamāṇaḥ
sattvaśuddhijñānaprāptisarvakarmasaṁnyāsa krameṇa
mokṣāya iti bhagavān pade pade 'bravid vakṣyati ca/

Thus, one who is qualified for *karma-yoga*, performing obligatory action without attachment and without longing for any result, can "step by step" (*krameṇa*) purify the mind. If, unsoiled by desire for results, one performs obligatory action, one is prepared to acquire self-knowledge, which may gradually lead to the state of knowledge (*jñāna-niṣṭhā*). Hence, from the standpoint of a seeker of *mokṣa*, such actions as sacrifice are all merely means for the emergence of knowledge. Although Śāṅkara opposes the *jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda*, his teachings thus paradoxically imply the necessity, at least for most persons, of the performance of action until the emergence of knowledge which arises from the destruction of nescience.

The *Bhagavadgītā* (VI. 1) states:

He who, without depending on the fruits of action, performs his bounden duty, he is a *saṁnyāsin* and a *yogin*, not he who is without sacrificial fire and without action.¹²

anāśritaḥ karmaphalaṁ kāryaṁ karma karoti yaḥ/
sa saṁnyāsī ca yogī ca na niragnir na cākriyaḥ//

With regard to this passage, Śaṅkara maintains that if anyone is "free from a desire for the fruits of action" and "performs his bounden duty," he should be regarded as having both the attributes of *saṁnyāsa* i.e. world-renunciation, and *yoga*, i.e. steadfastness of mind.¹³ In Śaṅkara's words, "it is to be known that he is an eternal *saṁnyāsin*, although he is engaged in action" (*karmaṇi vartamāno 'pi sa nityasaṁnyāsī iti jñātavyaḥ*).¹⁴ The term "*saṁnyāsin*" in this passage is extended to include the *karma-yogin*, who "sees only inaction in actions" (*karmasu akarmaiva paśyataḥ*).¹⁵ This is to be regarded as a metaphorical (*gauṇa*) use of the word *saṁnyāsin*.¹⁶

As in the case of *karma-yoga*, Śaṅkara recognizes the value of *bhakti* (devotion) as a gradual preparation for release. He maintains that the faithful, who are engaged in *bhakti* to the Lord (*īśvara*), "walk in the path of emancipation" (*mokṣamārge pravṛttāḥ*).¹⁷ Śaṅkara says:

The attainment of success, or the fruit, of the discipline of devotion to the Lord by worshipping him in one's actions, is a fitness for the state of knowledge. The state of knowledge which results from this fitness ends in the (final) fruit, which is *mokṣa*.¹⁸

svakarmanā bhagavato 'bhyarcanabhaktiyogasya
siddhiprāptiḥ phalaṁ jñānanisṭhāyogyatā,
yannimittā jñānanisṭhā mokṣaphalāvasānā/

In the *Gītābhāṣya*, Śaṅkara states:

But he [the highest person – *paraḥ puruṣaḥ*] is to be obtained by exclusive devotion, which is characterized by knowledge which has, for its object, the *ātman*.¹⁹

... sa bhaktyā labhyas tu jñānalakṣaṇayā
'nanyayā 'tmaviśayayā

Moreover, Śaṅkara speaks of *bhakti* as "characterized by the highest knowledge" (*paramārthajñānalakṣaṇāṁ bhaktim*).²⁰ Such *bhakti* seems to be the temporary, deliberately repeated cognition of the meaning of the *mahāvākya* practiced by the striving *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsin*. *Bhakti-yoga* not only prepares the ground for *jñāna-yoga*, but also holds the potentiality of developing into *jñāna-yoga* as the natural culmination of *bhakti*. The practice of disinterested *bhakti* leads to *mokṣa* not directly, but through *jñāna-yoga*. There is no such antithesis between *bhakti* and *jñāna* as there is between *karman* and *jñāna*.²¹ For example, in some passages of his *GBh* (VIII. 22, XVIII. 54, 55), Śaṅkara interprets the term *bhakti* as *jñāna*.²²

In short, both *karma-yoga* and *bhakti-yoga* are preliminary stages to the ultimate *jñāna-yoga*, which alone is the means of attaining *mokṣa*.

SAMNYĀSA (WORLD RENUNCIATION)

The theory that *jñāna* alone is the direct means of attaining *mokṣa* provides the philosophical foundation for the way of life called *saṁnyāsa*. The *āśrama-dharma*, prescribed in the *dharmaśāstras*, consists in four stages of life: *brahmacārya* (studentship), *gārhasthya* (householdership), *vānaprastha* (retirement) and *saṁnyāsa* (world renunciation). *Samnyāsa* as the fourth *āśrama*, free of the limitation of social life, is pursued by a *saṁnyāsin*, 'world renouncer.' The *Mānavadharmasāstra* declares that in order to attain *brahman*, one has to pass from order to order.²³ However, in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (III. iv. 17; III. iv. 21) and *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* (III. introduction), Śāṅkara cites the *Jābālopaniṣad* to support a view of the *āśramas* that differs markedly from that propounded by the *MDS*. According to the *Jābālopaniṣad*, Yājñavalkya, when asked by King Janaka to explain *saṁnyāsa*, said:

Having finished studentship, one should become a householder. Having been a householder, one should become a forest-dweller. Having been a forest-dweller, one should renounce the world. Or otherwise, one may renounce the world from the time of studentship, or from the house or from the forest. . . . On the day that one abandons desires, one may renounce the world.²⁴

... brahmacaryaṁ samāpya gṛhī bhaved gṛhī
bhūtvā vanī bhaved vanī bhūtvā pravrajat
yadi vetarathā brahmacaryād eva pravrajat gṛhād
vā vanād vā . . . yad ahar eva virajet tad ahar
eva pravrajat . . .

Thus, Śāṅkara admits "a sudden leap" (from any one of the three lower orders to the fourth order) in addition to "a gradual passage" (through the three lower orders to the fourth). On the authority of the *Jābālopaniṣad*, Śāṅkara asserts:

Smṛti and *śruti* enjoin the renunciation of all activity and enjoin it to accompany any of the stages of life.²⁵

... sarvakarmasaṁnyāsaavidhānād
āśramavikalpasamuccayaavidhānāc
ca śrutismṛtyoḥ

Moreover, he says:

What more is there to be said? He attains *brahma-nirvāṇa* who dwells lifelong in *brahman* after having undertaken *saṁnyāsa* [directly] from the condition of a *brahmacārin*.²⁶

kim u vaktavyaṁ brahmacāryād
eva saṁnyasya yāvajjīvaṁ
ye brahmany evāvaśiṭhate
sa brahmanirvāṇaṁ icchatīti

In short, both gradual and sudden passages of life into *saṁnyāsa* bring *brahmanirvāṇa*.

In his *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, Śaṅkara says:

Therefore, for the enlightened one who sees that *ātman* is unchangeable and who is eager for *mokṣa*, the renunciation of all actions is the only proper course.²⁷

tasmād viśeṣītyāvīkriyātmadarśino
viduṣo mumukṣoś ca sarvakarmasaṁnyāsa evādhikāraḥ

This passage already implies the two types of *saṁnyāsa* explicitly recognized by later tradition: *vidvat-saṁnyāsa* (*saṁnyāsa* of a knower) and *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsa* (*saṁnyāsa* out of desire for knowledge). The former is formal renunciation by someone who has already become a *jīvanmukta*. The latter is formal renunciation by one who is eager to attain *mokṣa*. In Śaṅkara's scheme, not every *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsin* is successful in this quest, which begins with his renunciation of actions, especially those incumbent on householders. Śaṅkara cites a passage from the *Bhagavadgītā*: "one does not attain perfection from *saṁnyāsa* alone,"²⁸ to show that the mere adoption of *saṁnyāsa* does not lead to "the state, [obtained] through *jñāna-yoga*, which is characterized by *naiṣkarmya*."²⁹ In his *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, Śaṅkara states the process through which such a *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsin* may ultimately attain *mokṣa*:

The steady-minded one, having abandoned, i.e. renounced, the fruit of actions, attains the peace called *mokṣa*, that is, the perfect state, in due order: the purification of mind, the attainment of the means of knowledge, the renunciation of all actions, and the state of knowledge.³⁰

... samāhitaḥ san karmaphalaṁ
tyaktvā parityajya śāntim mokṣākhyāṁ
āpnoti naiṣṭhikīm niṣṭhāyām
bhavāṁ sattvaśuddhijñānaprāptisarva-
karmasaṁnyāsajñānanaiṣṭhākrameṇa ...

It is apparent that *vividiṣā-samnyāsa* is not a single act of renunciation. It is, rather, a complex process involving such interacting factors as the acquisition of calmness (*śama*), the practice of self-discipline (*dama*) and compassion (*daya*) and a striving for insight, all of which in conjunction are conducive to attainment of *jñāna-niṣṭhā*.

Vividiṣā-samnyāsa is the usual form of *saṃnyāsa*. Far rarer is the *vidvat-samnyāsa* of a *jīvanmukta*, who has achieved emancipation even before his formal act of renunciation.³¹ Śāṅkara's use of the term *paramahaṃsa-parivrājaka* appears to denote the ideal of such a *vidvat-samnyāsin*. Yājñavalkya is an example of this type of *saṃnyāsin*. Prior to his *saṃnyāsa*, according to Śāṅkara, Yājñavalkya was a knower of *brahman* and was only seemingly, but not in reality, engaged in action.³² As a *jīvanmukta*, who was free of nescience (*avidyā*), Yājñavalkya had renounced the *inner* attachment to the "I" in addition to the *outer* attachment to sense objects. Having obtained right knowledge, he had no occasion to practice *karma-yoga*. Yājñavalkya's case may be generalized: a *vidvat-samnyāsin*, unlike a *vividiṣā-samnyāsin*, has no attachment to the "I." Śāṅkara's attention is focused on the emancipated *paramahaṃsa-parivrājaka*, who is exempt from all duties:

[*Śruti* and *smṛti*] declare,

"There is no enjoined duty [i.e., religious rite] for one who is grounded in *brahman*."³³

brahmasaṃsthasya karmābhāvaṃ darśayanti

A *vividiṣā-samnyāsin*, who is not yet "grounded in *brahman*," is also similarly exempt from such activity. In his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, Śāṅkara says:

Therefore, those who desire the world of *ātman* set forth as ascetics, that is, they should refrain from all activities. Just as established means, such as sons and so forth, are enjoined for one who is desirous of the three external worlds, just so a cessation of all seeking, the state of *pārvirājya* [lit. wandering asceticism], is enjoined for one who is desirous of the world of *ātman*, for a knower of *brahman*.³⁴

*tasmād ātmānaṃ lokam icchantāḥ parivrajyanty
eva, sarvakriyābhyo nivarterann evety arthaḥ/
yathā ca bāhyalokatrāyārthinaḥ pratiniyātāni
putrādini sādhanāni vihitāni, evam
ātmalokārthinaḥ sarvaiṣaṇānivr̥ttih
pārvirājyaṃ brahmavidō vidhiyata eva/*

It is, however, traditionally considered proper for *kuṭīcakas* and *bahūdakas*, which are grades of *vividīṣā-saṃnyāsins* in later tradition,³⁵ to perform certain religious rites.

Even a *vidvat-saṃnyāsin* or a *jīvanmukta*, however, cannot stop *prārabdha-karman*, which has already begun to produce effects. Though *mokṣa*, the ultimate purpose of bodily existence, has been gained, the effects of the actions that have produced the body continue to operate until their inherent energy is exhausted. However, actions that have not yet begun to produce effects can be neutralized by the emancipating knowledge.³⁶ Thus, in Śaṅkara's system, renunciation of action by a *vidvat-saṃnyāsin* does not mean that activity merely to maintain the body must be abandoned.³⁷ Śaṅkara says:

The realization that the ātman is not an agent destroys actions by means of refuting wrong knowledge. But wrong knowledge continues for a while, even after it has been refuted, owing to the past tendencies, as in the case of the knowledge of two moons.³⁸

akartrātmabodho 'pi hi mithyājñāna-
bādhanaena karmāṇy ucchinatti/
bādhitam api tu mithyājñānam
dvicandrajñānavat saṃskāraśāśat
kaṃ cit kālam anuvartata eva/

Thus, *prārabdha-karman* leaves a trace of nescience (*avidyā-leśa*) even in a *jīvanmukta*, who is free of nescience. This trace disappears only at the *videha-mukti*, i.e., the final release at the death of the body. *Prārabdha-karman* is the only reason for the continuance of the (present) birth: without it, final release would be attained immediately upon the attainment of ultimate knowledge.³⁹ From the foregoing analysis, it appears that there are three principal elements in Śaṅkara's description of a *saṃnyāsin*: (1) the abandonment of desire (or more properly all desire for anything that differs from *ātman*), (2) the renunciation of worldly things and (3) an exclusive concern for ultimate knowledge.

Śaṅkara contrasts a *tyāgin* i.e., an abandoner, with a *saṃnyāsin*. A *tyāgin*, he says, is an "ignorant" (*ajñā*) man, who abandons merely the desire for the fruits of his action, although he is a performer of works. A worldly *tyāgin* still performs action, whereas a *saṃnyāsin* abandons such actions. Śaṅkara admits that an ignorant *tyāgin* has the same religious concern as does a *saṃnyāsin*, insofar as both of them are concerned with "abandonment." However, he considers the *saṃnyāsin*, who abandons both actions and their fruits, superior to the *tyāgin*, who abandons the fruits alone.⁴⁰ In his

philosophical scheme, Śaṅkara uses the word *saṁnyāsa* to refer not only to a *saṁnyāsin*'s physical behavior but also to the state of mind — the religious concern — determining his behavior.

CONDITIONS OF ATTAINING MOKṢA

In his independent work *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Śaṅkara mentions nine necessary attributes of one who has attained *mokṣa*.⁴¹ In brief, these are: one must (1) be dispassionate toward all things non-eternal, (2) abandon the desire for sons (*putra*), wealth (*vitta*) and future life (*loka*), (3) reach the state of a *paramahansa-parivrājaka*, (4) be endowed with calmness (*śama*), self-discipline (*dama*), compassion (*dayā*), and so on, (5) be possessed of the qualities of a disciple (*śiṣya-guṇa*) which are well known from the scriptures, (6) be [internally and externally] pure, (7) be a *brāhmaṇa* and (8) approach one's teacher in the prescribed manner. Lastly, one's caste (*jāti*), actions (*karman*), behavior (*vr̥tta*), knowledge [of the Veda] and family must have been properly examined. These nine attributes may be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) pre-disposing factors of birth and environment such as *varṇa* [*brāhmaṇa-tva*], caste (*jāti*), past activities (*karman*), education in the *Vedas*, etc. [7 and 9]; (2) possession of personal characteristics that prepare one for instruction leading to *mokṣa* [5, 6 and 8] (3) qualifications gained through personal commitment [1, 2, 3 and 4]. In regard to this third category (qualifications gained through personal commitment), Śaṅkara says at the beginning of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*:

Therefore, something is to be stated subsequent to which the inquiry into *brahman* is proposed. It is stated: that [prior condition] consists in

- (1) the discrimination of things which are eternal and non-eternal;
- (2) non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit in this world and in the other world;
- (3) the acquisition of the means of tranquility, self-control and so on, and
- (4) the desire for release.

For if these [four factors] exist, even prior to an inquiry into *dharma* or after it, it is possible to inquire into *brahman* and to know it; but not otherwise.⁴²

tasmāt kim api vaktavyam yadanantaram
brahmajijñāsopadiśyate iti/ ucyate/
nityānityavastuviveka ihāmutrārthabhogavirāgaḥ
śamadamādisādhanasampan mumukṣutvaṁ ca/
teṣu hi satsu prāḡ api dharmajijñāsāyā
ūrdhvaṁ ca śakyate brahma jijñāsituṁ
jñātuṁ ca na viparyaye/

These four factors are necessary conditions for an aspirant of attaining *mokṣa* (= *mumukṣu*), i.e. for a *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsin*. The fourth of them (*mumukṣutva*) becomes superfluous in a *vidvat*, who has already attained *mokṣa*.

In both his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya* and *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Śaṅkara states that only a *brāhmaṇa* is eligible for *saṁnyāsa*, which is advocated as the ideal preliminary to *mokṣa*.⁴³ The injunctions of *śruti* concerning ritual action may be disregarded by *brāhmaṇas* who adopt *saṁnyāsa* but are always to be followed by *kṣatriyas* and *vaiśyas*, for whom "there is no possibility of renunciation."⁴⁴ Śaṅkara does not deny the possibility of a *kṣatriya*'s or other householder's attainment of *mokṣa* without *karma-saṁnyāsa*. The *kṣatriya* King Janaka, for instance, was a *gṛhastha* — not a *saṁnyāsin* — but nevertheless is said to have attained emancipation. In Śaṅkara's words,

One who, after action is undertaken, later comes to have correct insight, will then see no purpose in action and will abandon action together with its means. He [in reality] does nothing at all, even though — since for some reason, it is impossible [for him] to abstain from activity — he is engaged as before in activity for the maintenance of the mundane order, for there is [for him] no purpose of his own, inasmuch as he is devoid of any attachment to action and its results. Since such activity is consumed by the fire of knowledge, his activity amounts to inactivity.⁴⁵

yas tu prārabdhakarmā sann uttarakālam
utpannātmasamyagdarśanaḥ syāt sa
sarvakarmaṇi prayojanam apaśyan sasādhanaṁ
karma parityajaty eva / sa kutaś cin nimittāt
karmaparityāgasaṁbhava sati karmaṇi tatphale
ca saṁgarahitatayā svaprayojanābhāvāt
lokasaṁgrahārthaṁ pūrvavat karmaṇi
pravṛtto 'pi naiva kiṁ cit karoti,
jñānāgnidagdhakarmatvāt tadīyaṁ
karmākarmaiva sampadyate, . . .

Janaka has no notion, "I am an agent," although he seems to be a *karmin*. He is a *jīvanmukta*, but his *prārabdha-karma*n continues for the sake of leading people to the right path in the world.

A once-born *sūdra*, in Śaṅkara's view, is not qualified for knowledge of *brahman*. Such knowledge usually presupposes knowledge of the *Veda*, and as Śaṅkara points out in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, *śruti* prohibits a *sūdra* from learning or studying the *Veda* and even from knowing its contents or

performing Vedic rites.⁴⁶ It is only the three upper *varṇas* that may be led to *mokṣa* through a knowledge of the Veda. As the purpose of *karma-samnyāsa* is to attain a knowledge of *brahman*, *śūdras*, who are not qualified for such knowledge, are also not eligible for *karma-samnyāsa*. However, Śāṅkara says:

For those [*śūdras*], like Vidura, the righteous hunter and so on, who acquire knowledge through the after-effect of former actions, the attainment of fruit cannot be withheld, because knowledge brings about its fruit in all cases; and the *smṛti* (*Mahābhārata*) passage, "One is to recite it to the four castes," declares that the four castes are qualified for acquiring [knowledge of] the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* literatures.⁴⁷

yeṣāṃ punaḥ pūrvakṛtasaṃskāraśāśād
viduradharmavyādhaprabhṛtinām
jñānotpattis tesāṃ na śakyate
phalaprāptiḥ praṭiseddhum
jñānasyaikāntikaphalatvāt/ "śrāvayec
catur varṇād" iti cetihāsapurāṇādhigame
cāturvarṇasyādhikārasmaraṇāt/

Although Śāṅkara accepts the possibility that *mokṣa* may be reached through the knowledge of *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*, there is no doubt that he regards *karma-samnyāsa*, for which he holds only *brāhmaṇas* to be eligible, as the way of life most conducive to the attainment of *mokṣa*. It is for this reason that he appears to have allowed only *brāhmaṇas* to become members of the Śringeri Maṭha, which he is traditionally said to have founded. It is noteworthy, however, that Sureśvara, who, the *ŚDV* says, wrote his *vārtikas* on Śāṅkara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya* at Śāṅkara's own request,⁴⁸ argues in the *vārtikas* on the *BUBh* (III. v. 1) against Śāṅkara's exclusion of *kṣatriyas* and *vaiśyas* from *samnyāsa*.

For *śruti* shows that world-renunciation is for all three *varṇas*. [The statement in Śāṅkara's] commentary to the effect that world-renunciation is for the *brāhmaṇa* alone, is contradicted [by *śruti*].⁴⁹

trayāṇām api varṇānām śrutau samnyāsa darśanāt/
brāhmaṇasyaiva samnyāsa iti bhāṣyaṃ virudhyate//

Since we hear in *śruti* of *samnyāsa* of the three *varṇas* without distinction, the mention of the word *brāhmaṇa* [used in regard to *samnyāsa*] should be [regarded as] an indication [of the two other *varṇas* also]. If knowledge that removes one's eligibility for *karman* is obtained, how can a restriction of the eligibility for renunciation [*vyutthāna*] be imposed? 50

trayāṇām aviśeṣeṇa samnyāsaḥ śrūyate śrutau/
yadopalakṣaṇārthaṃ syād brāhmaṇagrahaṇaṃ tadā//

karmādhikāravicchedi jñānaṃ ced abhyupeyate/
kuto 'dhikāranīyamo vyutthāne kriyate balāt//

There is no evidence that this opinion of Sureśvara was ever accepted as authoritative in Śringeri Maṭha.

In the quest for knowledge of *brahman*, Śaṅkara emphasizes, it is important to approach "a spiritual teacher" (*ācārya* or *guru*), who is a knower of *brahman*, is familiar with the scriptures (*śāstras*) and can guide one on the path of *mokṣa*.⁵¹ The *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* states:

Anupaśyati ("he has an accordant perception") means that in accordance with and following the teachings of the scripture and teacher, he has a direct perception that all this universe is just the *ātman*.⁵²

... anupaśyati, śāstrācāryopadeśaṃ
anv ātmānaṃ pratyakṣatvena paśyati,
ātmaivedaṃ sarvaṃ iti

Further, in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, Śaṅkara says:

Therefore, only those that tread the path shown by *śruti* and spiritual teachers transcend nescience. Only they – and not those that follow the ingenuity of their own intellect – will cross over the unfathomable ocean of delusion.⁵³

tasmāt tatra ya eva śrutyācāryadarśita-
mārgānusāriṇaḥ ta evāvidyāyāḥ
pāram adhigacchanti/ ta eva cāsmān
mohasamudrād agādadhā uttariṣyanti netare
sva buddhikausālānusāriṇaḥ

Śaṅkara accepts *śruti* as an important "valid means of knowledge" (*pramāṇa*), but *śruti* does not have the unconditional power to provide knowledge of *brahman*, because it only supplies "information about things unknown, as they are."⁵⁴ For the sake of the attainment of *mokṣa*, it is necessary to find a spiritual teacher, from whom knowledge of *brahman* can be learned.

In the second desideratum mentioned by Śaṅkara for the attainment of *mokṣa*, such terms as "sons" (*putra*) and "wealth" (*vitta*) symbolize worldly things, and the term "future life" (*loka*) refers to life in the three worlds: the world of human beings (*manuṣyaloka*), the world of ancestors (*pitṛloka*) and the world of the gods (*devaloka*). These three worlds, from Śaṅkara's philosophical viewpoint, belong to the illusory phenomena, which must be abandoned in the quest for *mokṣa*. In his *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, Śaṅkara

argues that a *saṁnyāsin* should not dwell at home (*nagāre*), and in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, he says:

Wandering asceticism (*pārvirāja*) is integral to the development [ripening] of knowledge of *brahman*. . . . Therefore, scripture states: "Now, a wandering ascetic, with uncolored clothes, with shaven head, without family, pure, without hostility, living on alms, is suited for the experience of *brahman*" (*Jābālōpaniṣad* V).⁵⁵

brahmajñānaparipākāṅgatvāc ca pārvirājyasya . . . /
tac ca darśayati "atha parivrāḍ vivarṇavāsā"
muṇḍo 'parigrahaḥ śucir adrohi bhaikṣāṇo
brahmabhūyāya bhavati" iti/

For Śaṅkara, the term *pārvirāja* is practically synonymous with the word *saṁnyāsa*. In citing the *Jābālōpaniṣad*, Śaṅkara offers an image of a typical shaven-headed *saṁnyāsin*, living on alms, wearing clothes that are devoid of (worldly) color and wandering from place to place. To attain *brahman*, one has to be a *paramahaṁsa-parivrājaka* (wandering ascetic),⁵⁶ constantly living in his own *ātman*, removing nescience. In presenting the religious ideal of a *saṁnyāsin* and its philosophical basis, Śaṅkara wants to guide aspirants to the path of emancipation.

While an ignorant householder, who dwells in a house, seeks such various things as welfare and happiness through performance of religious rites, a *saṁnyāsin*, who has abandoned worldly things, is devoted solely to knowledge, whether he is a *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsin* or a *vidvat-saṁnyāsin*. The former implicitly accepts the *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*, the latter rejects it. In Śaṅkara's elaborate discussion of the way to *mokṣa*, *saṁnyāsa* — the life of a wandering ascetic — is repeatedly advocated, while other possible paths are mentioned only in passing — mentioned so seldom indeed that it is difficult to be sure exactly what Śaṅkara thought about them. For Śaṅkara, *mokṣa* is not possible without *jñāna*, and the road *par excellance* to *jñāna* is *karma-saṁnyāsa*. This *saṁnyāsa*, in turn, is possible only for *brāhmaṇas*. It was they for whom Śaṅkara's instruction was intended.

ABBREVIATIONS

Philosophical works ascribed to Śaṅkara

BSBh	<i>Brahmasūtrabhāṣya</i>
GBh	<i>Bhagavadgītābhāṣya</i>
BUBh	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya</i>

CUBh	<i>Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya</i>
MUBh	<i>Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya</i>
KUBh	<i>Kāthopaniṣadbhāṣya</i>
PUBh	<i>Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya</i>
Upad	<i>Upadeśasāhasrī</i>

BG	<i>Bhagavadgītā</i>
BU	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad</i>

NOTES

¹ William Cenkner, who has researched five such different *maṭhas* as those in Śrīṅgeri, Kāñcī and Dvārakā, remarks:

Although the Śaṅkarācāryas' discipleship is large, students (*śiṣya*-s) in the classical sense of the word are limited in number. There are few *śiṣya*-s following the path of *jñāna-yoga* under the personal guidance of the living Śaṅkarācāryas.

William Cenkner, *A Tradition of Teachers: Śaṅkara and the Jagadguru Today* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), p. 161. It appears that, like present-day Śrīṅgeri, the other *maṭhas* tracing their foundation to Śaṅkara also now have only a small number of *saṃnyāsins*.

² Daniel H. H. Ingalls, 'Saṃkara's Arguments Against the Buddhists', *Philosophy East and West*, 3, No. 4 (1954): 295. In this connection, it is appropriate to consider that Śaṅkara regards the *BU* as the most important *Upaniṣad*. Paul Deussen counted the *Upaniṣadic* passages quoted in Śaṅkara's *BSBh*: *Chāndogyā Up.* 810, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* 567, *Taittirīya Up.* 142, and *Muṇḍaka Up.* 129 etc. There are many quotations from the other Vedic scriptures, but they are much less frequent than the *Upaniṣadic* citations. Further, non-Vedic scriptures are also quoted (*Bhagavadgītā* 56, *Mahābhārata* 34). The numbers cited above leave little doubt that the *Chāndogyā* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads* represent for Śaṅkara the chief sources of scriptural truth, although it is certain that all the older *Upaniṣads* are important for him. The *Brahmasūtra* also places special emphasis on these two *Upaniṣads*, quoting the *Chāndogyā* (127 times) and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (57 times). It is noteworthy, however, that the number of Śaṅkara's quotations of the *Chāndogyā Upaniṣad* in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is necessarily much influenced by the prevalence of such quotations in the *Brahmasūtra* itself, which is often thought to have been, in its earliest form, an exegesis of the *Chāndogyā Upaniṣad*. After allowing for the strong preponderance of *Chāndogyā* quotations in the *Brahmasūtra*, it appears that Śaṅkara himself is most strongly attracted to the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. This suspicion seems to be confirmed by the fact that Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* is more extensive than that on the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. Cf. Paul Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, trans. Charles Johnston (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1912), pp. 30–31.

³ *BSBh*, III. iv. 27, part II, p. 1000.

⁴ *GBh*, upodghāta, p. 1.

⁵ *BSBh*, I. ii. 17, part I, p. 191. Paul Hacker, 'Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkara's', *Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*

100 (1950), 249. Śaṅkara's term is *avidyā-kāma-karman*, a three-member *dvandva* compound.

⁶ *Upad*, I. xvi. 71, p. 129.

⁷ *GBh*, XVIII. 10, p. 261.

⁸ *BSBh*, III. iv. 26, part II, p. 998.

⁹ *GBh*, III. 4, p. 108.

¹⁰ *GBh*, XII. 12, p. 184.

¹¹ *GBh*, V. 26, p. 96.

¹² *BG*, VI. 1, p. 99.

¹³ *GBh*, VI. 1, p. 100.

¹⁴ *GBh*, V. 3, p. 86.

¹⁵ *GBh*, V. 8-9, p. 89.

¹⁶ *GBh*, VI. 1, p. 100.

¹⁷ *GBh*, IX. 12, p. 141.

¹⁸ *GBh*, XVIII. 55, p. 285.

¹⁹ *GBh*, VIII. 22, p. 234.

²⁰ *GBh*, XII. 20, p. 188.

²¹ According to Śrīnivāsa-śāstrī, the author's teacher in Pune (personal communication), *jñāna* is "dependent upon reality" (*vastu-tantram*), while *bhakti* is "dependent upon a person" (*puruṣa-tantrā*). Śaṅkara's "exclusive *bhakti*" is *nirguṇa-nididhyāsana*, the repetition of meditation on *nirguṇa-brahman*, which follows purification of mind (*cittaśuddhi*) and *saguṇopāsana*: *aparokṣa-nirguṇa-sāṅsatkāra* is the fruit of *nididhyāsana*.

²² For a discussion of the meaning of *bhakti* in Śaṅkara's works, see Sengaku Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī*, p. 159.

²³ According to the *Mānavadharmasāstra*, "the study of three Vedas under a teacher" must be pursued "for thirty-six years, or for half that time, or for a quarter, or until the (student) has perfectly learnt them" [*Mānavadharmasāstra*, critically ed. J. Jolly, Trübner's Oriental Series (London: Trübner & Co., 1887), p. 40; *The Law of Manu*, trans. Georg Bühler (SBE: vol. XXV, 1886), III. 1, pp. 74-75]. Without breaking with his studentship, he may enter the order of householders [*MDS*, III. 2, p. 40; *LM*, p. 75]. By not breaking with his studentship is meant, according to the commentators, the continuance of Vedic study. Naturally the other rules of studentship, such as chastity, are superseded in the householder stage. Further, "a twice-born *Snātaka*," who has lived "according to the law in the order of householders," may dwell in the forest" [*MDS*, VI. 1, p. 115; *LM*, p. 198]. Having passed the third part of a man's natural term of life in the forest, he may live as "an ascetic during the fourth part of his existence, after abandonment of all attachment to worldly objects" [*MDS*, VI. 33, p. 118; *LM*, p. 205].

²⁴ *Jābālōpaniṣad*, IV' in *Thirty-two Upaniṣads* (Poona: Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series No. 29, 1895), pp. 242-244.

²⁵ *GBh*, III. introduction, p. 42.

²⁶ *GBh*, II. 72, p. 40. Cf. *GBh*, III. 3, p. 45.

²⁷ *GBh*, II. 21, p. 19.

²⁸ *BG*, III. 4, p. 46. na ca samnyasanād eva siddhiṃ samadhyagacchati.

²⁹ *GBh*, III. 4, p. 47, naiṣkarmyalakṣaṇaṃ jñānayogena niṣṭhām.

³⁰ *GBh*, V. 12, p. 90.

³¹ *GBh*, VI. 27, p. 109.

³² *BSBh*, III. iv. 9, part II p. 976.

³³ *BSBh*, III. iv. 20, part II p. 990.

³⁴ *BUBh*, IV. iv. 22, p. 933.

³⁵ Vidyāranya, *Jīvanmuktiviveka of Vidyāranya*, ed. with English translation by S. Subrahmanya and T. R. Srinivasa Ayyangar (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Center, 1978), I. 2–5, p. 1.

³⁶ *GBh*, XIII. 23, p. 211, *BSBh*, IV. i. 15, part II p. 1067.

³⁷ *GBh*, XIV. 25, p. 226.

dehadhāraṇamātranimittavyatirekeṇa sarvakarmaparityāgi.

³⁸ *BSBh*, IV. i. 15, part II p. 1068.

³⁹ *BSBh*, IV. i. 15, part II p. 1067. śārīrapātāvādhikaraṇāt kṣemaprāptiḥ.

⁴⁰ *GBh*, XVIII. 2, p. 255, XVIII. 11, p. 261.

⁴¹ *Upad*, II. i. 1–2, p. 191, 'Upadeśasāhasrī, Part I', trans. Sengaku Mayeda, in *A Source Book of Advaita Vedānta*, ed. Eliot Deutsch & J. A. B. van Buitenen (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1971), p. 124. Sengaku Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings: the Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara*, translated with introduction and notes (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), p. 211.

⁴² *BSBh*, I. i. 1, part I, pp. 22–23.

⁴³ *BUBh*, III. v. 1, p. 812, IV. v. 15, p. 948, *Upad*, II. 1. 2, p. 191.

⁴⁴ *BUBh*, IV. v. 15, p. 948.

na hi ksatriyavaiśyaḥ pārvīrājya pratipattiḥ

⁴⁵ *GBh*, IV. 19, p. 70. Cf. *GBh*, II. 11, pp. 11–12.

⁴⁶ *BSBh*, I. iii. 38, part I p. 312.

vedaśravaṇapratīṣedho vedādhyāyanapratīṣedhas

tad arthajñānānuṣṭhānayoś ca

pratīṣedhaḥ śūdrasya smaryate . . .

⁴⁷ *BSBh*, I. iii. 38, part I p. 313.

⁴⁸ Mādhava's *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, no. 22 (Poona: Ānandāśrama Press, 1891), XIII. 63–64, p. 470.

⁴⁹ Sureśvara's *Vārtikas*, V. 1651. Cf. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. II, part 2 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, second edition; 1974), p. 943.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

⁵¹ *Upad*, II. i. 6, p. 192.

⁵² *GBh*, XIII. 30, p. 215.

⁵³ *BUBh*, II. v. 15, p. 776.

⁵⁴ *BUBh*, II. i. 20, p. 737.

⁵⁵ *BSBh*, III. iv. 20, p. 991.

⁵⁶ As mentioned in the *Jābālopaniṣad*, the *paramahamsas* "always stay under a tree or in an uninhabited house or in a burial place and either wear garment [sic] or are naked; they are beyond the pairs of dharma and adharma, truth and falsehood, purity and impurity. They treat all alike, they regard all as the Self, to them a clod of earth or gold is the same and they beg alms from persons of all varṇas." P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. II, part 2, (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, second edition; 1974), p. 939. Cf. A. A. Ramanathan, *The Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads*, (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1978).

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THE MIRACLE OF A HAGIOGRAPHY WITHOUT MIRACLES:
SOME COMMENTS ON THE JAIN LIVES OF THE
PRATYKABUDDHA KARAKAṆḌA*

It is a common claim made by scholars of religious biographies, both Western and Eastern, that accounts of miracles occupy a central position in the traditional lives of holy men. In fact it is precisely these supernatural events which are seen to define the biography of a saint as opposed to that of a secular hero.¹ A brief survey of religious biographies written in Sanskrit and related vernaculars about the founders of the various schools of Vedānta and major devotional movements suggests that the claim is largely valid for India and is indeed useful as a device for separating the otherwise similar royal biography from the biography of the philosopher/sage. So, for example, we find the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Vidyāranya replete with the mention of miracles. These occur, of course, in the life of the young Śaṅkara who at age seven has already mastered all the learning that there is to master (chapter 5, vs. 1), and shows such filial devotion that he can shift the course of a river so that his mother will not have to walk far to take her daily bath (7.8). They also mark the career of the mature philosopher, which begins astonishingly early when Śaṅkara is but twelve years old (6.60) and after a divine encounter (6.25). Similarly, the *Prapannāmṛta*, a late Sanskrit hagiography of Rāmānuja, depicts the young Rāmānuja as a prodigy who masters the Vedas at the age of eight days (2.27) and as a child corrects his teacher Yadava on details of scriptural exegesis (3.59–60). Later on Rāmānuja often converts his opponents by displaying miraculous powers, among which is the repeatedly mentioned marvel of how the water used to wash his feet exhibits remarkable curative properties (chapter 46). Rāmānuja is also able to exorcise a demon possessing a young girl with this water (46.46), and is constantly in direct communication with the Divine (46.51 ff, for one example). Madhva in the *Śrīsumadhvaṇijaya* of Nārāyaṇācārya is second to neither of these rivals, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, in his own display of wondrous powers. He kills demons, cures incurable diseases and eats such prodigious amounts that bystanders are left in no doubt as to his superhuman identity.

Such miracle-working is by no means confined to these three Vedānta

leaders. Caitanya, in the accounts of his life, is likewise credited with marvelous deeds, including curing a leper with his embrace (*Caitanyacandrodayanāṭaka* Act 7). Vallabha, in the *Vallabhadigvijaya* written in Vrajbhāṣā, at age five defeats all the learned pandits in Benaras, for which feat he is immediately recognized as an *avatāra*, an incarnation of God (chapter 12). Even his physical appearance partakes of the supernatural, and it is adorned with such superhuman or "*aprākṛta*" ornaments that he appears in the court assembly of King Kṛṣṇadeva of Vijayanagar to defeat the Advaita Vedāntins (chapter 2). A hagiography of the Sikh Guru Nānak, clearly modeled on Hindu hagiographies, includes miraculous healing (7.153), the defeat of demons (8.126; 9.90ff), the ability to see divine manifestations invisible to mortals (10.11) and the astonishing power to return after his own death to supervise the division of his relics (10.19).²

The miracles recounted of the great philosophers, Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva and the devotional leaders Caitanya and Vallabha always include a description of the early and superhuman intellectual accomplishments of the hero of the particular biography. This was not strictly a requirement, however, even where a biography gave lavish attention to supernatural deeds. The Bengali Tantric saint Sarvānanda was celebrated by his son in a hagiography entitled the *Sarvānandatarāṅginī*, written in Sanskrit and now almost impossible to obtain. My information, in fact, comes from a modern Bengali study by ŚrīŚacīnāth Cakravarti. Sarvānanda is anything but an intellectual giant; as a matter of fact, by all accounts he was judged retarded. He spent his early years alone, wandering in the forest and mingling with outcastes and he was considered totally incapable of learning anything, a failure deemed grievous in a Brahmin family known for its learning. His greatness, however, had long been prophesied; his own grandfather Vasudeva, had received a divine message predicting that he would be reborn as his own grandson, Sarvānanda, and that mounted on a corpse before a Śiva liṅga invisible to ordinary mortals, he would achieve spiritual perfection. Sarvānanda's miraculous feats include a battle with Death in the form of a serpent, the overcoming of terrifying demons, the achievement of divine visions, curing the sick and lame and the ultimate acquisition of physical immortality.

It should be clear, thus, from this brief review that in Hindu India hagiographies and miracles would seem indeed to be closely associated. From philosopher to pious devotee, from reformer to Tantric adept, all

are seen to have been capable of and to have performed great miracles. When we turn to Buddhism, the case is less clear. There is first of all I think a problem in defining hagiography or biography in Indian Buddhism, though I suspect that this statement like all rash and radical statements may occasion some surprise. To begin with it is easiest to consider the one indisputable example of biography in Indian Buddhism, the various biographies of the Buddha about which there is now considerable sophisticated scholarship, most notably the French study by Barreau and the Japanese study by Nakamura.³ Both of these scholars take the position that in its earliest forms as it appears scattered throughout the Pāli canon, the life story of the Buddha contained little by way of miracles or supernatural feats, which are deemed to be later accretions, evidences for a gradual process of divinization. It is not possible to debate at this time whether such a hypothesis is in fact correct; what is important for the present discussion is that the developed Buddha biography does indeed relate miracles, and in at least one early incident, the conversion of the Kāśyapas, depicts the Buddha as a kind of powerful magician who performs a number of miracles to convert the heretics. When we come to the commentaries in Pāli on the *Apadāna*, *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, *Thera* and *Therīgāthas*, we are on shakier grounds in considering this body of literature as strictly "biographical" or "hagiographical". All of these accounts are closely connected and their purpose is not to relate the life of their subject, but to illustrate the power of karma, the efficacy of the pious deed and vow made in service of the Buddhist faith. It is also a moot point as to how many or which among the many whose *apadānas* are told in fact actually lived. I cannot presume to answer such a question; it is, then, with these reservations in mind that I comment on this group of writings and by extension on the related Sanskrit *Avadānas*. It is impossible to generalize about such a large body of writing, and I am hardly an expert; nonetheless I would venture to suggest that the accounts of the lives provided by these texts do not emphasize the performance of miracles; to the contrary they suggest in their details that holy men in the Buddhist tradition, though of course capable of performing miracles, ought not to display these powers before the lay public. Thus we have the various accounts of the monk Piṇḍola Bharadvaja (*Etadaggavagga*, *Manorathapuraṇī*, p. 213), where Piṇḍola is rebuked by the Buddha for having performed a minor miracle.⁴ In the Sanskrit *Divyāvadāna*, *Prātihāryasūtra*, the assertion is made that miracles are permitted only against the most stubborn heretics. While no fixed rule

ever seems to obtain, it does seem most generally to be the case that the Pāli commentaries which contain accounts of pious deeds and their rewards, namely the commentaries mentioned above to the *Apadāna*, *Anguttaranikāya*, *Thera* and *Therīgāthas* and the *Dhammapāda*, do not emphasize miracles. Where miracles occur they are more often associated with numinous objects such as relics. The ideal Buddhist is one who shows reverence to such holy objects and to the Buddhist law and the monastic community. He is not necessarily a miracle worker, and occasionally the miracle worker may come in for explicit criticism.

When we come to the Jain tradition, and finally to the main matter of this paper, I believe that a similar situation obtains. While the biographies of the Tīrthaṅkaras in the *Kalpasūtra* are filled with miracles, this is not necessarily the case for others in the Jain tradition. I shall examine as evidence for this hypothesis several Jain biographies of the Pratyekabuddha Karakaṇḍa, a figure who occurs in Buddhism as well but whose story there is different enough as not to impinge on our account here. The biographies that I shall discuss are in Sanskrit, Mahārāṣṭrī and Apabhraṃśa and date many of them from approximately the same time.⁵ Their evidence strongly suggests that miracle stories, far from being essential to all religious biographies, are in fact alien to some types of religious biography in India. In such cases, where miracle stories or accounts of supernatural events do occur, they are clearly associated with magical objects, for example, unusual images of the Tīrthaṅkaras, and with specific pilgrimage sites with which the subject of the biography is then linked. It is in fact not at all unusual to see a life story intimately associated with a pilgrimage site, nor is it exceptional to see a pilgrimage site glorified by tales of the miraculous nature of the natural phenomena, lakes and wells, at the site and the man-made or supernatural images housed in the temples there. *Tīthakalpas* and *māhātmyas*, detailing the merits and marvels of various pilgrimage sites, were written by both Digambara and Śvetāmbara Jains. Evidence from the Digambara biographies of Karakaṇḍa that will be introduced here suggests that the biographies in themselves were somewhat sober recitations of the workings of *karma*, the power of a single righteous act to produce a grand result, and that such life-stories were then joined to a marvelous account of the efficacy of a pilgrimage site with all its attendant miracles. Such an association served the interests of both biographer and compiler of the pilgrimage text; the supernatural stories increased the popular interest of the biography and no doubt stimulated

listeners to pay closer attention to the story as a whole, with its predominantly didactic purpose. At the same time, the close linkage of a well-known figure with a less-known site made that site familiar to the public and offered a reason for its sanctity. The hypothesis advanced here that the two, biography and miraculous pilgrimage tale, are fundamentally distinct entities is supported by the observation that in at least one account of the texts to be examined here the subject of the biography is stripped of the honor of playing any role in the marvelous events at the pilgrimage site. All of this is relegated to minor figures, although the miracle remains itself unchanged.

Our Jain biographies of Karakaṇḍa suggest yet one more possible hypothesis to account for the fact that miracle stories do not appear to be essential to the biographies and that relatively contemporary accounts may eschew miracles or include them seemingly randomly and without apparent religious significance. One of the accounts most heavily encumbered with miracles is also closest to the secular prose romance, which as Bāṇa in his *Kādambarī* noted pleases especially when it relates the unusual and thus amazes the reader. (vs. 8). This is, in essence, a reversal of the relationship between secular literature and religious biography as scholars normally define it. In this case it is the religious biography that in its purer state rejects the miraculous, only to include account after account of supernatural events as it assumes the form of the secular prose tale.

Having presented this lengthy introduction and my basic conclusions, I should like now to review some of the Jain biographies of Karakaṇḍa in substantiation of my theories. I shall begin with the Śvetāmbara accounts followed by the Digambara accounts which differ from the Śvetāmbara largely in that they link Karakaṇḍa with the pilgrimage site of Tera and credit him with building temples and participating in miraculous events there. I shall conclude with accounts from a Śvetāmbara pilgrimage text which shows a clear influence from the Digambara tradition, and with a Digambara text close to the courtly romance.

I. THE ŚVETĀMBARA ACCOUNTS

The earliest mention of the Pratyekabuddha Karakaṇḍa is in the *Uttarādhyaṇa Sūtra*, XVIII. 46–47, which merely mentions his name along with that of the three other pratyekabuddhas which the Jain tradition acknowledges. The Jain concept of the pratyekabuddha is slightly different from the Buddhist

understanding of the term which is found among other places in the Pāli *Puggalapannati*. According to the Pāli sources pratyekabuddhas are distinguished mainly by the fact that they live in an age when there is no Buddha and so must fend for themselves. They also do not teach what they discover, although they may serve as suitable fields of merit and the *avadānas* are replete with stories which extol the merit of service to a pratyekabuddha. In the Jain tradition, on the other hand, the chief characteristic of a pratyekabuddha according to such texts as the commentaries on the *Nandisūtra* is that pratyekabuddhas unlike svayambuddhas require some external sign in order to achieve enlightenment. Pratyekabuddhas are experienced in the scriptures, whereas scriptural study is not a prerequisite for a svayambuddha, and pratyekabuddhas have no human teacher from whom they may get their monastic insignia.⁶

The early commentaries to the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*, the *Niryukti* and *Cūrṇi*, contain the first elaborations of the story of Karakaṇḍa. Unfortunately, neither was available to me and I have begun with the account by Devendra. Devendra wrote at the end of the eleventh century. He has left two essentially identical lives of Karakaṇḍa, one noted in his *Ākhyānakamaṇikoṣa* written in Mahārāṣṭrī between 1073–1083 A.D. and on which we have the lengthy commentary in Sanskrit and Prakrit of Āmradeva, completed in 1134 A.D. The second account by Devendra is in his commentary on the *Uttarādhyāyana*, the *Sukhabodhavr̥tti*, also written in a late form of Jaina Mahārāṣṭrī. Briefly, the story is told of a King Dadhivāhana in the city of Campā, and of his wife Padmāvatī who becomes pregnant and is seized by the irrepressible desire to don the king's clothes and go out for a ride on the king's elephant. Pregnancy longings are part of the stock-in-trade of Indian folk tales, and are said to reveal something about the nature of the child to be born. In this case, no doubt, the fact that Padmāvatī desires to wear the king's clothes is a hint of the career of her future son: he is destined to become a great king. At any rate, off go Padmāvatī and the king, but suddenly the elephant goes wild. The king warns Padmāvatī, telling her to grab hold of a branch of a tree. She fails, and is carried off by the crazed elephant, while the king safely clings to the tree branch he has successfully managed to secure. Lost in the forest, Padmāvatī prays and undertakes specifically Jain religious vows; finally she meets an ascetic who leads her to the edge of a town where she takes refuge with a Jain nun. There follow some religious verses, which have the desired effect on Queen Padmāvatī, she becomes a nun herself. Padmāvatī

tries at first to conceal her pregnancy, and when her son is born she casts him away at the burial ground, with a signet ring to identify him as of royal origin. She tells the nun that her baby was still-born, but secretly she goes to the cemetery and gives her boy treats to eat. As he grows up he becomes the guard of the cemetery. One day two monks pass by and see an unusual object, a bamboo stick of a certain configuration. They predict that whoever is the owner of the stick will become king. Karakaṇḍa hears them, as does a passing Brahmin. There ensues a quarrel over the stick, but Karakaṇḍa eventually becomes its rightful owner. In the meantime fearing that the Brahmin will kill him, Karakaṇḍa goes to the city Kañcanapūra. It just so happens that the king there has died without issue. It was customary in such a case to release the royal elephant or horse and follow it until it displayed a liking to some individual; we find accounts of this process in the Jātakas and in numerous Jain stories, as well as that standard encyclopedia of tales the *Kathāsaritsāgara*. The choice is often attended by wondrous signs that confirm its legitimacy. So Karakaṇḍa is chosen king, and it is at this juncture that the only other event that may be considered as a candidate for a "miracle" occurs. Barred from entering the city because of his low-caste status, Karakaṇḍa lifts the royal sceptre, symbol of the king's power to punish all evil. The sceptre immediately blazes, the outward manifestation of the king's righteous wrath, and the citizens, chastened, permit Karakaṇḍa to enter the city. The next major event of Karakaṇḍa's life is a threatened battle against his father Dadhivāhana which is averted by Padmāvatī who comes and reveals Karakaṇḍa's true identity. Finally, Karakaṇḍa, having enjoyed royal splendor, becomes enlightened when he sees his favourite bull, once young and vigorous, now old and decrepit and easily defeated by the new young bulls. The story ends with a series of religious verses.

Such in the main is the Śvetāmbara account of Karakaṇḍa. It is told in numerous other sources, for example, the *Dharmopadeśamālā vivaraṇa* of Jayasimhasūri, which is earlier than Devendra's accounts by two hundred years, dating to 859 A.D. Jayasimha's story is slightly more dramatic; he goes into greater detail, for example, when Karakaṇḍa is chosen king, telling of the marvelous signs attending this choice. But in its basic plot outline it is identical to the version of Devendra given here.

To review the Śvetāmbara accounts, it is clear that what is emphasized in the history of Karakaṇḍa is his religious experience. The climax of the story comes when Karakaṇḍa achieves enlightenment, and this is made the

occasion, for example, in Devendra, for religious teaching in the form of the verses that conclude Devendra's account. The only deviations from strict recitation of the plot are in fact such religious verses, which are introduced by Devendra whenever he can. Jayasimhasūri follows a similar practice, and his tale likewise concludes with religious verses. In my view, none of the accounts attributes to Karakaṇḍa any significant miracles. Even the to us unusual process by which he is chosen king with its attendant wonders was widespread in the literature as the normal process by which a king was chosen when a former king had died without issue. Similarly, the blazing sceptre may be viewed as a metonymic device serving to describe in great vividness the king in all his fury. In any case, should one chose to classify these two events as "supernatural" or "miraculous" it is necessary to bear in mind that these are both entirely secular in scope and could occur to any lawful king. They do not therefore fall into a class of miracles which would define the religious biography. In fact it is to the Digambara accounts that we must turn to see Karakaṇḍa as the author of wondrous deeds as well as an individual who soberly attained enlightenment. It is in these texts that we see for the first time a Karakaṇḍa whose life history is marked by the extraordinary.

II. THE DIGAMBARA VERSIONS

The earliest Digambara account of Karakaṇḍa is also the most complicated. This is the *Brhatkathakośa* of Hariṣeṇa, dated in the ninth century. Another Digambara account, that found in the *Kathakośa* of Prabhācandra of the mid-eleventh century, distills Hariṣeṇa's more rambling and sometimes contradictory tale and provides perhaps the proper starting point for this discussion. There are several significant deviations from the Śvetāmbara texts given above. The first is that the very purpose of the story is here changed. The Śvetāmbara texts, in keeping with the Jain doctrine that a pratyekabuddha requires an external event in order to become enlightened, focussed on the incident when Karakaṇḍa sees his favourite bull now old and unable to fight; realizing the transient nature of all worldly phenomena, he achieves his religious enlightenment. In Prabhācandra, Karakaṇḍa's tale is introduced as an example of how great the results of a meritorious deed done in a past life can be; in the opening verse Prabhācandra states that "Even a cowherd, ignorant and impure, became a great king Karakaṇḍa,

having worshipped the Jina with a single lotus." The very focus of the story is thus completely different from that in the Śvetāmbara accounts. Given the fact that this is a tale to illustrate the workings of karma, the greatness of past pious acts, we must expect to find an accounting of the past lives of our characters, something that was totally absent in the Śvetāmbara writings. The story thus begins with characters who do not figure at all in Devendra or Jayasimhasūri, and in a setting that is also unique to the Digambara versions. The city is Tera, which has been identified as the modern Tagara in the Osmanabad district of Maharashtra.⁸ There are two kings in this Tera, Nīla and Mahānīla, and a merchant named Vasumitra with his wife Vasumatī. The merchant has a cowherd in his employ, named Dhanadatta. One day Dhanadatta finds a thousand-petaled lotus while wandering secretly in a forest. He steals it, when a snake maiden, a "*nāgakanyakā*", appears and tells him that he must give the wonderful lotus to the one who is "*sarvādhika*", "the greatest of all". Dhanadatta tells his master Vasumitra and together they go to the king, Vasumitra's superior in the normal hierarchy. The king sends them to a sage, who tells them that Dhanadatta should offer the flower to the Jina, "the greatest of all". The story now slightly changes venue in order to provide us with details of the past lives of the other characters; for those who cannot resist the suspense, Dhanadatta by his pious offering of the flower will become King Karakaṇḍa. Now, in Śrāvastī there was a merchant Nagadatta who was not so fortunate in his wife Nagadattā. She is having an illicit affair with a Brahmin, Somaśarman. The merchant Nagadatta, disgusted with them both, becomes a monk and departs this world. He is reborn as the son of King Vasupāla and his Queen Vasumatī; this is Dadhivāhana, (here, Dantivāhana) with whom the Śvetāmbara accounts in fact begin. Somaśarman, the Brahmin, dies and is reborn as an elephant which is presented to King Vasupāla. Nagadattā, the adulterous wife of the merchant Nagadatta who is now Dadhivāhana, also dies. She becomes the wife of a merchant Vasudatta in Tāmralipta. She has two daughters, Dhanavatī and Dhanaśrī. Dhanavatī is a Buddhist and Dhanaśrī a Jain, an interesting touch which allows Prabhācandra to introduce into his story the terrible enmity that existed between these two religious. Eventually, this Nagadattā goes to stay with her daughters. She breaks her Jain vows whenever she stays with her Buddhist daughter, an evil deed for which she will pay in another life. Eventually, though, she keeps her Jain fast and dies. She is reborn as the daughter of a couple in Kauśambī, Vasupāla and

Vasumatī. Because she was born on an inauspicious day her parents cast her away. She is placed in a box and set into the river. Eventually it is found by a gardener Kusumadatta who presents the child to his wife Kusumamālā. They name the child Padmāvatī, having found her in a lotus lake, whence she had ultimately drifted from the river. King Dadhivāhana comes to hear of Padmāvatī's beauty as she grows into young womanhood; the gardener shows him a signet ring found along with the child, and convinced of the girl's high birth, the king marries her. We now have a past life for Karakaṇḍa who was the cowherd Dhanadatta, Dadhivāhana who was the pious but cuckolded merchant Nagadatta, and Padmāvatī, who was the adulterous Nagadattā. Padmāvatī becomes pregnant with the future Karakaṇḍa, and here the story resembles the Śvetāmbara version. She wants to go riding the king's elephant dressed as a man and is carried off by the wild elephant. Her rescue in the Digambara version is, however, slightly more involved than in the Śvetāmbara versions. First, she is rescued by a Goddess from a lake and then by another gardener. The gardener's wife eventually chases her out, fearing that her husband will be too attracted to his new ward. Padmāvatī then gives birth to her son in a cemetery, where she meets the cemetery guard, an outcaste, who tells her that in fact he is a cursed semicelestial being. The story now follows the Śvetāmbara account once again with the prediction of two monks that whoever owns a certain bamboo stick will be king. Karakaṇḍa has the aborted fight with his father and then the Digambara tale diverges once more. Karakaṇḍa decides to march against the Southern kings from the Cola, Pāṇḍya and Cera lines. He has his religious realization when he subdues his foes and puts his feet on their crowns, only to see there tiny Jina images. He repents of this terrible sacrilege of stepping on a Jina image. On his return home he camps near Tera. Two aborigines named Dhārā and Śiva come to offer him homage. He inquires of them whether they have seen anything unusual in their wanderings. They relate to him the wondrous tale of Dhārāśiva and its Jina cave, bringing the story of Karakaṇḍa into close association with this pilgrimage site.

The aborigines tell Karakaṇḍa that on top of this cave there is an anthill, but what is so amazing is that an elephant can be seen to worship there daily. Karakaṇḍa digs at the spot where the elephant worships and uncovers a jewelled image of Pārśvanātha. He makes a cave for this image, but the cave is then flooded. A snake god appears and tells Karakaṇḍa the history of the wonderful image he has found. In the past there were two *vidyādharas*,

semi-celestial creatures, named Suvega and Amitavega. They had stolen this Jina image which had then resisted their efforts to take it home with them; once set down near Tera it had stayed firm. No one could move it. Disconsolate, the two *vidyādhara*s had sought the aid of a Jain sage who had explained to them that Suvega would one day be reborn as an elephant and would achieve release when Karakaṇḍa came and uncovered the image. The sage goes on to explain that the cave had initially been excavated by Nīla and Mahānīla, also two *vidyādhara*s, who had lost their magical powers in a battle and were living nearby in exile. Nīla and Mahānīla get their powers back; the elephant is released and Karakaṇḍa then builds several more caves. The story ends with a verse insuring that despite all the circumlocutions of the tale the moral will not be missed: "Thus by worshipping the Jina even a cowherd became so great. Why should this not happen to others as well?"

It is clear, even if the details of the story remain somewhat elusive, that this Digambara account is very different in tone from the Śvetāmbara account. Designed to show the workings of karma, it dwells on past lives as explanations for present conditions. It does not emphasize at all Karakaṇḍa's religious awakening, which is glossed over in the account of his Southern campaign in favor of a description of the marvellous history of Tera and Karakaṇḍa's role in building the temples there. The main claim to fame that Tera has, according to Prabhācandra, is that it is the resting place of a magical image, an image of Pārśvanātha, the special status of which is clear from its origins (stolen away by semi-celestials and in fact as Hariṣeṇa tells us originally made by a famous king of Laṅkā) and from the fact that it determined its own fate; it could not be moved when it decided where to come to rest. Such tales are often told of temples throughout India, and here the mention of Karakaṇḍa, cursed semi-celestials, an elephant worshipping and so on adds to the air of the marvellous. Karakaṇḍa participates in the mystery of Tera by being the only one who can unearth the image, release the elephant and build the caves. This is the climax of his story according to the *Kathākośa* of Prabhācandra. In keeping with the general atmosphere of the tale and its culmination in the story of the marvels at Tera, the whole account sparkles with the occasional miracle. The cemetery guard, for example, is a cursed semi-celestial, which has the added function of removing the otherwise unpleasant fact that Karakaṇḍa, raised by an outcaste, should become a king. In fact he is raised by a semi-divine being here and need not bear the opprobrium of consorting with outcastes. In

the Śvetāmbara accounts the outcaste is an outcaste, but when Karakaṇḍa becomes king his whole caste group is elevated to the status of Brahmins.

The version of Hariṣeṇa helps us to assess the nature of Karakaṇḍa's connection with Tera, and thus the nature of the connection of the biography with the wonder tale about the pilgrimage site. Hariṣeṇa offers a variant of the marvels at Terapura. In his alternate version it is in fact Nīla and Mahānīla who perform the function that is left to Karakaṇḍa by Prabhācandra; they in fact unearth the image that Suvega and Amitavega had pilfered; they are the ones whom the aborigines tell of the miracle of an elephant worshipping. Hariṣeṇa acknowledges the authenticity both of this version and of the second version in which Karakaṇḍa assumes the role played by Nīla and Mahānīla and in which Nīla and Mahānīla are reduced to interested bystanders who recoup their lost magical powers when they witness Karakaṇḍa's unearthing of the marvelous image of Pārśvanātha. It seems clear, then, that the story of Tera and its stubborn image, cursed semi-celestials and pious elephant was not always associated with Karakaṇḍa, but formed an independent tradition at some time later attached to Karakaṇḍa's life history. The sequence of events in Prabhācandra in fact also suggests the same; as a karma tale, the story would have been more naturally concluded with Karakaṇḍa's becoming king. The tale of Tera reads like a diversion from the main plot, to which the reader must be forcibly returned by the concluding verse which recalls the basic point of the story, that a cowherd became a king by a single act of worship.

Before passing on to our final version of Karakaṇḍa's life, one in which it is not a pilgrimage text but a secular romance that supplies miracles and marvels, I should like to mention that the Śvetāmbara tradition also knows of an association of Karakaṇḍa with Tera. As if to reinforce our contention that such an association belongs to an independent tradition of miracle stories about holy places, it records the connection between Karakaṇḍa and Tera only in a text specifically devoted to pilgrimage sites, and not in its *sūtra* commentaries or *prabandhakośas* where biographies otherwise occur. The *Tirthakalpa* of Jinaprabhāsūri tells about Karakaṇḍa twice, once when it speaks about Campā, and once when it speaks of Kalikuṇḍatīrtha. The story is clearly related to the Digambara account, although it differs in most of its details. The section on Campā briefly repeats the standard biography of Karakaṇḍa according to the Śvetāmbara tradition, starting from Padmāvati's pregnancy longing and concluding with Karakaṇḍa's enlightenment at seeing the old bull. It also states simply that Karakaṇḍa consecrated a Pārśvanātha,

in fact the Jina himself, through the intervention of an elephant who was also a semi-divine being. The account under Kalikuṇḍatīrtha makes all of this a bit clearer. It explains how the image of Pārśvanātha was not really an image; it was Pārśvanātha himself, who had taken up the posture of *Kāyotsarga* and remained there motionless. An elephant sees him and remembers his past births; he was once a Brahmin named Hemadhara from Videha. Teased unmercifully by some young gallants he decides to commit suicide. He is seen by a Jain monk and instructed. Dying by fasting, he is reborn as this elephant. He worships Pārśvanātha and becomes a semi-celestial. Karakaṇḍa hears this marvellous account of how Pārśvanātha, frozen in immortality, has been worshipped by an elephant, and rushes to the spot. Unable to see Pārśvanātha, he curses his ill luck when suddenly a snake god causes the likeness of Pārśvanātha to appear. Karakaṇḍa causes a temple to be erected on the spot.

Distinct from the Digambara account, nonetheless this fourteenth century pilgrimage text, true to its genre, relates a marvellous event associated with a *tīrtha*. That the story is probably late in the Śvetāmbara tradition and not at all an integral part of the life history of Karakaṇḍa seems clear from the fact that in the other Śvetāmbara accounts it is totally absent.

To pass on now to the final Digambara account to be dealt with in this paper, we move from the realm of popular religious literature, pilgrimage texts, into the realm of secular courtly poetry. The Apabhraṃśa *Karakaṇḍacariu* of Kanakumāra, dated in the early twelfth century is an elaborate expansion of the standard Digambara legend recounted by Hariṣeṇa and Prabhācandra. The text is filled with digressions, and the digressions are often marvellous in tone. Totally new incidents not found in other accounts are also introduced. So, for example in chapter 5 we find that Karakaṇḍa's wife is abducted by a semi-celestial in the form of an elephant; to comfort him someone tells Karakaṇḍa the story of Naravāhanadatta, a modified version from the *Kathāsaritsāgara*, in which a love-sick semi-celestial is also turned into a parrot by a female ascetic. In chapter 7, returning from his campaign against the Southern kings, Karakaṇḍa beholds the beautiful Rativegā. He marries her, but on the sea voyage home they encounter a sea monster. Karakaṇḍa defeats the monster, but he is then abducted by a divine damsel. Rativegā is saddened by the sudden disappearance of her new husband, and she prays to the Jain Goddess Padmāvatī who tells her that Karakaṇḍa will indeed return, master of all the Vidyādhara and enormously wealthy.

To anyone familiar with the medieval Sanskrit prose tale, it should be

immediately clear that it is that world to which the Apabhramśa *Karakaṇḍacariu* belongs. Its supernatural episodes are at home in the world of the courtly romance, not in the more sedate environment of the *Kathākośa* which confined its miracles in the main to those happening at holy sites, or those necessary to explain away otherwise unpleasant realities. These miracles have no religious function, although their literary appeal is often undeniable.

III. CONCLUSIONS

We began with a summary of the importance of miracles in many types of religious biographies in India, from those of philosophers, to those of vernacular saints and Tantric adepts. I then suggested that this intimate relationship was not in fact a necessary one, that there were many biographies in which miracles were not the norm. As evidence I have introduced several Jain accounts of the life of the Pratyekabuddha Karakaṇḍa, offering for consideration the hypothesis that miracles are not at all an inherent aspect of these biographies but come in from somewhere else, in one case from pilgrimage legends which are replete with accounts of miracles, and in another from the courtly romance which also favoured the supernatural.

NOTES

* This paper was presented at the Canadian Society for the Study of Religion in Montreal on June 4, 1985. Research for it was conducted with partial support from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council in a grant on religious biographies in Asia held by Dr. Koichi Shinohara, myself and Dr. Eva Dargyay. I take this opportunity to thank Dr. Shinohara for his assistance. Many of the ideas in this paper were developed through our discussions, particularly the notion of a close association between pilgrimage sites and their legends and religious biographies.

¹ For discussion and refutation of this concept with regard to Western hagiographies see Patricia Cox, *Biography in Late Antiquity: A Quest for the Holy man*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, pp. 43 ff. For a more complete discussion of the role of miracles in some of the Indian hagiographies see my articles, 'God as Idol: The Role of Magical Images in Medieval Sectarial Vaishnavism', *South Asian Religious Art Studies* 3 (1983), 12–24; 'Holy Warriors: A Preliminary Study of Saints and Kings in the Classical Indian Tradition', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 11 (1985), 1–13; 'Scholars and Wonder-Workers: Some Remarks on the Role of the Supernatural in Philosophical Contexts in Vedānta Hagiographies', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Festschrift Daniel H. H. Ingalls, 105/3, July 1985, pp. 459–469.

² Editions cited are as follows: *Srīmacchankaradigvijaya of Vidyāranya*, Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Vol. 122, Poona, 1932; *Prapannāmṛta* of Srīmadanantacarya, ed., Swāmī

Rāmanārāyaṇācārya, Benaras: Sri Venkatesvara Press, U.S. 2023; *Śrīsumadhavavijaya* with commentary of Śrīviśvapātītīrtha, Udipi, N.D.; *Caitanyacandrodayanāṭaka* of Kavi Karpūra, Calcutta: Sarasvati Press, 1885; *Vallabhadigvijaya* lacks title page and any information on publication, but the copy used is that in the Deccan College Library, Poona, *Nānakcandrodaya* of Devarājā Śarmā, ed., Pt. Vrajanath Jhā, Benaras: Sarasvata Bhavana Granthamala, vol. 105, 1977. For Sarvānanda see Śacināth Cakravarti, *Sarvānanda*, Candpur Sammilanī; Calcutta, Bengali year 1387.

³ André Bareau, *Recherches Sur la Biographie du Buddha Dans les Sutra-Pitaka et les Vinayapitaka Anciens*, Paris: Ecole Française D'Extreme Orient, two volumes, 1963 and 1975; Nakamura Hajime, *Gotama Buddha*, 4th edition, Tokyo, Showa 50.

⁴ Devanagari edition, Nalanda, 1976.

⁵ Editions used are as follows: of Devendra's commentary to the *Uttaradhyāyanasūtra*, Jacobi's edition as it is reprinted in A. M. Ghatage. *Kahānayatigam: A Prakrit Reader*, Kolhapur: Bharat Book Stall, 1950; Hariṣeṇa, *Brhatkathakośa*, ed., A. N. Upadhye, Singhi Jain Series, Vol. 1, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1943. Prabhācandra, *Kathakośa*, ed., A. N. Upadhye, Manikcandra Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, No. 55, Delhi: Bharatiya Jnana Pitha, 1974; Kanakumāra, *Karakaṇḍacariu*, ed. D. Hiralal Jain, Bharatiya Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jain Granthamālā, Apabhraṃśa Granthāṅka, 4, Benaras, 1964; Devendra, *Ākhyānikamaṇikośa* with *Vṛtti*, Prakrit Text Series, Vol. V, ed., Muni Śrī Puṇyavijayaji, Varanasi, Prakrit Text Society, 1962; Jayasimhasūri, *Dharmopadeśamālā*, Singhi Jain Series, Vol. 28, ed., Śrī Lalitcandra Bhagavāndāsa Gāndhī, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidyā Bhavan, 1949; Jinaprabhāsuri, *Tīrthakalpa*, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1941. On the Buddhist versions of the Karakaṇḍa story see Jarl Charpentier, *Studien zur Indischen Erzählliteratur*, I. *Paccekabuddhageschichten*, Upsala: Akademische Buchdruckerei, 1908.

⁶ See Ghatage, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–54.

⁷ References from C. H. Tawney, *The Kathakośa*, Oriental Translation Fund, New Series II, London, 1895, p. 4.

⁸ According to Hiralal Jain, in his introduction to the *Karakaṇḍacariu*, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–63.

BOOK REVIEW

Yajñapati Upādhyāya's Tattvacintāmaṇiprabhā (Anumānakhaṇḍaḥ), ed. by Gopikamohan Bhattacharya. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften: philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 423. Band. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasien, Heft 17. Wien 1984. 198 pp. Bibliography, Introduction, Analysis, Text (pp. 53–185), Indices.

The publication of Yajñapati Upādhyāya's commentary on the *Anumānakhaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is a significant event in the history of modern studies on Navya-nyāya. Yajñapati is the earliest known commentator on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. But only two parts of his *Prabhā* – that on the *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa* and that on the *Anumānakhaṇḍa* – have been traced so far. And for each of these parts only one manuscript in the Maithilī script has been noticed. The manuscript of the *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa* is preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris; that of the *Anumānakhaṇḍa* was preserved, until recently, at the library of the Sanskrit University, Darbhanga (formerly Darbhanga Raj Library). Professor Gopikamohan Bhattacharya – the author of this volume – informs me that all his attempts at finding the manuscript at Darbhanga were unsuccessful. I assume, therefore, that it has disappeared, somehow or other.

Yajñapati had a considerable impact on the evolution of Navya-nyāya, both in Mithilā and in Bengal – as Professor Bhattacharya shows in his Introduction (pp. 13–14; 17). The late Professor Erich Frauwallner – with whom Professor Bhattacharya worked during the years 1963–1965, as he recalls in his Foreword (p. 7) – was the first scholar in our time to draw attention to the importance of the pre-Raghunātha commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, and, first of all, that by Yajñapati. He also published parts of these commentaries and showed how they help us to better understand Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti*, which succeeded in eclipsing all the earlier commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (see reference in this edition, p. 17, n. 11. – Note that the commentaries by Yajñapati and others were still read by such

commentators on the *Dīdhiti* as Jagadīśa and Gadādhara). But complete editions have long been awaited. The present edition is the first one of the kind, and, naturally, Professor Bhattacharya — a well-known authority on Navya-nyāya — chose for publication the earliest among the commentaries known up to now. He is to be thanked for this work, as well as Professor Gerhard Oberhammer of Vienna, who played a decisive role in the matter (see p. 7) and to whom the book is dedicated. It is hoped that this publication will soon be followed by that of other pre-Raghunātha commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Unfortunately, because of the mysterious disappearance of the manuscript, of which mention has been made above, Professor Bhattacharya was constrained to base his edition upon two transcripts (see p. 18) — one of which, up to folio 85 among 125, was also used by the late Professor Frauwallner and is preserved at the Institut für Indologie, Vienna University. And both of them — especially the one just mentioned — have turned out to be bad. In 1975, thanks to the assistance of Professor Anantalal Thakur, then Director of the K. P. Jayaswal Institute, Patna, I was able to get the manuscript photographed at Darbhanga, and I have also at my disposal a xerox copy of the transcript preserved at Vienna. Now a comparison between the photograph and the transcript reveals that the latter was done by a local person not quite familiar with the subject, and who, moreover, had some difficulty in deciphering the Maithilī script, no longer in use.

Professor Bhattacharya has done a wonderful job in correcting the text as he had it and in filling up a number of lacunae (some folios are missing in the manuscript, and, in one place at least, it has not been possible to fill up the gap: see p. 103) with the help of the unpublished commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, to which he has access — those by Jayadeva, Rucidatta, Pragalbha, Vāsudeva, and Narahari (Yajñapati's own son), especially the last three, who extensively quote from Yajñapati's work (see p. 18). But, in the majority of the cases, it turns out that the errors and lacunae belong to the transcripts, not to the original manuscript. Furthermore, Professor Bhattacharya's work passed through several hands (see p. 7).

In these circumstances, it does not seem that this important text can be fully used unless it is thoroughly corrected. A complete list of the corrections which I have been able to make on the basis of the photograph at my disposal

will be published in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie*. Some of them are given here:

P. 53, line 3 from bottom. Read *yo yadā vastugatyā*, instead of *yadā ananyagatyā*.

P. 54, line 10. Read *sādhya virodhi . . .*, instead of *sā virodhi . . .*

P. 54, line 12. Read *pakṣatākāle*, instead of *pakṣadharmatākāle*.

P. 55, lines 9 and 12. Read *avyāptir* and *avyāpter*, instead of *ativyāptir* and *ativyāpter*.

P. 55, lines 10 and 14. Read *anumānapramāṇa . . .*, instead of *anumānapramā . . .*

P. 55, line 13. Read *tasyā api*, instead of *tasyāpi*.

P. 55, lines 13–14. Read *viśeṣalakṣaṇasaṃgrāhyatva . . .*, instead of *viśeṣalakṣaṇagrāhyatva . . .*

P. 55, lines 14–15. Read *bhramānumiti . . .*, instead of *pramānumiti . . .*

P. 57, lines 9 and 8 from bottom. Read *maṇikaṇṭha . . .* and *maṇikaṇṭhena*, instead of *maṇikṛn . . .* and *maṇikāreṇa*; and, in n. 29, replace the reference to the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* by *Nyāyaratna*, p. 110.

The same error occurs on p. 126, line 7 from bottom, where instead of *maṇikāramatam* should be read *maṇikaṇṭhānusārimatam* (cf. *Dyutimālikā*, p. 138). (On p. 147, corresponding to fol. 89, however, the name of *Maṇikaṇṭha* has been reproduced correctly. The Index, p. 188, has to be corrected accordingly, as well as the statement on p. 16.)

P. 60, line 3. Read *yad vā vyāpti . . .*, instead of *yadvyāpti . . .*

P. 60, line 4. Read *evāstv iti*, instead of *eva*.

P. 60, line 19. Read *ghaṭaḥ kalaśa*, instead of *vyāpṭeḥ karaṇam*.

P. 60, line 21. Read *etad eva pramāṇa*, instead of *etad apramāṇa*.

The entire text, p. 60, line 6 from bottom up to p. 61, line 13, has to be corrected. Note, among others, p. 60, line 5 from bottom: . . . *prathamasaṅketagrahamūlakasya*, instead of . . . *prathamasaḍdhetumūlakasya*; line 2 from bottom: *apramāṇe ti*, instead of *anumāṇe ti*; p. 61, line 4: *apramāṇasādharmyaṃ*, instead of *anumāṇasādharmyaṃ*; line 13: *anumāṇaprāmāṇya . . .*, instead of *anumānaprāmāṇya . . .*

P. 68, line 12. Read *apy anukūlaṃ*, instead of *ity anugataṃ*.

P. 68, line 3 from bottom. Read *pakṣatā . . .*, instead of *pakṣadharmatā . . .*

P. 73, line 2. Read . . . *dharmāvacchinnatvena*, instead of . . . *dharmāvacchedakatvena*.

P. 73, line 4. Delete the period and read in the same line what follows as the beginning of a new paragraph.

P. 73, line 6. Read *tajjñānādhīnajñānaṃ (bahuvrīhi)* instead of *tajjñānādhīnaṃ jñānaṃ*, and *pratiyogyaśamānādhikaraṇatvarūpaṃ* instead of *pratiyogyaśamānādhikaraṇarūpaṃ*.

P. 73, line 10. Read *vyāpyavyāpake ti*, instead of *vyāpyavyāpakaś ceti*.

P. 73, line 12. Read *vahnisāmānādhikaraṇavyāpakaś ceti* instead of *vahnisāmānādhikaraṇavyāpakaś ceti*, and *sambandhasya* instead of *sambaddhasya*.

P. 73, line 15. Read *vivakṣitam*, instead of *paryavasitam*.

P. 74, line 15. Read *sarvasyaiva*, instead of *dharmasyaiva*.

P. 74, line 20. Read *tatpratiyogikātyantābhāvatvam*, instead of *tatpratiyogikātyantābhāvavattvam*.

P. 74, line 10 from bottom. Read *kiṃcidghaṭopalambhakatvam*, instead of *kiṃcidghaṭopalambhakam*; delete the comma after *eva*, and insert a comma after *tathā*.

P. 74, line 6 from bottom. Read *yāvadarthānanvaya . . .*, instead of *yāvadarthaviparyaya . . .*

P. 75, line 2. Read *tadadhikaraṇānādhikaraṇatvam*, instead of *tadadhikaraṇatvam*.

P. 75, lines 5 and 7. Read *dhūmavyāpakārdrendhana . . .*, instead of *dhūmavyāpakendhana . . .*

P. 78, line 4. Read *bhūyaḥsu sthāneṣv iti darśanam iti śeṣaḥ*, instead of *bhūyassthāne kṣitidarśanam iti doṣaḥ* (see *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Bibliotheca Indica edition, Vol. II, p. 176).

P. 78, line 18. Insert *syāt* after *eva*, and delete *tu* after *na*. Read *pūrvoktenātra*, instead of *pūrvam uktam, tenātra*.

P. 78, line 8 from bottom. Read *tadgrahaś ca*, instead of *tadgrahasya*.

P. 78, line 3 from bottom. Read *tasyaivavyabhicāra . . .*, instead of *tasyaiva vyabhicāra . . .*

P. 86, line 14 from bottom. Read *vyāptigrahe*, instead of *vyāptisandehe*. (Lines 13–12 from bottom: read *dhūmatvāvaccinnā ca vyāptiḥ*.)

P. 90, line 1. Read *prakṛtam*, instead of *pratyakṣam*.

P. 90, line 9. Read *tatrāvyāptiḥ*, instead of *tatrāvivāptiḥ*. (On page 76, line 8 from bottom, read *anatiprasaktam*, instead of *atiprasaktaam . . .*)

P. 90, lines 17–18. Read . . . tatsādhakaliṅgasāadhanadvārā, instead of tatsādhyakaliṅgaṃ sāadhanadvārā.

P. 91, line 4. Read parihṛtā, instead of pariskṛtā (cf. p. 89, line 9: parihṛtya — as in *Prag.*, n. 356 — not parikṛtya).

P. 91, line 12. Read dvyanuke, instead of 'muke.

P. 94, line 6. Read viśeṣyavyabhicāraḥ, instead of viśeṣyavṛttivyabhicāraḥ.

P. 94, line 8. Read tādrśam api, instead of tādrśo 'pi.

P. 94, lines 11–12. Read dravyatvāvācchinnabahirindriyapratyakṣatvavyāpakasya, instead of . . . dravyatvāvācchinna pratyakṣatvasya.

P. 94, line 12 from bottom. Read . . . atyantābhāvāpratīyogitvaṃ, instead of atyantābhāvāpratīyogitvaṃ.

P. 94, line 7 from bottom. Insert pakṣe hetvasiddhiś ca after sādhyavaikalyaṃ.

P. 95, line 1. Read bahirindriyapratyakṣatvavyāpakavyabhicāritvaṃ, instead of . . . pratyakṣatvavyāpako.

P. 95, line 13 from bottom. Read abhisandhāyeśvaravāde, instead of abhisandhāya.

P. 95, line 12 from bottom. Read viśiṃṣa d, instead of viśiṣa d (note the interesting variant).

P. 95, line 7–6 from bottom. Read tadaiva, instead of tad eva.

P. 100, line 12. Read . . . sāghanābhāvavadvṛtti-, instead of . . . sāghanābhāvavṛtti.

P. 100, line 13. Delete the period after mānam, and read ity abhiprāyeṇa, instead of atrābhiprāyeṇa.

P. 100, line 17. Read pakṣāvyāvartaka . . . and pakṣavyāpaka . . ., instead of pakṣavyāvartaka . . . and pakṣavyāpaka . . . (On the variant reading pakṣavyāvartakaviparyaya see Mathurānātha's note in *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Bibliotheca Indica edition, p. 401.)

P. 100, line 7 from bottom. Read tatkarāṇasya, instead of tatkāraṇasya. (Line 8 from bottom: read prakṛtipadena siddheḥ, instead of prakṛtipadenāsiddheḥ.)

P. 100, lines 5–4 from bottom. Read tadubhayānyānyatvenābhipretam, instead of tadubhayānyānyatvam evābhipretam.

P. 100, line 1 from bottom. Read sādhakamāne, instead of sāghanamāne.

P. 101, line 6. Read tattayā ca tasyās, instead of tat tu tadā ca tasyās.

P. 101, line 9. Read atra siddhimātraparam, instead of atrāsiddhiparam.

P. 101, line 15. Read . . . siddhimātreccchāyām, instead of . . . siddhibhāvecchāyām.

P. 101, line 16. Read saty api līṅaparāmarṣe pakṣatāviraḥāt, instead of . . . līṅaparāmarṣapakṣatāviraḥāt.

P. 101, lines 9–8 from bottom. Read pakṣatāpādikāyās, instead of pakṣatāpakṣikāyās.

P. 104, line 1. Read . . . niyamopapattau, instead of viṣamopapattau.

P. 104, line 6. Read parāmarṣājanakatvān, instead of paramarṣajanakatvān.

P. 104, line 11. Read tadubhayānyataradinavṛttitayā, instead of tadubhayānyonyāni.

P. 104, line 12. Read niścītād ity, instead of niścītānīty (cf. *TC.*, p. 1302, 2–3).

P. 104, line 14. Read . . . dhvaṃsena, instead of . . . dhvaṃsane.

P. 104, line 16. Read hetutve viṣeṣaṇavaiyarthiād, instead of hetutvaviṣeṣaṇavaiyarthiād.

P. 104, line 5 from bottom. Read vartamānatvasandehād, instead of vartamanatvāt sandehād.

P. 107, line 3 from bottom. Read ananugatas, instead of avagatas. (Lines 6–5 from bottom: the manuscript has tādātmyarūpa: no lacuna.)

P. 128, line 2 from bottom. Read ekatatpadopādānād, instead of ekayatpadopādānād.

P. 129, line 4. Read sādhyavikalatvaṃ, instead of sadhyādhikaraṇatvaṃ.

P. 129, line 5. Delete draṣṭavyaṃ (crossed in the manuscript).

P. 129, line 6. Read hetutvaṃ, instead of hetvarthaḥ.

P. 129, line 8. Read vaiyarthyprasaṅgāc instead of vaiyarthiāt, and tad- instead of yad-.

P. 129, line 11. Read tajjñānālābhe, instead of tajjñānalābhe.

P. 129, line 2 from bottom. Read atrevābhidheyāparyavasānād, instead of atrābhidheyāparyavasānād.

P. 131, line 2. Read svārthamityutpāda-, instead of svārtham ity utpāda-.

P. 135, line 8 from bottom. Read lakṣaṇe, instead of lakṣye.

P. 137, line 2 from bottom. Read . . . dharmiparasya, instead of . . . dharmaparasya.

P. 137, line 1 from bottom. Read cāsiddhādisaṃkīrṇe yady api nāvyaṃptiḥ (there is no lacuna in the manuscript).

P. 138, line 3. Read saddhetvasādhāraṇasthale (no lacuna in the manuscript).

P. 138, line 5. Read *tatra*, instead of *yatra*.

P. 140, line 3. Read *uktānupasaṃhārivat*, instead of *uktānupasaṃgrahāvirataḥ*.

P. 140, line 15. Read *śeṣaḥ*, instead of *viśeṣaḥ*. (Line 13: read *saddhetor*, instead of *saddhetāv*. Conversely p. 138, line 1: *saddhetāv*, not *saddhetor*.)

Pp. 154–155. There is a great deal of confusion on these two pages; they cannot be read until the text is restored in the *Wiener Zeitschrift* (see above).

P. 157. 29.1 should start with *pakṣaṇiṣṭha* . . ., placed at the end of the last paragraph of 28. Note that *pakṣaṇiṣṭapramāviśayatvaprakārābhāva-pratiyogisādhyakatvam* = *TC.*, p. 1869, 7–8 (in place of *Ms.* -*viśaya*-, -*viśayatva*-, of course, should be read). A similar confusion occurs on p. 153, where the beginning of 28.3 should be read as the end of 28.2.

C.N.R.S.

KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARTICLES

AMES, WILLIAM L. / Buddhapālita's Exposition of the Madhyamaka	313
BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA, GADĀDHARA / Viśayatāvāda (<i>edited and translated by Sibajiban Bhattacharyya</i>)	217
FRANCO, ELI / Once Again on Dharmakīrti's Deviation from <i>Dignāga</i> on <i>Pratyakṣābhāsa</i>	79
GETHIN, RUPERT / The Five Khandhas: Their Treatment in the Nikāyas and Early Abhidhamma	35
GOLDMAN, ROBERT P. / The Serpent and the Rope on Stage: Popular, Literary, and Philosophical Representations of Reality in Traditional India	349
GRANOFF, PHYLLIS / The Miracle of a Hagiography Without Miracles: Some Comments on the Jain Lives of the Pratyekabuddha Karakaṇḍa	389
PARROT, RODNEY J. / The Problem of The Sāṃkhya Tattvas as both Cosmic and Psychological Phenomena	55
RASTOGI, NAVJIVAN / Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta	1
SAWAI, YOSHITSUGU / Śaṅkara's Theory of Saṃnyāsa	371
SJOMAN, N. E. / The Memory Eye: An Examination of Memory in Traditional Knowledge Systems	195

BOOK REVIEWS

Gopikamohan Bhattacharya (ed.), <i>Yajñapati Upādhyāya's Tattvacintāmaniprabhā (Anumānakhaṇḍah)</i> (KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA)	405
---	-----

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Steven Collins, <i>Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism</i> (PRABAL SEN)	99
The Rāmāyana of Vālmiki, <i>An Epic of Ancient India</i> , Volume I, Bālakāṇḍa (J. L. BROCKINGTON)	303
John Vattanky, <i>Gaṅgeśa's Philosophy of God</i> (KARL H. POTTER)	309
ANNOUNCEMENTS	107, 215



99
03
09
5

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